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Chapter 1: Introduction, Methodology & Conceptual Framework 
1.1 Introduction 
Interventions aimed at creating an environment in which businesses can 
flourish are a central element of public policies (supranational, national, regional 
and sub-regional/local) concerned with promoting enterprise and entrepreneurship, 
supporting indigenous industry and fostering regional economic competitiveness. 
Customarily policies concerned with improving the business environment have 
been of two types; those concerned with the improvement of the interactions of 
government with enterprises in terns of regulations, administrative procedures and iý 
taxation, and those concerned with the direct provision of various forms of 
business support such as business incubation. 
This research explores the rationale for the provision of business support, 
specifically business incubation as practised by European Business Innovation 
Centres, and investigates the degree and extent to which their activities impacts the 
performance of assisted businesses. 
1.2 Research Aims & Objectives 
This research has been conducted in accordance with the scope of an ESRC 
collaborative studentship Award (2001) sponsored by the North East Business & 
Innovation Centre Limited (`NEBIC'). 
The research investigates the development of business incubation and the 
policy rationale for the modality, specifically the role and importance of SMEs and 
includes an investigation of business incubation as developed and practised by the 
European Business Innovation Centre `NEBIC' and its impact on incubated 
businesses. In addition, this research has explored and investigated: 
1. The contribution of SMEs in regional economic performance in `less- 
favoured' regions of Europe; 
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2. The development of business incubators (including the role of 
stakeholders), incubator models (i. e. the impact of information and 
communications technology, and the development of 'new technology', 
`third generation', or `dot. com incubators') and their deployment in 'less- 
favoured regions of Europe; 
3. The added value of Business Incubators to the local and regional economy, 
explored with reference to the nature, focus and level of their activities and 
the services they provide. In particular, this was explored in the 
preparation of five case studies which compared the nature of operations of 
incubators accredited to the European Business and Innovation Centre 
Network (EBN) standard; and 
4. The impact of business incubators on the growth and development of 
innovative SMEs, specifically North East Business and Innovation Centre 
(NEBIC) in Sunderland (UK) and the performance of incubated firms 
relative to other firms located outwith NEBIC by comparing 
characteristics, performance and their behaviour vis-a-vis innovation. 
This research has sought to explore the nature of activities of business 
incubators and the way in which they add value to their local and regional 
economies. It endeavours to determine, notwithstanding inherent difficulties in 
attribution (i. e. determining cause and effect) whether incubators, specifically 
NEBIC, impacts the performance of incubated firms. 
1.3 Chapter Layout 
Chapter 1 explains the methodology adopted for this research and explores 
and develops a conceptual framework for this study informed by a literature 
review and empirical research. 
Chapter 2 considers the context for business incubation and investigates the 
importance of SMEs, their place in economic development policies and their 
contribution to economic performance. The chapter offers a brief review of those 
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facets of SME policy that have achieved or are accorded prominence around the 
globe before exploring the historical contribution of SMEs and their part in the 
economic structure with reference to the demographics of economic activity, their 
contribution to economic growth, innovation, and employment in Europe, 
particularly in 'less-favoured' regions of Europe (which are defined in this 
research as those countries with a GDP less than the EU average explain this the 
first time you refer to it? ). The chapter also provides an overview of scholarship 
vis-ä-vis investigations into the contribution of SMEs to innovation with reference 
to results obtained in this research (derived from a sample of 300 selected firms in 
the North East based within and outwith the North East Business & Innovation 
Centre) before concluding with an examination of the SME contribution to GVA 
and in less favoured regions of Europe. 
Following the review of the contribution of SMEs in less-favoured regions 
of Europe and their place in the economic structure, Chapter 3 proceeds to provide 
an overview of some of the chief instruments of industrial policy deployed to 
support indigenous SMEs and specifically the development and deployment of 
business incubation therein; and the place or role of policy makers, business 
support agencies, etc therein with reference to the nature of their stake-holding. In 
addition, Chapter 3 explores the impact of information communication 
technologies OCT) and e-commerce on the growth and development of the 
business incubators model i. e. `new economy incubators'. 
Chapter 4 offers an overview of business incubation as developed and 
practised by EU Business and Innovation Centres (BICs). "Some 150[+] Business 
and Innovation Centres (BICs) successfully operate organisational models of 
comprehensive systems of business support services for the launch and 
development of innovative enterprises. Based on a public/private and 
local/regional partnership, BICs act in their areas as an interface between the needs 
of enterprises and the offer of specialised services. They also contribute to the 
internationalisation of firms (marketing, interregional co-operation). The spreading 
of BICs in all assisted areas and their more intensive use in implementing regional 
programmes would help further disseminate good practice in business creation and 
development. BICs are linked by co-operation agreements to other Community 
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networks, such as the Innovation Relay Centres, the Euro Info Centres or the 
LEADER/LAG. "'. Chapter 4 compares and contrasts the activities of 5 UK BICs 
in an endeavour to develop an understanding of the nature and level of their 
operations, services, etc, and an insight into industry best practice. 
Chapter 5 explores and examines the contribution of business incubators to 
local and regional economies and the way in which they seek to add value with 
reference to their modus operandi, their aims and objectives and the nature and 
level of services they provide before concluding with the development of a model 
of 'value-added' business support functions developed in consultation with North 
East Business and Innovation Centre staff and tenant firms and from observation 
of incubator operations e. g. at NEBIC, (Sunderland), Entrust (Newcastle), 
ATMEL/Cenamps (Newcastle), The Digital Factory (Newton Aycliffe), 
Loughborough Innovation Centre, DeMontfort Innovation Centre, UNIEI 
(Nottingham), BioCity (Nottingham), The Hive (Nottingham), Mansfield I-Centre, 
Midlands Innovation Relay Centre (Coventry), St Johns Innovation Centre 
(Cambridge) between 2001 and 2005. 
Chapter 6 picks up the theme of `added value' as delivered by business 
incubation and examines the impact of business incubators and specifically, that of 
NEBIC, on the growth and development of innovative SMEs located therein. 
Finally, Chapter 7 presents an overview of key findings from the literature 
review and empirical research and notes their implications. 
1.4 Methodology 
The methodology adopted for this programme of research was prescribed 
by the terms of an ESRC Case Studentship award, as agreed between the 
University of Newcastle, the North East Business and Innovation Centre (the 
industrial sponsor of this ESRC Case Award) and the Economic and Social 
Research Council. 
1 European Commission Guidelines for programmes in the period 2000-06, 
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This investigation has utilised qualitative and quantitative approaches and 
techniques. In 2001, a comprehensive review of the literature concerned with 
theories of economic development and topics such as the SME sector, innovative 
SMEs, business incubation in the UK, Europe and the USA was conducted. The 
review, which included consideration of relevant public policy and initiatives and 
secondary data analysis, informed the development of a framework for the 
empirical research and, in particular, the definition of specific research questions to 
explore a number of hypotheses - principally that: 
(a) public support for SMEs -ä la business incubation - is justified given the 
contribution of SMEs to regional economic development and growth 
(particularly as regards their share of employment, capacity for innovation, 
job creation and importance to regional economic competitiveness and 
regeneration); 
(b) business incubators, specifically European Business Innovation Centres 
(BICs), enhance the performance of the firms they support or thereby 
contributing to the economic development of the region they serve which 
justifies the degree and extent to which they have been adopted and 
deployed as an instrument of economic development policy; 
(c) innovative SMEs and/or SMEs supported to be innovative generate 
increased economic effects than non-innovative/non-supported businesses; 
and 
(d) The nature and level of services provided by business incubators, 
specifically BICs, warrants public confidence and support (public 
investment) given their impact. 
Subsequently in 2002, the operation, activities and evolution of the North 
East Business & Innovation Centre Limited (NEBIC) were subjected to a close 
examination to better understand the nature and level of services provided and 
their impact, particularly on the performance of the firms supported therein. 
Qualitative and Quantitative techniques were used; participant observation, 
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unstructured and semi-structured interviews were conducted with NEBIC's 
business advisors, experts and stakeholders. Publications and research held at 
NEBIC were also consulted and an appreciation and understanding of NEBIC's, 
aims, objectives, functions and services was enhanced by attendance and 
observation at seminars and workshops organised by NEBIC and the European 
Business Incubator Network (EBN) and by interviewing NEBIC, EBN and other 
incubator personnel. 
This work informed the development of case studies to facilitate 
comparisons between the activities of NEBIC and four other EBN accredited 
business incubators (BICs), presented in Chapter 5, providing an overview of their 
operations, identifying commonalities, good practice and noting how each has 
interpreted and extended the EU BIC model with reference to regional market 
conditions, regional economic priorities, the existence of complementary business 
services. Of the BICs selected for study, NEBIC was prescribed for study under 
the terms of the ESRC Case Studentship; Coventry BIC was selected as an 
example of a university operated BIC and St John's Innovation Centre because of 
the economic prosperity of the region (which is in stark contrast to that of the 
North East of England). Kent BIC was chosen for study as it operates from 
multiple locations; and Hertfordshire BIC because at the time of writing it was the 
newest addition to the stock of BIC incubators. 
Also selected for study was London (Lee Valley) BIC given the novelty of 
the business model (taking equity in assisted businesses in exchange for the 
incubator's assistance), however the BIC went into administration before any 
study could be undertaken. Pronovus (Nottingham BIC) and BIC SwedenWest 
were also selected for study as examples of BICs operating a `virtual incubator' 
model (providing no accommodation for assisted businesses). Unfortunately, both 
BICs closed - seemingly for lack of patronage (political and/or financial) - before 
detailed study could be undertaken. 
This work was conducted as part of a systematic attempt to investigate the 
performance of firms located at a BIC, specifically NEBIC, compared with the 
performance of firms located outwith the BIC environment with the aim of 
6 
identifying if and how the incubator is impacting the performance of businesses 
located therein. In 2003,205 SMEs were interviewed from a sample of 300 that 
was created from (i) the stock of businesses located at NEBIC, (ii) other North 
East incubator facilities and (iii) businesses located in the North East (outwith both 
NEBIC and other incubator facilities) and selected at random from existing 
CURDS and NEBIC databases of regional businesses. 
While every effort was made to select firms comparable to those located at 
NEBIC as part of the sample to provide a proper base of comparison it proved 
impracticable to identify and select for each NEBIC located business a firm of a 
comparable size (as measured with reference to number of employees and/or 
turnover), age, sector, customer base, supply chain, applications of technology, 
skill level of management and staff, etc. Notwithstanding the inherent difficulties 
in constructing the sample, the selection of firms outwith NEBIC and other 
incubators as part of the sample was however refined so that only firms located in 
Tyne & Wear were selected for comparison in the hope that they would be 
operating in otherwise similar trading conditions, with access to broadly similar 
factor inputs (e. g. skill level of indigenous population employed in the businesses), 
comparable access to the same local business support services, proximity to other 
factor inputs, etc as the incubated businesses studied. In this way, businesses 
operating at the periphery of the region i. e. in rural areas were omitted on the 
grounds that the nature, size, factor inputs, etc of these businesses was unlikely to 
be as comparable with the NEBIC firms as other firms operating in closer 
proximity to the NEBIC firms (i. e. within one of the largest conurbations in the 
region (Tyne and Wear)). 
The researcher contacted each of the firms selected to explain the nature of 
the research, obtain their agreement to participate in this research and identify the 
proper person to survey and/or interview (i. e. most able to respond to the 
questions). The questionnaire was piloted with 10 firms selected at random from 
public databases and was subsequently revised to include questions to capture 
other business characteristics and test a range of hypotheses related to key 
propositions - namely that incubated firms will outperform their non-incubated 
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counterparts (e. g. by more innovatory) and demonstrate a range of characteristics 
and more 'advanced' or `sophisticated' behaviours that enable such performance. 
Despite assurances as regards confidentiality and anonymity, respondents 
were found to be reluctant to participate in taped interviews. Midway through the 
piloting of the questionnaire the taping of interviews was abandoned with 
responses written up during the interview (which was then conducted in person or 
by telephone according to the respondent's preferences). The interview questions 
were also laid out in the form of a postal survey for respondents who were 
prepared to participate in the research but were unwilling to be interviewed by 
telephone or in person. 
The survey and interview questions - which featured open and closed 
questions - were designed to capture information on the characteristics of 
respondent firms and their performance. These questions were modified and 
refined following the pilot activity so as also to collect data on the characteristics 
of the businesses founders. 
The sample and data set was assembled from the information gathered 
from the postal survey and interviews conducted by telephone and/or in person at 
the respondent's business premises. The sample (respondent profile) comprised 66 
firms located at the North East Business & Innovation Centre in Sunderland and 
143 firms located outwith the Centre but within the Tyne and Wear (of which 17 
were resident in other incubators in the locality). The quantitative data was 
analysed (using SPSS). Material for case studies illustrating the varied nature of 
businesses located at NEBIC, founder characteristics, size (number of employees 
and/or turnover), customer profiles, importance the business accords innovation 
and presenting the views respondents expressed as to the value of incubator 
services was also collected and is presented in Appendix 2. 
While the interviews with NEBIC personnel, incubator stakeholders and 
incubated firms were conducted in a manner that invited full and frank disclosures 
it must be acknowledged that, as in all research, the responses received by 
respondents may be coloured by the respondents own interests and/or concerns as 
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to what use their responses may be put (e. g. it is to be expected that incubator 
personnel might be reluctant to disclose information or provide responses that 
reflect badly on the incubator or indeed the form of support that is business 
incubation given that it is their livelihood). Similarly, an SME respondent 
operating within an incubator (i. e. NEBIC) might be reluctant to articulate 
criticisms or doubts as to the effectiveness of services or the degree and extent to 
which they impact their business as it might jeopardise their position in the facility 
and/or undermine their relationship with incubator personnel. 
Furthermore, it should also be acknowledged that it could be argued that 
many incubator personnel and incubated firms are conditioned to report positively 
on incubator operations not necessarily by the incubator's management but rather 
as an inevitable consequence of the many other studies or evaluations to which 
they are subject (many of which are part and parcel of the public funding the 
incubators receive). It is generally understood that a favourable evaluation report 
enables the provision of subsidised services and accommodation i. e. is 
instrumental in maintaining political and financial support for the incubator. 
Again, it is neither in the interest of incubator personnel or incubated firms to `bite 
the hand that feeds them' by reporting negatively or commenting unfavourably on 
incubator operations in any evaluation or study that might undermine support 
(political or financial) for the business incubator modality and their incubator in 
particular. 
1.5 Conceptual Framework 
Business support measures such as business incubation are usually 
presented as a response to structural disadvantages particularly those suffered by 
small and medium-sized enterprises or when there are considerations relating to 
regional imbalances and market failures. A market failure can be defined, for 
example, as "the inability of a system of private markets to provide certain goods 
either at all or at the most desirable or `optimal' level" (Pearce, 1996). As regards 
the provision of business support, specifically business incubation services, it is 
maintained that: 
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  policies and measures are required to enable small businesses to compete 
on an equal footing with larger organisations and to boost regional 
competitiveness and support economic regeneration); 
 A market failure exists insofar as private companies cannot or will not 
provide business support services because they cannot make a commercial 
return even where there is demand or need for a service. As explored in 
Chapters 3-5, the reliance on public sector funding for business incubator 
operating costs and the scarcity of private sector incubators does seem to 
evidence this proposition; and 
  The provision of incubator services will support the recipient businesses to 
develop, leading to the generation of new wealth and/or employment. The 
rationale for business support, particularly SME support is investigated in 
Chapter 2. An evidential basis for the proposition that a business support 
service, specifically business incubation, is responsible for economic and 
social effects is investigated in Chapters 3-6. 
Notwithstanding the fact that the policy conviction for the provision of 
business support services is `debatable'; for example, Bannock (2005) reviews the 
case for SME policies and takes a sceptical view of the need for governments to 
provide or fund information, advice or consultancy for SMEs (see also Parker, 
(2000), Dannreuther, (1999); Castel-Branco, (2003) and Curran (2000) and Gibb 
(2000) who express reservations about the value of SME support as a whole); 
business support services have been and are a significant article of public policy. 
Traditionally, measures have included a range of financial instruments that have 
included direct grants, subsidised loans, loan guarantees and increasingly 
initiatives to make venture capital more readily available. However, there has also 
long been support in the form of specialised types of training and in the direct 
provision of services offering information, advice and various kinds of practical 
assistance (including business incubation). 
According to Peck (2001, p. 445) public policy at the macro level is 
`dominated by various strands of neoliberal conviction politics, which assert that 
10 
the fiercely competitive economic environment abroad, coupled with deep-seated 
social problems at home, leave `no alternative' to a course of deregulation, 
marketization, privatization, and public asset-stripping'. According to Peck this 
`policy medicine ... never mind what it says on the bottle... is pretty much the 
same: purge the system of obstacles to the functioning of `free markets'; restrain 
public expenditure and any form of collective initiative; celebrate the virtues of 
individualism, competitiveness, and economic self-sufficiency; abolish or weaken 
social transfer programs while actively fostering the `inclusion' of the poor and 
marginalized into the labor market, on the market's terms'. While much of the 
literature analysing economic policy of the last 20 years is laced with thinly veiled 
invective and vitriol, Peet and Hartwick (1999, p. 52) summarise the neoliberal 
policy prescription as follows: 
  Fiscal discipline: the effective capping of government budget deficits. 
  Public expenditure priorities: should focus on supply-side investments not 
on social amelioration or progressive redistribution. 
  Tax reform: rates should be held down and incentives sharpened. 
  Financial liberalization: interest rates and capital flows should be market 
determined. 
  Exchange rates: rates should be sufficiently competitive to induce rapid 
growth in non-traditional exports. 
  Trade liberalization: quantitative restrictions on imports should be 
removed. 
  Foreign direct investment: barriers to the entry of foreign firms should be 
abolished. 
  Privatization: state enterprises should be returned to private ownership. 
  Deregulation: governments should abolish regulations restricting 
competition. 
  Property rights: legal systems should ensure property rights without 
excessive costs 
Crucially, according to Peck, these neoliberal prescriptions are often elided 
with, or relabelled as, 'imperatives of globalization'. As such, they are more likely 
to be perceived as economically derived rather than politically 
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constructed/mediated pressures. For Beck (2000, p. 122) neoliberalism is a form of 
'high politics' which presents itself as completely non-political. 
As is evident from the above 'business incubation' is not specified as part 
of the neoliberal prescription nor is there a stipulation concerned specifically with 
SMEs. Indeed, of the literature reviewed in the course of this research concerned 
with macroeconomic policy both receive scant attention (perhaps because they are 
held in scant regard) at the macro or national policy level or perhaps in recognition 
that the practice of business incubation and measures concerned to support SME 
development are more a product of economic development and regeneration 
strategies and plans formulated at the regional level as an instrument to reengineer 
the dynamics of regional economic growth. 
As regards understanding the dynamics of regional economic growth, most 
early theories of regional economic growth might be described as a product of 
neoclassical trade theory and growth theory which assumes that over time, 
differences in the price of labour and other factors across regions diminish and 
tend towards convergence. The theory, as noted by Dawkins (2003), has never sat 
particularly well with regional policy makers given the trend toward international 
divergence between the per capita incomes of industrialised nations and less 
developed nations (observed throughout the world since the end of World War II). 
While the empirical studies of Perloff et al 1960; Williamson 1965 were 
able to demonstrate economic convergence at the regional scale, Barro and Sala-i- 
Martin (1999) later postulated that that interregional convergence is more likely 
than international convergence because factors of production are more highly 
mobile across regions than between nations. More recently, neoclassical 
exogenous growth and trade theories have been supplemented by new endogenous 
growth theories that include departures from the received wisdom i. e. that 
convergence is the inevitable outcome of regional growth and that divergence is 
equally possible. Other variants to the endogenous growth theories acknowledge 
the importance of, and admit as endogenous to the model, such factors as 
technological change and innovation (Schumpeter, 1947), knowledge and 
12 
knowledge spill-overs (Romer, 1986), human capital (Lucas, 1988) and investment 
in public infrastructure (Barro, 1990). 
Moreover, the new empirical, economic and political realities that emerged 
in the late 1970s and early 1980s; namely the decline of manufacturing and the 
emergence of the service sector in the industrialized world, the increasing 
international mobility of capital and labour flows, and the growing interregional 
disparities in labour conditions across gender and ethnic lines posed an 
unprecedented challenge for policy makers (national, regional and local) as they 
endeavoured to manage an inevitable and complex adjustment of the national and 
regional economic structure. At a time when the convergence foreseen by 
neoclassical trade and growth theorists looked less than compelling various 
adjustments and proposed modifications to neoclassical theory have fired the 
imagination of policy makers in search of convergence (in less favoured regions) 
and increased divergence (in more favoured regions looking to maintain and 
extend their competitive advantage relative to other regions). 
The literature concerned with developing an understanding of the dynamics 
of regional economic growth - of which echoes can be found readily in 
contemporary regional economic policies and initiatives and the nature, focus and 
form of business support services, specifically incubator modalities (their function 
and the nature of services they provide) - is something of an ever-broadening 
church where concepts and notions can often be more compelling than empirical 
evidence, a subject this research returns to in Chapter 2,3,5, and 6. 
At the time of writing, regional innovation systems theory and theories of 
knowledge-based development are particularly influential at a conceptual level and 
in the way they have been diffused and adopted by national and regional policy 
makers. They represent an amalgam of territorial production and innovation 
models (agglomeration economies) i. e. new theories of economic geography that 
have evolved in the context of regeneration theories and growth machine theory 
which explore the socio-political context in which regional economic policy has 
evolved. Outlined below are some of the theories and concepts that resonate 
throughout contemporary regional economic development strategies and plans and 
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impact the instruments employed in their execution (particularly business 
incubators, as explored in Chapter 3-5) 
`Location' theorists (Weber (1929), Hoover (1937), Greenhut (1956), Isard 
(1956)) have suggested that firms locate near markets where the monetary weight 
or price of the final product exceeds the monetary weight or price of inputs 
required to produce that product and that firms weigh the total costs of production 
at particular locations when they select a location to operate from. Arguably the 
theory accords too much importance to transportation costs as a factor of 
production that now looks increasingly incongruous in service sector dominated 
economies increasingly integrated by the application of information and 
communication technologies. However, public investment in infrastructure, 
particularly business accommodation charged at subsidised rates (business 
incubators) coupled with other (free or subsidised) business support services (to 
reduce the costs of factor inputs) is a device that is employed the world over to 
encourage businesses to locate and/or remain within regions (public (financial) 
support for inward investors is but another). 
`Export Base' theories (Tiebout (1956a, 1956b) and North (1955,1956)) 
have postulated that regional growth in local political, economic and social 
institutions is largely determined by the regions response to exogenous world. 
demand and that it is this response that produces growth. Even a cursory review of 
the policy literature e. g. regional economic strategies and initiatives concerned 
with the provision of business support services (and business incubators - there 
public functions and activities) reveals a concern to support and enable indigenous 
industry to exploit opportunities in extra-regional markets (national and 
international). 
`Growth Pole' and `Cumulative Causation' theories have also left their 
mark in regional economic development strategies and plans. As regards the 
former, Perroux (1950) emphasises the importance of `growth poles', a spatial 
context for Myrdal's theory of cumulative causation (1957) upon which Kaldor 
(1970) and Dixon and Thirlwall (1975) have expanded and which postulates that 
increasing returns to scale produces clustering of economic activity within those 
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regions that are first to industrialise. Dawkins (2003, p. 140) suggests however that 
the notion of growth poles had been `abandoned in the 1980's due to growing 
dissatisfaction with the perceived lack of coherence between traditional notions of 
growth poles and empirical reality'. While this may have been true in academic 
circles, the notion of growth poles nevertheless persisted in regional economic 
policies and strategies. Investment continued in the creation and expansion of 
business incubators in and around 'growth poles' to boost regional economic 
dynamics in these economic cores continued throughout the 1990s. 
The work of Piore and Sabel (1984), proponents of `Flexible Specialisation 
and Network Theory', also merits attention when considered with reference to the 
nature and function of business incubator operations, particularly BICs. Piore and 
Sabel highlighted the patterns of interrelationships between firms found in new 
industrial districts and in particular the way in which they draw on flexible labour 
and capital that can easily be tailored to the needs of changing markets and 
leverage knowledge and information from highly localized networks bound by 
trust rather than hierarchical authority relationships found in vertically integrated 
forms of organization. Again, it has been observed in the course of this 
investigation that this too is something that business incubators, including BICs, 
endeavour to foster within their locality. 
Theories concerned with economic geography i. e. agglomeration 
economies; clusters and industrial districts are also particularly noteworthy; they 
moved centre stage in the 1990s. While Marshall (1920) is generally credited with 
first highlighting and providing a detailed description of the sources of 
agglomeration economies in industrial districts with his tripartite classification of 
knowledge spill-overs, local non-traded inputs and a local skilled labour pool; 
economic geography received a substantial shot in the arm with the work of 
Krugman (1991), Porter (1990) and Scott (1988) who noted the role and 
importance of clustering and agglomeration and the associated scale economy and 
efficiencies of industrial clustering. 
As for the relationship between business incubation and economic 
geography, much of the public (regional) investment ploughed into business 
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incubators was linked throughout the 1990s to, or presented as, investment to 
underpin the development of industrial clusters (directly or indirectly). Then as 
now, incubators appear with a spatial and sector specific or technology focus to 
support the development of indigenous industry. Many of the first incubators 
(often established with a generalist outlook) have evolved a technology focus or 
specialisation for part if not all their activities (often as a means of attracting 
additional public investment to support the expansion of their activities). 
Incubator managers also appear to have become particularly adept at getting 
business incubation adopted as part of the `lingua franca' amongst regional policy 
makers aspiring to develop within regions new industrial clusters as part of their 
response to industrial restructuring and strategies and plans vis-ä-vis economic 
development and regeneration. 
`Industrial restructuring' theories also have a particular resonance when 
considering the rationale for business incubation and the rate at which they have 
been adopted as part of regional regeneration initiatives. Industrial restructuring 
theories explain that fundamental shifts in the organization of industry and labour 
have resulted in a "deskilling" of the labour force (Harrison 1985), a relative 
decline in the proportion of workers earning middle-income wages (Leigh 1994), 
and a spatial stratification of the workforce (Massey 1984). In the context of 
regional regeneration strategies there was an expectation that incubators would be 
instrumental in churning out new businesses in such concentrations as to develop 
new industries and employment opportunities, reskill the labour force, counter the 
decline of traditional `heavy' industries and support regional restructuring. As 
regards business incubation, incubators and BICs in particular have operated a raft 
of programmes (often supported with EU structural funds) to support the reskilling 
of the indigenous workforce displaced by new technologies and industrial 
restructuring. 
'Growth Machine Theory' is another seam in the literature that is relevant 
to out understanding of the context for public sector interventions, particularly 
with reference to the provision of business support services for indigenous industry 
and the way in which they are charged with correcting 'market failure's. Molotch 
(1976) argues that regional growth is a unifying imperative among local political 
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and economic elites. In this theory, the impetus to pursue a strategy of regional 
growth does not come from structural economic forces or from the equilibrating 
tendencies created by exports and trade. Instead, it comes from political coalitions 
of land-based elites who stand to benefit from local economic development 
(Wolman, 1996). Political economists such as Buchanan and Tullock (1962) and 
Frey (Mueller, 2001) have suggested that politicians, primarily concerned with 
their own welfare, are motivated to instigate and promote policies that will 
maximise their chance of remaining in office through re-election. Given as, noted 
by Storey (1994), that the number of small businesses and self-employed people 
has increased significantly since the end of the Second World War, a concern to 
provide support measures for the SME sector and thus those employed therein, 
should not perhaps be surprising given just how potentially significant this `block' 
represents in electoral terms. 
The notion, however, that `land-based' elites are instrumental is now 
somewhat erroneous insofar as it over-states their role in modern regional 
economic governance and in particular the development of strategy and plans and 
the instruments designed and implemented to execute them; reflecting changes in 
modern politics and society; specifically changes in the nature of governance, 
citizenship and social strata. A modem or rather contemporary perspective would 
acknowledge that the technocracies or bureaucracies (national, regional and local) 
that have and continue to evolve as part of the policy making and policy executing 
process as being more instrumental. 
Indeed there is a related but distinct strand in the literature, namely `the 
economic theory of bureaucracy' (e. g. Niskanen, 1994) which focuses its attention 
on government (including regional, local and quasi-government) officials, 
recognising that - like politicians - state bureaucrats may have vested interests that 
they seek to pursue through the power that they exercise as part of the policy 
making/executing process. It is observed in the literature that bureaucrats or rather 
technocrats2 who are generally not subject to re-election may, nevertheless, feel 
under threat - in terms of job prospects, salary, power or other possible variables - 
if decisions are made to discontinue or substantially change programmes with 
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which they are associated or responsible. Conversely, their careers are likely to 
benefit from being associated with high-profile and ostensibly successful 
initiatives. As noted in chapter 5 and 6, at the time of writing, there appears to be 
a long-standing bureaucratic consensus, shared confidence in and commitment to, 
the deployment of business incubators (rooted in the fact that they can be 
presented as `flagship' regeneration projects and, moreover, the perception, 
howsoever rarely validated, that they `work'). Moreover, the concern or self- 
interest of the incubator community itself in preserving patronage (political and/or 
financial) should not be dismissed. 
Possible consequences of a situation in which bureaucrats pursue `rent- 
seeking' behaviour in order to maximise their own welfare, as noted by (Johnson, 
2006) include the establishment of larger and more resource-intensive programmes 
than might strictly be necessary; over-bureaucratic management and control 
structures; reluctance to undertake robust evaluations (see chapter 5) and 
reluctance to curtail ineffective programmes for fear of loss of power or status for 
the policy makers and possibly loss of jobs or income for people who depend upon 
the continuation of state funding. 
Moreover, it should be noted that the deployment and diffusion of the 
incubator modality has occurred at a time when the nature of governance, 
particularly economic governance was changing and responsibility for the design 
and execution of economic strategies and plans was being increasingly devolved to 
regional authorities and agencies (Frenz and Oughton, 2005). In the UK, as 
elsewhere in Europe, this coincided with the evolution of the European Union, the 
development of EU regional policy and the creation of the structural funds with 
local attendant regional and local structures that evolved to administer them. 
The EU structural funds, as noted in Chapter 3,4 and 5, have been 
particularly instrumental in supporting the formulation and execution of economic 
policy at the regional level and fuelling the proliferation of business incubators 
(including BICs) providing significant sums for the creation of the infrastructure 
2 The word 'bureaucrat' tends to be used pejoratively, not just in the literature but throughout the 
world, while 'technocrat', which is increasingly used (for the time being) as a descriptor of public 
servants, seemingly carries no such ire or lack of approbation. 
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and provision of incubator services (channelled into incubators as part of regional 
regeneration strategies and plans and on the basis of market failure and boosting 
regional competitiveness). Moreover, the regional and local technocracies that 
evolved became increasingly empowered and instrumental in the development of 
regional economic and strategies and plans negotiated within the framework for 
national economic and social policy agreed between the EU Commission and 
national governments. These new technocracies have sought new prescriptions 
derived on a new appreciation of factor inputs driving and necessary to regional 
economic growth and development with funding for economic development 
initiatives often conditional on the same. 
It might be argued (and indeed it is a principal contention in the literature 
concerned with forms of political and economic governance) that leadership as 
regards policy is increasingly driven from the `bottom-up' and that it is the 
technocracies that are increasingly influential within supranational, national and 
regional forms of governance. Logan et al. (1999), who provide an overview of 
recent developments in the growth machine literature, conclude that the impact of 
pro-growth policies is mixed suggesting that the growth machine perspective may 
be a more useful theory of why political coalitions form than a theory of how 
growth coalitions affect regional economic outcomes. 
`Innovation theories', specifically theories concerned with the geography 
of innovation and the systems of innovation approach are also increasingly 
influential in policy terms. As regards the geography of innovation, Marshall 
(1890) draws a distinction between internal economies that accrue at the level of 
the firm and external economies that are available to all firms in an industry or 
region and tend to be realised within a locality and may be sector specific. Internal 
economies depend on the internal organisation, capabilities and management of the 
firm while external economies depend upon the overall progress and development 
of the industrial environment in which firms operate. As for external economies 
he identified pecuniary external economies, agglomeration economies; pools of 
skilled labour and what Marshall termed `industrial atmosphere' which is now 
more commonly described as R&D or knowledge spillovers. The review of 
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incubator operations (see Chapters 3,4 and 5) reveals a concern to foster internal 
economies within assisted firms and reinforce external economies. 
More influential perhaps in contemporary regional economic strategies and 
plans, particularly those formulated for or by UK Regional Development 
Agencies, is 'innovation systems' theory. Innovation systems theory is 
particularly influential in regional policy and can be found in regional economic 
and innovation strategies the world over. The term `system of innovation' refers to 
interactions between different elements in the economy that combine to promote 
innovation that include firms, infrastructure, institutions (including laws, 
regulations, rules and habits (Fagerberg, 2005)) and systems of finance, 
governance and education. Freeman (1987: 1) defines a system of innovation as: 
`the network of institutions in the public and private sector whose activities and 
interactions initiate, import, modify, and diffuse new technologies', while 
Schumpeter (1951) states that `innovation capacity is largely dependent upon the 
construction and institutionalisation of a heterogeneous network of public/private 
entities that can provide firm-formation expertise, gap funding, seed capital and 
'collective entrepreneurship'. According to (Dosi, 2000), relatively few regions 
have developed the vision, inter-institutional relationships and leadership to 
transcend existing techno-economic paradigms. However, it is here in systems 
theory that the relative position of business incubators is most explicitly 
acknowledged. 
Much of the literature concerned with the systems approach has concerned 
national systems of innovation and is focussed on the role of knowledge and 
innovation in determining productivity and growth (Lundvall, 1992, Nelson, 
1996). As noted by Oughton and Frenz (2005), this is analysed within the context 
of a socio-economic system that encompasses an interlocking set of factors, 
including: industrial structure; the education and science system; institutions 
(North, 1990); finance and governance (O'Sullivan, 1998). Further, it is suggested 
that it is the very nature of and extent of these linkages between theses factors that 
determines the dynamics of the system (Grabher, 1993, Granovetter, 1995, 
Leydesdorff, 2000, Oughton, Landabaso and Morgan, 2002). 
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This approach has been extended to the identification of regional systems 
of innovation (integrating the systems of innovation approach and the cluster 
concept), first introduced by Cooke (1992) and further developed by Morgan, 
(1997), Braczyk et al. (1998), Baptista and Swann (1998), Cooke et al. (2000), 
Howells (1999,2002), Nilsson et al (2003), and Asheim and Gertler (2005) and 
amalgamating theories on territorial innovation models in a knowledge-based and 
learning economy (Doloreux, 2002). A regional innovation system is generally 
defined as the systemic interaction between (1) the regional production structure or 
knowledge exploitation subsystem which consists mainly of firms, especially 
where these display clustering tendencies and (2) the regional supportive 
infrastructure or knowledge generation subsystem which consists of public and 
private research laboratories, universities and colleges, technology transfer 
agencies, vocational training organizations, etc (Coenen and Asheim, 2005). This 
The `regional innovation system' as a concept is increasingly influential 
and has achieved a level of currency in policy terms with regional policy actions 
increasingly dedicated to factors supporting individual and organizational learning, 
technology transfer, innovation and business performance, and interactions 
between public and private sector research and development assets. This has also 
been observed by Oughton and Frenz (2005), within the regional systems of 
innovation literature (Saxenian, 1994, Brusco, 1982,1990, Cooke, 1998, Cooke 
and Morgan, 1994a, Oughton, Landabaso and Morgan, 2002, Howells, 2002, 
Asheim and Gertler, 2004) and the related literatures on industrial milieux 
(Crevoisier and Maillat, 1991, Cooke and Morgan, 1994b). 
The innovation systems approach and the importance of knowledge and 
innovation to regional economic growth and the dynamics of development has 
captured the imagination of policy makers, particularly regional policy makers 
seeking to foster the development of an `innovating region'. Etzkowitz and 
Kloftsen (2005) define an innovating region as one that has `the capability to move 
across technological paradigms and periodically renew itself through new 
technologies and firms generated from its academic base'. Further, they have 
postulated that `innovation policy is created `bottom-up' as an outcome of 
'collective entrepreneurship' through collaboration among business, government 
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and academic actors - the triple helix' and that 'the emergence of university- 
industry-government interactions - the triple helix - can also be identified as a key 
factor in regional development'. The role and contribution of universities to 
regional economic growth dynamics is a popular theme in contemporary regional 
economic strategies and is borne on a tide of confidence in theories of knowledge 
based economic development that have moved centre stage amidst globalisation 
and pressure on traditional factors of production in developed countries. 
While the importance of human capital, knowledge and innovation is 
integral to notions or theories of knowledge-based development - now increasingly 
considered key to regional competitiveness - the empirical evidence that elevates 
the position of universities within regions as a key institution with knowledge 
spill-overs from these institutions supporting neighbouring firms (Jaffe, 1989), 
though less so with distant firms (Jaffe, Trajtenberg and Hendersen, 1993) is 
limited. The regard in which universities are held by policy makers owes perhaps 
more to the perception that they are a key repository of knowledge and, as such, in 
a global, `knowledge-based' economy it is presumed that they have a key 
contribution to make. 
Undoubtedly the profile Massachusetts Institute of Technology enjoys, 
lauded for its interaction with industry and thus its contribution to the region's 
economic growth and development, and has been influential in creating 
expectation as to the potential nature and level of contribution universities might 
make. The UK government, for example, was prompted to invest £65.1m of 
public money over a five-year period in the CMIT (Cambridge-Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology) a partnership between the University of Cambridge and 
MIT and created with the aim of bringing the entrepreneurial spirit of MIT to 
British universities and realise their potential contribution to national economic 
growth. Arguably, the results (economic impact) have been less than impressive, 
though both the University of Cambridge and MIT are said to have done well out 
of the arrangement. 
Indeed, despite the much vaunted role and supposed contribution of 
universities espoused in the literature as part of the `triple-helix', the Lambert 
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Review of Business-University Collaboration (2003) in the UK provides little, if 
any, evidential base for this proposition. While universities (in the UK) may be 
home to a great deal of scientific and technological investigation the degree and 
extent to which this is applied, successfully exploited or commercialised is 
uncertain. Moreover, there is little empirical evidence that supports the 
proposition that universities make a major contribution to the dynamics of regional 
economic growth (other than as a source of employment and as regards student 
expenditure in the local economy). Nevertheless, knowledge-based development 
theories and theories concerned with regional innovation systems hold that 
universities or rather the interface between universities (and other public 
infrastructure) and the private sector is increasingly influential in shaping the 
dynamics of regional economic growth. Indeed, a great many incubators have 
been established by universities (with the support of regional economic 
development agencies and other public authorities committed to fostering the 
development of the interface between universities and the private sector) as part of 
regional economic strategies and plans. 
1.6 Summary 
As is evident from the above, regional policy makers can draw upon a 
wealth of perspectives and propositions from the theoretical literature in 
formulating regional economic development strategies and plans. While a number 
of authors have tried to develop models integrating different economic theories, 
regional policy makers (supranational (EU), national and regional level) have 
perhaps been more adept, drawing liberally on the notions espoused in the 
literature, particularly at the conceptual level, in the development of rationales and 
policy frameworks for public interventions in the regional economy. Figure 1 
(below) relates the practice of business incubation through the contemporary 
economic policy framework to relevant conceptual theory found in the literature. 
In macro-economic policy terms, as illustrated in Figure 1, a concern for 
indigenous industry (industrial and enterprise policy, particularly SMEs) is bound 
up largely in notions of international competitiveness and interventions to address 
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market failures. Policy is, however, expressed in somewhat general terms while 
execution, particularly support for SMEs in the form of business incubation (as 
explored in Chapter 3) has hitherto been instrument of SME policy practised at the 
regional level. Increasingly this occurs within a `fast policy' environment (Peck 
and Tickell, 2002) wherein new concepts are diffused and adopted (often in the 
absence of detailed or even compelling empirical evidence that would justify the 
nature or scale of public investment) by regional policy makers hungry for new 
solutions and an apparent boundless enthusiasm for new approaches. It is a feature 
of this `fast-policy environment' that policy makers are seemingly quick to assume 
that a notion or concept observed or rather perceived as successful in a specific 
context may be transplanted and installed in a new environment irrespective of the 
different factors conditions that prevail therein 
As illustrated in Figure 1, the rate of diffusion and adoption of the 
incubator modality by policy makers (largely driven in the early stages of the 
industry by regional policy makers and now increasingly endorsed by national 
government) and which accounts for increasing levels of public investment given 
the increased scale of the industry (increasing competition for patronage - political 
and financial) finds the industry and individual incubators under increasing 
pressure to produce more compelling rationales, definitions and performance 
metrics to attract and sustain public sector support. In an industry which is 
increasingly mature (as evidenced by the creation of national incubator 
associations, the establishment of business incubation as occupation with attendant 
professional standards and best practice frameworks) incubators are increasingly 
concerned to establish and present to stakeholders best practice and communicate 
achievement. 
Irrespective of context, however, SME related policies including the 
current widespread support for the incubator modality have generally evolved via a 
process driven by local/regional crises (e. g. industrial restructuring) or 
underdevelopment, a lack of alternative development models, and as flowing from 
an expectation that regional and local authorities with direct responsibility for 
regional economic affairs i. e. regeneration, should be seen to implementing 
strategies and plans to arrest industrial decline and revitalise their communities. 
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Moreover, from a review of relevant literature, as illustrated in Figure 1 
(below), the increased national scrutiny of regional economic development 
authorities and associated reporting requirements is likely, in turn, to prompt 
increased scrutiny of their agents (those executing regional economic, strategies, 
plans and their instruments). In the UK, for example, regional development 
agencies are increasingly evaluated against new metrics stipulated by the 
Department for Trade and Industry (dti), namely `public service agreements'. In 
addition, `best value' performance indicators are being adopted (or imposed) 
across the public sector - in particular, regional and local government - to assess 
the return on public investment. The bureaucratic imperative vis-a-vis evaluating 
the outcome of strategies and plans and, in particular, public investment is forecast 
below to intensify given the fiscal pressure that the incubator environment shall 
fall subject; public investment in business incubators is a finite commodity which 
with the decline of the structural funds and increased competition for such funds as 
remain (between new and existing incubators and competing approaches) will 
surely compel regional economic authorities and development agencies to be more 
rigorous in evaluating the return on their investment. 
As illustrated in Figure 1, it is anticipated that evaluation and 
standardisation or regulation are a foreseeable response to the scope, scale and 
maturity of the industry and, moreover, the fiscal pressure that will escalate as the 
industry becomes more competitive and as public funding is stretched to continue 
to support the proliferation of incubators within the economy. As such, it is also in 
the interest of the incubator community to develop new and more persuasive 
metrics (over and above the largely qualitative and anecdotal evidence of 
achievement) as it competes for public funds and against other approaches as 
might evolve. 
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At the time of writing, business incubators (particularly EU BICS) are 
generally credited with and/or claim a range of qualitative and quantitative effects. 
As regards an example of the former, BICs are said to have made a meaningful 
contribution to supporting a move from a top-down approach to regional 
development (largely characterised by public interventions designed to facilitate 
transfers of mobile capital and jobs from prosperous or prospering regions to 
underdeveloped or declining regions), to a bottom-up approach focused on 
maximising the indigenous potential for economic development (see chapter 4). 
However, the literature that `evaluates' the impact of business incubators, 
quantitative measures (as applied within or to the incubator community) are rarely 
properly or adequately descriptive. Indeed, most incubators (European and UK) 
and external or independent evaluations do not use sophisticated methods or highly 
quantifiable or comparable techniques to document and/or validate their impact 
and/or the degree and extent to which they have 'added-value' and rely more on 
publicising specific success stories. Surprisingly, given the level of public 
investment in the practise of business incubation in the US, EU and elsewhere in 
the world, there seems to have been (hitherto) little appetite within or outwith the 
incubation industry for a more systematic and exacting evaluation that would 
provide evidence that the level of commitment to business incubation is warranted. 
This research has therefore endeavoured to investigate and establish 
evidence that would justify current levels of confidence and investment in the 
business incubator modality. 
27 
Chapter 2: The Contribution of SMEs to Economic Performance 
2.1 Introduction 
From a review of the policy literature it is evident that the importance and 
contribution of SMEs to the national, regional and local 'economic core' 
(Kirkhoff, 1996) and sustainable development is rooted in economic policy the 
world over. Governments (supranational, national, regional and local) around the 
world now actively seek to foster conditions for the growth and development of 
SMEs as these economic units are considered to enhance economic 
(country/regional) and industrial (at firm and aggregate level) competitiveness and 
entrepreneurship and produce external benefits such as `knowledge spill-overs', 
economic efficiency, innovation, and aggregate productivity growth. 
The political and cultural significance of SMEs has been noted by 
commentators throughout the world, notably in the US where enterprise is 
considered integral to the notion of `the land of opportunity' and is largely 
symbolic of both political and economic democracy as illustrated by, for example, 
the US Small Business Administration (SBA) which has stated that: "They [SMEs] 
keep intact the heritage of ingenuity and enterprise and they help keep the 
"American Dream" within the reach of millions of Americans"1. 
The political and economic importance of SMEs to the `American Dream' 
is acknowledged specifically in US Government policy and is summarised, for 
example, as follows: 
"Small firms make two indispensable contributions to the American 
economy. First, they are an integral part of the renewal process that 
pervades and defines market economies. New and small firms play a 
crucial role in experimentation and innovation that leads to 
technological change and productivity growth. Second, small firms are 
the essential mechanism by which millions enter the economic and 
1 US Small Business Administration retrieved from website: 
http: //www. sba. gov/aboutsba/history/index. html retrieved on 20.06.04 
28 
social mainstream of American society. Small business is the vehicle 
by which millions access the American Dream by creating 
opportunities for women, minorities and immigrants. In this 
evolutionary process, community plays the crucial and indispensable 
role of providing the "social glue" and networking that binds small 
firms together in both "high tech" and "main street" activities. The 
crucial barometer for economic and social well being is the continued 
high level of creation of new and small firms in all sectors of the 
economy by all segments of society" (US SBA, 1998). 
Indeed, Presidential support in the United States for small business is 
personally identified with the current incumbent: 
"Every new business starts with an idea for a better product or process. 
These ideas become reality only when confident entrepreneurs are 
willing to take economic risks. Small businesses are the heart of the 
American economy because they drive innovation - new firms are 
established on the very premise that they can do a better job. For 
innovative small businesses, adequate performance is never good 
enough and excellence is an endless pursuit. These dynamic 
companies also drive the job creation process. In fact, small and young 
companies create two thirds of the net new jobs in our economy, and 
they employ half of all private-sector workers. Entrepreneurship has 
become the path to prosperity for many Americans, including 
minorities and women" (The President's Small Business Agenda, 
2005). 
Elsewhere and across the world, as explored below, the contribution of 
SMEs to economic performance is widely acknowledged by nation states and is 
reflected in industrial policies and their instruments. 
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2.2 Europe 
The contribution of SMEs to the social and economic fabric has been 
noted, for example, by the European Commission in a variety of EU policies and 
initiatives, notably the European Council's 2000 Lisbon Strategy wherein the 
Commission has stated: 
"Europe's competitiveness depends strongly on its small businesses, 
which are a key source of jobs, a breeding ground for business ideas 
and a main driver for entrepreneurship" (European Commission, 2003, 
p. 2). 
Similarly, the European Charter for Small Enterprises (of the same year), 
plus the Commission's 2003 Entrepreneurship Action Plan, the Innovation Action 
Plan, the Competitiveness & Innovation Programme (CIP) and the "SME strand" 
of the upcoming 7th Framework Programme for R&D (FP7) reflect the socio- 
economic and political priority accorded SMEs. Further, Enterprise Commissioner 
Erkki Liikanen (2003, p. 1) has stated that: 
"Small and Medium Sized Enterprises form the backbone of the 
European economy. They are key to entrepreneurial spirit and 
innovation in the EU and thus crucial to ensure EU competitiveness". 
More recently the European Commissioner for Science and Research, 
Janez PoWnik (2005) has stated: 
"High-tech, new technology-based SMEs are particularly important in 
terms of their impact and growth potential. They typically carry out 
their own research and are a key component of the innovation system, 
facilitating the emergence of new products and markets. Some can 
grow rapidly to become the large firms of tomorrow while others drive 
innovation in existing large firms". 
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These supranational policies, instruments and commitments are reflected in 
the policy of European nation states endeavouring to engineer or sustain economic 
growth and ensure economic competitiveness. In Ireland, for example, the 
National Competitiveness Council (NCC) established by the Government in May 
1997 acknowledged (in 1998) that: 
"Apart from contributing to overall growth and employment, SMEs 
are an essential element of competitiveness. A well-developed and 
vibrant SME sector will be an important source of innovation. Most 
new firms begin in the SME sector and they can also be a breeding 
ground for new products and services. Secondly, the SME sector is a 
source of strength for the economy as a whole. Because it can offer a 
wide range of goods and services, larger firms will always have a 
choice of supplies and markets also. This means that the economy will 
have the necessary flexibility to cope with fluctuations. If the structure 
of the economy is a complex one, because of layers of firms that are 
interrelated, then shocks will lose some of their impact as they move 
through the economy". 
In the UK, SMEs are similarly acknowledged as significant in economic 
terms by the Performance and Innovation Unit (2001): 
"The UK's 3.7 million SMEs account for approximately 40% of our 
GDP and have an annual turnover of one trillion pounds. Employing 
over 12 million people in the UK, they also account for 85% of the 2.3 
million extra jobs created by new businesses in the private sector 
between 1995-99 and more than 50% of the 3.5 million jobs gained 
from expansion over the same period... [further, they are 
acknowledged as key to competitiveness insofar as they play] a vital 
role in the economy, providing new ideas, products, services and 
jobs". 
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In a similar vein, in Turkey, the Republic of Turkey Ministry of Industry 
and Trade's Small and Medium Industry Development Organization (KOSGEB, 
2003) states: 
"The Small and Medium Industrial Enterprises (SMEs) form the 
backbone of any economy. Irrespective of whether one looks at the 
developed countries of the world, such as USA, Japan and Germany or 
developing countries such as Thailand, Malaysia and China, a dynamic 
and vibrant SME sector is playing a key role in the successful 
economic growth of these countries... a strong SME sector helps 
achieve many important socio-economic objectives of a country. For 
example: SMEs are the biggest source of low cost employment; SMEs 
help in regional and local development; SMEs respond to market 
fluctuations more easily; SMEs help achieve fair and equitable 
distribution of wealth; SMEs are key drivers for value-added exports; 
SMEs assist in fostering a self- help and entrepreneurial culture in the 
country; [and] SMEs support and complement large scale industries" 
(p. 1). 
2.3 Africa 
In Africa (specifically, Egypt) "The development of Small and Medium 
Enterprises (SMEs) in Egypt is considered to be one of the most crucial 
components of the Government's social and economic development agenda for 
Egypt" while in South Africa their potential to alleviate poverty (which is now 
contested by Beck et al (2003) - see below), and the SME contribution to 
employment (particularly youth unemployment) and the empowerment of a whole 
demographic or ethnic group is highlighted by the Human Sciences Research 
Council for the SA Department for Labour (p. 13): 
"The development of very small and micro enterprises (VSMEs - 
those with 10 or less employees) is an important policy priority for 
South Africa. This priority derives from a number of sources. First, 
such enterprises are seen as an important generator of employment 
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and, hence, of poverty alleviation in a country where increasing 
numbers are likely to find their future work in smaller and informal 
enterprises. Second, this is reinforced by the particular challenge of 
youth unemployment. It is estimated that approximately one-third of 
school leavers will not find formal sector employment or go on to 
further studies at present (Kraak, 2003). In this climate, the informal 
portion of the VSME segment of enterprises is seen as a vital vehicle 
for youth employment. Third, given the historical legacy of white 
advantage and black disadvantage in South Africa, VSMEs are also 
seen as a crucial tool for broad-based black economic empowerment. 
Fourth, given the widespread international claims about the economic 
importance of entrepreneurship, VSMEs are also considered an 
integral part of any attempt to construct a more vibrant entrepreneurial 
culture in South Africa". 
2.4 Asia 
In South Asia, the Small and Medium Enterprise Development Authority of 
Pakistan (2005, p. 1) states: 
"In the industrial development of a country the importance of the 
SME sector cannot be overemphasized. SMEs constitute nearly 90% 
of all the enterprises in Pakistan; employ 80% of the non-agricultural 
labour force; and their share in the annual GDP is 40%, 
approximately" while in India, according to Kacker (2005) "small and 
medium industries play a vital role in the growth of the economy. 
Small industries have a 40% share in industrial output, producing over 
8000 value-added products. They contribute nearly 35% in direct 
export and 45% in the overall export from the country. They are one of 
the biggest employment-providing sectors after agriculture, providing 
employment to 28.28 million people... [and] constitute more than 80% 
of total number of industrial enterprises and form the backbone of 
industrial development". 
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In Korea, the Small and Medium Business Administration (SMBA) 
highlights the SME contribution to national competitiveness and states that: 
"enhancing the competitiveness of all SMEs is vital to the objective of 
increasing national competitive power... [and are the] backbone of the 
Korean economy... SMEs represent 99.8% of entire enterprises (2.95 
million SMEs), and 86.7% of total employment (13.09 million 
employees) in Korea". 
Furthermore, they are acknowledged as the: 
"bedrock of Korean industry, because they produce special goods that 
are impractical for larger enterprises to produce, and because they 
supply various components for larger enterprises to produce finished 
goods [further] The speed and flexibility of operation unique to SMEs 
are behind virtually all production. SMEs are described as continually 
seeking to develop technological innovations, and to formulate new 
products for the market. Korea also recognises the role of SMEs in 
stabilising the social structure, as their presence prevents dramatic 
imbalances of economic power". 
Elsewhere in Asia, specifically in Singapore, the Minister for Home Affairs 
Mr Wong Kan Seng (2004) stated that: 
"SMEs generate almost 30% of Singapore's gross domestic product 
and comprise 90% of the total establishments in Singapore. SMEs 
employ half of the workforce. During the economic recession in 2001 
and 2002, the employment of our SMEs rose by 6.6%, in contrast to 
those of our MNCs which shrank by 1.7%. However, being relatively 
small, SMEs have inherent disadvantages such as limited bargaining 
power, market intelligence, economies of scale and resources. As a 
result, the productivity of our SMEs is generally low - about $48,000 
value added per employee per annum as compared to the $149,000 
value added per employee per annum among the MNCs". 
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Interestingly, Singapore's experience, vis-ä-vis a `dip' in the economic 
cycle mirrors, to an extent, the European recession of 1990-3 wherein, a decline in 
employment was observed (in Europe) which was found to be greater in large or 
medium-sized enterprises than in SMEs (suggesting that SMEs are less vulnerable 
to fluctuations in the business cycle). Indeed, whereas data from the European 
Observatory of European SMEs (2003) suggests that while employment generally 
remained more stable in SMEs than LSEs during periods of recession (and that in 
times of economic recovery, employment growth has tended to be concentrated in 
the larger enterprises), in Singapore's (albeit more recent) recession SMEs 
evidently thrived. 
In Japan, the Japanese Government has recently legislated to promote the 
growth and development of SMEs and enhance the economic and social well-being 
of entrepreneurs, SMEs and their employees in The Small and Medium Enterprise 
Basic Law (1999). Furthermore, the Japanese Government's recent White Paper 
(2004) on Small and Medium Enterprises published by the Japanese Government 
which is entitled 'The Limitless Potential of the Diversity of Small and Medium 
Enterprises' is illustrative of the way in which SMEs have achieved prominence 
not only in socio-economic terms but also pre-eminence as a political policy 
panacea which may be said to have naturally given the social and economic 
context i. e. in Japan (2002), 99.7% businesses are classified as SMEs now 
employing 81 percent of the total Japanese workforce. Further, 51 percent of 
shipped manufacturing goods are produced by SMEs while in the wholesale 
industry; this figure is 62 percent and in retail represents 73 percent. Evidently, 
historical data cited in the White Paper illustrates that this picture has changed 
little in 35 years. 
The 2004 White Paper is also particularly noteworthy as it highlights the 
way in which SMEs may lead a resurgence of Japan Inc and highlights the 
potentialities of SMEs vis-a-vis their capacity to create new business, lead 
technological innovation and in their diversity be "engines of economic 
development". The rationale for the SME focus is also explained by an 
examination of the rate of growth in total factor productivity in present-day 
Japanese manufacturing by size and the finding that growth is, on average, higher 
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in SMEs than large enterprises. This finding is reinforced with reference to the US 
experience `In the United States, it has been reported that half of all technological 
innovation in manufacturing is produced by SMEs'2 and is presented as part of the 
rationale for the new policy focus and rationale i. e. SMEs play an active and 
leading role in technological progress and other forms of technological innovation 
and are thus key to developing and sustaining national competitive and 
comparative advantages. 
The White Paper is however interesting for other reasons which reveal that 
the SME contribution to innovation and economic growth is only part of the policy 
equation (in this way, and in the light of SMEs policies reviewed throughout 
Europe, the US and countries in transition, the SME policy rationale is strikingly 
consistent in its coherence and consideration of other social and economic issues. ) 
For example, it notes the way in which SMEs support (and may be instrumental in) 
the creation of new lifestyles, providing employment opportunities for the elderly 
and women, supporting the development of new forms of work organization and 
new working arrangements, and their capacity to reshape (and be integral to) the 
delivery public services so that they are more attuned to local community needs. 
Furthermore, it indicates that SMEs are expected to provide solutions to a range of 
other societal and economic problems which include, for example: 
  the need to address anticipated labour shortages (prompted by declining 
birth rates, the `opportunity costs of childcare', changes in attitudes toward 
marriage and birth, female (social and economic) emancipation, and an 
aging population); 
  their capacity to providing employment opportunities for women so that 
they are able to re-enter the workforce after marriage and childbirth and 
their potential to facilitate the personal fulfilment of older persons and 
their independence (financial) - evidently, in Japan, SMEs are more likely 
to engage older workers or offer older workers and women more flexible 
2 The State of Small Business: A Report of the [US] President (1996), which describes how in 
extremely innovative industries in 1982 (computer equipment and electronic components, etc. ), 
SMEs created approximately the same proportion of technological innovation as large enterprises. 
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working arrangements, part-time and temporary employment or shorter 
working hours. 
  provide community solutions to local problems that cannot be solved 
within the conventional framework of public administration (the public 
sector) and private-sector profit-making enterprises i. e. the role of 
social/community enterprises and their capacity to provide citizens with 
opportunities to make contributions to their localities social capital and in 
ways not readily quantified such as the "stimulation of exchange among 
local residents"; "improvement of convenience of life of local residents"; 
"source of local employment opportunities" and "create employment and 
avenues for personal fulfilment". 
2.5 Australasia 
In New Zealand SMEs are viewed by, for example, the Ministry of 
Economic Development (Industry and Regional Development Branch, 2002) as a 
source of flexibility and innovation, and make a significant contribution to 
economies, both in terms of the number of SMEs and the proportion of the labour 
force employed by these firms. The significance of the SME sector in New 
Zealand is increasing, with further opportunities presented by globalisation and 
technological development. 
In Palestine, SMEs and their development has been highlighted by the 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD, 2004) as being 
critical in arresting the collapse of the economy to one of subsistence while in 
Israel the policy rationale highlights not only the SME contribution to economic 
growth and diversity and innovation but also other contextual and political 
priorities e. g. the social contribution SMEs can make as providers of employment 
in peripheral areas and for minorities, women, demobilised soldiers and new 
immigrants. As noted by Israel's Small and Medium Enterprise Authority: 
"Small and medium-sized business are considered, according to 
common perception in developed and developing states, an important 
source for the growth of the economy and for the creation of stable 
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and, from the economic point of view, healthy places of employment. 
In Israel, also, therefore, the Government view these businesses as one 
of the tools for achieving its economic targets and one of the central 
layers in the Israel economy and society. The chief advantages of 
small and medium-sized businesses are they are innovative, flexible, 
and quick to set up at a low cost and with dispersed risk. They are 
likely to provide an appropriate solution to problems of employment in 
peripheral areas, as well as among particular populations, such as 
minorities, women, demobilised soldiers and new immigrants". 
2.6 Developing Countries and Countries in Transition 
SMEs are considered vital to developing countries wherein "SMEs are the 
emerging private sector in poor countries, and thus form the base for private 
sector-led growth" (Hallberg, 2000, p. 5) and as acknowledged in United Nations 
Industrial Development Organisation's (UNIDO) Millennium Development Goals 
(2004) and countries in `transition' as explained by Miroslaw Marek, Director of 
the Department for Crafts, Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (Polish Ministry 
of Economy): 
"The far-reaching economic reforms that began in Poland in 1989, 
together with alterations to the political system and changes in the 
social structure have resulted in rapid development of small and 
medium size enterprises. Poland puts great importance on to the 
growth of small and medium size enterprises for several reasons. 
SMEs form the backbone of the market economy and, as in most other 
countries create a significant number of new jobs. In addition, support 
to small enterprises helps in demonopolization, as well as social 
stability, through the development of the middle class. SMEs 
development policy presently faces new challenges related to Poland's 
integration with EU". 
The contribution of SMEs to the transformation of centrally planned 
economies to market economies is noted by Smallbone and Venesaar (1997). 
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Their contribution in social, economic and political terms has also been noted by 
the Centre for the Study of Democracy (CSD) an interdisciplinary public policy 
institute founded in 1989 and comprising a wide and diverse partnership which has 
declared (reviewing the Bulgarian economy) that: 
"The success of Bulgaria's SME sector is essential to the development 
of the economy as a whole. Foremost, SMEs are labour intensive and 
capable of creating many new jobs at low costs. These jobs will be 
necessary to absorb new unemployment created by restructuring 
former State Owned Enterprises ("SOEs"). Among other important 
SME contributions to the economy are: 
1. SMEs service the needs of larger corporations and provide 
services that facilitate business. One role that SMEs can play 
is as suppliers to larger companies thus contributing to the 
external competitiveness of these firms. 
2. SMEs are a source of innovation on the basis that they are 
more flexible, more dynamic and more sensitive to shifts in 
demand than larger firms. 
3. SMEs contribute as "Seed-Beds" from which large companies 
can grow. 
4. SMEs will provide an additional market for the purchase of 
second-hand equipment from SOEs. 
5. SMEs train entrepreneurs needed to develop the private 
sector and foster private investment". 
As a result of these factors, the larger and more developed the SME 
sector, the greater the SME contribution to the growth of the economy. 
Therefore, it is imperative that during this time of concern, that the 
Bulgarian authorities take into consideration the role of SMEs in the 
economic development of the country". 
In summary SMEs are, as part of a `received wisdom', now regarded as 
integral to social and economic development policies across the globe (in both the 
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developed and developing world). For example, the OECD Istanbul Ministerial 
Declaration on Fostering the Growth of Innovative and Internationally Competitive 
SMEs (2004) acknowledges the importance of small and medium-sized enterprises 
(SMEs) insofar as they are now the dominant form of business organisation 
throughout the world, accounting for in excess of 95 per cent of the business 
population; constitute an important dynamic element in all economies as drivers of 
innovation, especially in knowledge-based industries; and "play a key role in 
driving sustainable economic growth and job creation while contributing to the 
social, cultural and environmental capital of nations". 
2.7 The contribution of SMEs to economic performance 
The importance of SMEs to the development of national, regional and local 
economic development, performance and, more generally, the general social fabric 
is erroneously understood as a modem phenomenon that arose within the last 60 
years. Evidently, throughout Europe and the US, SMEs were the pre-eminent 
economic unit or form (until industrialisation) and were instrumental (in both 
social and economic terms) in the development of national and regional 
economies. As noted, for example, by Alexis De Tocqueville in 1835 in his 
writings on the US "What astonishes me in the United States is not so much the 
marvellous grandeur of some undertakings as the innumerable multitude of small 
ones". 
Evidently, SMEs prevailed (particularly single unit enterprises generally 
staffed by and servicing the local communities in which they operated) as the 
dominant economic form or unit of production and distribution until the emergence 
of large enterprises in the mid 19th century a transition facilitated by the industrial 
revolution and the emergence of new technologies, mechanisation and [then] new 
forms of work organisation (factory production) engineered to achieve economies 
of scale. The concomitant impact on demographics e. g. urbanisation and the 
deployment of mechanisation and technology in rural and peripheral areas (in e. g. 
farming, textiles, fisheries) coupled with the rise of factory production in new 
industrial centres (the original technology poles) radically altered population 
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distributions, densities and concentrations of economic activity (and capital) as 
well as socio-political and socio-economic structures. 
As larger enterprises and heavy industry became the significant economic 
unit or form, leading technological advances and exports, and became symbols of 
economic superiority neoclassical economists predicted the dominance of large 
firms, suggesting that they were inherently more profitable than small firms. A 
central tenet of their thought - economics of scale - an assumption that as the size 
of the firm increases, the cost of production per unit decreases and the proposition 
that size is a prerequisite to the achievement of economies of scale and enabled the 
exploitation of foreign markets and the ability to keep abreast of regulations and 
new opportunities in technology. 
Neoclassical economics prevailed as the mainstream economic for over a 
century, particularly in the US. Kirchhoff (1994) has suggested that America's 
adoption of neoclassical theory and the domination of large firms after World War 
II prompted many Americans to believe that large enterprises would ever be the 
source of wealth creation and distribution. Indeed, the literature reviewed as part 
of this study has, historically, seemingly supported the view that SMEs were, in 
any event, less efficient than their larger counterparts. For example Weiss (1964 
and 1976) concluded that SMEs produced at lower levels of efficiency, "On the 
average, about half of total shipments in the industries covered are from 
suboptimal plants. The majority of plants in most industries are suboptimal in 
scale, and a very large percentage of output is from suboptimal plants". As noted 
by Audretsch (2004) citing Pratten (1971) found similar evidence for the UK, 
where `suboptimal' scale establishments accounted for 47.9 percent of industry 
shipments. 
While many scholars were concerned to investigate e. g. (i) whether LSEs 
and/or SMEs possess advantages derived from their size; (ii) the welfare 
implications (in economic terms) of a market structure dominated by LSEs (iii) the 
efficiencies of large-scale production resulting in economic concentration and the 
public policy implications, others clearly sought to explain how this economic 
structure had come to pass. For example, William Whyte (1956) postulated that in 
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the US, this structure and belief or acceptance that this structure was the optimum 
structure was a product of the depression and military training in WWII which had 
created a behavioural norm of accepting employment within and obedience to 
large bureaucracies. Indeed the economic reality of what was the 1950s, 1960s and 
1970s, wherein large companies dominated the US economy a period of `scale and 
scope' (Chandler, 1990) arguably supported this analysis. 
The belief in industrial behemoths exploiting market power, economies of 
scale and performing as engines of innovative activity was acknowledged by 
Schumpeter (1942) who stated that "What we have got to accept is that (the large- 
scale establishment) has come to be the most powerful engine of progress" while 
Galbraith (1956) stated "There is no more pleasant fiction than that technological 
change is the product of the matchless ingenuity of the small man forced by 
competition to employ his wits to better his neighbour. Unhappily, it is a fiction. " 
Indeed, the belief in large corporations and the ability to mobilise and organise 
labour had become so predominant that John Kenneth Galbraith, in his 1967 book 
`The New Industrial State' was prompted to express the hypothesis that large 
corporations working in coordination with big governments and large labour 
unions would run nations. 
Clearly, the relative importance of SMEs (or perceptions thereof) had 
evidently declined over time in both North America and Europe. Indeed, in the 
post-war era, small firms and entrepreneurship were viewed as something of a 
luxury, perhaps needed by the West to ensure a decentralization of decision 
making, but in any case only at a cost to efficiency (Weiss, 1976). A range of 
work conducted in North America and Europe documents a sharp trend towards a 
decreased role of SMEs during the post-war period (Caves, 1982; Teece, 1993; and 
Brock and Evans, 1989). The proportion of the `economically active' that might 
be classified as self-employed (and thus SMEs) decreased in most Western 
countries and until the mid to late 1970s, as observed by, for example, Blau (1987) 
who found that the proportions of both male and female self-employed in the non- 
agricultural U. S. labour force declined for the main part of the twentieth century 
(Blau notes however that this decline bottomed out in the early 1970s and started 
to rise until at least 1982). Indeed, conventional wisdom (post war) predicted that 
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increased `globalization'3 would present a more hostile environment to small 
business (Vernon, 1970) and that their ability to compete or thrive would be, in 
any event, naturally constrained. For example, Horst (1972) showed that the 
propensity to engage in foreign direct investment was a factor of firm size, while 
Caves (1982) argued that the additional costs of globalization incurred by small 
businesses would "constitute an important reason for expecting that foreign 
investment will be mainly an activity of large firms". As summarised by Gomes- 
Casseres (1997, p. 33): 
"Students of international business have traditionally believed that 
success in foreign markets required large size. Small firms were 
thought to be at a disadvantage compared to larger firms, because of 
the fixed costs of learning about foreign environments, communicating 
at long distances, and negotiating with national governments". 
The view that SMEs are intrinsically ill-equipped in the global economy is 
however put most succinctly by Chandler (1990) who states simply that "to 
compete globally you have to be big". 
However, in the early part of 20th Century, some economists began to 
question neoclassical theory because it eliminated entrepreneurship from the 
economic process, effectively denying the role the entrepreneur in the creation and 
distribution of wealth and the production of new demand in the economic system. 
Joseph Schumpeter (1934), one of its early critics, considered innovation as key to 
the creation of new demand for goods and services and particularly entrepreneurs 
(the owner managers who started new, independent businesses to exploit 
innovation). To Schumpeter, the entrepreneur initiated the destruction of the 
3 Defined by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development's Bangkok Declaration on 
'Global Dialogue and Dynamic Engagement' (February, 2000) as "an ongoing process that presents 
opportunities; as well as risks and challenges. It has expanded the prospect for technological 
advances and for effective integration into the international economy... It has increased prosperity 
and the potential for countries to benefit. However, globalization also raises the risk of 
marginalization of countries, in particular the poorest countries, and the most vulnerable groups 
everywhere. Income gaps within and among countries remain wide, and the number of people 
living in poverty has increased. Asymmetries and imbalances in the international economy have 
intensified. Instability in the international financial system continues to be a serious problem and 
requires urgent attention" 
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existing economic order by introducing new products and services, by creating 
new forms of organization, or by exploiting new raw materials. Thus 
entrepreneurs, by exploiting innovations, destroyed the structure of existing 
markets and caused established firms with older products or services to decline. 
Schumpeter's dynamic concept of `creative destruction' recognized that innovation 
created new demand and that entrepreneurs bring these innovations to the market. 
Schumpeter considered entrepreneurs to be major mechanisms of wealth creation 
and distribution in capitalism. 
While Schumpeter's analysis had its critics (and admirers) it has gained a 
greater currency in the last twenty years as economies throughout the world have 
become increasingly less characterized by the dominance of industrial `behemoths' 
or `monoliths'. Schumpeter's critique of neoclassical theory with its strong belief 
in market equilibrium and economies of scale and, in particular, its lack of 
recognition of the impact of entrepreneurship on economic development became 
more persuasive towards the end of the 20t' Century as in the mid-1970s a new 
economic reality began to undermine the neo-classical interpretation of economics. 
In the USA, as noted by Brock and Evans (1989), in 1987 the average real GDP 
per firm which had increased by nearly two thirds between 1947 and 1980 from 
$150,000 to $245,000 had been largely attributable to the dominance of larger 
enterprises had fallen by around 14 percent to $210,000, which they observed 
reflected the re-emergence of SMEs. Similarly, Acs and Audretsch (1990) found 
that SMEs accounted for one-fifth of manufacturing sales in the USA in 1976, but 
the small firm share of sales had risen to over one-quarter by 1986. Similarly, in 
the OECD countries there occurred a structural shift (over time) in these 
economies from large companies competing through mass production and 
economies of scale towards smaller companies relying on knowledge, initiative 
and flexibility. 
This new economic reality has promoted ever-greater scrutiny of neo- 
classical theory and a revived interest in Schumpeter's earlier work. In general, 
however, a number and/or combination of variables are assumed to have caused 
this transition, eroding the traditional view of SMEs and their limited potentialities 
- among them, increased global competition, changes in demand and 
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demographics, intensified uncertainty and new and radical changes in technology, 
creating new market opportunities. For example, globalisation increased 
competitive pressure on manufacturing firms in high-cost locations, which led not 
only to a shift in production capacity to low cost countries, but also to increasing 
productivity by using technological inputs. Large firms, as reported by Audretsch 
(2002), rationalised by restructuring, outsourcing or downsizing and the number of 
business owners in OECD countries increased from 29 million to 45 million 
between 1972 and 1998. Meanwhile `Information and Communication 
Technologies' (ICTs) gave rise to new markets, such as personal computers, 
software and ICT-based services, which revolutionised production processes in 
many industries and led to growth of the service sector. 
The transition from the era of Fordist mass production to what has been 
described variously as a transition to an "information economy" in which the 
accumulation and exploitation of knowledge is now more important than 
investment in physical assets (Acs, undated) and/or from a "managed economy" to 
an "entrepreneurial economy" which is variously characterised by `turbulence', 
`uncertainty' and a larger role for small firms (Audretsch and Thurik, 2001) 
appears to have taken place between the mid-1970s and the early 1990s. This 
transition which Jensen (1993, p. 835) describes as the "Third Industrial 
Revolution" reflected structural changes in the economies of Europe which shifted 
the region's comparative advantage towards knowledge-based activities are noted 
in Acs (1996 and 1999); Acs and Audretsch, (2001); Audretsch and Thurik, (1997, 
2000 and 2001); Audretsch et al., (2000 and 2001); Carree and Thurik, (1997); 
Carree et al., (1999 and 2000); Thurik, (1995); and Verheul et al. (2001). Further, 
the economics of this transitional period have prompted a range of explanations. 
Various aspects and explanations are discussed in Acs (1996), Acs and Audretsch 
(2001), Acs, Carlsson and Karlsson (1999), Acs, Morck and Yeung (1999), 
Audretsch and Thurik (2000), Brock and Evans (1989), Carlsson (1992,1996 and 
1999), Carree and Thurik (1997), Carree et al. (2000), Eliasson (1994), Glancey 
and McQuaid (2000), Loveman and Sengenberger (1991) and Piore and Sable 
(1984). 
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Audretsch and Thurik (2001), for example, have postulated that the re- 
emergence of SMEs and specifically entrepreneurship (in North America and 
Europe) is derived specifically from increased globalization, which shifted the 
comparative advantage towards knowledge based economic activity and have 
characterised managed economies as a natural political, social and economic 
response to an economy dictated by the forces of large-scale production, reflecting 
the predominance of the production factors of capital and (unskilled) labour as the 
sources of competitive advantage and 'entrepreneurial economies' as a political, 
social and economic response to an economy dictated not just by the dominance of 
the production factor of knowledge (which Romer (1990, and 1994) and Lucas 
(1988) identified as replacing more traditional factors as the source of competitive 
advantage) but also by a very different, but complementary, factor previously 
overlooked: entrepreneurship capital, or the capacity to engage in and generate 
entrepreneurial activity, while Brock and Evans (1989) evolved six hypotheses to 
explain the `return of the SME': 
  Technological change had reduced the extent of scale economies in 
manufacturing. It is postulated that new technologies reduced the 
importance of scale economies in many sectors enabling technology-based 
SMEs to challenge LSEs reliant on mass production techniques for their 
competitive advantage (Carlsson, 1989). 
  Increased globalization had rendered markets more volatile as a result of 
competition from a greater number of foreign rivals. 
The changing composition of the labour force, moving towards a greater 
participation of females, immigrants, and young and old workers, may be 
more conducive to smaller rather than larger enterprises, due to the greater 
premium placed on work flexibility. 
 A proliferation of consumer tastes away from standardized, mass-produced 
goods towards stylized and personalized products creates a niche for small 
producers. 
  Deregulation and privatization facilitate the entry of new and small firms 
into markets that were previously protected and inaccessible. 
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  The increased importance of innovation in high-wage countries has 
reduced the relative importance of large-scale production and instead 
fostered the importance of entrepreneurial activity. 
Elsewhere Traü (2002), who also acknowledges `the rise of the SME' 
sector as a global phenomenon, identifies a number of factors that have been 
instrumental in the development of a new global economic structure which 
include: 
  The need for product differentiation brought about by rising income levels 
which acts against mass standardization in numerous industries. 
  Technological changes that have increased flexibility and made it possible 
for smaller operations to be competitive. Jovanovic contends that "recent 
advances in information technology have made market-based coordination 
cheaper relative to internal coordination and have partially caused the 
recent decline in firm size and diversification " (Jovanovic 1993, p. 221) 
while Meredith (1987) argues that small firms are just as well, or better, 
equipped to implement technological advances and predicts the factory of 
the future to be a small factory. 
  Labour unionisation which enhanced the incentive to decentralize 
operations. SME creation was fed by the tendency of large firms to 
concentrate on `core competences' (Carlsson 1989) and, specifically in the 
1980s, corporate spin-offs and divestment (Jovanovic, 1993). 
  Career paths have become much more complex, marked by an increased 
desire for control over lifestyle choices. This is said to reflect broader 
societal changes wherein self-employment (or entrepreneurship) is more 
highly valued as an occupational choice than before. For example, 
Kirchhoff (1996) postulates that self-employment is no longer 
characterized as under-employment or a best or only alternative to 
employment but a way to achieve a variety of personal goals (not only 
basic human needs (e. g. physical needs) but also self-realization (Maslow 
1970). Indeed, according to Schiller and Crewson (1997) approximately 
one infouryoung U. S workers pursue self-employment as a career choice. 
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  The influence of the 1970s oil shocks which made large-scale energy 
intensive production less sustainable. 
  Market deregulation through the gradual dismantling of protectionist 
regimes which enhanced foreign competition and removed the uncontested 
position of the large conglomerates of the 1950s and 1960s. 
  Increased market uncertainty that worked against huge long-term 
investments in very large operations. 
  Although difficult to document, it is likely the case that the pace of product 
obsolescence has accelerated and, in the process, fed the forces of creative 
destruction. 
0 Public policy has become much more aligned towards stimulating small 
business and accelerating the pace of business formation over time, 
particularly in the past decade and right up to the most recent federal 
government's budget. 
While the influence of the `oil shocks' and `increased market uncertainty' 
were not necessarily specific to the large-scale enterprise (LSE) sector, there is 
otherwise much in Trau's analysis with which to agree. 
In summary, and notwithstanding a range of scholarship that has sought to 
investigate and account for the pre-eminence of SMEs in political, fiscal and 
policy terms, the commitment to SMEs has generally evolved as a regional 
response to regional crises (albeit in a `fast policy' environment - see Chapter 1). 
In contrast however, it should be noted that the impetus for Japanese policy has 
seemingly evolved rapidly as part of a national response to the perceived failure of 
indigenous LSEs (see Chapter 3). Suffice as to say, as noted in Chapter 1 (Figure 
1), SME policy and instruments are integral to regional economic development 
strategies and plans. 
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2.8 The SME contribution to economic performance in Europe 
In Europe, an understanding of the importance of SMEs in social and 
economic policy terms has evolved slowly, as SMEs have become more prevalent 
within the demographics of the economic structure - "A political priority in 
favour 
of SMEs has gradually developed within the European Union as a result of the job 
creation potential of SMEs" (European Commission, 1998). As the role of SMEs 
(see below) has become better understood it has now become integral to European 
(particularly EU) policy and supranational actions and socio-economic instruments 
concerned with generating employment, economic growth and securing 
international competitiveness in a global economy. 
As economic units and in demographic terms, prima facie and as illustrated 
below, SMEs are now the dominant economic unit or form in Europe with micro 
enterprises accounting for the majority of the SME stock in Europe. 
Table 2.1: EU Profile of Enterprise (Data) 
Enterprise size class Number of Enterprises Relative % 
Micro (0-9 employees) 19042000 93.10 
Small (10-49 employees) 1202000 5.88 
Medium (50-249 employees) 169000 0.83 
SME Total 20413000 99.80 
LSE (249+ employees) 40000 0.20 
Total 20453000 100 
Source Data: European Observatory (2003)4 
Similarly, in the US, the micro enterprise is the most prevalent economic 
unit, although less so (proportionately) than in the EU. The relative proportion of 
small firms in the US is however markedly higher. 
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Table 2.2 US Profile of Enterprise (Data) 
Enterprise size class Number of Enterprises Relative % 
Micro (0-9 employees) 4476451 78.565 
Small (10-49 employees) 1001961 17.585 
Medium (50-299 employees) 190519 3.343 
SME 5668931 99.494 
LSE (299+) 28828 0.5059 
Total 5697759 100 
Source Data: US SBA5 
Throughout Europe (as illustrated overleaf), particularly in many of the 
`less favoured regions' of Europe (which are defined herein as those countries with 
a GDP less than the EU average) SMEs are clearly significant within the 
6 demographics of the economic structure. 
° Source Data: 'European Commission Observatory of European SMEs (Statistics)' retrieved on 
29.11.04 from website: http: //www. eim. nl/observatory_7_and 8/en/stats/2001/varl/lcou size. html 
5 Source Data retrieved on 02.12.04 from US Small Business Administration website: 
http: //www. sba. gov/advo/stats/us_02ss. pdf 
6 GDP per capita was selected as the basis of comparison as this is the principal measure by which a 
region's economic prosperity is judged by the European Commission vis-ä-vis regional policy and 
the allocation of the EU Structural Funds. For example, regions qualifying as "Objective 1" 
regions, (covering 22% of the EU population) are so classified because they have less than 75% of 
the average EU GDP per capita. As this only includes Portugal, Greece and Spain, for the purposes 
of this research this definition of 'less-favoured region' has been expanded to include those 
European countries with a GDP per capita less than the EU average. 
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Figure 2.1: National Stock of Enterprises by Size Class 
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As presented in the table overleaf there are, however, notable differences 
between the composition of the enterprise stock in `less favoured' regions from EU 
regions with a GDP higher than the EU average. Evidently less favoured regions 
have, on average, a notably higher proportion of Micro sized firms (93.19% of 
their total enterprise stock compared to 89.92% of more favoured regions). 
As regards, small enterprises, these represent 5.77% of the enterprise stock 
in less favoured regions as compared to 8.04% in regions with a GDP higher than 
the EU average, while 0.876% of their enterprise stock are medium sized firms 
compared to 1.81% in `more favoured regions'. 
7 Source Data: 'European Commission Observatory of European SMEs (Statistics)' retrieved on 
29.11.04 from website: http: //www. eim. ni/observatory_7_and_8/en/stats/2001/varl/1cou_size. htmi 
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Table 2.3: Profile of European Enterprise Stock by County and Size Class (%)8 
Micro Small Medium SME LSE GDP 
Luxembourg 86.36 9.09 4.55 100.00 0.00 219 
Norway 92.57 6.29 1.14 100.00 0.00 162 
Switzerland 88.82 9.32 1.86 99.69 0.31 135 
Denmark 89.94 8.38 1.68 99.44 0.56 127 
b 
Iceland 96.30 3 70 0 00 100.00 0.00 126 . . 
Ireland 84.95 11.83 2.15 100.00 0.00 126 
Netherlands 90.42 7.59 1.63 99.64 0.36 122 
Sweden 90.04 8.12 1.48 99.63 0.37 120 
Average: 89.925 8.04 1.811 99.8 0.2 142.5 
Austria 86.28 11.50 2.21 99.56 0.44 117 
Belgium 94.84 4.24 0.55 99.82 0.18 117 
Finland 93.87 5.19 0.94 99.53 0.47 114 
France 93.13 5.71 0.96 99.80 0.20 114 
aA 
UK 94.58 4.53 0.72 99.80 0.20 114 
PO 44 Germany 88.13 10.23 - 1.27 99.63 0.37 112 
Italy 95.47 4.07 0.39 99.93 0.07 111 
Spain 94.70 4.60 0.59 99.89 0.11 92 
Greece 97.49 2.13 0.25 99.87 0.00 72 
Portugal 93.41 5.56 0.88 99.85 0.15 46 
Average 93.19 5.776 0.876 99.768 0.219 100.9 
SMEs are therefore, as illustrated above, a significant demographic vis-ä- 
vis the economic structure of both `less favoured' and `more favoured' regions. 
They are therefore naturally accorded attention by policy makers not least because, 
as explored below, they account for so much of a nation's and region's 
employment providing a vital contribution to both the social and economic fabric. 
8 Source Data: European Commission Observatory of European SMEs (Statistics)' retrieved on 
29.11.04 from website: http: //www. eim. nl/observatory_7 and_8/en/stats/2001/varl/lcou_size. html 
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2.9 SME contribution to Employment 
SMEs are lauded across the globe for their potential to make a contribution 
(social and economic) to the wealth (and more equitable distributions thereof) and 
health (including political) of nation states and regions, i. e. social and economic 
cohesion. Consequently, a range of policy instruments have now been developed 
and deployed by governments world wide to support the SME sector, not only to 
be competitive in economic terms, but also to achieve a range of social and 
political objectives as explored in Chapters 3ff. 
The new policy rationale is not simply a nod to or recognition of the 
demographics of the economic structure but owes much to the SME share of 
employment. Systematic international studies examining the re-emergence of 
SMEs and entrepreneurship in North America and Europe conducted by, for 
example, Loveman and Sengenberger (1991), and Acs and Audretsch (1993) have 
found that the relative role of SMEs varies systematically across countries, and 
secondly, in most European countries and in North America, SMEs began 
increasing their relative importance as of the mid-1970s and evidently account for 
a significant share of the active workforce in OECD countries. 
For example, in Europe SMEs account for approximately 99.9 percent of 
all organizations and provide 72 percent of total employment (European 
Commission, European Network for SME Research, 1997), although some 
employment share disparities can be observed among European countries (Albors 
and Kingham, 1998) and as illustrated below. More specifically, in the US, for 
example, micro enterprises account for 10.976% of employment, while small firms 
account for 17.71%. Further, as illustrated below, Medium sized enterprises (50- 
299 employees) account for 17.39% and LSEs 53.91% (US Small Business 
Administration). In Europe, however, micro enterprises account for significantly 
higher proportion of employment than the US (34.29% of all employment), small 
enterprises 18.96% (again higher than the US) while medium sized enterprises (50- 
249 employees) 13.11% (less than US - although the latter might be explained in 
9 Source Data: US Small Business Administration retrieved on 04.12.04 from website: 
http: //www. sba. gov/advo/stats/us_02ss. pdf 
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part by difference in classification of Medium sized and LSE). As illustrated 
below, SMEs (Micro, Small and Medium-sized enterprises combined) account for 
66.36% of all employment in the EU and LSEs 33.64%. What is immediately 
striking from the chart below is the relative concentration of enterprises (SMEs 
and LSEs) in 5 countries with a GDP less than the EU average (i. e. 'less-favoured' 
regions) and their relative share of total employment in the EU, as illustrated 
above, by all size classes of enterprise. 
Figure 2.2: Profile of employment in Europe by size class and national GDP 
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Source Data: European Commission Observatory of European SMEs, 2001 10 
Further, is evident from the data presented below, as regards the 
demographics of employment `less favoured' regions have (i) a significantly 
higher average proportion of total employment in Micro sized firms than `more 
favoured' regions (37.41% as compared to 26.27%); (ii) a lesser proportion of 
employment [average] in small firms (18.92% as compared to 21.11%); (iii) a 
lesser proportion of employment [average] in medium sized firms (13.76% 
10 Source Data: European Commission Observatory of European SMEs (Statistics)' retrieved on 
29.11.04 from website: http: //www. eim. ni/observatory_7_and_8/en/stats/2001/varl/1cou_size. html 
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compared to 18.29%; and (iv) a lower proportion of employment [average] in 
LSEs (29.91% as compared to 34.33%). 
Table 2.4: European SME stock by country, size class and region 
More Favoured Regions 
Employment Distribution in Europe by size (1,000s) Relative % of National Employment 
Micro Small Medium SME LSE Total Micro Small Medium SME LSE GDP 
Luxembourg 49 50 52 151 57 208 23.56 24.04 25.00 72.6 27.40 219 
Norway 350 230 196 776 321 1097 31.91 20.97 17.87 70.74 29.26 162 
Switzerland 601 573 563 1737 864 2601 23.11 22.03 21.65 66.78 33.22 135 
Denmark 448 363 278 1089 495 1584 28.28 22.92 17.55 68.75 31.25 127 
Iceland 30 22 10 62 55 117 25.64 18.80 8.55 52.99 47.01 126 
Ireland 225 209 183 617 269 886 25.4 23.59 20.65 69.64 30.36 126 
Netherlands 1357 1004 1041 3402 2044 5446 24.92 18.44 19.11 62.47 37.53 122 
Sweden 614 408 358 1380 869 2249 27.3 18.14 15.92 61.36 38.64 120 
Less Favoured Regions 
Employment Distribution in Europe by size (1,000s) Relative % of National Employment 
Micro Small Medium SME LSE Total Micro Small Medium SME LSE GDP 
Austria 563 511 460 1534 808 2342 24.04 21.82 19.64 65.5 34.5 117 
Belgium 1416 517 346 2279 1029 3308 42.81 15.63 10.46 68.89 31.11 117 
Finland 310 205 189 704 486 1190 26.05 17.23 15.88 59.16 40.84 114 
France 5889 3261 2471 11621 5766 17387 33.87 18.76 14.21 66.84 33.16 114 
UK 6245 3033 2507 11785 9527 21312 29.3 14.23 11.76 55.3 44.7 114 
Germany 8516 6069 3316 17901 12010 29911 28.47 20.29 11.09 59.85 40.15 112 
Italy 6912 3032 1578 11522 2820 14342 48.19 21.14 11.00 80.34 19.66 111 
Spain 5994 2559 1614 10167 2629 12796 46.84 20.00 12.61 79.45 20.55 92 
Greece 1041 314 234 1589 244 1833 56.79 17.13 12.77 86.69 13.31 72 
Portugal 1181 720 568 2469 661 3130 37.73 23.00 18.15 78.88 21.12 46 
Average 2318.94 1282.22 886.89 4488.06 2275.22 6763.28 32.46 19.90 15.77 68.12 31.88 119.22 
Source Data: European Commission Observatory of European SMEs, 200111 
Evidently, SME across Europe account for the dominant share of 
employment (particularly in less favoured regions) while LSEs account for a 
higher share of employment in More Favoured Regions than Less Favoured 
Regions (illustrated below): 
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Figure 2.3: Average % of Total Employment in the EU (2000) by size class 
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Source Data: European Commission Observatory of European SMEs, 200112 
SMEs are clearly a significant demographic in social and economic terms 
(in `less favoured' and `more favoured' regions), however, the policy concern to 
support the SME sector owes much also to the perception that they make a 
significant contribution to regional economic dynamics - not least their perceived 
contribution to job creation. 
2.10 SME contribution to job creation 
The policy focus as regards SMEs and their economic contribution is not 
rooted simply in the current demographics of employment but also the capacity of 
SMEs to create employment a fact that was perhaps not particularly well 
appreciated and understood until the 1980s wherein Birch (1981, p. 8) confounding 
the conventional wisdom prevailing at the time, found that, 'Whatever else they are 
doing, large enterprises are no longer the major providers of new jobs for 
Americans'. Birch's study of all US firms from 1969 through 1976 (1987) 
discovered that small firms, (firms with 100 or fewer employees) created 81% of 
the net new jobs in the United States. 
' Source Data: 'European Commission Observatory of European SMEs (Statistics)' retrieved on 
29.11.04 from website: http: //www. eim. ni/observatory_7_and_8/en/stats/2001/varl/1cou_size. htrni 
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As economists generally regard net new job creation as a measure of 
economic growth, Birch's findings suggested that small rather than large firms 
caused most economic growth. Not surprisingly, much of the subsequent research 
[and policy] concerned with SMEs is concerned with their contribution to 
economic growth and, specifically, their capacity to create employment and that 
this is disproportionate to their size (Davidsson, Lindmark & Olofsson, 1993 and 
1994; Drucker 1994; ENSR, 1994; Fumagellia & Mussati, 1993; Kirchhoff & 
Phillips, 1998; and Aiginger & Tichy, 1991). 
As is evident, however, from a review of both the academic, political, 
economic and industrial literature, Birch's findings provoked considerable 
controversy and his data, methodology and application of data has been challenged 
as have his conclusions (see below). However, while the academic rigour of 
Birch's work was challenged, his work nevertheless underpinned a reorientation of 
industrial and regional policies in which SMEs were accorded a central role. 
Birch's findings had an additional resonance, given the persistent and relatively 
high unemployment rates observed in most OECD countries in the early 1990s 
which elevated employment and policy approaches to developing employment 
opportunities at the heart of public policy (OECD, 1997; Schreyer, 1996). 
According to Burrows (1991), Birch's 1979 findings were instrumental in 
persuading the Thatcher administration to create an `enterprise culture' in the UK 
(see Bridge et al, 1998). Further, a subsequent analysis of SBA data from 1969 
through 1990 demonstrated that firms with 100 or fewer employees were the 
primary creators of net new jobs in the United States13 thus cementing the SME as 
a central concern for industrial policy and further undermining the completeness of 
neoclassical theory and giving added credibility to Schumpeterian economic 
interpretations i. e. that small firms through innovation rather than large firms 
through economies of scale cause economic growth. 
In Europe, methodologies similar to Birch's were applied which evidently 
not only supported a reorientation of industrial policy in the EU nation states (e. g. 
12 Source Data: 'European Commission Observatory of European SMEs website (Statistics)' 
retrieved on 29.11.04 from website: 
http: //www. eim. ni/observatory_7_and_8/en/stats/2001 /var2/1 cou_size. html 
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the UK) but reinforced and seemingly validated the new approach to industrial 
policy in the US insofar as SMEs became not just as an added or peripheral 
dimension but as a central policy concern' 4. For example, Gallagher and Stewart 
(1986) and Storey and Johnson (1987) found that small enterprises (in the UK) 
created most of the new jobs. Further, Storey (1994) reviewing US and UK job 
creation studies by Birch, (1979); Armington, et al (1982); Gallagher et at (1986); 
Birch (1987); Gallagher et at (1987), and Gallagher et al (1991) concluded that 
while the SME contribution to job creation may have been overstated in Birch's 
original 1979 study, SMEs were nevertheless a significant source of job creation. 
Subsequent research by Konings (1995) found that that the gross job creation rate 
was highest in small establishments and lowest in large establishments and, by 
contrast, that the gross job destruction rate was lowest in small establishments and 
highest in large establishments while an OECD review of the contribution of 
SMEs (Schreyer, 1996) also concurred as the importance of the SME contribution 
to job creation. 
However, the nature and precise extent of the SME contribution to 
employment and economic performance has and is still the subject of `debate' 
(Harrison (1995); Acs, (1995); Storey, (1995); Davis, et al, (1996); Davidsson et al 
(1996) and has formed the subject of a 1996 OECD review). In general there is, 
however, (and notwithstanding significant levels of dissent - see below) a wealth 
of empirical evidence from the literature that seemingly supports the small 
business generator thesis: job creation rates fall with firm size in Australia 
(Williams, 1989), Canada (Picot et al., 1994; Baldwin and Picot, 1995), Denmark 
(Leth-Sorensen and Boegh-Nielson, 1995), Finland (Lumme, 1996), Germany 
(Wagner, 1995), the Netherlands (Broersma and Gautier, 1997), Sweden 
(Davidson, 1995), the United Kingdom (Doi and Cowling, 1998; Gallagher et al., 
13 Handbook of Small Business Data, 1994 edition, U. S. Small Business Administration 
14 Just as it is argued that Birch's work energised policy and a change in the focus of industrial 
policy in the US, Owen argues that a study carried out by the American management consultants, 
Arthur D. Little was particularly instrumental in the UK in changing industrial policy and which 
highlighted the dearth of fast-growing, technology-based firms in Britain compared to the US. In 
'New Technology-Based Firms In The UK And The Federal Republic Of Germany, A Report For 
The Anglo-German Foundation For The Study Of Industrial Society' (1977) is was reported that 
the number of new technology-based firms set up in Britain since 1950 and still in existence in the 
mid-1970s was estimated at about 200, compared to several thousand in the US. 
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1990), and the United States (Davis et al., 1994; Birch et al., 1993); so do net job 
rates, according to most of these studies as explored and reviewed by Schreyer: 
Table 2.5: SME contribution to Job Creation 
Country/Author Gross job creation rates Net job creation rates 
Canada: Picot, Baldwin, Dupuy fall with [increased] firm fall with [increased] firm size 
(1994) size 
United States: Haltiwanger (1995) fall with [increased] firm fall with [increased] firm size 
size 
United States: Dennis et al. fall with [increased] firm fall with [increased] firm size 
size 
United States: OECD (1995) fall with [increased] firm fall with [increased] firm size 
size 
Japan: OECD (1995) fall with [increased] firm no systematic relationship 
size 
Denmark: Leth-Sorensen, Boegh- fall with [increased] firm only micro-firms show high net 
Nielsen (1995) size job creation rates - no systematic 
relationship for other size classes 
Germany: Wagner (1995) fall with [increased] firm highest net job creation rate in 
size 20-49 size class 
Netherlands: Broersma and Gautier fall with [increased] firm job creation rates in firm with 
(1995) size less than 100 employees exceed 
job change rates of firms with 
more than 100 employees 
Sweden: Davidsson (1995) fall with [increased] firm smallest firms show largest net 
size creation and destruction rates 
United Kingdom: Gallagher et al. fall with [increased] firm highest net job creation rates for 
size micro enterprises, weaker 
performance of 20-49 size class 
Adapted from Source: Schreyer, P., (1996) 
This research might be contrasted, however, with data recently produced on 
the other side of the Atlantic in Canada. While between the second quarter of 
1996 and the second quarter of 1997, Canadian firms created 580,000 net new jobs 
and SMEs accounted for 81 percent of this net job growth (Industry Canada, 1998) 
an examination of data concerning the number of jobs created between the fourth 
quarter 2003 and the fourth quarter of 2004 wherein approximately 161 000 net 
59 
jobs (payroll jobs) were created reveals this growth in employment in the period 
was largely generated by large firms (those with 500 employees and over), which 
accounted for 101 percent of net job creation, while SMEs both lost jobs. 
Figure 2.4: % Contribution to Total Net Change by Size of Firm 
(Number of Employees), Canada 2001-2004 
Quarter 
Q3 2004 
Q2 2004 
Q1 2004 
Q4 2003 
Q3 2003 
Q2 2003 
Q1 2003 
Q4 2002 
Q3 2002 
Q2 2002 
Q1 2002 
Q4 2001 
Q3 2001 
Q2 2001 
Qi 2001 
Source Data: Industry Canada, 2005 
00-4 
  5-19 
Q 20-49 
Q 50-99 
  100-299 
Q 300-499 
  500 + 
It is evident, from the data (below), that only small businesses with 5-19 
employees contributed to net job creation (59 percent) but these gains were offset 
by the employment decrease in the other categories of small business. 
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Table 2.6: Quarterly Net Change in Payroll Employment by Firm Size, 
Canada, Q 12001 to Q3 2004 
Total Net Change % Contribution to Total Net Change by Size of Firm (Number of Employees) 
%, y/y Jobs, y/y 0-4 5-19 20-49 50-99 0-99 100-299 300-499 100-499 500 + 
Q12001 3.7 445,716 10.2 1.3 8.2 6.1 25.8 11.4 3.6 15.0 59.2 
Q2 2001 2.8 344,534 2.0 8.8 13.3 12.1 36.1 11.0 2.7 13.7 50.1 
Q3 2001 1.8 220,349 30.4 2.6 17.3 15.8 66.1 0.1 -1.0 -0.9 34.8 
Q4 2001 0.9 118,891 33.4 39.9 36.0 13.9 123.2 -18.7 -39.8 -58.5 35.3 
Q12002 0.9 109,548 -10.5 32.4 43.3 37.1 102.3 . 8.6 -26.8 -35.4 33.1 
Q2 2002 1.7 219,942 -2.2 5.4 36.8 37.7 77.8 14.1 -16.4 -2.3 24.5 
Q3 2002 2.9 371,463 -0.5 1.0 24.1 25.5 50.1 16.7 -8.7 8.0 41.9 
Q4 2002 3.7 468,364 -1.0 2.0 22.3 23.7 47.0 13.1 -1.9 11.1 41.9 
Q12003 3.3 417,855 1.6 -0.2 17.6 19.7 38.6 13.1 2.8 15.9 45.4 
Q2 2003 2.3 295,447 4.5 03 9.6 9.5 23.9 12.4 4.5 16.9 59.2 
Q3 2003 1.0 133,500 9.1 -5.9 14.3 15.7 33.1 16.6 11.4 28.0 38.9 
Q4 2003 0.7 88,971 7.3 -15.3 18.5 29.4 39.9 17.6 13.8 31.4 28.7 
Q12004 0.5 63,120 1.3 19.9 15.9 25.8 62.9 0.6 -37.4 -36.8 73.9 
Q2 2004 0.7 93,736 -20.0 92.5 -28.9 -45.4 -1.7 -31.3 21.3 -9.9 111.7 
Q3 2004 1.2 158,969 -18.7 59.0 -10.6 -30.6 -0.8 -9.7 3.4 -6.3 107.1 
Source Data: Industry Canada, 200515 
Evidently, therefore job creation by SMEs is not necessarily a constant. 
Indeed, in an analysis of three regions in the UK (Hart and Hanvey, 1995) found 
that while employment creation came largely from SMEs, most of the job losses 
also came from SMEs. 
is Source Data: Industry Canada retrieved on 28.01.05 from Statistics Canada website: Survey of 
Employment, Payrolls and Hours, December, 2004. http: //strategis. ic. gc. ca/epic/internet/insbrp- 
rppe. nsf/en/rd01030e. html 
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Moreover, significant degrees of variation have also been noted between 
countries and regions (Keeble and Walker, 1994; Kidd and Gallagher, 1994; Hart 
and Hanvey, 1994; and Storey, 1994) and as illustrated below by the Canadian 
data: 
Figure 2.5: % Contribution to Total Net Change by Size of Firm (Number of 
Employees) by region (Canada, 2001-2004) 
Region 
Newfoundland 
Prince Edward Island 
Nova Scotia 
New Brunswick 
Quebec 
Ontario 
Manitoba 
Saskatchewan 
Alberta 
British Columbia 
Yukon 
North West Territories 
Nunavut 
-100% -50% 0% 
50% 100% 
00-4   5-19 Q 20-49 Q 50-99   100-299 0 300-499   500 + 
Source: Industry Canada, 200516 
As is evident from the data table and illustration above, there are significant 
degrees of variation between regions. 
16 Source Data: Industry Canada retrieved on 28.01.05 from Statistics Canada website: Survey of 
Employment, Payrolls and Hours. December, 2004. http: //strategis. ic. gc. ca/epic/internet/insbrp- 
rppe. nsf/en/rd01030e. html 
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Table 2.7: % Contribution to Total Net Change by Size of Firm (Number of 
Employees) by region (Canada, 2001-2004) 
Year-over-year Annual Net 
Change in Payroll Employment by 
Province and Territory and Firm 
Total Net Change Growth Rates (%) by Size of Firm (Number of Employees) 
Size, Four-quarter Averages, 
Q4 2002 to Q3 2004 Q4 
y/y Jobs, y/y 0-4 5-19 20-49 50-99 0-99 
100- 
299 
300- 
499 
100- 
499 
500 + 
Newfoundland 0.2 441 -0.4 5.8 3.2 -1.2 2.7 -3.6 23.6 
3.8 -2.3 
Prince Edward Island 0.9 574 1.0 -1.4 -3.5 -2.7 -1.8 -2.7 4.3 -0.7 
4.6 
Nova Scotia -0.8 -3,170 -3.0 1.3 "1.5 -0.8 -0.7 -0.9 
5.1 0.6 -1.5 
New Brunswick -2.4 -7,227 -0.9 -0.2 -2.4 -4.0 -1.6 -6.2 -9.3 -7.1 . 
1.7 
Quebec 0.6 17,311 -2.5 1.3 1.5 0.1 0.5 -1.2 -0.8 -1.1 
1.3 
Ontario 0.9 43,582 -1.2 2.5 -1.2 -1.6 -0.1 -1.1 0.3 -0.7 
2.2 
Manitoba -0.9 -4,456 -3.0 3.0 -3.6 -7.3 -2.2 -2.7 -4.1 -3.1 
1.0 
Saskatchewan 2.4 9,396 -2.7 2.8 -2.2 -3.4 -0.7 -3.3 7.7 
0.0 6.4 
Alberta 1.6 23,672 1.8 3.1 -1.9 0.4 1.0 3.4 -1.4 2.0 
2.2 
British Columbia 1.3 20,470 0.0 4.0 1.8 -0.4 1.8 2.6 4.8 3.2 -0.1 
Yukon -0.7 -105 -2.7 4.0 2.4 0.8 
1.7 0.2 - - - 
North West Territories 1.6 347 -6.3 1.8 4.3 -9.1 -0.7 9.1 - - 
Nunavut 3.4 365 -6.0 -7.9 -0.8 25.4 3.1 -6.8 - - 
Canada Total 0.8 101,199 -1.1 2.4 -0.3 -1.1 0.3 -0.5 
0.6 -0.2 1.5 
Source: Industry Canada, 200517 
Interestingly, micro sized enterprises (as defined in Canada as enterprises 
with 0-4 employees) generally figure as having experienced net losses in the 
period while firms with 5-19 employees generally figure as net job creators. 
Similarly, while firms with 20-49,50-99, and 100-299 employees tend to account 
for net job losses, firms with 300+ employees seemingly account, in general terms 
(and with significant exceptions) to net job creation in the period. 
In a similar vein, the UK's Trade Union Congress (TUC) economic report 
`Small firms - myths and realities' (2003) has challenged research that has given 
rise to the presumption the small firms are responsible for job creation and that a 
large SME sector is now critical for a successful economy on the grounds that the 
facts of these matters have been obscured until relatively recently by "a lack of 
hard statistical data" (page 1) and a failure to properly account for the SME 
17 Source Data: Industry Canada retrieved on 28.01.05 from Statistics Canada website: Survey of 
Employment, Payrolls and Hours, December, 2004. http: //strategis. ic. gc. ca/epic/internet/insbrp- 
rppe. nsf/en/rd01030e. html 
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contribution to `job destruction'. Comparing the figures for total employment 
(averages) for 1994-1996 and 1999-2001, the authors of the report found that "over 
this period total employment in SMEs had changed little, increasing by less than 2 
per cent. In contrast, almost all the increase in total private sector employment has 
been in large firms, with an increase of 17 per cent. The share of total private 
sector employment in SMEs has fallen from 52.3 per cent in 1994-1996 to 47.7 per 
cent in 1999-2001". 
The presumption that SMEs make the most significant contribution as 
regards job creation (and an acknowledgement of their contribution to `job 
destruction') has also been explored in the EU Observatory of European SMEs 
2003 Report (No. 7- SMEs in Europe 2003), which found that during the 1990-3 
recession, the decline in employment was found to be greater in large or medium- 
sized companies than in SMEs, thus suggesting that SMEs are less vulnerable to 
fluctuations in the business cycle. 
This seemingly mirrors Singapore's experience as explained by the 
Minister for Home Affairs Mr Wong Kan Seng (2004) "During the economic 
recession in 2001 and 2002, the employment of our SMEs rose by 6.6%, in 
contrast to those of our MNCs which shrank by 1.7%". Evidently, while 
employment generally has remained more stable in SMEs during periods of 
recession, in times of economic recovery, however, employment growth has 
tended to be concentrated in the larger enterprises. 
As may be observed, for example, from European data for the period 1990- 
2001 (as illustrated below) and during and following the recession of 1990-1993, 
LSEs were seemingly getting bigger while the average size of micro-firms 
declined: 
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Figure 2.6: Profile of % Change in Employment/Enterprise in EU 19 
(by Enterprise Size Class) 1990-2001 
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Source Data: European Commission Observatory of European SMEs. 200118 
However it should be acknowledged that in Europe while the average size of 
micro-sized firms decreased, their number nevertheless increased during this 
period. 
Figure 2.7: Profile of Employment in EU 19 by Enterprise Size Class, 1990- 
2001 
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Source Data: European Commission Observatory of European SMEs, 200119 
1e Source Data: 'European Commission Observatory of European SMEs (Statistics)' retrieved on 
29.11.04 from website: http: //www. eim. ni/observatory_7_and_8/en/stats/2001/var4/4el9. htmi 
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There is in fact an array of scholarship that contests and rejects the view 
that small firms are the engines of job formation - or that their role is over-stated - 
(Dunne, Roberts, and Samuelson, 1989; Leonard, 1986; Little, et al., 1987; Brown, 
Hamilton, and Medoff, 1990). For instance, Davis, Haltiwanger and Schuh (1993) 
state that "many claims about the job-creating prowess of small businesses derive 
from fallacious interpretations of data on the size distribution of employment" 
(page 12) and later that "Public discourse about job creation rarely distinguishes 
between the small business share of gross job creation and its share of net job 
creation. Consequently, claims about the job creation role of small business often 
conjure up the image of an economy in which large firms inexorably shrink and 
small firms struggle valiantly to replenish the stock of jobs" (p. 13) and have 
endeavoured to show that while gross rates of job creation and destruction are 
higher in small firms, there is no systematic relationship between net job creation 
and firm size. 
Davis, Haltiwanger and Schuh's critique of Birch's original work has itself 
however attracted its own share of criticism from e. g. Davidsson, P. (1995). More 
recently, however, Davis, Haltiwanger and Schuh (1996) having "corrected for the 
regression to the mean fallacy" they claim is inherent in Birch's results in 
estimating employment generation for the U. S between 1972-1988 nevertheless 
conclude that SMEs do in fact account for more than their share of new 
employment. In particular, in their study large enterprises created 53% of the new 
jobs but their employment share is 65%. At the same time, large enterprises 
destroyed 56 % of the jobs, which is greater than their share of new jobs created. 
As noted above, the data and methodology used by Birch (1979) have 
given rise to a range of criticisms (Armington and Odle, 1982 and Harrison, 1997). 
According to Harrison, apart from the fact that Birch did apparently not establish a 
difference between SMEs and subsidiaries of large companies, 
19 Source Data: 'European Commission Observatory of European SMEs (Statistics)' retrieved on 
29.11.04 from website: http: //www. eim. nl/observatory_7_and 8/en/stats/2001/var2/4el9. html 
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Harrison also criticised Birch for failing to illuminate the fact that most 
employment was created by only a small proportion of firms, i. e. fast growing 
firms (which Birch subsequently 'corrected' in 1987 wherein he coined the term 
for such firms - "gazelles"). Evidently several studies, both European and 
American have seemingly confirmed this phenomenon i. e. that job creation is not 
uniform across or within the size classes of enterprise. In a study on the European 
Economic Community, Storey and Johnson (1987) observed that over a period of 
12 years, less than 10% of firms created at the start of the period had grown 
beyond 20 workers and less than 1% of them had surpassed 100 workers. 
Furthermore, an OECD study (1999) illustrated that within the reference 
period job creation was not a constant across regions and that significant 
disparities vis-ä-vis the contribution of SMEs to employment existed across 
Europe. For example, the number of SMEs with between 20 and 500 employees 
that had doubled their employment only represented between 2% and 10% of the 
surviving firms, but had generated between 48% and 88% of new employment 
created by this type of firm in France, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain and Quebec. 
Indeed, a review of the literature reveals that number of studies in Germany, 
Greece and Sweden (Julien, 2000), Ireland (O'Farrel, 1984), the United States 
(Dunkelberg and Cooper, 1982), Canada (McMullan and Vesper, 1987) and some 
regions in the United Kingdom (Gallagher and Miller, 1991) have seemingly 
confirmed these observations. 
In summary, there has been and continues to be forthright criticism of the 
scholarship and policy rationale for SME support based on their capacity to create 
jobs which some have dismissed as a `myth'. For example, as according to Postrel 
(1994, p. 1) "Small business is, apparently, the opposite of the weather: Everybody 
praises it, and everybody does something about it. But all this posturing is based 
on bad economics and worse politics. Contrary to endlessly repeated conventional 
wisdom, small companies do not account for the vast majority of new jobs". 
Moreover, the policy rationale for SME support based on their social and 
economic contribution as regards their ability to create employment has also been 
critiqued at a qualitative level i. e. in terms of job quality. There is, for example, 
microeconomic evidence that does not support the pro-SME view that small firms 
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create better quality jobs than large firms. Research undertaken in the US and 
Europe has found a systematic and positive relationship between employee 
compensation and firm size (Brown and Medoff, 1989; Brown et al 1990). Indeed, 
an array of empirical evidence would seem to indicate that LSEs offer more stable 
employment, higher wages and more non-wage benefits than SMEs in developed 
and developing countries, even after controlling for differences in education, 
experience and industry (Brown, Medoff and Hamilton, 1990; and Rosenzweig, 
1988). r J 
Notwithstanding such dissent, vis-ä-vis the SME contribution to job 
creation and/or the quality of jobs created, the political commitment to SMEs - 
perhaps surprisingly - remains undimmed and they remain central to economic 
strategies and plans the world over. Unshakeable in their conviction, policy 
makers continue to accord SMEs a pivotal role in economic development and 
regeneration policy still very much predicated on their capacity to create 
employment. Moreover, another 'front' has opened up in the SME debate vis-ä- 
vis their relative contribution to economic development and competitiveness, 
namely their capability and capacity to innovate. 
2.11 SMEs and innovation 
It has been postulated that big businesses, profiting from "economies of 
scale, " are more naturally efficient and, by their nature, are more innovatory (more 
naturally equipped to be so), i. e. innovation is a factor of size (see Pagano and 
Schivardi (2001) reviewing innovatory activity in Europe). Indeed, until relatively 
recently, the conventional wisdom (e. g. Chandler (1990) who concluded, 'to 
compete globally you have to be big') has stipulated that SMEs are inherently 
disadvantaged insofar as they have a deficit of knowledge assets which constrains 
their ability to generate innovative outputs and be as competitive as LSEs. 
Schumpeter, for example, has suggested in Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy 
(1942, p. 101) that it is in fact "The monopolist firm [that] will generate a larger 
supply of innovations because there are advantages which, though not strictly 
unattainable on the competitive level of enterprise, are as a matter of fact secured 
only on the monopoly level". Similarly, Galbraith (1956) has argued "Because 
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development is costly, it follows that it can be carried on only by a firm that has 
the resources which are associated with considerable size" while Nelson (1959) 
submits that larger firms are more likely find an economic application for their 
innovation. Similarly, Scherer (1991) notes that larger firms are endowed with 
economies of scale vis-a-vis promotion and in distribution, facilitating the 
penetration of new products and the achievement of greater returns on investment 
in innovation. 
There are those, however, that have questioned what has, prevailed, until 
relatively as `received' or `conventional wisdom' and would now assert the 
contrary. For example, Scherer (1988, pp. 4-5) submits: 
"Smaller enterprises make their impressive contributions to innovation 
because of several advantages they possess compared to large-size 
corporations. One important strength is that they are less bureaucratic, 
without layers of 'abominable no-men' who block daring ventures in a 
more highly structured organization. Second, and something that is 
often overlooked, many advances in technology accumulate upon a 
myriad of detailed inventions involving individual components, 
materials, and fabrication techniques. The sales possibilities for 
making such narrow, detailed advances are often too modest to interest 
giant corporations. An individual entrepreneur's juices will flow over 
a new product or process with sales prospects in the millions of dollars 
per year, whereas few large corporations can work up much 
excitement over such small fish, nor can they accommodate small 
ventures easily into their organizational structures. Third, it is easier 
to sustain a fever pitch of excitement in small organization, where the 
links between challenges, staff, and potential rewards are tight. 'All- 
nighters' through which tough technical problems are solved 
expeditiously are common". 
Indeed, more recent research has postulated that the size of an enterprise 
(smaller enterprise) enables innovation to flourish free from bureaucratic 
constraints (Link and Bozeman, 1991). Similarly, Acs and Audretsch (1987) 
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provide empirical evidence that small firms have a relative innovative advantage 
over their larger counterparts in highly innovative industries. Further evidence for 
the comparative advantage of small firms in inventing radically new products is 
also given in Prusa and Schmitz (1991), and Rothwell (1983 and 1984). 
From a review of recent scholarship, it is increasingly acknowledged that 
SMEs do make a significant contribution to innovation and/or that the nature and 
level of their contribution may be variable given: 
(i) The industry sector (and the nature thereof). Acs and Audretsch (1987), 
reviewing the performance of US firms found that small firms have higher 
innovation rates in "high technology" skill-intensive industries and larger 
firms have the innovative edge in "lower technology, " capital-intensive 
industries. In their subsequent research, investigating the relative 
innovation intensity amongst LSEs and SMEs in the manufacturing sector, 
Acs and Audretsch, (1988) and (1990) found that the innovation rate 
(calculated with reference to the number of personnel employed) was 
higher in SMEs than LSEs. Acs (1996) measuring innovation (defined as 
the total number of innovations per 1000 employees in different industry 
sectors) found that that small firms (<500 employees) produced more 
innovations in the fields of electronic computing equipment, process 
control instruments, electronic components, engineering and scientific 
instruments and plastics products. Subsequent research conducted by Acs 
and Audretsch (2001) investigating innovatory activity amongst small 
firms and across sectors found significant variations. For example, they 
found SMEs as making particularly significant contributions vis-ä-vis 
innovation activity in a number of industries including computers and 
process control instruments as industries. Acs and Audretsch's findings 
complement and extend the work of Baldwin and Johnson (1999), who 
have observed the importance of small firms vis-ä-vis electronics, 
instruments, medical equipment, steel, and biotechnology. 
(ii) The country and its state of industrial development. Pavitt et al. (1987) and 
Rothwell, (1988) Acs and Preston (1997) contend that SMEs are 
responsible for a disproportionately large number of technological 
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innovations in industrialized nations (and in newly industrialized countries 
such as Korea (Lee, 1995) while in 'less' or `least favoured regions', 
specifically developing countries larger (and exporting) firms have been 
revealed as the mainstay of innovation and typically the primary 
mechanism through which technologies are adapted from abroad to local 
circumstances (See Biggs, Shah, and Srivastava, 1996; Pack, 1992, and 
Pack and Westphal, 1986). Elsewhere, research undertaken by Harhoff and 
Licht (1996) indicated that fewer SMEs in the five new German Länder 
(previously East Germany) were innovative compared with West German 
counterparts (more than two-thirds of the smallest SMEs in East Germany 
were not considered innovative and were found to be less than half as likely 
to undertake R&D, as are their West German counterparts). 
(iii) The economic or market structure. Acs and Audretsch (1987,1988, and 
1990) have also observed that market structure influences the total amount 
of innovative activity as does the relative innovative advantage between 
large and small enterprises. 
(iv) Location (specifically proximity to universities and resultant `knowledge 
spill-overs'). Acs et al (1994) in an econometric study and analysis of the 
pattern of innovations in the U. S. (in 1982) concluded that the innovative 
output of small firms was higher in the vicinity of universities. A study 
conducted by Audretsch and Vivarelli (1996), covering 15 Italian regions 
over nine years, arrived at the same conclusion. 
Other research has sought to advance our understanding of the relative 
contribution of LSEs and SMEs as regards innovation by investigating (a) the 
nature and relative levels of patenting activity amongst LSEs and SMEs (e. g. 
Scherer, 1983; Bound et al., 1984; and/or (b) relative levels of expenditure by 
LSEs and SMEs on research and development; and/or (c) innovatory activities as 
reported by SMEs and LSE. 
As regards (a), LSEs in the US have been found to the most innovatory 
economic form/unit of production (Acs and Audretsch (1990) found (analysing 
data for the US (SBA Innovation data) that the most innovative U. S. enterprises 
(those registering patents) were, in fact, LSEs -a finding explained as a 
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consequence of the fact that LSEs tended to have large R&D laboratories and be 
more naturally R&D resource intensive). Rothwell and Zegveld (1982) in a study 
of 380 innovations made between 1953 and 1973, in the U. S., UK, B. R. D., Japan, 
and France found that small firms contributed 31 % and large firms 54 % of all 
innovations. In estimating how radical the innovations were they also concluded 
that the entire output of small firms in UK consisted of radical breakthroughs. 
(The U. S. small firms produced 27 % of the "radical breakthroughs" made in the 
country as well as 30 % of the "major technological shifts" and 37 % of the 
"improvement-type innovations"). 
In West Germany SMEs have evidently demonstrated a higher propensity 
to patent than LSEs (Schwalbach and Zimmermann (1991)) and elsewhere 
research undertaken by Gellman (1976 and 1982) indicated that SMEs were 
contributing 2.45 times more innovations per employee than large firms while Acs 
and Audretsch (1990) found that small firms introduce 2.38 more innovations per 
employee than their larger counterparts. 
It must be noted, however, that research based on patents as a measure of 
innovatory activity, should be treated with caution. As noted by Scherer (1983), 
"The quantity and quality of industry patenting may depend upon chance, how 
readily a technology lends itself to patent protection, and business decision- 
makers' varying perceptions of how much advantage they will derive from patent 
rights. Not much of a systematic nature is known about these phenomena, which 
can be characterized as differences in the propensity to patent". Furthermore, as 
observed by Mansfield (1984), "The value and cost of individual patents vary 
enormously within and across industries... Many inventions are not patented. And 
in some industries, like electronics, there is considerable speculation that the patent 
system is being bypassed to a greater extent than in the past. Some types of 
technologies are more likely to be patented than others". In addition, most SMEs 
producing innovations (as observed in the course of the surveys and interviews 
undertaken in the course of this research) do not necessarily avail themselves of 
patent or other formal protections but consider themselves no less innovative or 
less concerned with innovatory outputs. 
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Results from research comparing propensity to innovate based on patent 
data may, however, be skewed by the selection of industries or technologies 
sampled. For example, in specific studies of the semiconductor industry and 
patent data between 1977-89, Almeida and Kogut (1997) and Almeida (1999) 
argue that small firms tend to innovate in relatively unexplored fields of 
technology while larger enterprises seem to concentrate their research, measured as 
patents, in more established fields. Indeed, as observed by Jovanovic (2001) "The 
new economy is one in which technologies and products become obsolete at a 
much faster rate than a few decades ago" and so the propensity to patent may also 
be reduced as the state of the art is much more fluid. In addition, it should also be 
remembered that patents, of themselves, may contribute little to the knowledge 
stock or economics of a locality, region or nation if they are not commercially 
exploited or are exploited but elsewhere. 
As regards (b), Harhoff and Licht (1996) determined that SMEs (defined in 
their study as having fewer than 500 employees) accounted for only 12% of the 
research and development expenditures in (West) Germany. However, again 
expenditure on R&D as an indicator of innovatory activity should also be treated 
with caution as this is in fact only a measure of activity (specifically, factor inputs 
and not outputs), and as such may not be particularly illuminating or evidential as a 
measure of the innovativeness and impact of innovations. 
Furthermore, while LSEs may report higher levels of expenditure on R&D 
this may in fact be explained as a consequence of the fact that they are more able 
to disaggregate support or identify such costs with reference to e. g. dedicated R&D 
personnel whereas as noted in the course of this research relatively few SMEs 
reported that they had a dedicated R&D budget or could differentiate between 
expenditure on R&D from general expenditure which might therefore distort 
research results predicated on this indicator. Indeed, many of the SMEs 
interviewed in the course of this research indicated that they considered themselves 
innovatory or regarded themselves as innovating in product, process or 
administrative terms but did so without formal arrangements or measures (to 
disaggregate expenditure or staff time dedicated to R&D or innovation) a point 
also observed by Santarelli and Sterlachinni (1990 and 1994). Interestingly, 
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Harhoff and Licht (above) did observe that only 3% of the largest corporations in 
Germany that did not undertake formal R&D were considered innovative while, 
25% enterprises with fewer than 50 employees without formal R&D could be 
considered innovative. 
As regards (c), Harhoff and Licht's observation that the propensity to 
innovate seemingly decreases as the size of the enterprise decrease, these results 
were later echoed in the European Commission's Community Innovation Survey 
`Innovation in Europe Results for the EU, Iceland and Norway' (2004) which also 
found that the propensity to innovate generally increases with the average size of 
an enterprise: 
Figure 2.8: Proportion of EU enterprise with Innovatory Activity (1998-2000) 
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Source Data: European Commission's Community Innovation Survey (CIS), 2004 
The CIS data illustrates that a higher proportion of large or medium-sized 
enterprises reported innovative activities than small firms during the period 1998- 
2000. Similarly, Harhoff and Licht's (1996) data (extracted from the Mannheim 
Innovation Data Base measuring the extent of innovative activity in German 
enterprises between 1990 and 1992) also indicated that propensity to innovate 
seemingly decreased as the size of the enterprise decreased i. e. 52% of enterprises 
with fewer than 50 employees were not innovative while only 15% of the 
enterprises with at least 1 000 employees were not innovative. 
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The EU survey also noted that there were proportionally more enterprises 
in the EU with innovation activity in industry than in services for each of the size- 
classes (illustrated overleaf) and that the `gap' between these two sectors increased 
as a function of the size-class. Evidently, while the proportion of enterprises with 
innovation activity among small enterprises in the industrial sector and the services 
sector was relatively similar (40% and 36%, respectively), the degree of difference 
increased from 4% to 9% among medium-sized enterprises and to 11% among 
large enterprises. 
Figure 2.9: Proportion of EU Enterprises reporting innovative activity 
by sector (1998-2000) 
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Source Data: European Commission's Community Innovation Survey, 2004 
Evidently, however, a significant proportion of the enterprise stock LSE 
and, more particularly SME are innovating in a myriad of technologies and sectors 
although Pack and Westphal, 1986) and Pagano and Schivardi (2001) have 
observed, analysing a sample of European industrial sectors, that a larger average 
firm size is associated with faster innovation rates, while Acs and Audretsch 
(1987), examining innovation in the US have suggested that small firms tend to 
have higher innovation rates in "high technology" skill-intensive industries and 
larger firms have the innovative edge in "lower technology, " capital -intensive 
industries. 
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Industry Services 
In summary, relative innovation intensities notwithstanding, it is now 
generally accepted, as observed by the OECD, that "SMEs are a heterogeneous 
population of firms whose contributions to the innovation system are wide ranging 
and include not only R&D based new products and services, but also improved 
designs and processes and the adoption of new technologies". It is postulated that 
the contribution of entrepreneurial small firms to innovation and technological 
change has not been particularly well understood as traditional measures of 
innovatory activity have been inherently inadequate or ill-suited to the (e. g. patent 
or BERD discussed above) and that historically SMEs have been contributing to 
the innovation stock and the competitiveness of international, national, regional 
and local economies howsoever unobserved by policy makers and academics. 
Moreover, it is also suggested that the contribution of SMEs to innovation 
and thus competitiveness and economic growth is actually a more modem 
phenomenon prompted by changes in the economic structure (globalization, new 
technologies that have facilitated new forms of work organisation and ways to 
engage and mobilize labour an, not least, the emergence of knowledge as the 
critical factor in production - also discussed above). For example, Jovanovic 
(2001) has observed that "The new economy is one in which technologies and 
products become obsolete at a much faster rate than a few decades ago. It is clear 
that we are entering the era of the young enterprise. The small enterprise will thus 
resume a role that, in its importance, is greater than it has been at any time in the 
last seventy years or so". In fact, there is a probably a grain of truth in both 
hypotheses and that the answer lies somewhere between the two. 
The increased recognition and interest in the nature and level of innovation 
as occurring within SMEs has also prompted interest in the relative economic or 
commercial value of innovatory activity as occurring in SMEs and a range of work 
investigating the specific contribution of `innovatory' SMEs to the creation of 
employment (itself an indicator of economic value). While the former is 
seemingly beset with methodological difficulties it is generally accepted, as 
regards the latter, that innovation has a positive effect on employment creation, an 
effect it is suggested, that may be more pronounced in small and medium sized 
enterprises than in large scale enterprises, and more so in the manufacturing as 
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well as the service sectors (see for example, Cesaratto et al., 1996; Kleinknecht et 
al., 1990; Klomp and Pronk, 1998). Generally, the analysis of employment 
creation by small innovative enterprises points to four key findings summarised in 
Tether (2000, p. 110): 
1. Innovative or technology based new and small firms are more likely to 
create employment than similar firms in the general population. 
2. The average rate of employment creation in an individual innovative 
or technology based new or small firm tends to be modest. In general 
the average rate of employment creation amongst such firms is much 
less than ten jobs per firm per year (Storey and Tether (1998)). This is 
not a recurrent finding for the UK, but also for continental Europe. 
3. Growth amongst innovative and technology based new and small firms 
tends to be concentrated in a few firms (Storey et al., 1987; and North 
et al. 1994). 
4. Even amongst the fastest growing innovative and technology based 
new and small firms the absolute number of jobs created over a decade 
tends to be modest. 
In general terms, it is evident from the literature that innovation at 
aggregate as well as at firm level is said to have a positive effect on employment. 
As noted in European Commission, DG Enterprise's Report `Innovative Small and 
Medium Sized Enterprises and the Creation of Employment' (2001), "there seems 
to be a consistently negative relationship between firm size and the rate of 
employment creation in innovative enterprises. However, although the average 
growth rate of employment appears to be higher in SMEs than in large scale 
enterprises, growth in innovative small firms is very variable with some small 
innovative enterprises showing very high and others very low growth rates. This 
underlines the higher risk small innovative enterprises face and may result in a 
comparatively low number of jobs created in these firms". 
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Additionally, a range of work has also been undertaken that has 
endeavoured to explore whether the nature and or the level of innovation produces 
different effects on employment. Specifically, as regards the different effects of 
product and process innovation on employment creation Lettmayr et. al (1997), for 
example, found that in Austrian SMEs reporting product and process innovation 
posted the highest increase in turnover followed by enterprises with only product 
innovation. 
Notably, enterprises reporting only process innovations seemingly 
performed worse than non-innovative enterprises with regard to turnover growth. 
Further, with regard to employment growth only those SMEs that reported, product 
as well as process innovation posted a notable increase, results seeming confirmed 
by the EU's Second Community Innovation Survey (CIS II) and in the work of 
Ludsteck and Steiner (2000) who, in an analysis of the European manufacturing 
sector, found that innovation has a significant effect on employment only if 
product as well as process innovation is conducted jointly. As regards studies as to 
the impact of organisational innovations, (e. g. Coriat, 1995) it is postulated that 
they too may be an important source for increased productivity and 
competitiveness and that they may well have a major impact on the creation of 
employment, productivity and growth. 
SME contributions to innovation and/or R&D (howsoever measured and 
reported) have attracted interest by policy makers who have (worldwide) 
programmed initiatives and instruments to support SME innovators via, for 
example: 
  Business Incubators/Innovation Centres and other business services; and 
  R&D grants (e. g. in Europe via the European Commission's Framework 
Programmes (now in their sixth incarnation) while in the US as reported 
by the US SBA, the US Departments of Agriculture; Commerce; Defence; 
Education; Energy; Health and Human Services; Transportation; the 
Environmental Protection Agency; the National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration and the National Science Foundation are required by Small 
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Business Innovation Research Program (SBIR) to reserve a portion of their 
R&D funds for award to small business and similarly the Small Business 
Technology Transfer Program (STTR) again requires the Departments of 
Defence; Energy; Health and Human Services; the National Aeronautics 
and Space Administration and the National Science Foundation to reserve 
a portion of their R&D funds for award to small business 
Notwithstanding the level and array of support devoted to supporting SME 
innovators, the economic value of innovations is difficult to quantify empirically. 
For example, there are difficulties in disaggregating the economic performance of 
an enterprise and attributing parts thereof to a product(s), process (es) or indeed 
administrative innovation(s) to say nothing of adequately acknowledging the 
contribution of other factors. Indeed, Gold (1976) postulates that argued that the 
objective of determining the economic effects of innovation is generally 
unattainable. 
Therefore and in concluding this review of the contribution of SMEs to 
regional economic performance and specifically in `less favoured' regions a 
review of GVA (the difference between the value of goods and services produced 
and the cost of raw materials and other inputs which are used up in production) 
data by country and size class across Europe is thus perhaps more informative as 
perhaps it is the degree and extent to which SMEs create and add economic value 
that is perhaps more descriptive and revealing in economic terms (especially given 
the inherent difficulties in quantifying the contribution of SME innovations to 
economic performance). Indeed, it is perhaps the truest measure of 
entrepreneurship i. e. the capacity to manipulate factor inputs (whatever they may 
be) and add value for a commercial return. 
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2.12 SMEs and GVA 
Evidently, not only do SMEs account for a significant proportion of GVA 
as generated in the EU (illustrated below) to which micro, small and medium sized 
enterprises play a part, in fact their collective contribution to total GVA exceeds 
that of LSEs. This latter finding is perhaps not surprising given the demographics 
of the EU's economic structure and the preponderance of SMEs therein. 
Figure 2.10: Total EU GVA (2000) by size class 
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Source Data: European Commission Observatory of European SMEs, 200120 
Furthermore, as is evident from the data (set out in the table below) the 
`less-favoured regions' (italics) of the EU account for 88.4% of total EU GVA. 
Furthermore, the SME stock of the EU's less favoured regions accounts for 
46.16% of the total while their LSE stock accounts for 42.24%. 
20 Source Data derived from Eurostat's SME Database for 1993/1997, as updated by EIM Business 
& Policy Research retrieved on 12.04.05 from European Commission Observatory of European 
SMEs (Statistics)' from website: 
http: //www. eim. ni/observatory_7_and_8/en/stats/2001 /var3/1 cou_size. htmi (12.04.05 
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Table 2.8: Value added by country and size class (million Euros), 200021 
`Less-Favoured Regions' in italics 
Micro Small Medium SME LSE Total GDP 
Luxembourg 3110 4707 17231 25048 8712 33760 219 
Norway 13059 12485 15215 40759 37651 78410 162 
Switzerland 32224 28568 28376 89168 96884 186052 135 
Denmark 16729 14678 13639 45046 31624 76670 127 
Iceland 1340 994 511 2845 20221 23067 126 
Ireland 24308 40550 57732 122590 248647 371236 126 
Netherlands 37031 39182 57451 133665 104768 238433 122 
Sweden 24675 20906 22492 68073 64087 132161 120 
Austria 18486 22962 23977 65426 63225 128650 117 
Belgium 43048 30749 23087 96883 53343 150226 117 
Finland 13076 10097 8289 31461 39507 70968 114 
France 164310 134850 125116 424277 502944 927221 114 
UK 303402 454799 618794 1376995 2208841 3585836 114 
Germany 230574 255612 232954 719140 476002 1195142 112 
Italy 599063 444301 288648 1332012 533974 1865986 111 
Spain 73505 63295 63548 200348 161935 362283 92 
Greece 47687 41787 26343 115817 23933 139750 72 
Portugal 61201 58239 54442 173881 86427 260308 46 
Total 1706828 1678761 1677845 5063434 4762725 9826159 
In addition, as illustrated below, the average GVA per enterprise in `less 
favoured regions' greatly exceeds that of their counterparts in `more favoured' 
regions: 
21 Source Data: 'European Commission Observatory of European SMEs (Statistics)' retrieved on 
29.11.04 from website: http: //www. eim. nl/observatory_7_and_8/en/stats/2001/var4/4el9. html 
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Figure 2.11: Total EU GVA (2000) by size class and 'Region' 
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Source Data: European Commission Observatory of European SMEs, 2001 
Interestingly, while the collective GVA of `less favoured' regions exceeds 
that of `more favoured' regions (a factor of the volume of EU enterprise located in 
`less favoured regions'), the average GVA per enterprise in more favoured 
regions' does in fact exceed that of `less favoured' regions (see table below). 
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Table 2.9: Value added/enterprise by country and size class - 2000 (1000 
Euros) 
`Less-Favoured Regions' in italics 
Micro Small Medium SME LSE Total GDP 
Luxembourg 64 95 332 167 152 163 219 
Norway 37 54 78 52 117 71 162 
Switzerland 54 50 50 51 112 72 135 
Denmark 37 40 49 41 64 48 127 
Iceland 45 46 51 46 369 198 126 
Ireland 108 194 316 199 923 419 126 
Netherlands 27 39 55 39 51 44 122 
Sweden 40 51 63 49 74 59 120 
Austria 33 45 52 43 78 55 117 
Belgium 30 59 67 43 52 45 117 
Finland 42 49 44 45 81 60 114 
France 28 41 51 36 87 53 114 
UK 49 150 247 117 232 168 114 
Germany 27 42 70 40 40 40 112 
Italy 87 147 183 116 189 130 111 
Spain 12 25 39 20 62 28 92 
Greece 46 133 113 73 98 76 72 
Portugal 52 81 96 70 131 83 46 
Source Data: European Commission Observatory of European SMEs, 200122 
As may be observed from the data above and chart below, the difference 
between the average value of goods and services produced and the cost of raw 
materials and other inputs which are used up in production is greater in `more 
favoured' regions and `less favoured' is higher in `more-favoured' regions for each 
size class of enterprise other than `Small' (illustrated below). 
22 Source Data: 'European Commission Observatory of European SMEs (Statistics)' retrieved on 
30.11.04 from website: http: //www. eim. nl/observatory_7_and_8/en/stats/2001/var6/lcou_size. html 
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Figure 2.12: Average GVA per EU Enterprise (2000) 
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Source Data: European Commission Observatory of European SMEs, 2001 
Table 2.10: Value added/enterprise by country and size class (2000) (1000 
Euros) by `Region' 
Micro Small Medium SME LSE Total 
Average GVA per 
enterprise in 51.5 71.13 124.25 80.5 232.75 134.25 
`More Favoured 
Regions' 
Average GVA per 
enterprise in 40.6 77.2 96.2 60.3 105 73.8 
`Less Favoured 
Regions' 
Source Data: European Commission Observatory of European SMEs, 2001 
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Furthermore, as may also be observed from the trend lines in the chart 
below the difference between GVA per enterprise increases by size class as does 
the level of disparity between the contribution of `less favoured' and `more 
favoured' regions. Notwithstanding this difference as between SMEs in `less 
favoured' and `more favoured' regions, SMEs nevertheless and across the EU 
account for the significant portion of EU GVA by enterprise. 
Figure 2.13: GVA (Average) per Enterprise by Size Class (2000) 
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Source Data: European Commission Observatory of European SMEs, 2001 
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As regards Value added/employment in enterprises (by size class) and 
across the EU (less favoured and more favoured regions) there are again 
significant variations vis-a-vis the contribution by size of firm and by country and 
by region (less/more favoured). 
Table 2.11: Value added/employment by country and size class - 2000 
(1000 Euros) by region 
`Less-Favoured Regions' in italics 
Micro Small Medium SME LSE Total GDP 
Luxembourg 166 2035 34257 1161 106369 1559 219 
Norway 81 1134 8220 233 103827 447 162 
Switzerland 113 
. 955 5116 278 99273 
577 135 
Denmark 104 1000 5368 252 59187 428 127 
Iceland 52 957 4013 105 230064 848 126 
Ireland 306 3652 29699 1325 652002 3995 126 
Netherlands 74 934 6111 243 43396 431 122 
Sweden 101 954 6247 252 72537 488 120 
Austria 95 892 5245 291 69326 570 117 
Belgium 84 1332 6861 179 50215 277 117 
Finland 66 945 4509 149 75635 335 114 
France 71 951 5233 171 97558 373 114 
UK 92 2881 24831 395 320529 1027 114 
Germany 74 704 5229 203 36270 337 112 
Italy 152 2648 18110 323 203873 452 111 
Spain 29 511 3937 74 54785 134 92 
Greece 61 2524 11175 145 64047 175 72 
Portugal 96 1549 9186 255 99843 381 46 
Total 1817 23677 193347 6034 2438736 12834 
Source Data: European Commission Observatory of European SMEs, 200123 
23 Source Data: `European Commission Observatory of European SMEs (Statistics)' retrieved on 
29.11.04 from website: http: //www. eim. nl/observatory_7_and_8/en/stats/2001/var5/lcou_size. html 
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However, and most notably, as regards GVA/employment by size-class of 
enterprise, the average as calculated for 'More Favoured' and `Less Favoured' 
regions is vastly superior in the former: 
Table 2.12: Average GVA/employment (1000 Euros) 
Regions Micro Small Medium SME LSE Total 
`More Favoured' 124 1452 12378 481 170831 1096 
`Less Favoured' 72 1050 8513 193 97223 368 
Source Data: European Commission Observatory of European SMEs, 2001 
2.13 Summary: The contribution of SMEs to regional economic 
performance 
In policy terms, SMEs are now seemingly central to economic policy 
worldwide and, as explored above, are accorded a pivotal role in for example, 
Europe, the US and Asia in securing national competitiveness, embedding the 
entrepreneurial spirit, securing economic growth and mass employment. 
Furthermore, they are considered to be one of the principal driving forces in 
economic development and are said to form the backbone of the market economy 
for, as illustrated above, SMEs account for 99%+ the enterprise stock of EU 
Member States of which 93.1% are Micro firms (0-9 employees), 5.88% are Small 
Firms (10-49 employees) and 0.83% are Medium-sized firms (50-249 employees). 
In 'less-favoured' regions of Europe SMEs account for 88.88% of the EU's 
total stock of Micro Firms, 88.87% of Small Firms, 84.21% of Medium Sized 
Firms and 87.5% of Europe's total stock of LSEs. From the data presented above, 
it may also be observed that `less-favoured' regions in Europe have, on average, a 
notably higher proportion of Micro sized firms (93.19% of their total enterprise 
stock compared to 89.92% of more favoured regions). As regards, small 
enterprises, these represent 5.77% of the enterprise stock in less favoured regions 
as compared to 8.04% in regions with a GDP higher than the EU average, while 
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0.876% of their enterprise stock are medium sized firms compared to 1.81% in 
'more favoured regions'. 
Perhaps the most significant contribution to the socio-economic fabric is 
however the SME contribution to employment. However, as regards their 
contribution to employment in `less-favoured' regions and `more favoured 
regions', there is evidently significantly higher average proportion of total 
employment in Micro sized firms in `less favoured' regions than `more favoured' 
regions (37.41% as compared to 26.27%); lesser proportion of employment 
[average] in small firms in `less favoured' as compared to `more favoured' regions 
(18.92% as compared to 21.11%); lesser proportion of employment [average] in 
medium sized firms in 'less favoured' as compared to `more favoured' (13.76% 
compared to 18.29%; and lower proportion of employment [average] in LSEs `less 
favoured' as compared to `more favoured' (29.91% as compared to 34.33%). 
Notwithstanding, the industrial structure of `less-favoured' and `more- 
favoured' regions and debates as to the contribution of SMEs to job creation, 
specifically 'net job creation' and/or `job destruction' a subject that seems to 
occupy scholars more so than policy makers, a competitive SME sector is heralded 
as key to sustainable development, innovation and productivity within and outwith 
`less favoured' regions. Productivity amongst SMEs (and LSEs) is notably higher 
in `more-favoured' regions that `less-favoured' regions as measured by GVA. 
Furthermore, productivity increases by size class of enterprise which would appear 
to suggest that size still matters or rather confers competitive advantages. 
However as illustrated below, in the European Commission's 2003 SME 
Observatory Report, as regards `Value Added as per occupied person' in Europe, 
while the actual value as per size class of enterprise increases with firm size and is 
ultimately higher in LSEs than SMEs (see above), the adjusted value added per 
employee (adjusted for differences in the economic structure) is higher in SMEs 
(in all size classes of SME except Micro-sized firms) than LSEs. 
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Figure 2.14: Value added per occupied person, Europe (19), 2003 
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Source Data: European Commission's SME Observatory Report, 200324 
The EU Commission's SME Observatory Report also illustrates that while 
LSEs may have been the dominant economic unit and considered the optimum 
form of business organization and inherently more efficient and profitable and 
while this still may be the case, using a proxy measure of profitability (which is the 
gross operating surplus, and is defined as the difference between gross value added 
and labour costs and adjusted for imputed wage costs and expressed as a 
percentage of gross value-added) profitability ranges between 40-52 % in small, 
medium-sized and large enterprises, while for micro enterprises, it is significantly 
lower at almost 25%. 
Furthermore, according to the EU Commission Report the difference 
between small, medium-sized and large enterprises all but disappears when 
adjusted for sectoral effects although micro enterprises consistently lag behind the 
other size-classes whether or not sectoral effects are taken into account. 
24 Source Data: European Commission Report Observatory of European SMEs 2003, No. 7 'SMEs 
in Europe 2003', page 27 citing EIM Business & Policy Research, estimates based on Eurostat's 
Structural Business Statistics and Eurostat's SME Database, also based on European Economy, 
Supplement A, May 2003, and OECD: Economic Outlook, No. 71, June 2003 (assuming the same 
industry structure by size class). 
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Figure 2.15: Profitability by size-class, Europe (19), 2003 
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Observatory of European SMEs 200325 
In any event, notwithstanding debates as regards job creation and 
destruction, economic efficiency, profitability and innovativeness (and the various 
measures cited for the proposition that SMEs are significant), SMEs are lauded 
throughout `less favoured' and `more favoured' regions of Europe, the US and 
Asia, for their ability to provide employment, support economic growth and thus 
economic and political emancipation of minorities, contribute to the alleviation of 
poverty and assure more equitable distributions of wealth and democratic power 
throughout society and support economic growth (as explored variously by, for 
example, Jovanovic (1982,2001); Ericson and Pakes (1995); Audretsch (1995); 
Hopenhayn (1992); Lambson (1991) and Klepper (1996) to mention but a few. 
It is also clear that, in fostering conditions to support and enhance the SME 
contribution, economic developers and planners aim also to derive a range of other 
social benefits that are frequently attributed as products of a vibrant SME sector. 
For example, it is submitted that SMEs can be instrumental in countering regional 
disparities, providing opportunities for indigenous economic activity that reduce 
25 European Commission Report Observatory of European SMEs 2003, No. 7 'SMEs in Europe 
2003', page 28 citing EIM Business & Policy Research, estimates based on Eurostat's Structural 
Business Statistics and Eurostat's SME Database, also based on European Economy, Supplement 
A, May 2003, and OECD: Economic Outlook, No. 71, June 2003. 
90 
Micro Small Mediim -sized Large 
pressures to migrate from rural to urban areas and thus ultimately contribute to 
greater social stability. In addition, by taking part in cross-border co-operations, 
SMEs contribute to the development of the border areas and facilitate to 
understand cross-cultural differences in the neighbouring countries (Szabo, 2003). 
It is also submitted that indigenous social and economic potential as realised by 
and in SMEs is critical to addressing marginalisation/peripherality and key to 
sustainable growth processes (Stiglitz, 1998; Magarinos and Sercovich, 2002; and 
Ocampo, 2002). Further they are said to enhance political stability by 
strengthening middle-class influence and distributing prosperity (Vosloo, 1994). 
In addition, SMEs are considered to endow national, regional and local 
economic structures with resilient industrial systems. For example, Jacobs (1969) 
and M. Porter (1990) note that concentrations or intensities of enterprises in e. g. a 
particular sector or region endow that sector or region with competitive advantages 
(re competition for knowledge and new ideas) while Rothwell (1983 and 1984) 
emphasises that large and small firms complement and succeed each other in the 
innovation and diffusion process. 
Further, SMEs are lauded for their flexibility and ability to adapt quickly to 
changing market demand and supply situations. Cohen and Levinthal (1989) 
suggest that small firms are particularly adept at developing the capacity to adapt 
new technology and ideas developed in other firms and are therefore able to 
appropriate some of the returns accruing to investments in new knowledge made 
externally, while Luetkenhorst (2004) and others explain that as compared to 
larger firms SMEs are more naturally flexible, enjoy a closer proximity to 
customers and a therefore more responsive to customer needs and are not 
encumbered by layers of management and bureaucracy (see also Scherer above) 
which enable them to make decisions more quickly. 
It also generally asserted (and accepted by policy makers) that SMEs 
provide positive externalities to their surrounding (local or national) economy, 
complementing scale-intensive large firms, and that they make input factors 
available at higher quality or lower prices, or create innovations on which 
consumers or other producers in the value chain (upstream or downstream) may 
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build. Indeed, according to for example Audretsch (1995) and others (see above) 
small firms account for a disproportionate share of new product innovations, given 
their low R&D expenditures. 
It is also asserted that the ability of SMEs to innovate and generate and 
diffuse knowledge within the enterprise stock is also crucial to economic 
competitiveness - see European Commission Competitiveness Report (2004) 
which contends that knowledge generated by SMEs is not only applied by the 
originating company but may also be adopted, adapted and applied by other 
businesses with minimal investment (cost is largely borne by the originator); thus 
supporting endogenous growth (see also Romer, 1986; Lucas, 1988 and 1993 and 
Grossman and Helpman, 1991). It is also postulated that within concentrations or 
intensities of enterprises, complementary inputs and services are likely to be more 
readily available within such an industrial structure than one dominated by large, 
vertically integrated producers. 
Aside however from the social and economic value accorded SMEs in both 
the scholarly and policy literature, the evidence that supports many of these 
propositions is less than overwhelming and certainly not beyond contestation. 
Indeed, the current policy conviction may be as readily undermined as fortified by 
the literature. A concern to support the SME sector (notwithstanding dissent e. g. 
Postrel, 1994) nevertheless remains which while perhaps a product of economic 
growth and development theories might also be explained in part by a fusion of 
growth machine theory and the economic theory of bureaucracy and regeneration 
theory (see Figure 1). Moreover, the fact that the number of small businesses and 
self-employed people has increased significantly since the end of the Second 
World War, a concern to provide support measures for the SME sector and thus 
those employed therein may also rest as much on the fact that it represents a 
significant `block' in the demographics of economic activity and in the social 
fabric and in electoral terms. It is perhaps more true to say that the current 
commitment to the SME sector and public support for the business incubator 
industry may stand on this basis as opposed to any compelling evidential 
foundation for the modality. This is explored in the remainder of this thesis. 
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Chapter 3: Public Support for Indigenous Businesses and Business Incubation 
3.1 Introduction 
The contribution of SMEs to social, economic, political development and 
democracy has been the subject of a wealth of academic and policy research. 
Despite the multiplicity of claims vis-a-vis their contribution to national 
competitiveness, innovation, and job creation the nature and level of these 
contributions is, arguably, still not particularly well understood or 
easily/satisfactorily verified empirically (see chapter 2). While the veracity of 
such claims is disputed and might reasonably be expected to have undermined the 
current policy consensus, research that questions the fundamental assumptions 
underlying public support is remains largely unlooked-for and a political and 
bureaucratic/technocratic policy concern to foster conditions conducive to SME 
development and support the business services sector particularly business 
incubation (as illustrated in Figure 1) continues to prevail the world over. 
On the basis of desk research and unstructured interviews with incubator 
managers and stakeholders at for example, North East Business and Innovation 
Centre (Sunderland), Entrust (Newcastle), ATMEL/Cenamps (Newcastle), The 
Digital Factory (Newton Aycliffe), Loughborough Innovation Centre, DeMontfort 
Innovation Centre, UNIEI (Nottingham) BioCity (Nottingham), The Hive 
(Nottingham), Mansfield I-Centre, Midlands Innovation Relay Centre (Coventry), 
this chapter provides a brief overview of some of the chief instruments of 
industrial policy and business support measures (in Europe) designed to support 
indigenous businesses, before exploring the development of business incubation 
(including definitions and models thereof) and the deployment of business 
incubators in Europe. 
3.2 Support for indigenous SMEs 
SMEs have recently emerged as a central policy concern not only within 
the European Union, the US, Japan at al but also European countries in transition 
moving from centrally planned to market economies. In the EU, the European 
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Community's legal basis for reinforcing the business services sector was 
established in 1989 with the introduction of regional policy measures to assist local 
or endogenous development. Since that time, a number of policy documents 
adopted by the Commission have given a strong impetus to this type of measure. 
The White Paper on Competitiveness, Growth and Employment (1994) recognised 
that business services were "one of the key components" of SME competitiveness 
and emphasised that "non-physical (i. e. knowledge-based) investment" must in 
future be accorded at least the same priority as physical investment. 
Subsequently, the Green Paper on Innovation (1995) emphasised the 
organisational factors which were essential in order to facilitate SME access to 
innovation services (and it designates BICs as one the instruments capable of 
fulfilling this role - see below and case studies). Further, in 1999, the European 
Commission Communication on the competitiveness of European enterprises in 
the face of globalisation stressed the importance of non-physical services to 
businesses. 
In Europe and outwith the EU a raft of policy instruments and legislation, 
as reported by UNECE (2003), has emerged in the last five years: 
m Albania: (Law on SMEs, 2002); 
  Bulgaria (National Economic Development Plan for 2000-2006; Law 
on Small and Medium-sized Enterprises, adopted in September 1999 
and National Strategy on the Development of Small and Medium-sized 
Enterprises in Bulgaria for the period 2002-2006); 
a Czech Republic (Industrial Policy of the Czech Republic - 2000, Act 
No47/2002 on Support of Small and Medium-sized Activities); 
  Hungary (Law on SMEs -1999); 
  Poland (Government Program on Capital for Entrepreneurs, September 
2002); 
  Romania (Law No 133/1999 on "Stimulation of Private Entrepreneurs 
for the Establishment and the Development of Small and Medium Sized 
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Enterprises with subsequent Amendments and Government Decision 
No. 1211/2001 on "Establishing the National Credit Guarantee Fund 
for SMEs and Measures for Simulating, the Starting up and Developing 
SMEs", 2002); 
  Slovakia (The Government Resolution No 779/2000 of 27 September 
2000 on "Government Ratification of the State Support Programmes 
for the period of 2000 - 2005"); 
A concern for SMEs has also exercised legislators in the former USSR where 
comparable policy measures and legislation to support SMEs has been enacted in 
recent years in: 
v Armenia (State Support of SME, December 2000); 
  Azerbaijan (Law on State Support for Small Entrepreneurship, June 
1999); 
  Estonia (Enterprising Estonia. National Policy for the Development of 
Small- and Medium-sized Enterprises in Estonia in 2001-2006); 
  Georgia (Law on Small and Medium Enterprise Support, 1999); 
  Kazakhstan (Government Resolution on "Measures of Support of 
Women Entrepreneurship, June 2000); 
  Kyrgyzstan (Presidential Decree on "Measures on Improvement of 
Conditions for Development of Business in the Kyrgyz Republic, 
September 2001 and Government Resolution on "Ratification of the 
State Program on Entrepreneurship Development in Kyrgyz Republic 
in 2001-2003, August 2001); 
0 Latvia (Guideline for the Industrial Development in Latvia - 2001 and 
National Programme for the Development of SMEs 1997-2001); 
" Lithuania (New SME strategy - September 2000), 
  Uzbekistan (Law on Guarantees for the Freedom of Entrepreneurial 
Activities, May 2002). 
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Similarly, the dissolution of Yugoslavia has been followed by comparable 
initiatives in: 
  Croatia (Law on Small Business Development Encouragement, 
prepared by Ministry for Crafts and SMEs, accepted in 2002); 
  Macedonia (National SME Strategy, 2002); 
Historically, as rehearsed below, industrial policy has, since the end of the 
Second World War and until relatively recently, been concerned with the 
promotion of particular industries and larger enterprises therein. However, 
changes in the industrial structure (again, the world over) in the last 30 years (as 
rehearsed in the previous chapter) and thus the competitive advantage of nations 
(prompted by the development of economic capability and capacity across the 
globe and the consequent globalisation of trade), economic restructuring and the 
erosion of the large company as the dominant economic form has been paralleled 
by the rise (or rather the return) of the SME and an appreciation of the contribution 
of this `economic unit' (and their potentialities) to supranational, national, regional 
and local economic performance. 
This chapter proceeds to provide a brief overview of support for indigenous 
businesses (industrial policy) and the emergence of business incubation in Europe 
and its application in `less-favoured regions' thereof. The chapter then proceeds to 
consider the range of business support measures supporting SME development in 
Europe and specifically business incubation. 
From a review of the literature (policy and scholarship), it is evident that 
national and regional industrial policies (in the US, Western Europe (including 
`less favoured' regions) and Asia may be said to have been largely concerned 
(until relatively recently) with the promotion of successful (large) businesses, 
specific sectors (e. g. manufacturing, agriculture and such other industries which 
figure prominently in international trade between nations) characterised by large 
vertically integrated OEMs and more recently emergent technologies (again at the 
behest of large multinational corporations who have tended to lead R&TD in such 
areas). There is little to suggest that SMEs have figured as a pre-eminent concern 
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in national, regional or indeed supranational industrial policies anywhere in the 
world until relatively recently. Indeed, as noted by the Government of South 
Africa (undated) "Monetary, foreign-exchange and industrial strategies were 
formulated to support the specialisation of larger firms in capital-intensive 
production, feeding the higher end of the market, and small-scale producers were 
left to produce inferior goods, commonly catering for the lower end of the market, 
and using labour-intensive means of production". 
Some of the most notable or main instruments of industrial policy may be 
generally said to have included: 
  Protectionist measures (tariffs and artificial barriers including 
regulatory policies); 
  Promotion of Mergers and Acquisitions; 
  Subsidies for indigenous enterprises and subsidies to attract FDI; 
  Systems of national, regional and local grant aid; and 
  The development of business support services and latterly `business 
incubation'. 
3.3 Protectionist measures 
Policy support for indigenous industry has a long history and one which 
arguably began with protectionism. Alexander Hamilton, in his `Report on 
Manufactures' communicated to the House of Representatives on December 5, 
advocated support and aid as critical for indigenous infant industries as long ago as 
1791. He wrote "The superiority antecedently enjoyed by nations who have 
preoccupied and perfected a branch of industry, constitutes a more formidable 
obstacle.. . to the 
introduction of the same branch into a country in which it did not 
before exist. To maintain, between the recent establishments of one country, and 
the long-matured establishments of another country, a competition upon equal 
terms, both as to quality and price, is, in most cases, impracticable. The disparity 
... must necessarily be so considerable, as to forbid a successful rival ship, without 
the extraordinary aid and protection of government". 
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One of, if not the most significant, instruments developed and deployed 
across the globe to support indigenous industry have been protectionist measures 
(i. e. tariffs on imported goods) and regulations designed to inhibit imports that 
compete with indigenous product/producers which, as instruments of industrial 
policy, have been variously lauded or disparaged. Writing on tariffs in the 19th 
century, economist Taussig (1931) nevertheless concluded that they did little or 
nothing to promote domestic industry: "Little, if anything, was gained by the 
protection which the United States maintained... The intrinsic soundness of the 
argument for protection to young industries therefore may not be touched by the 
conclusions drawn from the history of its trial in the United States, which shows 
only that the intentional protection of the tariffs of 1816,1824, and 1828 had little 
effect". 
Taussig's analysis might be contrasted with work elsewhere within and 
outwith the US. In Britain, for example, Kitson and Solomou (1990) have 
postulated that the General Tariff of 1932 provided a substantial stimulus to the 
domestic economy in the 1930s, making domestic products more competitive, 
encouraging import substitution and macroeconomic expansion while Buchanan 
(1998) writing on the history of U. S. protectionism has submitted that "Behind a 
tariff wall built by Washington, Hamilton, Clay, Lincoln, and the Republican 
presidents who followed, the United States had gone from an agrarian coastal 
republic to become the greatest industrial power the world had ever seen - in a 
single century. Such was the success of the policy called protectionism that is so 
disparaged today". 
Buchanan's analysis is nevertheless highly disputed and diametrically 
opposed for as much as he attributes the growth and prosperity of America to 
protectionism do others contend that this was achieved in spite of import 
restrictions and not because of them. 
In summary, however, protectionism appears largely to have been a 
product of economic conditions and not merely theoretical perspectives and the 
degree and extent to which such measures form part of the policy fabric supporting 
indigenous SMEs evidently recedes, in general terms, with increased prosperity as 
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economies seek markets for their wares, only to make a return in times of 
economic strife and when imported goods prevail or threaten to prevail over 
indigenous product. For example, in Britain, as noted by Paul Kennedy (1987): 
"Between 1760 and 1830, the United Kingdom was responsible for around two- 
thirds of Europe's industrial growth of output... With 2 percent of the world's 
population and 10 percent of Europe's, the United Kingdom would seem to have 
had a capacity in modern industries equal to 40-45 percent of the world's potential 
and 55-60 percent of that in Europe... It alone was responsible for one-fifth of the 
world's commerce, but for two-thirds of the trade in manufactured goods". It is 
alleged that it was against a backdrop of economic prosperity, that Adam Smith's 
`The Wealth of Nations' led and seemingly won the intellectual battle in favour of 
Free Trade (Fay, 1931; Chalk, 1954) defeating the doctrine of mercantilism (1820) 
and marked by the repeal of the Corn Laws in 1846 (Thomas, 1929) and the 
Navigation Acts in 1849 (Clapham, 1910) and later the Anglo-French Commercial 
Treaty of 1860 (Dunham, 1930). The move to free trade and away from 
protectionist policies was, however, subsequently reversed, in response to the 
introduction of protectionist policies in Germany in 1879 (at the behest of large 
enterprises (Bohme, 1967) and elsewhere in Europe (Bairoch, 1989) and in light of 
other political imperatives, which included for example, a change in the largely 
laissez-faire policy approach to colonization, commerce, industry and agriculture 
which was replaced (1886-1914) by more interventionist approaches designed to 
foster trade within the British Empire and so extend Britain's influence around the 
world (Knowles, 1926). 
While protectionist measures still featured in the armoury of industrial 
policies designed to support and promote indigenous industry throughout the 18th, 
19`h and 20th century, they are now increasingly difficult to sustain against the tide 
of globalisation and in light of a range of successive multi-national agreements 
which might be traced to October 1947, when the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade (GATT) was agreed between 23 countries in Geneva, Switzerland. 
Later, in November 1947 delegates from 56 countries met in Havana, Cuba, to 
negotiate the charter of a proposed International Trade Organisation which was 
agreed in March 1948 by some 50+ countries but rejected by the US Congress. 
Nevertheless, in subsequent, years 1949 (Annecy, France) and 1950 (Torquay, 
99 
England), the GATT countries exchanged approximately 13,700 tariff concessions 
reducing 1948 tariff levels by an estimated 25%. Between 1955 and 1979 a further 
4 rounds of talks produced agreements resulting in a combined $347 billion in 
tariff reductions. The period is also notable for the fact the 1960-62 GATT round 
involved negotiations related to the creation of the European Economic 
Community, while the 1973-79 produced an agreement not only on the reduction 
of tariffs but also trade barriers. More recently, the 1986-93 trade round was 
notable for major reductions in agricultural subsidies, an agreement to allow full 
access for textiles and clothing from developing countries, and an extension of 
intellectual property rights. 
With the liberalisation of trade established (arguably) as a general point of 
principle (political and economic) the World Trade Organisation was created in 
Geneva in 1995, marking a move towards a global framework of free trade and (at 
best or worst) a new basis upon which trade and economic relations could be 
conducted. As is evident from the above, notwithstanding an increased global 
commitment to free trade, support measures (tariff and non-tariff) for indigenous 
enterprise remain an integral element of industrial policy as nation states seek to 
compete for economic power within industries and technologies. Consequently, 
this political and economic accord is something of an uneasy alliance and is 
evidently fractious as members continue to seek to find ways (tariff and non-tariff) 
of protecting and promoting indigenous businesses with subsidies and equivalent 
protective measures as illustrated by numerous disputes and WTO rulings which 
include, for example: 
  having introduced tax breaks for US exporters, the EU's decision by way 
of response to introduce Million sanctions against the US, was approved 
in August 2002 by the WTO; 
  duties imposed by the US on steel imports were ruled illegal by the WTO 
in December 2003; 
  WTO talks in September 2003 collapsed following disagreements on farm 
subsidies; 
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  the EU was authorised in February 2004 to introduce sanctions, again 
against the US for refusing to repeal an 88 year old statute allowing US 
firms to sue low-price importers; 
  in April 2004 and in March 2005, the WTO ruled US subsidies in favour 
of cotton farmers were unfair and illegal; and 
  in August 2005 the WTO declared a European Union tariff on imported 
bananas illegal backing a claim brought by Latin American countries that 
the new tariff which purportedly aimed to safeguard exports from 
countries in the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) group (mainly 
former EU colonies which had, historically received preferential treatment 
within the EU for their crop) would have a "devastating effect" on their 
economies and exports. 
Most recently, and at the time of writing, the EU is currently locked in 
row with China vis-a-vis textile imports, following the abolition of a quota 
system which has historically protected EU textile producers. The quota 
system has been abolished as part of the process of liberalising trade with 
China and China's admission to the WTO. 
In summary, while business incubation may now be `flavour of the month' 
the world over and seemingly attracts more `column inches' within and outwith the 
scholarship, it is evident from the above that protectionist measures (e. g. quotas) to 
support indigenous enterprises remain part of the policy `mix'. 
3.4 Promotion of Mergers & Acquisitions 
Protectionism is not the only medium that has been deployed by developers 
to support indigenous industry and engineer both competitive and comparative 
advantage. Mergers and acquisitions were promoted throughout the 1960s, 70s 
and 80s (particularly, in the UK and Europe) on the presumption that the 
integration of businesses and their operations would facilitate further economies of 
scale and enhance competitiveness against for example America's corporate 
giants, Japan's Keiretsus and Korea's Chaebols. 
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Specifically, the European rationale might be illustrated with reference to 
the work of Servan-Schreiber (1968) who warned of the "American Challenge" in 
the form of the "dynamism, organization, innovation, and boldness that 
characterize the giant American corporations" (p. 153). As America's LSEs were 
largely considered to be the engine of growth and innovation, Servan-Schreiber 
(who was by no means alone) advocated the "creation of large industrial units 
which are able both in size and management to compete with the American giants" 
(p. 159). According to Servan-Schreiber (p. 159): the problem for industrial policy 
makers in Europe was [then] "choosing 50 to 100 firms which, once they are large 
enough, would be the most likely to become world leaders of modern technology 
in their fields. At the moment we are simply letting industry be gradually 
destroyed by the superior power of American corporations". 
Subsequently, a new economic reality (see Chapter 2) which prompted a 
policy shift and new focus and concern for small and medium sized enterprises, 
particularly a change in industrial dynamics where industrial restructuring 
produced high levels of unemployment and a belief (amongst academics and 
policy makers) that small firms would be the principal source of new jobs, 
offsetting the contraction that was taking place in larger industrial enterprises 
(Birch, 1987). Furthermore, in UK for example, within the automotive and IT 
sector - two sectors which had been reorganised at government behest into larger 
groups - several of the groups or `giants' created by the state-sponsored mergers 
performed poorly (Owen, 2004). Indeed, many of the industrial behemoths that 
had very much dominated world economies and policy concerns came under 
increasing pressure through the globalisation of trade (specifically 
increased/internationalisation of supply without a concomitant increase in 
demand). In short, large, vertically integrated corporations were increasingly 
perceived as being less than an optimum form of business organisation, inherently 
unwieldy, bureaucratic, inflexible, ponderous and seemingly out of step with the 
new economic reality (Langlois, 2003), prompting many to re-evaluate and 
differentiate between what were and were not core business(es) and hive off 
unwanted businesses, sometimes through management buy-outs. Further, 
deregulation and privatization of nationalized industries in for example the UK, 
Australia, Finland, Italy and Sweden (OECD, 1995) began to undo many of the 
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great and vertically integrated and publicly owned industries and in so doing, it is 
argued, fuelled increases in the SME stock. 
3.5 Subsidies for indigenous enterprise and/or attract foreign direct 
investment (FDI) and/or inward investment 
Within and outwith the free trade framework(s), direct investment in or 
subsidy for indigenous businesses (new and/or existing businesses) proceeded 
largely unfettered until tempered by international trade agreements concerning 
competition (free trade-see above) and, in Europe by European State aid rules 
agreed as part of the treaty that founded the European Community Article 88(3) 
which aim to ensure fair competition and, in Europe, a single common market (and 
comparable international reciprocal agreements). The degree to which subsidies, 
and in particular approaches or subsidies designed to attract inward investment 
(e. g. FDI), have fallen out of favour might perhaps be best illustrated with 
reference to the European Commission - DG Regional Policy (Landabaso and 
Mouton, 2002, page 2): 
"Generally a large number of jobs are created overnight, usually 
with a statement from the leading public figure in the field making 
the front page of the regional or national press. This is, of course, 
much more spectacular but considerably less significant 
economically than, for example, creating one or two extra jobs in 
some of the hundreds or thousands of regional SMEs by 
stimulating internal capacities and local synergies, which is what 
an effective industrial/regional policy can realistically achieve" 
This point might also be illustrated with reference to the experience of FDI 
as observed in the North East of England (one of Europe's 'less favoured' or 
indeed `least favoured' regions) where the modality has been deployed with 
`mixed' fortunes. By way of example, Nissan Motor Manufacturing (UK) Ltd is 
heralded as a major policy success (and in its own right), employing 5,000 at the 
Sunderland plant (with an estimated 12,000 people now working in the automotive 
sector in the City of Sunderland) and setting productivity records (most productive 
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car plant in Europe for the last seven years) and said to produce a fifth of all cars 
produced in the UK, export 75% of production to 45 countries including Japan (in 
2004 the figure reached 79.5%) and is estimated to contribute around £400 
million to the local economy each year, with 240 suppliers within the region. The 
Nissan plant is credited as enabling the region to develop a reputation in 
automotive manufacturing, triggering or supporting the development of other 
indigenous and globally competitive automotive and supplier businesses (Unipres 
UK Ltd. (Japan); TRW Systems Ltd. (USA); Magna Kansei Ltd. (Japan / Canada); 
SP Tyres UK Ltd. (USA); Johnson Controls UK Ltd. (USA); Calsonic Kansei 
(Japan); and R-Tek Ltd. (Japan / USA)) and an automotive cluster. 
This might be contrasted with the fortunes of the microchip factory 
established by the German engineering group Siemens at Silverlink, North 
Tyneside in 1999. According to Liddle and Corcoran (1996) the grant package to 
support the FDI amounted to E30million (Regional Selective Assistance), a 
combined £15 million from the North Tyneside City Challenge fund and the 
Tyneside Training and Enterprise Council (TEC) towards infrastructure 
development and training, respectively, £15million from English Partnerships for 
site preparation and an additional £150,000 from North Tyneside Council. 
Further, in addition to the financial commitments of central government 
and the local agencies, there was, according to Liddle and Corcoran, a 
comprehensive set of non-financial commitments to support Siemens' investment 
e. g. zero-rating for the majority of the site and a change in the direction of North 
Tyneside's City Challenge programme to support the company's needs. 
Trumpeted, initially, as a major national and regional coup (politically and 
economically as the company was also contemplating making its investment in 
Austria), and forecasted to generate 1,800 jobs and said to comprise £1.1 billion of 
investment, the plant ceased operations in advance of achieving full operative 
1 BBC (2005) `New Nissan car will secure jobs', Wednesday, 2 February, 2005,06: 23 GMT 
retrieved on 14.05.05 from website: http: //news. bbc. co. uk/l/hi/england/wear/4225291. stm 2 Sunderland City Council (2005) retrieved on 14.05.05 from website: 
http: //www. sunderland. gov. uk/Publ ic/Editable/ThemesBusiness/Invest-in-Sunderland/automotive- 
manufacturing. asp reported 
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capacity within 18 months of opening and is often cited to highlight weaknesses in 
approaches geared to FDI. 
Subsidies and policy approaches concerned to attract FDI have also been 
the target of additional criticisms insofar as they generally fail to attract the high 
value added processes and functions such as R&TD and strategic functions 
(Headquarters) which are generally retained in the region/country of origin (and 
where they are often incentivised to maintain this capability) and where the 
strategic decisions, not least on the location and delocation of business activities 
and investment are taken and on the basis of criteria outside the control or 
influence of the region receiving the investments. According to Mikel Landabaso 
and Benedicte Mouton (2002) citing Tidd et al, (1997) "Less than 10% of 
innovative activities of the world's largest 500 companies are located outside their 
countries of origin... production activities are internationalised at about 25% and 
marketing is much higher" (COTEC, 1998). 
Indeed, regardless of their perceived success or failure, such high profile 
projects have had, and continue to attract, their share of criticism insofar, as for 
example: 
(a) A region (or part thereof) may become too dependent on a particular 
employer in social, economic and political terms. Thus political 
stakeholders (national, regional and local) are beholden to continue to 
support such enterprises by creating e. g. favourable tax and planning 
regimes and subsidise investment as a failure to do so may prompt the FDI 
to look elsewhere for more favourable treatment and/or supportive 
conditions. It is reported, for example, that "Nissan has received £170m of 
government grants or regional selective assistance to subsidise the plant 
since it began car production two decades ago"3. However, against a back- 
drop of increased competition, talk of plans to relocate production in 
Sunderland to the euro-zone (in advance of the UK general election of the 
3 The Journal (2004), 'Every Nissan job drives two more on the outside', Oct 22,2004, retrieved on 
15.05.05 from website: 
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Ph of June 20014) evidently concerned the UK national government so 
much that Nissan was awarded a £40 million UK Government Grant 
(approved by the European Commission in January 20015) to enable the 
plant to secure a £203 million contract for the Nissan Micra and despite the 
fact the it was reported that even with the grant there was up to a 17% 
reduction in components sourced from UK manufacturers6. The political 
context (nee imperative) for the subsidy was notable (as was the political 
pressure levered locally and regionally). Indeed, the company may be said 
to have timed its approach to local, regional and the national government 
perfectly i. e. the political consequences of a collapse of a whole sector of a 
regional economy (and such a significant sector - as measured in 
employment terms) or rather the prospect thereof) on the cusp of a general 
election, particularly in the heartland of the ruling government party 
(combined with the fact that the relocation of production to France 
threatened was explained (to the public) as a consequence of the 
government's stance on joining the euro was, no doubt, telling). 
(b) Businesses supported through subsidy, especially subsidised FDIs, may be 
impacted by other influences such as geo-political concerns (for example, 
the recession that hit Japan circa 1990 which according to Sakakibara 
(2001) persisted until 2002), prompting government and public pressure to 
persuade leading Japanese businesses to invest in their country of origin as 
opposed to making FDI and relocate operations in the home country); 
and/or broader concerns within, for example, a group. As regards Nissan in 
Sunderland, the fortunes of the largely state owned Renault, which 
acquired a 36% stake in Nissan in March 1999 and in the face of global 
competition for its own products prompted the company (Renault) to 
rationalize production and raise the spectre that production in Sunderland 
http: /ricteesside. icnetwork. co. uk/0400business/teesvalley/tm objectid=14981439&method=full&sit 
eid=50081 &headline=every-nissanjob-drives-two-more-on-the-outside-name_page. html 
4 BBC (2000) 'Blair in talks over Nissan jobs', Monday, 31 July, 2000,11: 51 GMT 12: 51 UK 
retrieved on 16.05.05 from website: http: //news. bbc. co. uk/l/hi/business/858265. stm 5 BBC (2001) `From Datsun to Nissan' Thursday, 25 January, 2001,17: 18 GMT retrieved on 
16.05.05 from website: http: //news. bbc. co. uk/1/hi/business/1136490. stm 
6 BBC (2001) 'Q&A: Why Nissan chose the UK' Thursday, 25 January, 2001,12: 54 GMT 
retrieved on 16.05.05 from website: http: //news. bbc. co. uk/1/hi/business/1136312. stm 7 On the eve of the UK's 2005 general election, again an automotive producer approached the UK 
government for assistance (MG Rover) but on this occasion (and albeit in different circumstances) 
without comparable success. 
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of Nissan cars might be relocated to France and mainland Europe to prop 
up manufacturing plants there. 
(c) Indigenous supplier businesses (within e. g. a cluster) may not be 
sufficiently diverse and/or may be financially beholden/dependent on the 
larger business for example Unipress (noted above), which employs 890 
reportedly relies on Nissan for 75% of all its business8. Where 
employment opportunities outside e. g. the cluster may limited, when 
confronted by employer demands (e. g. changes in working conditions, the 
indigenous population (whether labour is unionized or not) may be largely 
beholden to accept e. g. working conditions and create/maintain conditions 
that upskill labour while keeping wages and employee rights/protection 
low, regulation to a minimum and specialisation. 
Notwithstanding the wealth of criticism they continue to attract, subsidies 
like protectionist measures, remain part of the policy mix. However, they now 
seemingly occupy in regional economic and political terms a lesser role as 
compared to strategies and approaches concerned with the development of 
indigenous capability (initiatives to develop indigenous human capital, 
entrepreneurial ism and ultimately business incubation). 
3.6 Systems of supranational, national, regional and local grant aid 
In the US, at for example State level, and within and outwith the `Less- 
Favoured' regions of Europe (nations and regions thereof) government authorities 
and agencies (national, regional and local) operate or support a raft grant schemes 
and initiatives to support indigenous industry (i. e. Innovation and R&TD, training, 
etc) including SMEs (and for which many incubators act as brokers/provide 
services in support of grant applications- i. e. preparation of grant applications, 
partner search/brokerage, project management, etc - see below and case studies). 
8 The Journal (2004) `Every Nissan job drives two more on the outside' Oct 22 retrieved on 
16.05.05 from website: 
http: //icteesside. icnetwork. co. uk/0400business/teesvalley/tm_obj ectid=14981439&method=full &sit 
eid=50081 &headline=every-nissan job-drives-two-more-on-the-outside-name_page. html 
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In the EU, for example, R&D grants for indigenous industry via the 
European Commission's Framework Programmes will soon enter their seventh 
incarnation while in the US (at the Federal level) the US Departments of 
Agriculture; Commerce; Defense; Education; Energy; Health and Human Services; 
Transportation; the Environmental Protection Agency; the National Aeronautics 
and Space Administration and the National Science Foundation are required by US 
Office of Technology Small Business Innovation Research Program (SBIR) to 
reserve a portion of their R&D funds for award to small businesses and similarly 
the Small Business Technology Transfer Program (STTR) again requires the 
Departments of Defence; Energy; Health and Human Services; the National 
Aeronautics and Space Administration and the National Science Foundation to 
reserve a portion of their R&D funds for award to small business. 
In the US, the SBA and NBIA promote a range of grant programmes and 
initiatives to support, for example, R&TD, training, business start-up, special 
loans, etc, while in the EU, as may be observed from the case studies below, 
Coventry BIC for example promotes EU Framework Programmes, providing 
indigenous SMEs with a range of support to access this particular grant regime that 
includes information, assistance in the preparation of grant applications, 
partner/project/technology searches, contract negotiation, etc. 
Elsewhere in Europe, a pan-european network of BICs including in their 
number: `Innotek' and `Socran' (Belgium); 'BIC Brno', 'BIC Ostrava' and 'BIC 
Plzen' (Czech Republic); `Culminatum' and `Hermia Yrityskehitys' (Finland); 
`Cicom' and `Thesame' (France); 'BIC Frankfurt' and `Wista Management' 
(Germany); 'BIC of Attika' (Greece); 'Innostart' (Hungary); 'BIC Dublin' and `SE 
BIC' (Ireland); 'BIC Lazio', `EUROBIC Abruzzo e Molise', `Promofirenze', 
`Tecnopolis CSATA' (Italy); 'BIC Twente' (Netherlands); `NET' (Portugal); 'BIC 
Bratislava' and 'BIC Cassovia' (Slovakia); 'BIC Euronova', `CEEI Ciudad Real', 
'CEEi Valencia'; `Cimtec' (Switzerland); 'Birmingham BIC', 'Kent Technology 
Transfer' (UK) support SMEs to access this and other EU Commission grant 
regime. Notwithstanding their support however, the EU Commission has yet to 
achieve its target of 15% of EU research funds reaching SMEs i. e. 85%+ is 
currently absorbed by Europe's LSEs. 
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At a national and regional level in, for example, the UK a number of 
government departments (e. g. DTI, SBS) offer business grants or `research awards 
and/or commissions' for indigenous firms to support innovation, research and 
technological development that include: 
  Knowledge Transfer Partnerships wherein business are part funded to 
pursue projects of between 1 and 3 years duration with a university, college 
or research organisation with expertise to e. g. support R&TD and this 
improve profitability; 
  SMART Grant Awards offering a grant of up to 75% of the cost of carrying 
out a technical and commercial feasibility study lasting between 6 and 18 
months and up to £50,000; 
  SPUR Grant Awards supporting SMEs to develop new products and 
processes involving a significant technological advance for the UK 
industry or their sector and up to pre-production prototype stage (A fixed 
grant level of 35% of eligible costs, up to a maximum grant of £150,000 
may be offered to projects of between 6 months and 3 years in duration, 
which involve eligible projects costs of at least £75,000); and 
  SpurPlus Grant Awards which provide grant awards of unto £500,000 at 
35% of eligible costs to support the development of leading edge 
technologies in areas such as telecommunications and biotechnology up to 
pre-production prototype stage. 
At a regional level a range of aid instruments have proliferated to attract and/or 
support local firms. For example, in the environs of the North East of England 
Business and Innovation Centre in Sunderland (see Case Study below) a range of 
instruments are available via the local authority that includes: 
  `Selective Finance for Investment' (SFI) from the UK Government at a rate 
of up to 20% of the value of a project; 
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  Discretionary grants offered to manufacturing businesses and service 
industries supplying to e. g. national/international markets and making local 
investments that involve capital expenditure on fixed assets that, creates 
and/or safeguards jobs and provides net benefits to the UK economy, 
contributing to increased productivity and skills (Grant awards have 
been/are often scaled to the level of private sector capital expenditure, 
number of jobs created and level of additionality, etc), e. g. Nissan UK was, 
according to the Automotive Unit of the DTI (2003) awarded (in 2003) 
£3.26 million Government support (as part of a £95 million investment by 
Nissan) for production of a new model securing 250 jobs9; £5 million UK 
Government grant (Regional Selective Assistance) as part of £223 million 
investment creating (according to the City of Sunderland and BBC news 
reports) 200 jobs and safeguarding another 1,00010. 
  Rent relief grants equivalent to e. g. 25-50% of the rent payable for up to 
one year to eligible businesses creating new jobs, occupying new or larger 
privately-owned industrial premises and taking up leases of at least 3 years. 
  Basic Services Grant supporting e. g. 50% of eligible costs in securing 
essential basic services to industrial premises, covering such items as a new 
electricity or gas supply, drainage works (including toilets) and canteen 
facilities, as well as the preparation of land for the construction of 
industrial premises. 
  Interest Relief Grants e. g. equivalent to 5% per annum of the value of loans 
used to purchase machinery or buildings for industrial use, awarded for up 
to half the duration of the loan and a maximum of 2 years. 
9 Automotive Unit of the Department of Trade and Industry (2003) retrieved on 20.07.05 from 
website: http: //www. autoindustry. co. uk/news/press_releases/04-12-03_1 
10 Sunderland City Council (2005) retrieved on 12.05.05 from website: 
19.07.05http: //www. investinsunderland. co. uk/support-grants. asp retrieved from for Business and 
Investment; and BBC(2005) 'New Nissan car'will secure jobs', Wednesday, 2 February, 2005, 
06: 23 GMT, retrieved on 14.05.05 from 
website: http: //news-bbc-co. uk/l/hi/england/wear/4225291. stm 
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  Removal Grants covering up to e. g. 50% of eligible costs for companies 
moving into industrial premises in the region, whether they are relocating 
from outside the area or they are moving from one property within the City 
to another. 
  Business Marketing Grants to firms employing e. g. less than 50 people 
that are undertaking a promotional campaign as part of an overall 
marketing plan, covering up to 50% of the cost of items such as the 
design and print of brochures and other promotional material, up to a 
maximum of £1,500. 
In summary, a raft of instruments has evolved over time to support 
indigenous industries and firms. While much of industrial policy has historically 
been reactive by nature i. e. a policy response designed to support indigenous 
industry in the face of increased competition from abroad (protectionism and 
government sponsored mergers and acquisitions) this has given way (largely as a 
consequence of free-trade and the emergence of SMEs as a significant unit in the 
economic structure) to policy approaches designed to build indigenous capability 
and capacity. 
Notwithstanding free-trade agreements a range of governmental initiatives 
and instruments offering grant or financial aid to indigenous firms under an R&D 
banner now proliferate throughout the US and Europe. Similarly, grants to attract 
foreign direct investment or inward investment are a significant part of national 
and regional government armouries to support economic development and growth. 
While LSEs still seem to be the greatest beneficiaries and that such systems of aid 
do not always sit comfortably within the scope of free-trade principles, it is 
nevertheless accepted as one of the chief means through which governments may 
support indigenous firms (LSEs and SMEs). 
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3.7 Business Support for Small Businesses & Business Incubation 
More recently, however, with the advent of globalisation and radical 
changes to the economic structure which have borne witness to the emergence of 
SMEs as critical to the innovation system, the demographics of employment and 
national and regional GVA (and an appreciation thereof), new approaches to 
support SME development have emerged. 
In the US, the move to support small firms was founded on a political 
concern that large enterprises had achieved a level of pre-eminence, nee 
dominance, that was unhealthy at best, a sentiment that found its first expression in 
the first US antitrust legislation - the Sherman Act of 1890. Notwithstanding this 
sentiment, however, there is little to suggest that this dampened the consolidation 
of US industry (achieved through vertical and horizontal integrations - mergers 
and acquisitions - which were subsequently aped in Europe). Indeed, not until 
some sixty years later did the United States establish the Small Business Service in 
1953 (consolidating a range of work developed and executed by a number of 
predecessor agencies which were created largely as a response to the Great 
Depression, namely the Reconstruction Finance Corporation (RFC) established by 
President Hoover in 1932 and the Second World War wherein Congress created 
the Smaller War Plants Corporation (SWPC) in 1942 to support small business to 
participate in war production (which was then dominated by larger firms) and 
provide them a level of financial viability (via direct and encouraging large 
financial institutions to make credit available to small enterprises, and advocating 
small business interests to federal procurement agencies and big businesses). 
Dissolved after the war, the SWPC's lending and contract powers were 
transferred to the RFC while the Office of Small Business (OSB) in the 
Department of Commerce also assumed some responsibilities (largely concerned 
with education, provision of information and management counselling for 
individual entrepreneurs). Abolished in 1952, the RFC was replaced by the Small 
Business Administration, established by the US Congress in the Small Business 
Act of July, 1953 to preserve what was considered to be inefficient enterprises, 
which, if left unprotected, might otherwise become extinct and specifically to "aid, 
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counsel, assist and protect, insofar as is possible, the interests of small business 
concerns". 
The charter also stipulated that the SBA would ensure small businesses a 
"fair proportion" of government contracts and sales of surplus property. In 
addition, the SBA provided direct loans to business and to victims of natural 
disasters, guaranteed bank loans to small firms, and provided management and 
technical assistance and business training. The SBA's remit was later extended in 
1958, prompted by a Federal Reserve study which had found that small businesses 
could not obtain credit to support technological advancement, with the 
introduction of the Small Business Investment Company scheme (Investment 
Company Act of 1958), through which the SBA licensed, regulated and helped 
provide funds for privately owned and operated venture capital investment firms 
and long-term debt and equity investments to high-risk small businesses. 
Similarly, in the UK just as in the US, the preservation of SMEs also began 
to occupy policy makers, most notably after WWII. Just as the US SBA evolved a 
concern as to the impediments to entrepreneurship in, for example, the financial 
system, the Macmillan Committee arrived at a similar conclusion (in 1931) and 
recommended that a new type of capital-raising agency, specialising in small 
business support be established. This was not however implemented until the 
Industrial and Commercial Finance Corporation (ICFC) was created at the end of 
the war with a remit to supply risk capital to smaller firms. As in the US, the main 
thrust of the UK policy in support of indigenous SMEs was initially concerned 
with access to finance and subsequently under the supervision of The Industrial 
Reorganisation Corporation and Ministry of Technology with `facilitating' or 
`engineering' consolidation within sectors and fragmented industries; largely in 
response to the economies of scale being achieved in the US via vertical and 
horizontal integrations (mergers and acquisitions). 
According to Owen (2004), and in contrast with the US, a concern for 
SMEs did not however manifest itself in UK government procurement strategies. 
Owen notes that in the UK, government procurement (particularly the Ministry of 
Defence) favoured larger firms (who it is argued were instrumental in the 
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definition of policy and had the resources to lobby and represent their interests on 
government committees) "Unlike the US Department of Defence (whose 
procurement budget was very much larger), British officials did not deliberately 
seek to encourage innovative small firms". Evidently, it was not until increased 
anxiety at the end of the 1960's as regards the fortunes of smaller firms in the UK 
(and as compared to their US counterparts), US economic dominance and the 
effects of industrial restructuring that SMEs became the focus of a committee of 
inquiry in 1969. 
The subsequent Bolton Report highlighted the decline of SMEs, a range of 
structural impediments inhibiting SME growth and moreover the importance of 
SMEs to national competitiveness. Subsequently, the National Enterprise Board 
was established to support promising high-technology ventures which were 
difficult to finance through conventional sources and take a stake in small firms (in 
high-tech sectors) to accelerate their growth (largely a mirror of US policy 
instruments being implemented by the US SBA). In addition, a policy concern for 
SMEs was stimulated further by changes in the intellectual property regime of the 
US (the Bayh-Dole Act (1980), PL 96-517) - see below - which gave universities 
the right to exploit government funded research results) and a US policy concern 
to promote industry-university collaborations in the field of innovation. Almost by 
way of response the UK government was prompted to reconstitute the National 
Research Development Corporation and the residue of the National Enterprise 
Board as the British Technology Group (1985) and as in the US gave universities 
the right to exploit their own innovations and support to ramp up their technology 
transfer activities. 
Elsewhere, in Japan for example, support for SMEs was seemingly less an 
organic or incremental response to the pressures of globalisation and economic 
restructuring (as explored in Chapter 2) and rather a more `urgent' and 
programmed response. In 1999, at a time when unemployment was at its highest 
level with industry (particularly manufacturing) struggling with restructuring and a 
rate of business start up conspicuously lower than e. g. the USA which was in any 
event trailing the rate of business closures (USA: business starts 13.8%, closures 
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11.4% (1994) Japan: business starts 3.7%, closures 3.8% (1994-96) the Japanese 
Ministry of International Trade and Industry (1999, p1) was 'concerned': 
"In order to break out of the present recession in the economy and 
secure more employment opportunities, creating new business 
must be seen as a prime policy task. This should be achieved 
through comprehensive policy packages, including budget 
measures, taxation measures, and deregulation, as well as 
appropriate management of the macro-economy. In line with the 
Industrial Rehabilitation Plan initiated by the Prime Minister, 
Ministry of International Trade and Industry has enacted all- 
embracing legislation to support new business (Law for the 
Promotion of New Business Creation), in addition to the budget 
measures in the Emergency Special Framework for Economic 
Countermeasures". 
As may be observed above, SMEs were suddenly key and `frontline' to the 
rehabilitation of the Japanese economy and the government legislated accordingly. 
The Law for Facilitating the Creation of New Business was swiftly enacted to 
provide broad support: 
  for individuals (whether by individuals (retired company employees, 
housewives, students, etc), medium/small companies (and spin-offs), and 
others wanting to start up new business; 
  business activities by medium/small enterprises that make use of new 
technology; and 
  The development of a business environment that makes use of regional 
industrial resources. 
Other measures included: 
 a grant regime operated by the Small Business Corporation to support 
business/product development, testing and manufacture; 
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 a debt guarantee scheme for business start-ups; exceptions to the stock 
option system; a capital investment fund (Industrial Structure 
Improvement Fund) for e. g. industrial spin-offs and start-ups; 
  R&D grants/subsidies and for SMEs; 
  government/public authority procurement targets [from SMEs]; 
  the Technopolis Law, the Key Facilities Siting Law (abolished with the 
enactment of the Law for Promotion of New Enterprises) and the Brain 
Location Act; 
  tax relief for SMEs; 
  capital for new business support facilities ("incubators") via the Regional 
Development Corporation; and 
  Measures to promote coherence in the SME business support 
infrastructure (unification of the Technopolis Foundation, the Small 
Business Promotion Corporation, and others) to better support research 
and development to commercialisation. 
Distilling policy approaches observed elsewhere, in for example the US 
and Europe as regards the development of indigenous SMEs and 
entrepreneurial ism, the Japanese government has also enacted measures to: 
  supplement regional policies and inward investment strategies designed to 
attract new industries (e. g. development of roads, harbours, and other hard 
infra-structure); 
  support the development of research equipment, research facilities and the 
provision of subsidies for research and development; 
  promote the development of urban areas by integrating industry, 
academia, and concentrations of population around cutting edge 
technologies; 
  advance the regional distribution of plants and concentration of service 
industries that support industry, e. g. natural science research institutes, the 
software industry, and the information processing service industry; 
  utilise regional industrial resources in order to develop a business 
environment that encourages creation of new enterprises in local areas via 
programs (regional platforms) for comprehensive provision of the 
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technological, personnel, and financial support required at every stage in 
the creation of new enterprises in local areas, from research and 
development to investment in business enterprises, and promotes the 
development of business incubators and leased plant sites in High-Tech 
Industry Integration Regions and Advanced Research Function Integration 
Districts.. (Law for Promotion of New Enterprises, Section 4); 
  support regional development by concentrating industrial, cultural, 
scientific, research, exchange, and other functions characteristic of a 
region (the Multipolar Act); 
  promote and support the private sector research base (capacity and 
capability) via the development of R&D and commercialization 
infrastructure facilities (research centres or `cores'); 
  support collaborative working between industry and academia (and 
utilization of public sector research assets (expertise and facilities) by 
private sector); 
  develop telecommunications research and development promotion 
facilities (Telecom Research Parks); 
  support for facilities to support agriculture, forestry, and fisheries R&D 
and commercialization and the revitalization of coastal regions (the 
Private Sector Resources Utilization Law); and 
  Support indigenous enterprise in areas where traditional industries 
(manufacturing) were in decline (with concomitant economic and social 
consequences for many `one company towns') to develop and or diversify 
away from historic reliance on local OEMs. The Regional Industrial 
Concentrations Reinvigoration Law aims to support this renewal by 
establishing R&D and experimental facilities, research equipment, etc., to 
support the development of new and advanced technologies, markets and 
human resources". 
11 Japan's Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology 
http: //wwwwp. mext. go. jp/hakusyo/book/hpag2003Ol/hpag2003Ol_2 099. html accessed 26.02.05 
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In the EU there is now an array of EU business support measures 
12 
designed to support SMEs as summarised in the chart below and by country. The 
Support Measures and Initiatives for Enterprises (SMIE) database financed by the 
Enterprise Directorate-General of the European Commission provide an integrated 
information resource on business support measures for the EU. The database 
identifies more than 1900 measures from EU Member States and 600 measures 
from other countries i. e. candidate states (CY, CZ-REP, EE, HU, LV, PL, SI), 
EEA (IS, NO, LI) and CH as illustrated below: 
Figure 3.1: Profile of Business Support Measures by Country 
nwrt 
Source Data: European Commission Enterprise Support Measures Database 
Notably, as may be observed from the graph (above), a number of the `less 
favoured' regions with a GDP less than the EU average (UK, Germany, Spain and 
Italy) have implemented considerably more business support measures than `more 
favoured' regions. 
12 Business support measures refer to the broadest group of public and semi-public business support 
actions that include "business support services", but also indirect support provided by grants. 
programmes and tax incentives intended to support businesses. Further the business support 
measures featured are those originating as or in a public policy initiative, targeting SMEs by 
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From an analysis of data extracted from the EU Commissions SMIE 
database of business support measures as provided by either public or private 
organisations or indeed, by individuals (in all cases though, the service providers 
act as agents for the public authorities) it is possible to identify a range of 
objectives that include support for employment and training, international co- 
operation, management capacity-capability, foreign trade, research and 
development, particular technologies and environmental programmes. 
Table 3.1: Profile of EU Business Support Measure by Objective 
Measure objectives - III I '= I I I ý= 1 1110 r-- F" 
EU countries A B DK FIN F D EL IRL I L NL P E S UK Total 
1. Employment & training 13 16 13 5 11 20 14 14 8 4 19 18 24 19 28 226 
11 Education and trainin 10 20 3 18 10 10 14 4 25 2 3 1 5 6 4 135 
12 Job creation 15 34 6 22 42 36 11 6 40 12 9 3 28 7 13 284 
1.3 Foster women entrepreneurs / employees 2 3 4 7 4 23 2 7 3 2 57 
1.4 Foster young entrepreneurs / employees 12 1 2 8 13 11 5 2 24 5 4 1 9 5 8 110 
1.5 Foster disabled entrepreneurs / employees 2 4 1 2 2 4 3 2 3 25 
1.6 Foster entrepreneurs / employees from ethnic minorities 2 1 2 2 1 4 1 14 
2. Inter national co-operation 12 6 19 19 9 15 16 5 5 4 11 12 17 8 13 171 
2.1 Enterprise co-operation 5 1 13 2 3 22 1 2 1 4 5 5 65 
2.2 Enterprise networking 3 2 1 10 7 1 5 2 11 1 1 10 8 62 
2.3 Dissemination of knowledge (for tar get group of individual (enterprise)) 5 2 1 15 6 3 7 1 6 3 6 1 1 4 5 66 
2.4 Other knowledge transfer 6 2 4 4 2 12 2 4 3 6 46 
3 Management capacity-skills 37 38 22 14 36 35 20 24 111 141 22 35 47 21 43 419 
3.1 Quality mans ement 2 1 2 1 3 3 14 2 3 32 
3.2 Financial (re)structuring 10 6 3 7 3 25 3 3 21 3 9 6 22 5 2 128 
3.3 Business culture development 7 2 14 1 131 1 2 1 7 4 3 56 
34Export strate 3 3 9 4 3 4 a 1 1 6 39 
3.5 Business transfer/family business succession 1 5 1 2 2 12 
4. Foreign trade promotion 3 6 11 16 6 14 2 8 3 5 4 8 3 11 100 
5. P&D and innovation 21 9 16 16 18 40 12 13 17 8 12 13 18 13 28 254 
51 Research 2 3 1 4 1 7 1 3 22 
5.2 Feasibility studies 2 1 1 1 7 2 15 
5.3 Development 3 3 1 8 5 1 2 36 3 3 3 1 69 
54 Innovation 16 / 4 11 4 9 4 3 38 1 11 3 9 2 2 121 
5.5 Protot in 1 1 1 1 4 
5.6 Demonstration 1 1 3 
6. Technology 15 3 2 25 12 26 11 10 9 3 12 12 13 9 19 181 
611CT 2 1 2 41 1 11 1 6 3 21 
6.2 Bio-technolo 2 1 2 7 
6.3 Environmental technology 4 1 3 1 9 1 1 3 23 
6.4 Other technology 5 1 1 11 5 6 18 
6.5 Technology transfer 3 1 1 2 3 2 2 10 1 2 1 1 1 30 
7. Environment 20 4 6 3 9 17 8 1 3 4 10 7 16 3 6 117 
7.1 Pollution enera 3 2 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 2 17 
72 Ener serving 2 4 4 1 1 2 1 1 2 1 1 1 3 1 26 
7.3 Other 1 21 1 5 1 
1 
17 
Total 243 17 1 
j 
216 309 156 95 403 77 160 122 271 145 23 2 2 
Source Data: Euronean Commission Enterorise Sunoort M easures Database 
Evidently, 55% of business support measures across the EU are largely 
generic. Specifically, the manufacturing sector accounts for 9.77% of business 
support measures while other services account for 8.08% and Tourism, catering 
and leisure 4.64%. 
explicit intention or practical use and offered at non-commercial conditions (and wherein a 
substantial part of the service is of the non-financial kind). 
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Figure 3.2: EU Business Support Measures by country & GDP 
Luxembourg (GDP 219) 
Denmark (GDP 127) 
Ireland (GDP 126) 
Netherlands (GDP 122) 
Sweden (GDP 120) 
Belgium (GDP 117) 
Austria (GDP 117) 
UK (GDP 114) 
France (GDP 114) 
Finland (GDP 114) 
Germany (GDP 112) 
Italy (GDP 111) 
Spain (GDP92) 
Greece (GDP 72) 
Portugal (GDP 46) 
® All sectors 
Q Other services 
  Technology enterprises only 
  Agriculture and fisheries 
  Transport 
Q Construction 
  Manufacturing 
Q Tourism, catering and leisure 
Q Retail, wholesale and repair trades 
Q Fnergy & mining 
  Convnunication (IT) 
  Arts & culture 
Source Data: European Commission Enterprise Support Measures Database 
Further, as regards the deployment of business support measures in less-favoured 
regions, as compared to `more-favoured' regions, they are as a rule, more 
numerous in `less-favoured' regions while in terms of coverage Europe's SME 
stock, while just over half (50.85%) of all instruments and measures are concerned 
to support SMEs in general terms, support for business start-ups and innovative 
technology enterprises account for 14.66% and 12.85% of all business support 
measures, respectively: 
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Figure 3.3: Business Support Measure by Country and 
GDP and Target Population 
Luxembourg (GDP 219) 
Denmark (GDP 127) 
Ireland (GDP 126) 
Netherlands (®P 122) 
Sweden (GDP 120) 
Belgium (GDP 117) 
Austria (GDP 117) 
UK (®P 114) 
France (®P 114) 
Finland (GDP 114) 
Germany (®P 112) 
Italy (GDP 111) 
Spain (®P 92) 
Greece (GDP 72) 
Portugal (®P 46) 
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al. All enterprises starting up or in first phase of development 
  2. Single person enterprises 
Q 3. Craft enterprises and artisans 
Q 4. Exporting enterprises 
  5. Innovative/technology enterprises 
Q 6. Co-operatives 
  7. Women-owned or women-operated enterprises 
Q 8. Enterprises started by unemployed people 
  9. Enterprises started by young people 
  10. Enterprises started by disabled people 
Q 11. Enterprises started by ethnic minorities 
  12. SME enterprises (generic) 
Source Data: European Commission Enterprise Support Measures Database 
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In summary, as may be observed from the table below there now exists a 
range of business support measures, throughout the EU, to support indigenous 
SMEs that range from the provision of facilities, information, advice and direct 
support, training and education, finance, premises and strategic services: 
Table 3.2: Profile of EU Business Support Measure by Type 
Measure Types - a P= -I 
I II C ? Ilm I1 11 1 
EU countries A B DK FIN F D EL IRL I L NL P E S UK 
1. Reception. FacjIItles and Basic INonnetieu. Referral 6 6 4 13 23 11 13 6 6 7 6 4 5 5 2 
11 First-Stop-Shop 3 2 6 6 3 1 3 4 4 1 4 4 
12 Official registration and documentation 2 1 2 1 1 13 4 1 2 
13 Distribution of publications, information packages 4 5 3 1 7 3 1 2 5 2 
1.4 Initial diagnosis 3 1 3 5 1 1 14 1 2 1 2 
15 Si n ostirr 2 1 2 
2. Piofessional Iuformotion Services 12 2 10 14 13 13 15 7 5 10 7 9 7 10 16 
21 Legislation 7 2 1 2 5 2 
22 Market information (including export markets and public procurement) 1 2 8 10 1 1 3 2 2 2 1 10 
2.3 Technical 3 2 1 2 3 1 1 4 
2.3.1 Standards & Certification 11 1 1 21 1 1 1 
2 3.2 Patent & Copyright 2 1 1 2 2 1 2 13 1 1 1 
233 Specific areas e environmental) 1 1 4 2 
3. Advice & Diect Srt> rotz 15 14 11 15 28 19 11 25 10 9 11 16 18 20 41 
3.1 Business planning and strategy 7 2 5 24 3 11 1 34 3 4 91 1 5 
3.2 Advice on functional areas of business activity 6 4 3 20 2 3 1 1 11 2 3 1 7 1 5 
3.2.1 General aNce 1 2 5 1 6 2 6 2 
32.2 Marketing 5 7 1 1 2 
3 2.3 Design 2 2 1- 
32.4 Finance 4 2 6 17 1 1 2 2 1 
3.2.5 Production 1 2 2 12 1 
32.6 Other 2 25 2 1 
33 Mentorin 4 9 3 7 7 7 2 6 5 2 9 1 4 7 9 
4. SME-s, ecific Tialniii and Flotation 4 17 8 7 9 7 19 11 12 7 6 10 6 10 9 
41 Stal-up 2 5 3 6 1 5 1 12 1 1 2 
42 General training and education facilities (employees, entrepreneurs etc. 2 4 1 5 2 1 1 1 14 3 1 3 3 
43 Growth and development 14 15 2 1 17 1 1 1 2 3 1 
44 Conversion courses 1 1 2 
4.5 Targeted trainin (women entrepreneurs, ethnic minorities etc. 2 1 1 5 1 2 1 1 1 
5. Fiirouce 53 27 6 12 14 7 12 42 42 59 10 12 
51 Equity finance 7 12 8 4 10 32 2 4 3 4 14 
52 Loans 14 1o 9 8 14 50 1 2 30 7 14 
53 Guarantees 10 4 8 2 8 12 2 1 4 3 2 
5 3.1 Direct uarantees 
5 3.2 Mutual uarantees 1 3 1 1 
54 Grants & Subsidies 45 37 18 32 85 23 
1 
4 89 23 52 
55 Tax incentives 8 1 1 12 1 4 2 
6. Pretises & Euviteument 1 1 1 21 4 1 1 8 1 3 1 
61 Incubation units 2 1 4 2 2 3 2 2 1 3 
62 Business units/factor s ace 2 1 
63 Location su ort 1 
7. Stiatej is services 4 6 5 4 6 5 
Total 228 195 144 270 218 270 131 22 278 141 24 
Source Data: European Commission Enterprise Support Measures Database 
As may be observed from the table (above), Reception, Facilities, Basic 
Information, referrals account for 8.78% of all support measures, Professional 
Information Service 9.31%, Advice and Direct support 21.46%, Training and 
Education 10.17%, Finance 44.45% (Business Grants account for 17.79%), 
Premises & Environment 3.54%, and Strategic services 2.29%. Interestingly, 
despite the profile now accorded business incubation, incubation units (premises) 
account for only 0.99%. This figure should not, however, be taken as 
representative of Europe's interest and investment in incubators/incubation for, as 
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below, incubation is much more than `bricks and mortar' and incorporates many of 
the other measures listed above as part of the incubator/incubation model. 
3.8 Business Incubation 
Business incubators continue to attract attention from policy makers, 
academics, economists, public and private sector donors and sponsors and 
international organizations. "According to some as yet unpublished statistics from 
the National Association of Business Incubators - based in the United States-- 
there are now between 3,500 and 4,500 business incubators worldwide, although 
the precise number is difficult to pin down. Of these, more than 900 are said to be 
located in the United States; China has another 460 or so; Germany has 385 
incubators; France has over 200; Great Britain has about 160; Japan has a little 
over 200, and Australia has around 110. From the Arctic Circle to South Africa 
and Singapore - universities, governments and corporations are using incubators to 
accomplish a range of wealth creation and social goals. In China, East Germany 
and the Ukraine, for example, incubators have been used to facilitate the transition 
to a market economy. In Israel, they have played a key role in helping to integrate 
immigrants from Russia and the ex-Soviet bloc into the mainstream economy. And 
in Canada and the United States both large corporations and angel investors have 
used incubators to accelerate the growth of new companies emerging from the 
explosion in the high tech sector particularly ICT and biotech in the late 90's" 
(Carty, 2003, p. 3). 
As noted in chapter 2, in the developed world and in developing countries 
and countries in transition, as noted above, SMEs constitute the dominant 
economic actor (in demographic terms) and are held to make a significant 
contribution to Gross Domestic Product, job creation, innovation, and 
competitiveness. From political, economic and social perspectives, SMEs are also 
regarded as engines of economic growth and activity that can reduce regional 
disparities (social and economic). Consequently, industrial, regional and economic 
development policies look set to continue to foster the growth and development of 
business incubators across the globe. 
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3.9 Business Incubation and Business Incubators: Scope 
There are a range of definitions that reflect significant variations in the 
nature, level, aims and objectives, roles and mandates of an `incubator' (as they 
have evolved with the term) and with significant differentiation of the form (see 
Figure 1) which illustrate the level of definitional and conceptual heterogeneity 
that pervades both the literature and the nature and organization of the industry. 
Indeed, as noted by Wilcock (1999) "distinctions are blurred; the wide variety of 
operating environments and objectives makes categorisation difficult" In fact, it 
might be said that the proliferation of incubators is equalled only by the number of 
definitions advanced by both the practitioner and academic community to explain 
the phenomenon, for example, the UKBI Incubation Impact Assessment Study 
1999/2000 cites 22 definitions (pp. 113-116). 
In general terms, incubators are established to address inherent market 
failures such as an inequitable access to information and capital as well as a lack of 
focused business advice for new small businesses (Campbell, 1989, pp. 56-59). 
Incubators have also been described by Smilor & Gill (1986, p. 191) as holding 
"the possibility of linking talent, technology, capital and know-how to leverage 
entrepreneurial talent to accelerate the development of new technology-based 
firms, and speed the commercialisation of technology" while Falkeström et al 
(2000) define it simply as "a place where newly created firms are concentrated in a 
limited space"13 and Petree et al., (1997, p. 3) as "providing favourable controlled 
conditions to aid in the growth of new ventures". 
At the 1998 European Commission Best Practices in Incubator 
Infrastructure and Innovation Support workshop in Helsinki, a business incubator 
was defined as: `A place where newly created firms are concentrated in a limited 
space. Its aim is to improve the chance of growth and rate of survival of these 
firms by providing them with a modular building with common facilities (telefax, 
computing facilities, etc. ) as well as with managerial support and back-up services. 
The main emphasis is on local development and job creation. The technology 
13 European Commission OJ C186 - 51/52dd. 27 July 1990 
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orientation is often marginal'. As noted in the European Commission Enterprise 
Directorate General's Final Report 'Benchmarking of Business Incubators' Centre 
for Strategy & Evaluation Services (2002 - page 5), this definition, with the advent 
of `virtual incubators (see below) arguably places too much emphasis on the 
physical aspects of incubator operations. 
In the US, in the country that is held to have pioneered incubators, the 
National Business Incubation Association (2001, page 22) defines an incubator 
with reference to the business incubation process: "Business incubation is a 
dynamic process of business enterprise development. Incubators nurture young 
firms, helping them to survive and grow during the start-up period when they are 
most vulnerable. Incubators provide hands-on management assistance, access to 
financing and orchestrated exposure to critical business or technical support 
services. They also offer entrepreneurial firms shared office services, access to 
equipment, flexible leases and expandable space - all under one roof". 
The Australia and New Zealand Association of Business Incubators 
(ANZABI), defines business incubation as follows "Business incubation involves a 
unique mix of advice, services and support to help small businesses develop and 
grow. It takes place in incubators which are infrastructural developments that help 
businesses to become established and profitable", while United Kingdom Business 
Incubation defines an incubator (in the UK Incubation Impact Assessment Study 
1999/2000, p. 45), as comprising: 
 A local property-based facility, multi-tenanted and managed 
  Shared space and back-office services - reducing tenant administration 
costs 
  On-site, in house business development services and indirect access to 
management, resources, networks and transfer of knowledge/skills - 
building tenant expertise and credibility 
 A strong selection policy 
  Young, small firms as tenants 
  The reduction of initialising costs - reducing financial risk for start-up 
firms 
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 A supportive environment 
  The aim of improving tenant survival and growth in formative years 
More recently, in 2004, UKBI has defined an incubator as "a unique and 
highly flexible combination of business development processes, infrastructure and 
people, designed to nurture and grow new and small businesses by supporting 
them through the early stages of development and change" (p. 1). While the 
provision of physical space for start-ups is evidently a defining characteristic of an 
incubator the definition used by ELAN in France (as noted in the European 
Commission Enterprise Directorate-General's `Benchmarking of Business 
Incubators' Report (Section 2, page 5)) does not stipulate or define an incubator 
with reference to physical attributes and instead bases its definition on the 
objectives of promoting new start-ups and helping existing firms to expand. 
More recently, business incubation is increasingly presented as a process 
that explains what occurs within an incubator and wherein equal emphasis is 
placed on other aspects including entrepreneur training, mentoring and visibility. 
For example, as defined by European Commission Enterprise Directorate-General 
in Benchmarking of Business Incubators (2002, p. 17): 
"Business Incubation is a dynamic business development process. It 
is a term which covers a wide variety of processes which help to 
reduce the failure rate of early stage companies and speed the growth 
of companies which have the potential to become substantial 
generators of employment and wealth. A business incubator is 
usually a property with small work units which provide an 
instructive and supportive environment to entrepreneurs at start-up 
and during the early stages of businesses. Incubators provide three 
main ingredients for growing successful businesses - an 
entrepreneurial and learning environment, ready access to mentors 
and investors, visibility in the marketplace". 
Most notably, while NBIA has previously acknowledged that the business 
incubator is an economic development tool, the EU Commission definition which 
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is more specific and highlights the specific role incubators in supporting 
employment and wealth creation. The role of incubators, over and above 
supporting the development of enterprise, is also developed by the Science Park 
and Innovation Centre Expert Group (SPICE)14, which defines a business 
incubator as follows: A Business Incubator/Innovation Centre Offers rooms for 
lease, start-up consulting and business planning as well as shared office services to 
(technology based) innovation companies and entrepreneurs. Such a centre aims at 
promoting local and regional economic development, the transfer of technology 
and innovation as well as the creation of jobs. There are different types of 
incubators, the most typical being: 
  Mixed use incubators promoting economic development and growth 
through enterprise development and offering services to all kinds of 
enterprise (low-tech, no-tech, light manufacturing, services); 
  Economic development incubators focused on specific targets, such as job 
creation or industrial restructuring. These institutions are often policy 
driven and heavily managed under local or regional Governments; and 
  Technology incubators promote technology-based (start-up) companies 
with a particular view to the transfer and diffusion of technologies. These 
are often linked to universities, research institutes and or science and 
technology parks and, thus, focus on specific industrial clusters and 
technologies. 
Again, the SPICE definition considers physical attributes (accommodation) 
but not only articulates the provision of services to business but also includes, as 
an integral element, broader goals and economic development objectives which 
are being extended ever further to include for example education and social 
enterprise (see, for example, BIC case studies in Chapter 4). The SPICE definition 
(above) also alludes to a typology of incubators and it is evident from a review of 
the literature that there have been numerous contributions to the 
development/efforts to develop incubator taxonomies. 
14 A global network of experts in business incubation, innovation centres, technology parks, 
regional economic development, technology transfer and entrepreneurship from national and 
international associations of business incubators and technology/science parks in 25 countries. 
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There is, however, a discernible 'reservation' amongst incubator managers 
as regards the field of endeavour that is incubator/incubation research; aggregating 
`incubator' activities, (largely to generalise and build incubator/incubation 
typologies) and establish 'benchmarks' (the real utility of which seems to be in 
doubt), and the end to which this research might ultimately be put i. e. 
`superimposed' over the workings of their facilities somewhat 
artificially/simplistically and potentially reducing the scope of `incubator' 
operations or rather the understanding thereof. The classification of business 
support facilities as incubators or otherwise by third parties is often inconsistent 
with the modus operandi of many of these business support facilities as originally 
conceived and which were, it is often pointed out, conceived well in advance of the 
development of this `science/field of research'. 
Notwithstanding the above, from a review of the literature (largely 
academic) incubator taxonomies have been drawn with reference to: 
(a) The technology orientation and the level of management support provided: 
Figure 3.4: Incubator Typology drawn with reference to Level of 
Management Support and Technology Orientation 
Technology-orientations 
Low Medium High 
Low 
Management 
Medium 
Support 
High 
Industrial 
Estate 
Business 
Park 
Science Park 
Managed Entreprise Innovation 
Workshop Centre Centre 
Business Technology 
EU`BIC' 
Incubator Centre 
Source: European Commission Enterprise Directorate-General Benchmarking of 
Business Incubators Final Report (2002), page 6 
15 Industrial estates in the top left-hand corner generally have a non-selective intake, provide little 
or no management support and have no special criteria with regard to business activities and 
technology content. At the opposite extreme, in the bottom right-hand corner, technology centres 
have highly selective admission criteria, provide 'hands-on' management support, and have a highly 
specialised technology focus 
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(b) Their focus or target clientele (Plosila and Allen, 1985); 
(c) The nature and level of sponsorship - public, private, university, non- 
profit, or hybrid (Nyrop, 1986; Allen and McCluskey, 1990); 
(d) With reference to the relative state of development or maturity of the 
incubated firms (Allen, 1988); 
(e) Primary financial sponsorship (Kuratko and LaFollette, 1987; Smilor, 
1987; Temali and Campbell, 1984); 
(f) Whether incubatees are spin-offs or start-ups (Plosila and Allen, 1985); 
(g) The business focus of the incubatees e. g. product development, 
manufacturing, mixed use (Plosila and Allen, 1985; Sherman, 1999); 
(h) The business focus of the incubator (i. e. property development or business 
assistance - Brooks, 1986); 
(i) Organisational patterns (United Nations, 2001) e. g. `A non-profit business 
incubator running with the help of a community or an economic 
development foundation'; `A non-profit business incubator running with 
the help of a community or an economic development foundation'; `A 
private or for-profit incubator usually owned by venture and seed capital 
investment groups or real estate development partnerships'; `A joint effort 
of the local and central Government, a non-profit private organization [A 
partnership allows the incubator to take advantage of both the expertise of 
the private sector and the use of public funding]; `An affiliation of a 
university [The purpose of such a business incubator is to help in the 
development and transfer of new technology]; 
(j) The practices of incubation and the evolution of the incubator model. 
Lalkaka (2001) refers to a `first generation' of incubators (established in 
the 1980s) generally offering affordable space and shared facilities to 
carefully selected entrepreneurial groups which in the 1990s added 
supplementary services such as counselling, skills enhancement and 
networking services to access professional support and seed capital, for 
tenants within the facility and affiliates outside. In addition, he identifies a 
`second generation' emerging in 1998 concerned with mobilising ICT and 
providing a convergence of support, towards creating growth-potential, 
tech-based ventures and a `third' which brings together support services 
for knowledge based businesses with linkages to HEIs, research centres, 
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venture capitalists and international joint ventures"(Lalkaka, 1997). The 
evolution of the incubator model is also explored in the European 
Commission's Benchmarking Business Incubators Report (see below and 
adapted) to acknowledge the development of incubators concerned with 
the social economy and specific types of entrepreneur): 
Figure 3.5: Evolution of Incubation Model(s) 
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Adapted from Source: 
European Commission Directorate General Enterprise (2002) 
Benchmarking Business Incubators Final Report, Section 2, p. 3 
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Early 
2000s 
In practice, many of the incubators examined in the course of this 
research, particularly BICs (see also case studies below) are operating as 
technology incubators AND are practising sector specific incubation AND 
incubation with and without walls AND New economy incubation AND 
social economy incubation AND incubation targeting specific types of 
entrepreneur (e. g. graduates, academic spin-offs, entrepreneurs from black 
and other ethnic minority groups) all as part of the same incubator model 
(particularly BICs - see case studies). 
Further, while a number of contributors to the field have noted the 
provision of services outwith the incubator as a new or emergent 
phenomenon - e. g. Rice and Matthews (1995), and Lalkaka (1997) who 
refers to a `second generation' of incubators serving businesses within 
walls and on an outreach basis - discussions and interviews with incubator 
managers and personnel undertaken in the course of this research suggest 
that this facet of incubator operations was evidently, more often than not, 
part of their original 'first generation' incubator model. A number did 
however acknowledge, that this feature of incubator operations owed 
much to the speed at which the incubator `matured' over and above an 
immediate concern to achieve optimum occupancy levels (and break 
even), the entrepreneurial flair of the incubator managers and staff who 
realised that the incubator could and should be capable of much more (and 
frequently in advance of their sponsors and stakeholders) and that in any 
event, incubation and/or high value added business support of the kind 
which they were equipped and staffed to deliver (off-site) was an 
important activity in its own right in strategic and/or political terms 
(demonstrating additional value for money to initial sponsors) and in 
financial terms (as potentially a source of commercial revenue that might 
be exploited once the incubator had established its reputation and 
credibility with the local business community and other agencies outwith 
the incubator's walls). 
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As regards new economy incubators, the dot. com boom circa 2000 
prompted the development of a great many Intemet/ICT business focused 
incubators, especially in the USA and, to a more limited degree, in 
Europe. The Harvard Business School survey in 2000 identified 356 such 
incubators around the world. Of these 222 were found to be in the US 
(about 25 % of the total U. S. incubator stock), while others were found in 
Canada (14), UK (28), China-Hong Kong (11), and Brazil (10) - Hansen 
et al, 2000. 
As noted in the European Commission's Benchmarking Business 
Incubators Report (2002, p. 8)"in 1994, only 1 out of every 25 technology 
incubator companies was IT related, by 1999, this figure had risen to 20". 
Sponsors include the quoted arms of established consultancies and 
technology solutions providers such as Bain & Co., Ernst & Young, HP 
and Dell and IBM; telecommunications companies such as Sprint PCS; 
and dot corn start ups such as cocoon, Gorilla Park, Ant Factory, Cartezia, 
and Internet-Incubation". 
Doubts have however been expressed as regards the veracity of the 
European Commission's figures from within the incubator community in 
the course of this research vis-ä-vis the assertion that by 1999,20 of all 25 
businesses incubated were IT related. It has been suggested that this may 
overstate or misrepresent the profile of businesses assisted i. e. the phrase 
IT-related is rather `loose' and while it seemingly implies that 80% of 
businesses assisted were IT businesses, it would perhaps be more true to 
say that 80% of businesses assisted received assistance with the 
application of ICT in their business. 
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Notwithstanding, these semantics (which are nonetheless 
important) as reported by Lalkaka (2003, p. 7): 
"In the 1999-2000 period, some 400 for-profit, Internet incubators 
were added in the US and elsewhere, due to expanding 
opportunities that the Internet seemed to offer and due in part to 
unrealistic expectations. Typically, this model provides a smart 
workspace, focussed consulting services to a small growth- 
potential group of firms, takes equity in the companies through an 
affiliated venture capital facility, and accelerates them to the 
market. The bulk of these incubators - once considered the 
paradigm of best practice - have closed down. Nevertheless, the 
equity-based, net-worked model has taught some lessons and 
continues to have relevance". 
In the course of interviews conducted as part of this research, 
however, it has been suggested that in the UK at least, the adoption of the 
`new economy incubator model' (or derivatives thereof) may account for a 
number of incubator casualties, most notably London BIC (now in the 
hands of administrators) which reportedly deferred income from tenants 
and start-ups (i. e. rent) in return for equity and, in so doing, fell prey to a 
general misconception as to the commercial potential or more specifically 
the rate of return (and time for return) on `new economy businesses' and 
moreover the rate of return/return on investment (outwith basic service 
charges/tenant rents) for most start-ups facilitated by incubators. 
For example, it is to be remembered that many of those incubators 
that have `bought into' the `new economy model' or otherwise provide or 
exchange support, services, accommodation and facilities in return for 
equity in the assisted/incubated businesses do so at a point in the 
development or life of the business where the market i. e. venture 
capitalists have generally elected not to intervene or invest their time 
(expertise) or money as the risk is calculated as being to high or the rate of 
return relative to their investment not sufficiently rewarding or timely so 
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as to render the activity as not commercially viable. A sense of 
commercial reality was seemingly suspended by a number of incubator 
operators swept up in a wave of optimism as to the commercial potential 
of `dot. com' businesses, reinforced by political and economic 
development priorities for the same. 
In the North East funding was evidently made available to 
establish a new model economy incubator at the North East of England 
Business and Innovation Centre (NEBIC). While not sharing the funding 
agencies optimism re the commercial prospects (and then regional 
endowments) of potential new economy businesses, NEBIC nevertheless 
accepted funds to establish a facility specifically for ICT businesses. 
What is clear however, is that NEBIC remained consistent in its approach 
and unlike many refused to suspend, neglect or `water-down' the normal 
rules of business/business incubation i. e. NEBIC recognised that a 
"business is a business" regardless of whether it be a `traditional' or `new' 
economy business and that it must, like all businesses, generate a return to 
pay the bills (and regardless of the prevailing "hype", "expectation", 
"fad", "fashion" or "misplaced enthusiasm" and/or "confidence of 
economic development strategists and funding agencies (no matter how 
well intentioned) and experienced institutional investors alike"!. 
Another explanation advanced in the course of this research for the 
failure of so may `new economy' incubators has been the nature of the 
intervention of strategic and/or funding agencies which tasked or 
incentivised so many of these failed incubators to support `new economy' 
businesses and adopt `new economy' incubator models without fully 
understanding the real potential of indigenous regional endowments, the 
incubation process, the sustainability of `new economy incubator models', 
the new challenges presented by the incubation of new economy 
businesses and the new approaches required to incubate them to say 
nothing of the rate of return in `new economy' ventures. 
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It has also possible that first and second generation incubator 
managers were more readily able to largely dismiss, as a case of the 
`emperors new clothes', the hype that surrounded 'new economy' 
incubators/incubation (i. e. to a large extent their incubator operations were 
relatively mature (and their business model settled) and thus the funding 
made available for `new-economy' incubation was accepted only as an 
extension of their existing model and not something that overly skewed or 
re-defined their business model). 
In addition, it may be that a lack of experience, expertise and 
general savvy i. e. naivety amongst third generation incubator managers 
may also explain, in part, so many of the incubator failures around this 
time. For example first and second generation incubator managers may 
have been more able to influence funding agencies and challenge them 
(albeit discreetly and at a personal and institutional level) as necessary i. e. 
where for example regional strategies and plans may be/were ultimately 
flawed as unworkable -a factor often of their personal networks, expertise 
and experience and their `institutional presence' within for example the 
regional incubation/innovation system. 
Further it has also been suggested that stakeholder/sponsor 
expectations and pressure on the `third generation' incubators to achieve 
(in essence a host of `undeliverables') prompted something akin to `land- 
grab effect' where incubators in an effort to achieve targets were 
prepared/compelled to incubate sub-standard ideas as the only means of 
demonstrating activity and their endeavour. Naturally, the coupling of the 
new incubator model (wherein incubators accepted equity instead of rent) 
with sub-standard, non-commercial/less than optimum commercial 
propositions to say nothing of the inevitable market correction and 
revaluation of such businesses was inherently doomed. 
(k) The relationship between sponsorship and motivation (Allen and 
McCluskey, 1990, p. 64 - see table 3.3 below). 
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Table 3.3: Incubator Value-Added Continuum 
Business 
Real Estate Value-Added Through Development 
Business 
For-Profit Non-Profit Development 
Property Development Academic 
Development Corporation Incubators Seed eed Capital Capital Incubators Incubators Incubators 
Capitalize 
Real estate Job Faculty-industry Investment 
appreciation Creation Collaboration Opportunity 
ý 
Sell proprietary Positive statement Commercialise 
services to of entrepreneurial University 
tenant potential Research 
Create 
opportunity for 
Generate sustainable Strengthen Service Product 
technolo chnol 
income from the and Development 
err organization 
instructional Mission 
8 
Create Diversify Capitalise 
0 Investment Economic Investment 
Opportunity Base Opportunity 
ö Bolster Tax Base 
Complement Create good will 
existing between institution 
programmes and community 
Utilise vacant 
Facilities 
Property Economic University Managing 
Developers Development Officials Partners 
Officials 
Economic Politicians Economic Limited 
Development Development Partners 
Officials Officials 
Politicians Economic 
Development 
Officials 
Ability to pay Net jobs University High Growth 
rent potential Affiliation Potential 
New Technology 
a°. firms Intensive 
ö 
'y Local Net jobs 
E ownership Potential 
Not retail, wholesale Complements 
of personal services University 
Programmes 
Graduated rent Graduated rent 
Growth 
ä None Time limit Time limit 
Performance 
W 
None None 
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It is postulated that incubators at the right side of the matrix are more likely to add 
economic value to the local economy (because they emphasise business 
development) than incubators on the left side of the continuum. 
However, it also became evident in the course of interview undertaken with 
incubator managers that an incubator's orientation as understood within and outwith 
the incubator (e. g. amongst incubator sponsors and stakeholders) may give rise to 
tensions and potentially significant disputes. For example, whereas an incubator 
might be initiated by the estates/property development arm of e. g. a local authority 
or indeed a university which may regard the investment in an incubator as a `real 
estate' investment which should ultimately yield a return (i. e. the revenue derived 
from tenant rents) they are invariably staffed by members of the organisation's 
economic development, regeneration or business support staff who are naturally 
disposed to seek to develop the portfolio of services and extend the nature and level 
at which they can add value to assisted businesses (i. e. reinvesting the revenue 
derived from tenant rents in e. g. new equipment, facilities, programmes, etc thus 
significantly reducing the rate of return). 
Consequently, these tensions which can erupt within separate divisions of a 
local authority are often the catalyst that compels authorities (often in the absence 
of a formal policy) to decide policy at an executive level i. e. is the business 
incubator portfolio tasked simply with generating a financial return to the estates 
department(via tenant rents) or with providing incubator services with the 
concomitant impact on the immediate financial return to the authority 
(notwithstanding the other socio-economic returns generated by the latter) or both? 
In any event, it has been suggested in the course of this research (and more 
than once), that academic and practitioner interest in the concept of and evolution 
of incubators as a species of business support and the field of endeavour concerned 
with defining and categorising what is and is not the business of an incubator 
(`incubation') has a lot to answer for insofar as it may have skewed the focus (and 
understanding) of economic development strategies, actions and policy 
instruments (and efforts to support enterprise/entrepreneurship) the world over! 
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For example, it has been observed that while incubators are generally 
perceived and considered to be concerned with the provision of services to start- 
ups/new businesses (as illustrated by the definitions of business incubators above 
(academic, practitioner and stakeholder and including, for example, the European 
Commission), it has been suggested that those who have sought/now seek to 
categorise or define what they understand and think the business of incubators to 
be about/should be about are to an extent, divorced from the reality. 
3.10 Incubator Focus 
There is, for example, a presumption in policy - instruments and funding 
regimes - particularly European and specifically UK, and the literature (academic 
and practitioner as researched in this study - see for example, Lalkaka, 2003) that a 
business support facility presenting itself as an incubator/concerned with 
incubation is confined/should confine itself to new businesses (a term which is 
itself ill-defined within and outwith the incubator community and is, at best 
arbitrary, and can be found to mean for example, a business pre-start, a business 
less than 12 months, 3 years and 5 years old). 
Not surprisingly, it has been suggested, however, that this is far from the 
norm and that there is world of difference in `what is' and (arguably) `what should 
be' and indeed whether a number of representations as to what is `best practice' 
are correct. In reviewing whether this focus for incubator operations is to be found 
in practice and having examined business incubator admission criteria amongst a 
sample of incubators operating in the East Midlands (telephone interviews 
conducted with incubator managers on 28.04.05), it may be observed that 13 of 31 
in the sample (see table below) do not in fact operate admission criteria, while 
those that do so, do not necessarily confine themselves to new businesses or 
business start-ups howsoever they are defined. 
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Table 3.4: Sample East Midlands Incubators & Operation of Entry Policies16 
Facility Entry policy 
1. The Bearings No 
2. Boughton Pumping Station No 
3. Chadburn House No 
4. Coney Green Business Centre No 
5. Dunston Innovation centre Yes 
6. Edwinstowe House No 
7. Mansfield Business centre No 
8. Mansfield I centre Yes 
9. Markham Environmental Technology Centre Yes 
10. Pleasley Vale Business Park No 
11. Ransonwood Business Park No 
12. E- Centre, Sherwood Energy Village Yes 
13. Tapton Innovation Centre Yes 
14. Westthorpe Innovation Centre Yes 
15. Turbine Yes 
16. Bio City Yes 
17. Blue Coat Incubation Centre NBV Yes 
18. Broadway Media Centre Yes 
19. Castle Cavendish Yes 
20. Nottingham Fashion Centre No 
21. The Hive Yes 
22. Innovate Office No 
23. Lenton Business Centre No 
24. Mercury House Yes 
25. Nottinghamshire International Clothing Centre Yes 
26. UNIEI Lab Yes 
27. New Brook House Yes 
28. Nottingham Science and Technology Park Yes 
29. S. G. C. S. Business Park No 
30. Southglade Food and Drink Park Yes 
31. Strelley Hall Business Centre No 
16 Source: Alliance SSP Strategic Partnership and independently confirmed by telephone interviews 
conducted with incubator managers and staff on 28.04.05 
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It has been indicated in the course of this research that the focus of those 
business support facilities that are described and/or presenting themselves as 
`incubators' are, in fact, rarely concerned with providing support for `new' 
businesses to the exclusion of existing and established businesses. 
For example, in the course of research conducted at NEBIC (desk research 
and interviews conducted with incubator managers and staff - past and present), it 
is clear that the general interest of the original NEBIC scheme (and most `first 
generation' incubators), as originally conceived was to extend the array of business 
support in the locality and as part of this approach offer new/alternative premises 
within a supportive environment to indigenous businesses, business starts and 
other businesses that might be persuaded to locate to the facility from outwith the 
locality and region - "Support for start-ups and existing businesses was not 
perceived as mutually exclusive". This is reflected in the profile of businesses 
assisted by NEBIC in 2004 wherein BIC supported approximately 300 business 
start-ups (90% of which were individual entrepreneurs, 5% industrial spin- 
offs/hive-offs and 5% academic spin-offs), the BIC also supported 500+ existing 
SMEs to say nothing of the 160 businesses already resident on site. In addition, in 
2004, NEBIC organised 50 Training events attended by 500+ would be 
entrepreneurs and 20 training events for existing businesses attended by more than 
200 people. Moreover, of the businesses located at the North East Business and 
Innovation Centre, one of the tenant companies interviewed was founded in 1964 
and others in 1970,1971,5 in the 1980s, and five in the 1990s. 
It is evident that within the incubator community there is a feeling that an 
ill-conceived policy/funding thrust concerned with increasing business birth rates 
may be responsible for introducing an unwelcome pre-condition for support (as 
might be provided to a business by an incubator) i. e. that supported or incubated 
businesses be `new'. The policy thrust that accords the promotion of new or micro 
businesses as a priority may be traced to a range of empirical investigations which 
include, for example: 
  Ashcroft and Love (1995) and (1996) who, found that regions with higher 
business birth rates have experienced higher levels of job growth; 
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  Reynolds (1999) who has observed that entrepreneurship [in the USA] is 
positively related to growth; 
  Thurik (1999) provided empirical evidence from a cross-sectional study 
from 1984 to 1994 of the 23 countries that are part of the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), that increased 
entrepreneurship, as measured by business ownership rates, was associated 
with higher rates of employment growth at the country level; 
  Reynolds et at. 2000 in the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM) 
Study wherein an empirical link between the degree of entrepreneurial 
activity and economic growth, as measured by employment, at the country 
level was observed; 
  Foelster (2000) examines data for Sweden between 1976 and 1995 
identified a link between micro behaviour and macroeconomic 
performance, and observed that increases in self-employment as a share of 
total employment had a positive impact on regional employment rates in 
Sweden; 
  Callejon and Segarra (2000) analysing data for Spanish manufacturing 
industries (1980-1992) found find that both new firm start-up rates and 
exit rates contribute positively to the growth of total factor productivity in 
regions as well as industries; 
  Audretsch and Fritsch (2002) who concluded (analysing data for the 
1990s) that regions with a higher start-up rate exhibit higher growth rates 
  Similarly, Carree and Thurik (1999) and Audretsch et al. (2002) Audretsch 
and Thurik (2002) find that OECD countries exhibiting higher increases in 
entrepreneurship have also experienced greater rates of growth and lower 
levels of unemployment. 
However, the policy concern for new firm formation not sit particularly 
well throughout the academic community (e. g. Storey, 1993), nor does the 
justification for targeting certain types of business (Storey and Johnson, 1987; 
Johnson and Smallbone, 2003; Atherton and Lyon, 2001); characteristics of the 
business owner (Johnson and Smallbone, 2003) or even the spatial dimension of 
SME policy (North et al, 2003; Porter, 1995). This accords with concerns of 
practitioners interviewed in the course of this research who have expressed the 
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view that the promotion of support for business start-up over and above support for 
existing businesses may be ill-conceived; and that despite popular misconceptions 
to the contrary, many of today's incubators were in fact originally conceived as 
facilities for the provision of an integrated package of services (and 
accommodation) for new business and existing businesses (e. g. technology 
businesses and/or simply businesses with `growth potential'). 
It is evident from discussions with incubator management and staff and 
observation of incubator operations (at for example, North East Business and 
Innovation Centre (Sunderland), Entrust (Newcastle), ATMEL/Cenamps 
(Newcastle), The Digital Factory (Newton Aycliffe), Loughborough Innovation 
Centre, DeMontfort Innovation Centre, UNIEI (Nottingham) BioCity 
(Nottingham), The Hive (Nottingham), Mansfield I-Centre, Midlands Innovation 
Relay Centre (Coventry) to mention but a few) that the desire to facilitate business 
start-ups (on the basis of their capacity to generate or support employment and 
economic growth - which no doubt underpins much of the public funding 
channelled into business incubation programmes and incubators) is but a part of 
incubator operations and omits consideration of the degree and extent to which 
value is being added [by incubators] to existing SMEs vis-a-vis their growth, 
17 sustainability and ability to generate employment. 
Incubator managers and staff interviewed in the course of this research 
have emphasised that the provision of services and/or accommodation to `new' 
businesses is but one facet of their operation (see services and case studies below) 
and that the word `incubator' as understood conceptually and applied as a 
descriptor of their operations has been allowed, unduly, to define or characterize 
the nature and level of the whole organisation as concerned with support for new 
businesses and erroneously omits consideration and representation of a myriad of 
17 Other criticisms of incubator funding agencies have included (in the UK) the organisation or 
operation of European Regional Development Funds (specifically Objective 2 funding) which 
prescribes that businesses assisted with ERDF should receive substantive assistance amounting to 
five days support. This apparently arbitrary stipulation, seemingly unique within Europe to the UK, 
has seemingly forced incubators to develop supply-led programmes and interventions to 
accompany demand led interventions i. e. incubators may find themselves in situations where they 
are unable to deliver assistance as required by businesses unless the business accepts additional 
(and perhaps unwanted or unnecessary assistance) so that the incubator is able to draw down 
European funding to deliver the support. 
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other services (e. g. provided to existing businesses) i. e. support for new firms is 
one of the things such facilities provide but is not necessarily that by which they 
would wish to be/should be defined (see incubator rationales and services below). 
Indeed, in practice it seems that the measure of `newness' as applied by 
incubators is seemingly arbitrary or remains (deliberately) ill-defined so as to be 
not unduly prescriptive. Further it has been suggested that incubator models 
focussed exclusively at supporting new businesses may be fundamentally flawed 
as being unsustainable without significant subsidy insofar as the rental income 
(and the level at which this is may be charged to start-up businesses) is unlikely - 
of itself - to support the delivery and development of substantive incubator 
services over and above limited firm-level benefits to the tenants (i. e. incubator 
operations and services are not merely a factor of the aims and objectives of the 
incubator but also the level of financial return that can be generated from tenants 
and assisted businesses). 
Furthermore, and pursuant to the entry policies explored above, and 
notwithstanding the suggestion that business incubation should be concerned with 
new businesses, it is suggested in the incubator literature (generated within and 
outwith the incubator community) that incubators should operate selection policies 
i. e. apply admission/entry criteria and focus or select where they add value. In the 
UK, according to UKBI's National Business Incubation Framework (2004, p. 4) 
while it is acknowledged therein that incubator clients should be appropriate to the 
"objectives of the incubation environment and its stakeholders" and that "the 
selection policy will differ from one incubation environment to another, depending 
on the mission statement and overall objectives [it is assumed that most clients 
admitted to incubation environments] should be admitted on the basis that they 
demonstrate the following characteristics: 
  Exhibit potential for growth; 
  Meet specified targets; 
  Be able to put forward a business idea/plan; 
  Be willing to accept and act upon the advice/mentoring provided; and 
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  Have (or be able to develop) the capacity to pay for the facilities and 
services". 
In any event, and in consideration of the incubator operations visited in the 
course of this research and discussions with incubator managers, it is submitted 
however that such `entry criteria' are generally less than exacting and that they 
often appear little more than a nod to the notion that an incubator should be 
selective as regards who they elect to support. Naturally incubators look to 
provide accommodation and services to viable propositions with the potential for 
growth not least because of the revenue an incubator hopes to secure vis-a-vis rents 
and from the provision of other services (whether they be subsidised or provided at 
commercial rates). Further, the notion of a `capacity to pay' is in any event 
generally imperative for incubator management insofar as they are largely 
dependent on the revenue from tenants (unless wholly subsidised and that the 
future of the subsidy is secure) to support the bulk of all incubator operations 
including personnel costs i. e. their own jobs; i. e. patronage may be temporary and 
outwith an incubators control whereas income from tenants is something over 
which they have and can exercise direct control. 
As regards those incubators that do present themselves as prima facie 
concerned with supporting for example only `innovative' businesses or for 
example specific technologies and as having a more rigorous or selective criteria 
for admission over and above basic commercial viability, they too are nevertheless 
largely subject to an overriding financial imperative. It has been suggested that 
unless an incubator is financially secure and has established revenue streams from 
e. g. anchor tenants, incubated and `grown' businesses and other off-site activities 
such as public commissions/service contracts and consultancy (or unless heavily 
subsidised) it must favour businesses with a capacity to pay as opposed to perhaps 
those businesses or innovators developing/hoping to commercialise, for example, 
blue sky research (in a particular technology) as the return may be so far removed 
from the present and/or the technology so insufficiently mature to support the 
generation of revenues. In other words, incubators are often forced `pass' on 
radically innovative propositions or technologies in favour of perhaps a`less 
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exciting' or less radically innovative businesses which have the capacity to pay 
their incubator bills. 
Indeed, herein lies one of the dichotomies observed in the course of this 
research, as while incubators are often understood to be concerned with innovatory 
high-technology businesses and are often perceived and/or presented by 
stakeholders as there to offer specialist support to innovating high-technology 
companies, the importance of the technology or `radicalness' or `novelty' of the 
innovation is often overplayed and it would be more true to say that they are in fact 
concerned with supporting commercially viable propositions (high-tech or 
otherwise) i. e. the commercial viability of tenants and businesses assisted is key to 
the viability of the incubator and more so than the degree of innovation present in 
the business. Of the multiple incubators visited in the course of this research, they 
have been found to be incubating or providing homes for high-tech and low-tech 
businesses in a myriad of technologies to social enterprises, charities, and other 
business support organisations including `virtual incubators' and `virtual 
technology incubators' (e. g. CENAMPs). 
This undeniable financial imperative may in fact explain the nature of 
incubator entry criteria being espoused by incubator associations i. e. that the 
`selection' of tenants is based on their commercial viability without necessarily 
prescribing degrees of innovation or the nature and level of growth that an 
incubated firm must achieve (over and above that required to pay their rent/for 
services). Indeed, as may be observed from the UKBI criteria (above) the fact that 
an incubated business be `new' is not in fact a stipulation. 
3.11 The Development of Business Incubation 
However, before proceeding to a more detailed exposition of the role, 
function and added value or impact of incubators (specifically BICs), the way in 
which the modality has evolved and achieved a currency in economic development 
circles merits attention. The origins of business incubation modality can be traced 
back to Western industrialised countries in the late 1970s and early 1980s. The 
period may be characterized as one of increased unemployment prompted by the 
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collapse of many traditional industries. In both Europe and the USA, policy 
makers in response to economic restructuring which had devastated formerly 
prosperous and industrious communities (in social and economic terms), sought 
fresh strategies and approaches to support the regeneration of sectors, communities 
and indeed whole regions. The collapse of so many industries and industrial 
giants compounded the erosion of neo-classical economic theory (and policy 
approaches rooted therein). 
The emergence of new approaches, prompted by a new focus upon the 
potential of enterprise, innovation and new firm formation to produce endogenous 
growth (Eisinger, 1988; Massey et al., 1992; Atkinson, 1991) characterised much 
of the policies and politics of the 1980s (in the UK and the USA). This major shift 
in public policy focus, during the early 1980s, towards the promotion and 
development of new small firms as the vehicle for job creation, which it is largely 
acknowledged was reinforced by Birch's startling results in 1979, ensured that the 
SME sector would be a key focus for policy makers, politicians and academics. 
Evidently, widespread interest in business incubators as an economic 
development tool began in the early 1980s. According to Weinberg, Lyons, and 
Shook, (1995) the first incubator programs were established in the United States in 
Pennsylvania and North Carolina in 1983 and were followed by programmes in 
other states. Weinberg et at., report that by late 1985, approximately 12 states had 
incubator programmes by 1989, about half the states had or were developing 
programs and by 1994,49 states had operating business incubator programmes. 
However, commentators have observed a decline in state financial support in 
relation to the number of incubation programs a fact they attribute to the economic 
difficulties of the early 1990s and a shift in economic development policy from 
broad-based programs - such as business incubators - to targeted programs 
focusing on specific technology and manufacturing needs. 
However, the roots of business incubation/incubators might be traced much 
earlier. Lavrow and Sample (2002) attribute the origins of business incubation 
some 40 years earlier. They note that Student Agencies Inc., located in Ithaca, 
New York, was established to incubate student companies in 1942 and that in 
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1946, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) president Karl Compton and 
other alumni founded the American Research Development (ARD) incubator. 
According to Lavrow and Sample (2002, p. 16) the first documented incubator 
outside of the academic environment was the Batavia Industrial Centre (BIC) 
located in Batavia, New York. They report: "The building was purchased by a 
local family business, Charles Mancuso & Son Inc., after Massey Ferguson went 
bankrupt, leaving approximately 2,000 people out of work. The building covered 
850,000 square feet, which was impossible to lease out to a single tenant. It dated 
back to 1882 and was in need of a new roof and other repairs". 
According to Adkins (2001) cited in Hacket and Dilts (2004, p. 57), "the 
developer opted to sublet subdivided partitions of the building to a variety of 
tenants, some of whom requested advice and/or assistance with raising capital. 
The business incubator was born". One of the first tenants in the building was a 
company that incubated chickens. According to McKee (1992, p. 41) "People 
observed the similarity between incubating chickens and incubating companies, 
and the term stayed with the industry". The BIC is still in operation with 110 
tenants employing some 1,000 people. Not all tenants are start-ups; any business 
can rent space in the building. Over the years, the BIC has incubated more than 
1,000 businesses and employed more than 5,000 people through its graduates and 
tenants (see Burger, 1999, Aragon and Landry, 2000, Adkins, 2001, and Hackett 
and David, 2004). 
Generally, however, incubation programs diffused slowly in the 1960s and 
1970s, typically as government-sponsored responses to the need for urban/mid- 
western economic revitalization; a motivation to find new uses for old, abandoned 
factory buildings in distressed areas; and on the initiative of a number of 
entrepreneurs and groups of investors to transfer their venture experiences to new 
companies in an environment conducive to innovation and commercialization (see 
also Meeder, 1993). Led largely by universities (Smilor and Gill, 1986) interest in 
incubators and incubation was stoked significantly in 1963 when 30+ academic 
and scientific institutions collaborated to establish the University City Science 
Centre (UCSC), aimed at stimulating and rationalizing the process of 
commercializing basic research output which was [then] billed as the U. S. 's largest 
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urban research park (Bowman-Upton et al., 1989; Schierer, 1985). Later, in the 
1970s and 1980s, other US communities gripped by the realities of industrial 
restructuring adopted the incubator modality (Allen and Bazan, 1990). 
Evidently, incubator diffusion (illustrated in Figure 1) increased 
significantly during the 1980s and 1990s reflecting a general shift in resources to 
support the small business environment. According to NBIA there 20 incubators a 
year were opening in 1984 which increased to more than 70 per annum in 1987. In 
addition, other contributions to the development and diffusion of the incubator 
modality in the US are also said to have included (a) the Bayh-Dole Act in the U. S. 
Congress in 1980 which significantly reduced the uncertainty associated with 
commercialisation of federally funded basic research -a significant stimulus for 
University innovation/incubator centres (Allen and Weinberg, 1988); (b) increased 
recognition of the importance of innovation and intellectual property rights 
protection; and (c) increased opportunities to realise returns on investment in the 
commercialization of biomedical research and (d) interest in incubation from the 
corporate sector - e. g. the Fairchild Corporation, which between 1957 and 1970 
was reportedly directly or indirectly responsible for the start-up of 35 companies 
including Intel and National Semiconductor (National Council for Urban 
Economic Development, 1985). 
It is, unclear as to when the deployment of business incubators became a 
programmed policy action as opposed to an organic development in response to 
local needs and conditions which seemingly evolved through the efforts of local 
energetic actors/institutions keen to develop new approaches. However, if one 
moment in the history of the development of incubators were to be highlighted as 
being significant in the adoption of the incubator modality [in the US] as a national 
instrument of policy, the National Foundation's (1985) Experimental Research and 
Development Program (National Science Foundation, 1985) which sought to 
stimulate and institutionalise best practices in the processes of evaluating and 
commercializing selected technological inventions (Bowman-Upton et al., 1989; 
Schierer, 1985) might be selected as the moment when the US Government 
committed to incubators or `innovation centres' (piloted in the 1970s and by 1981 
had expanded to include a total of eleven centres which served as the basis for 
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future university efforts in launching innovation/incubator centres (Allen and 
Weinberg, 1988, p. 200). NBIA (2004). also highlights the contribution of the U. S. 
Small Business Administration (SBA) Pennsylvania Legislature which in 1982 
enacted Walter Plosila's design for the state's Ben Franklin Partnership Program, 
which included incubators as a key component of a technology and manufacturing 
agenda (which subsequently became an early model for other states' support of 
business incubation) and Control Data Corporation's City Venture Corporation, 
which developed business in several large and small cities 
However, it should also be acknowledged that the United States economy 
was, in any event, evolving from a reliance on primarily large manufacturing firms 
to embrace a base of newer, smaller, technology-driven, service-oriented 
businesses (and arguably in advance of any other economy in the world) which 
might, to some extent, account for some of the abandoned factories noted by 
Meeder (above). Evidently US `Inc' (i. e. LSEs) confronted by (and at the same 
time riding) the `technological revolution' and the increased globalisation of 
competition of trade, was prompted or rather forced to restructure (and lay off 
thousands of employees in the process -a factor which would again account (at 
least in part) for Meeder's defunct factories (see above)). Notwithstanding the 
restructuring of US LSEs, SMEs were seemingly creating an unequalled number of 
jobs while new ventures embracing new technologies were `birthing' in 
unprecedented numbers. Not surprisingly, these events were not overlooked by 
local and regional economic development practitioners who were increasingly 
persuaded that small businesses were becoming a significant factor in: 
  job creation (although in reality they were, to some extent, 
absorbing/countering the effects of LSE restructuring and job destruction 
(the social, economic and fiscal costs of redundancies); and 
  Economic diversity, to say nothing of their potential to expand the tax 
base). 
It is, however, difficult to discern whether the emergence of SMEs was 
perceived [at the time] as anything more than a `band-aid' for the consequences of 
economic restructuring or as a component of a hitherto unappreciated `knowledge 
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economy'. In any event, and with or without the benefit of an economic 'crystal 
ball' it was surely natural (even on the grounds of pure demographics) that 
economic developers (given the changing demographics of the economic structure) 
created programs that would support and nurture new venture creators 
(entrepreneurs) and their start-up companies. 
Elsewhere in the world, in the UK for example, incubators or managed 
workspace as it was then called emerged has been adopted more gradually. The 
development or introduction of incubation/incubators is generally attributed to 
British Steel (Industry) Ltd., a subsidiary of British Steel formed in 1975 to create 
work in steel producing areas that were to suffer significant job losses as a 
consequence of modernization and privatization. The concept was further 
developed and deployed as part of system of SME support that has evolved in the 
UK during the last 30 years which have seen the UK persevere with lower 
marginal tax rates and the liberalisation and deregulation of labour and capital 
markets. During this period the UK developed and established approximately 300 
enterprise agencies between 1978 and 1986 (some of which prospered while others 
failed (while the introduction of Business Links also rendered many superfluous 
and prompted a number to close), 80 training and enterprise councils (TECs) from 
1989 to which was added the aforementioned network of Business Links (some 
training and enterprise councils absorbed their local business link to alleviate the 
financial difficulties that have seemingly afflicted the latter since their creation 
while some chambers of commerce merged with their local training and enterprise 
council and the local Business Links followed them). 
Given the number of actors the UK has, unsurprisingly, sought to 
rationalize the business support infrastructure. The Small Business Service 
established as an Executive Agency of the Department of Trade and Industry in 
April 2000 is often the subject of speculation as regards its future i. e. that it might 
be disbanded (TECs have already been abolished) as may a number of Business 
Links who have struggled to become self-sustaining. In the UK, Regional 
Development Agencies, local authorities and universities look set to be tasked with 
performing a more integral role. It is speculated that a number of Business Links 
may become increasingly superfluous and that a number of the country's larger 
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incubators may bid against current Business Link franchisees and subsume these 
activities. 
Elsewhere in Europe, in for example other `less-favoured regions', 
incubators emerged as a policy modality in Berlin in 1983 (Berliner Innovation - 
und Gründerzentrum-BIG), which was established by the Technical University in 
Berlin with support from the Berlin parliament. Evidently, the example was 
adopted elsewhere in Germany thereafter and the number of incubators increased 
significantly throughout Germany following unification as the modality (in the 
form of technology centres) was deployed to support restructuring and facilitate 
entrepreneurship and economic development. Incubators were established before 
unification in Berlin, Leipzig, Frankfurt/Oder, Dresden and it was the federation of 
west german incubators (Arbeitsgemeinschaft Deutscher Technologiezentren 
(ADT) which facilitated the deployment of incubators in the east, with west 
german incubators (e. g. Dortmund, Hannover and Schwerte) partnering their east 
german counterparts. 
In Italy, another of Europe's `less favoured' regions, SPI - Promozione e 
Sviluppo Imprenditoriale S. p. A (part of the Institute of Industrial Reconstruction 
concerned largely with restructuring steel producing regions) has played a 
significant role in the development and deployment of incubators and has, in 
particular adopted the EU BIC model (which may account for the prevalence of the 
large number of BICs in Italy as compared to other regions of the EU) offering 
managed workspace and business support within and outwith the incubator walls. 
For example, centres have been established in Trieste (1989) and Genoa (1990), 
Taranto in Puglia (1992), followed by others in Pozzuoli (Naples) and Marcianise 
(Caserta). As reported by the OECD (1999, p. 73) a second generation of almost 
exclusively purpose-built centres opened during 1995 and 1996 at Massa in 
Toscana, Teramo in Abruzzo, Gorizia in Friuli Venezia Giulia, Campobasso in 
Molise, Catania in Sicily, and Casarano in Puglia's southern province of Lecce and 
in 1997 at Temi. Further additions to Italy's incubator stock are evidently 
proposed for Calabria, Taranto, Savona, La Spezia (Liguria), Lovere (Brescia), 
Piombino, Foligno, Salerno (Campania), Sassari and Nuoro. 
151 
3.12 Incubators today 
According to (McKinnon and Hayhow 1998), the number of business 
incubators almost quadrupled between 1986 (140 incubator sites) to 1996 (548) 
and it is now reported by the NBIA that there are approximately 1,000+ incubators 
in the US alone (up from only 12 in 1980) and an estimated 3,500-4,500 
worldwide (Lalkaka, 2003) an estimate which was recently affirmed by the Global 
Forum on Business Incubation: Creating Conditions for Innovation (2004) wherein 
it was stated that "there are nearly 4000 incubators of various types operational in 
the World". It is reported that Europe now has nearly 1000 incubators including 
300 in Germany and 200+ in the UK (but see below). Among the developing 
countries, China which has shown exponential growth in the incubators and over a 
period of ten years is reported to have established almost 400+ incubators most of 
which appear to be linked to universities/HEIs (however as illustrated below, this 
figure now appears understated). Korea is reported to have around 300 Incubators, 
Japan 130, and India approximately 80. 
Table 3.5: Incubator Distribution Statisticsla 
Country Number of 
Incubators* 
USA 1000 Figure is proximate to NBIA figure (Lalkaka, 2001) 
Germany 300 
UK 200 UKBI 2005 figure: 220+ 
Japan 130 
AABI figure: 265 as of Nov 2002 (The Vision for 
year 2010 calls for developing 300 new incubators) 
Korea 300 AABI figure: 289 as of Oct. 3,2003 
China 400 
AABI figure: Beijing, China: 400 as of end 2002; 
Shanghai, China: 436 as of 2002; Taipei, China: 69 
as of January, 2004 
India 80 AABI figure: India: 76 
18Adapted from Source: University Grants Commission of India (Apex Body of the Government of 
India) retrieved on 28.03.05 from website: http: //www. ugc. ac. in/new_initiatives/kbe. htmi 
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However, there are difficulties with the figures reported (above) and not 
least the figure reported by UKBI. UKBI holds that there are 220 incubator 
environments in the UK (illustrated below). 
Figure 3.6: UK Distribution of EU BICs and UKBI Incubators 
NOV Peterhead 
rt+ 
I`ý., The OU1e J 
f er iesa IalurJ. IV 
our«. 
_ýýy 
Aberdeen 
All 
M Innur Pýj SCOTT At J 
{ H. hrid e 'ý 
s 
ý r .ý .` Ill Grodh 
P h ert 
ATLANTIC 
afPA 
It 
9` e 
OCEAN "4! rah 
l. lart; "i,. lir"aßerwick-upon-Tweed 
NCy. own St Soawe*a 
Numb 5' as ý: J 
r Mrel 1 United Kingdom eNewcs ie 
Tyne 
ÖONE ORTHERN Strarro" it IengötI C 
h 
AntrIr 
et Be1faN VNVlehev or p 
.P wn 
ý 
t. tiBeWle! wrY 
q'ý.. .1 
ItJ "(06U yo 1. 
t"ck 
f. 1/1Yb i, " AVAI . 
ÄiorBea+Mae 
,. 
Bleekpooll 16. Q: OOLahds& 
k a tI na v uSh Sea, Prestp" "i Republic A 
of Ireland j` c. Wll+ :: 
ýwerponl 
*as Skerýes3 
ý Gý1" 
° Kwei6a, GALWAX 
Q Incölh 
L 
ýtokr 
Mb 
CLAD 9 
hMA' tlli ý. Doon t ItY 
S wich tlme( *PPM r ;: ro `1, j Lam ý ýw, ýýe. 
"j 
"_ CiCEt r. } OWeStOR Tralime. i . "ý.. .... -. ^T_. 'ý 
AbOryllt 
l 
i6r 
LlerxWef'i, Blrnnn arm h ýSN Cr": t e er . 
BERRY ;r Car SA 
1hf . 
Nlr . ýbeäurY0 kNý ark 
a eixstowe r ±t Cork : r ... ._ WA Es obryertltr° ` Lutaf_- 60, 
' MM101ý . "- YIP 
i'1 
Haven Swenle yý ne T 
ý y" M. AD. rdauprdd+ü ý Car aPlKat 03' > UnkergUe 
. l' Ce1t, L Sea .. 
it ni r7 
r+ 
. cal raernýlete 
!I Torquay 'Weymouth 
st AusliAlß 
_ý 
ý`:. + * EnghSA Charme! Abbe Rh f 
Popuhtioii Ilennsity Key 
2,200 to 7,670 BIC Distribution - UK (EBN) 
950 to 2,199 
650 to 949 " BIC Distribution - Republic of Ireland (EBN) 
420 to 649 
280 to 419 " Incubator Distribution - UK (TMI) 
180 to 279 
100 to 179 Source data: UKBI Incubator Databasel 
7,0 to 99 
Evidently incubators are generally located in areas with relatively high 
population densities (urban locations) while only a small proportion of the 
incubator stock, as reported by UKBI, are located in peripheral regions or rural 
areas). However, UKBI's figures differ from EU Commission statistics obtained 
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from the EU Commissions Incubator Database (CORDIS) (2005) - Column A 
below - for reported incubator environments in the UK which in turn differ or are 
less than consistent with statistics found in the EU Commission Enterprise 
Directorate General's Final Report Benchmarking Business Incubators (2002) - 
Column B- see below: 
Table 3.6: European Commission EU Incubator Statistics 
Country A 
2005 
B 
2002 
Country A 
2005 
B 
2002 
Country A 
2005 
B 
2002 
Portugal 8 23 Slovakia 1 - Poland 4 
France 83 192 Greece 8 7 Latvia 2 - 
Ireland 7 6 Bulgaria 1 - Finland 38 26 
Belgium 14 13 Denmark 7 Austria 15 63 
Germany 206 300 Spain 29 38 Italy 25 45 
Lithuania 5 - UK 263 144 Romania 2 - 
Estonia 2 - Luxembourg 1 2 
- 
Turkey 
- 
1 - 
Czech Republic 2 - Netherlands 10 
7 Sweden 1 39 
Naturally, this is not to say that the difference between the figures 
represents increases or decreases in incubator stocks and is more likely attributable 
to the selection of incubators included in the samples. As regards, incubator 
figures reported by incubator associations in general, it appears that they may be 
less than representative. Evidently, the stock of incubators as reported by UKBI is 
in fact a stock of incubators that has subscribed (paid) to be a member of the 
incubator association. However, by sampling regional figures for the East 
Midlands wherein UKBI reports the existence of 30 incubators in the region as a 
whole and cross referencing these figures with incubators in two of the six sub- 
regions in the East Midlands (as reported by the Alliance Strategic Sub-regional 
Partnership and the Greater Nottingham Partnership) it was found that in just these 
two sub-regions of `North Nottinghamshire and North Derbyshire' and 'Greater 
Nottingham' (only two of the six sub-regions that comprise the `East Midlands') 
there were in fact 31 incubators (listed below and illustrated overleaf) in these two 
sub-regions alone of which only seven were enumerated or represented in the 
UKBI figures. 
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Table 3.7: Incubators in two of the six sub-regions of the East Midlands19 
1. The Bearings Newark NG24 4BZ 
2. Boughton Pumping Station Ollerton NG22 9HQ 
3. Chadburn House Mansfield NG18 1AH 
4. Coney Green Business Centre Clay cross S45 9JW 
5. Dunston Innovation centre Chersterfield S41 8NG 
6. Edwinstowe House Edwinstowe NG219PR 
7. Mansfield Business centre Mansfield NG18 2AE 
8. Mansfield I centre Mansfield NG19 5BR 
9. Markham Environmental Technology Centre Duckmanton S44 5HS 
10. Pleasley Vale Business Park Pleasley NG19 8RL 
11. Ransonwood Business Park Mansfield NG8 6PE 
12. E- Centre Sherwood Energy Village Ollerton NG22 9QS 
13. Tapton Innovation Centre Chesterfield S41 0T2 
14. Westthorpe Innovation Centre Killamarsh S21 12Z 
15. Turbine Worsop S81 8AP 
16. Bio City City NG1 1GF 
17. Blue Coat Incubation Centre NBV Wollaton NG8 5GY 
18. Broadway Media Centre City NG13AL 
19. Castle Cavendish Radford NG7 5PN 
20. Nottingham Fashion Centre City NG1 3BB 
21. The Hive City NG14BU 
22. Innovate Office Sherwood Park NG15 ODA 
23. Lenton Business Centre Lenton NG7 2BY 
24. Mercury House New Basford NG7 7FN 
25. Nottinghamshire International Clothing Centre Hucknall NG15 8AY 
26. UNIEI Lab Wollaton NG7 2RQ 
27. New Brook House City NG7 5LR 
28. Nottingham Science and Technology Park Lenton NG7 2RQ 
29. S. G. C. S. Business Park Beeston NG9 2ND 
30. Southglade Food and Drink Park Hucknall NG5 9RG 
31. Strelley Hall Business Centre Strelley NG8 6PE 
If these figures are taken as representative, UK figures as reported by the 
UK's national incubator association may be significantly understated (in this case 
by 343%). 
19 Source: Alliance SSP Strategic Partnership and independently confirmed by telephone interviews 
conducted with incubator managers and staff on 28.04.05 cross referenced with UKBI database 
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Figure 3.7: Incubator distribution in two of the six sub-regions 
of the East Midlands (UKBI and Non UKBI Incubators) 
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As may be observed from the above the 
concentration of incubators generally 
accords with population density and there 
are relatively few incubators in areas with 
a relatively low population density. 
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Similarly in the London region cross referencing the number of `incubators' 
identified in the course of this study against those acknowledged or rather 
represented on the UKBI incubator database appear less than representative as only 
7 from 40 (below) appear. Again, this supports the conclusion that the number of 
incubators in the UK is grossly understated (in London by 471%). 
Table 3.8: Incubators in London region (UKBI Members in Bold) 
1. Antfactory London WC1A 1HB 
2. Brains ark Plc London ECIR 4PA 
3. Brand Sell London EC2A 3DQ 
4. Brunel Enterprise Centre Uxbridge UB8 3PH 
5. Cane Hill Science and Business Park Croydon CR9 MS 
6. City Fringe Partnership London EC2P 2EJ 
7. Cobweb Incubator Ltd London SW19 2RD 
8. Cockpit Arts London 
WC1N 2NP and 
SE8 3DZ 
9. Company Guides London EC2A 2BS 
10. Creative Business Gateway 
11. Creative Lewisham London SW4 9PT 
12. cube8. com London W2 6LE 
13. DDL Internet Incubator London SW1W ODH 
14. East London Centre London E15 1NT 
15. eSouk. com London W1Y IAG 
16. e-Start. com London W1V 5FD 
17. E-S ner Limited London EC4Y 8JT 
18. Fast Future Ventures London NW2 2QB 
19. First Base Middlesex HA18LT 
20. Gavron Business Centre London NW1 6DD 
21. Gorilla Park London EC1Y OTA 
22. Hoxton Bibliotech London EC1V 9EY 
23. idealab London WIR 1 RB 
24. Ideas hub London NW3 5JS 
25. Imperial College Innovations Ltd London SW7 2A 
26. Internet Incubator London SW1X 8JU 
27. kickstartventures. com London SW 10 9PT 
28. Knowledge Dock Centre London E16 2RD 
29. Lee Valley Technopark London N17 0LN 
30. Lodestone Innovation Partners Ltd London WIT 4HJ 
31. London BioScience Innovation Centre London NW1 OTU 
32. London Business Innovation Centre Limited Enfield EN3 7XU 
33. Medway Innovation Centre Chatham SE18 OF 
34. New Media Knowledge Harrow HAI 3TP 
35. OFEX London E18AT 
36. Peabody Trust London SE1 7JB 
37. Software Business Network London WC1R 4QN 
38. The Ideas Factory London SW1P 2TX 
39. Wandsworth Youth Enterprise London SW17 ORG 
40. WHEB Partnership London SEI SEN 
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Figure 3.8: Incubator distribution in London 
(UKBI and Non UKBI Incubators) 
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As above, the concentration of 
incubators generally accords with 
population density and there are 
relatively few incubators in areas 
with a relatively low population 
density. 
Similarly, NBIA figures may be similarly flawed as again the association is 
one which in which the members are admitted on the basis of their annual 
subscription as are, in fact, members of the European BIC association and the 
German Incubator Association ADT. Further, as is illustrated below, not all 
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incubators are affiliated to the German incubator association ADT (Andere 
Zentren) and thus caution should be exercised in accepting figures, as stated by 
incubator associations as being representative (non-ADT-affiliated incubators 
marked below in red). 
Figure 3.9: Distribution of Incubators in Germany 
(ADT and Non-ADT accredited) 
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Adapted from source: ADT 
It has also been suggested in the course of this research that even EBN 
figures re the number of BICs may not be fully representative as a number of BICs 
may have dispensed with or otherwise allowed their membership (and thus BIC 
status) to lapse for which a number of explanations have been advanced: 
  the benefits of association did/do not accord with the costs/level of 
subscription; and/or 
  that in any event local accreditation or stake-holding is more significant 
than pan-european networking, endorsement or standards; 
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  that the costs of association or membership (over and above the basic 
subscription charge) including attendance at transnational events and 
conferences did not represent value for money (re cost benefit) or prompted 
criticisms from within and outwith the organisation that the additional costs 
amounted to little more than `jollies' for executives or otherwise did not 
represent value for money. 
Similarly, it has been suggested that a great many of the UK's incubators 
have not availed themselves of UKBI membership and for similar reasons. 
3.13 Summary 
Notwithstanding the difficulties in quantifying the number of incubators 
that now exist in the EU, according to the EU Commission's Enterprise 
Directorate-General's Benchmarking of Business Incubators Report (2002, page 
35), incubators as they have evolved in the EU have been established in the main 
by a range of stakeholders that include EU and/or other international agencies 
(13.4%), national authorities and public agencies (25.3%), private sector 
organizations (20.8%), universities and other R&D organizations (16.4%) and 
community and voluntary organizations (11.5%) - p. 34.24% of incubators in the 
EU are considered public agencies, 28% semi-public and 37.6% considered private 
or otherwise independent of the public sector (10.4% unknown). 
However, even in the UK and upon a strict construction of their legal 
status, many incubators registered as private or independent businesses are in fact 
charitable companies limited by guarantee. Although classified as private sector 
businesses, the nature of their operations and the way in which they conduct it is 
more often than not, analogous to a public body - according to the EU 
Commissions report 21.8% of incubators are said to be operating on a for-profit 
basis, 76.9% on a Not-for-profit basis (p. 41). 
In the US, according to NBIA, about 25 percent of business incubators are 
sponsored by academic institutions, 16 percent are sponsored by government 
entities, 15 percent are sponsored by economic development organizations, 10 
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percent are sponsored by for-profit entities and 10 percent are sponsored by other 
types of organizations while about 5 percent of business incubators are "hybrids" 
with more than one sponsor (19 percent of incubators have no sponsor or host 
organization). Most North American business incubators (about 90 percent) are 
non-profit organizations focused on economic development. About 10 percent of 
North American incubators are for-profit entities; usually set up to obtain returns 
on shareholders investments. 
Evidently the majority of EU incubators are situated in urban locations 
(54.4%), while the remainder are distributed between Greenfield, rural locations 
and others (24%, 6.4%, and 10.4%, respectively) and have been established in a 
range of properties that include new and converted premises (60.3% and 21.8%, 
respectively) - p. 36. While in the US, 44 percent of business incubators draw their 
clients from urban areas, 31 percent from rural areas and 16 percent from suburban 
areas. In addition, nearly a tenth (9 percent) of all incubators draw clients from 
outside their region or from outside the United States20. 
In any event, and whichever dataset is selected as a basis for comparison of 
the development and deployment of the modality in the EU and in `less-favoured' 
regions of the EU, there is evidently a wide variation vis-ä-vis the deployment of 
the incubator modality in purely numerical terms and by Member States. For 
example, using figures reported in the EU Commission Report Benchmarking 
Business Incubators (2002, p. 9), wherein an incubator is defined by the authors as: 
"A business incubator is an organisation that accelerates and 
systemises the process of creating successful enterprises by 
providing them with a comprehensive and integrated range of 
support, including: incubator space, business support services, and 
clustering and networking opportunities. By providing their clients 
with services on a `one-stop-shop' basis and enabling overheads to 
be reduced by sharing costs, business incubators significantly 
improve the survival and growth prospects of new start-ups. A 
20 NBIA (2005) retrieved on 14.04.04 from National Business Incubation Association website:, 
http: //www. nbia. org/resource_center/bus_inc_facts/index. php 
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successful business incubator will generate a steady flow of new 
businesses with above average job and wealth creation potential. 
Differences in stakeholder objectives for incubators, admission and 
exit criteria, the knowledge and intensity of projects, and the 
precise configuration of facilities and services, will distinguish one 
type of business incubator from another" incubator deployment is 
profiled as follows: 
Figure 3.10: 
Distribution of Incubators in EU (2002) 
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Source Data: EU Commission Report Benchmarking Business Incubators (2002) 
As may be observed from the chart above, cross-referencing the number of 
incubators per Member State against national GDP (Luxembourg (Highest) and 
Greece (Lowest)), it may be observed (from the trend-line) that the number of 
incubators per Member State generally decreases relative to increased GDP. 
Furthermore, EU data, presented in the EU Commission's Benchmarking Report 
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Number of Incubators 
(pp. 13-14), points to wide variations in the `density' of business incubator 
developments. As illustrated below, while Austria has the highest `density' of 
incubators per SME (1 incubator per 3,000 companies), Greece has the lowest 
`density' - 1: 106,000 SMEs. With the exception of Belgium and the Netherlands, 
the lowest densities of incubators are to be found in southern EU Member States. 
Table 3.9: Distribution of EU Incubators by Country and 
No. of indigenous SMEs 
Member Stat GDP* No. of Incubators No. SMEs (`000s Ratio A: B 
Luxembourg 219 2 18 1: 9 
Norway 162 N/A N/A N/A 
Switzerland 135 N/A N/A N/A 
Denmark 127 7 235 1: 33 
Iceland 126 N/A N/A N/A 
Ireland 126 6 160 1: 26 
Netherlands 122 6 550 1: 91 
Sweden 120 39 243 1: 6 
Austria 117 63 237 1: 3 
Belgium 117 131 594 1: 45 
Finland 114 26 180 1: 7 
France 114 192 2,116 1: 11 
UK 114 144 3,355 1: 23 
Germany 112 300 3,334 1: 11 
Italy 111 45 3,251 1: 72 
Spain 92 38 2,349 1: 61 
Greece 72 7 747 1: 106 
Portugal 46 23 656 1: 28 
Average 119.2 911 18,025 1: 19 
Source Data: *GDP - Eurostat News Release STAT/04/145 3 December 2004; and 
EU Commission Directorate General Enterprise (2002) Benchmarking Business Incubators 
Final Report 
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Furthermore, as may be observed from the chart below, EU countries in 
`less favoured' regions (lower than average EU GDP) tend to have a lower 
intensity of business incubators per head of population than regions with a higher 
GDP per capita. 
Figure 3.11: 
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Benchmarking Business Incubators Final Report 
An analysis of this nature is, of course, only of limited value because 
business incubators generally have very specific target markets and this data does 
not reveal, for example, the nature, level and scale of incubator operations. 
Nonetheless, it does provide an overview as to where incubation has been 
deployed and with what intensity, relative to the national enterprise stock. 
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Distribution of Incubators in the EU 
by number of SMFs (thousands) and by country 
In summary, incubation is evidently not only a European but also a 
worldwide phenomenon, as may also be illustrated with reference to the number of 
incubator associations that have emerged around the globe (see Chapter 5) and is a 
business support modality that is continuing to evolve (see also Chapter 4). While 
it is difficult to get a `fix' on the number of incubators operating throughout 
Europe, it is likely from the research undertaken in the course of this study and 
notwithstanding the semantics of what `is' and what `is not' an incubator that the 
number of incubators operating across the globe is significantly understated and 
that the true size and value of the industry is not known. However, on the basis of 
existing data and research undertaken by the European Commission (illustrated 
above) there are seemingly significant differences as between Member States and 
between `more favoured' and `less favoured' regions of the EU vis-a-vis the 
degree and extent to which the business incubator modality has been adopted and 
deployed as an instrument of SME/industrial policy. 
As is evident from the US and European data (cited above), the deployment 
of the modality is largely driven by stakeholders from public and quasi public 
sectors, with the majority operating in urban areas and on a not for profit basis. 
Chapters 4 and 5 proceed to consider in more detail the nature of incubation and 
explore the way(s) in which incubators contribute or add value and impact their 
regional and local economies, while Chapter 6 explores how incubators 
(specifically NEBIC) impact the businesses they serve. 
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Chapter 4: European Business and Innovation Centres (Case Studies) 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter commences with an overview of the BIC model, the 
distribution of the BICs across Europe and how European BICs are financed. In 
order to investigate the way in which BICs contribute or `add value' to their 
locality and/or region, as prescribed by the terms of the ESRC Case Studentship, 
this chapter proceeds to compare the nature of incubator operations, services and 
activities of 5 BICS (presented as case studies below and which include a detailed 
consideration of the North East Business and Innovation Centre - the industrial 
sponsor of this research). The cafe studies were compiled from desk research, 
reviewing BIC literature - generated with and outwith the incubator community - 
and interviews with BIC personnel managers and staff (currently employed and 
retired) and BIC personnel and stakeholders attending the 10'' EBN Congress in 
Porto between the 4 `h and 6 `h of October, 2002. 
4.2 European Business & Innovation Centres: Background 
As noted above, this research is particularly concerned with incubation and 
incubators and, specifically, European Community Business & Innovation Centres 
- E. C. BICs - which were originally established as an instrument of the European 
Community's regional policy. The origins of the BIC concept can be traced back 
to the recession of the 1970s which prompted [in Europe] the development of 
policy, instruments and action(s) [by European, National, Regional and Local 
Authorities] to regenerate areas affected by the decline of traditional industries by 
endeavouring to create or foster conditions that would support alternative 
employment opportunities. They were established as regional organizations, with 
the general objective of contributing to the stimulation of local economies in 
regions of the EU with a GDP less than the EU average undergoing/requiring 
industrial restructuring and/or having industrial potential and classified specifically 
as Objective 1,2,5b, 6 regions as per the EU Structural Fund classifications of the 
European Regional Development Fund which have evidently been integral to their 
development. This context for BIC operations, has historically been fundamental 
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to the multiplicity of BIC rationales, the nature and level of their operations 
(thought not in all cases as the modality has also operates in what might be 
considered `more favoured' regions without Structural Fund support e. g. St Johns 
Innovation Centre, Cambridge). 
As noted in the Commission of the European Communities DGXVI 
Regional Policy and Cohesion Evaluation of Community Measures in support of 
European Community Business and Innovation Centres (EC - BICs - 1998) BICs 
were designed as a structured approach to a policy of services to support the 
launch of innovative businesses (principally in the manufacturing industry or in 
allied services). Following the first BIC experiment in 1983 involving the 
SOCRAN ("Societe de Creation d'Activites Nouvelles") Centre in Liege 
(Belgium), the model was adopted and diffused throughout Europe and perhaps 
most extensively between 1984-97. In 1991, the first BICs were established in 
Central Europe in Prague and Brno (Czech Republic) and following a European 
Commission Evaluation of the BIC programme between 1997-98 BICs were 
included as an integral element of European Regional Policy as reflected in the EU 
Commission's 1999 Guidelines for Structural Fund programmes for the period 
2000-06. 
Specifically, BICs were required to (by DGXVI) to commit to a number of 
general objectives, which may be summarised as follows: 
1. The stimulation of local economies, by gearing human, physical and 
financial resources to strengthen the business sector, in particular the 
creation of new SMEs (not subsidiaries of large enterprises) and the 
development of existing SMEs, and sources of innovation and 
technological advancement. (Evidently, this incubator `brand' or typology 
does not accord with much of the literature and categorisation therein that 
regards incubators as concerned with business creation only). 
2. The development of a systemized and coherent organization of business 
services, especially in the less favoured regions of the EU (a key feature in 
the development of those BICs established with ERDF funding vis-ä-vis 
avoiding duplication and assuring additionality). In addition, as explored 
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in the following chapter this mission 'aim' is now much more a 
strategic/business imperative for a great many BICs as locally, regionally 
and nationally the competition for leadership in the field, patronage and 
public funds intensifies. 
3. Increasing the efficiency of public programmes and aid and improving the 
access of entrepreneurs and SMEs to business services and enhancing their 
chances of success. 
4. Supporting the creation and development of independent businesses by 
offering a complete range of business support services as well as by 
mobilizing public and private resources and organizations with 
responsibility for economic development in the area. 
Since its introduction, the BIC model has developed variously in response 
to regional conditions and has been framed to respond regional economic needs, 
the structure of business support services, regional endowments and the nature and 
level of remedial actions, policy and the attendant funding framework. With the 
evolution and maturing of the BIC model, the objectives have now been refined 
(by and now operated by EBN) to support the Commission's `EC BIC' 
accreditation arrangements. EBN (2004, p. 25) now defines a BIC as a `Regional 
Economical Development Tool aimed at developing innovation'. Furthermore, as 
according to the EU Commission (undated)', a decision to establish a BIC must be 
based on "a long-term commitment to improving the regional economy through 
the development of innovative businesses", which to an extent, represents an 
acknowledgement that the development of a BIC and all that this entails so as to 
render it sustainable in the long term is itself a substantive and long term 
programme. 2 
'European Commission (undated) Guide to European Business Innovation Centres Factsheet 4. a 
(Setting up a BIC) retrieved on 20.05.05 from website: 
http: //europa. eu. int/comm/regional-policy/innovation/innovating/pdf/fiche_4a en. pdf 
2A number of incubators in the US and UK have closed as stakeholders have misunderstood this 
fundamental point i. e. the level at which incubator projects must be resourced at start up and in the 
short term to medium term to achieve critical mass and presence within the business support 
infrastructure and become self-sustaining. There is an anxiety within and outwith the community, 
in the UK at least (and observed in the US), that the rate at which incubators are being set up and 
the level of addition will ultimately undermine the ability of funding agencies i. e. local authorities 
and regional development/enterprise agencies) to adequately resource them all. 
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The stipulation that BICs focus on innovation now requires BICs to define 
what "Innovation" means in their catchment area and define what kind of 
enterprise should be created [and supported by them] to render the territory more 
competitive and/or what processes or changes are required in existing SMEs in 
order to increase their competitiveness (technological, commercial, organisational, 
financial change). In the event that the territory shows R&D potential, 
technological innovation should be a priority. Furthermore, the European Business 
and Innovation Centre Network (EBN) criteria for BIC accreditation (2004, p. lff)3 
stipulate that a BIC must: 
  Work in a specific catchment area (a region, province, city etc. ). In 
practice, however a number of BICs examined in the course of this research 
have developed interests outwith their region and in any event as 
businesses in their own right this `requirement' constraining the 
development of the BICs and their long term sustainability is somewhat 
incongruous. Upon further investigation, it appears to that the stipulation 
was introduced to ensure that BIC resources are focused with the requisite 
intensity to deliver added value (and not so diluted i. e. spread so thinly so 
as to undermine the ability of a BIC to deliver substantive benefits thus 
undermining the BIC brand) and also to avoid duplication and possibly 
conflict (i. e. competition between BICs in the same territory and/or for the 
same clients is not regarded as desirable); 
  Be acknowledged by public authorities who are relevant within the 
framework of their mission. As may be observed from the Case Studies 
(below) acknowledgement in regional strategies and plans, representation 
in key decision trees/strategic groups and ultimately institutional support 
(in political and financial terms) is key to success and failure. As regards 
the latter, it is suggested these failings were factors in the closure of 
Pronovus and the London BIC insofar as they failed to attract and/or retain 
patronage and financial support) 
3 EBN (2004) 'BIC Observatory - An overview of the BIC approach in its 20th year' 
(10 March 
2005) retrieved on 20.05.05 from EBN website: http: //quality. ebn. be/Documents/2- 
B IC%20qual ity%20mark%20criteria. pd f 
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  Be either public or private, and work in coordination with other support 
organisations (see Case Studies below); 
  Have an allocated budget; 
  Have a clear positioning, strategy and action plan aimed at creating new 
jobs through the creation of innovative companies or bringing forward 
existing companies (See Case Studies for Mission Statements/Aims and 
Objectives); 
  Have identified premises (a BIC may also be hosted by a bigger 
organisation); 
  Have an identified staff of at least 3 people full time able, as a minimum (at 
start-up). to promote/communicate and identify projects and provide 
evaluation, strategic guidance and back-up services for projects and 
entrepreneurs 4) and when 'fully operational' should ultimately comprise (as 
a minimum) 8-10 people configured as follows: 
Figure 4.1: Model Organisational BIC Structure 
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Source: European Commission Guide to European Business Innovation Centres 
Factsheet (4. b) 
4 European Commission (2004) 'Guide to European Business Innovation Centres Factsheet (4. b)' 
retrieved on 17.07.04 from European Commission website: 
http: //ec. europa. eu/regional_policy/innovation/innovating/guidec_en. htm 
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In addition, BICs are also now expected to: 
  Support authorities in designing and implementing local development 
programmes aimed at creating new innovative SMEs and/or bringing 
forward existing SMEs. These programs may concern spin-off engineering, 
clustering, internationalisation, entrepreneurship (females and ethnic 
minorities, environmental innovations, training and coaching 
entrepreneurs, interregional benchmarking, and improvement of the 
availability of finance. 
  They must develop a methodology in order to promote, support, detect and 
generate innovative companies. 
  Be active in terms of incubation (creation of innovative enterprises) or 
SME support. 
  Provide incubation services which should include, for example: 
o Risk analysis pre-creation (technology, marketing, human resources 
etc. ) and guidance and support in order to define an action plan, 
feasibility studies, budget forecast, and a business model; 
o Financial engineering: public measures (tax, subsidies), alternative to 
bank loans (business angel networks, seed capital, venture capitalists, 
private initiatives (competitions etc. ), EU programs (FP6, 
Gate2Growth, sector-oriented programmes, etc. ); 
o Training: analyse entrepreneur needs, signpost to relevant organisations 
or design and implement specific training programs; 
o Mentoring and Networking (coaching, clubs of entrepreneurs, 
associations); 
o Helping to provide access to premises with appropriate services 
(signposting to suitable premises or hosting when managing an 
incubator); and 
o Follow-up for 3-5 years after creation (continued access to financing, 
benchmarking against business plan to ensure realization and proposal 
for corrective actions if necessary. Follow- up may be partially sub- 
contracted but BICs should be proactive in the prevention of business 
failure. 
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Figure 4.2: Example Incubation Service Modcl5 
WESTBIC `New Business Development Path' 
1. Evaluation And Assessment Of The Project 
2. Product/Service Screening 
(a) Feasibility Testing 
(b) Market Research 
3. Technical Development 
(a) Product Development 
(b) Research And Development, 
(c) Customer Testing & Evaluation 
4. Business Analysis 
(a) Business Planning, 
(b) Financial Planning, 
(c) Sources Of Funding, 
(d) Cash-Flow And Profitability Forecasts, 
(e) Human Resources 
5. Marketing And Selling Strategies 
(a) Product Launch, 
(b) Marketing Plans, 
(c) Sales Strategies 
6. Commercialisation 
s Source: WESTBIC (2004) retrieved on 29.01.03 from website: http: //www. westbic. ie/new- 
business-development-path. html 
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  Provide services to existing SMEs that might include, for example: 
o General diagnostic of the gaps to innovation: SWOT analysis; 
recommendations and action planning; 
o SME consulting: support aimed at increasing their innovation profile 
(marketing, financing etc. ); 
o SME vocational training (e. g. internationalisation, management, IP 
etc. ); and 
o Include SMEs in specific projects (clustering, enterprise take over, 
technology transfer, female management, renewable energy, etc - see 
case studies below) 
Depending on the characteristics of the territory and the existing actors, 
BICs may place emphasis on fostering the creation of new innovative enterprises 
and/or developing innovation in existing enterprises. BICs may also support non- 
innovative businesses with e. g. consultancy, diagnostic, and training programmes 
or through other programmes concerned with e. g. internationalisation, clustering, 
enterprise, succession planning, take-over, exits, licensing, franchising, etc. 
4.3 Deployment of European Business Innovation Centres 
At the time of writing there are reportedly some 155 BICs now operating 
throughout the EU (accredited to the EBN criteria/standard) that, prima facie 
equates to 7.3 BICs per country. However, having profiled the distribution of 
BICs by country as is illustrated below, this figure does not accurately represent 
the degree and extent to which the modality has been adopted and deployed. 
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Table 4.1: Deployment of EU BICs by Country 
AUSTRIA: RIZ NO Holding GmbH 
BELGIUM: Bureau Economique de la Province de Namur; CAP 
Innove (Centre d'Accompagnement dc Projets Innovants); 
CEEI Heracles; CEEI ID Scrl; CEEI Socran; IDELUX; 
Innotek; Maison de l'Entreprise S. A. 
CZECH REPUBLIC: BIC Brno; BIC Ostrava spol. s r. o.; BIC Plzen; Technology 
and Innovation Centre (TIC) Prague; Technology Centre 
DENMARK: B. I. C. Nord; EURA A/S - Regional Development 
Company Ringkjoebing County 
FINLAND: B. I. C. Carelia; BIC BOTNIA; BIC Kymi; BIC Oulu; 
Culminatum B. I. C.; Technology Centre Kareltek; Western 
Finland B. I. C. 
FRANCE: ACCET- CEEI Val d'Oise; Aditec pas de Calais CEEI; 
Carrefour Entreprise Sarthe; CCI de Lyon Equipe 
d'animation NOVACITE; CEEI 47; CEEI Alimentec; 
CEEI Alsace; CEEI CAP ALPHA; CEEI d'Ille et Vilaine 
CREAT'IV; CEEI de Nimes; CEEI Gers-Gascogne; CEEI 
Provence; CEEI Pyrenees; CEEI Quimper-Cornouaille; 
CEEI Synergia - La Technopole Caen-Normandie; CEEI 
Theogone (Part Technologique du Canal) Conseil General; 
CEEI-CAP DELTA; CICOM Organisation; Futura Corse 
Technopole; Nantes Atlanpole; Orleans Technopole; Plein 
Sud Entreprises; Promotech Nancy; Regie Departementale 
des Ruches d'Entreprises; Saint-Etienne Metropole; 
SAVOIE TECHNOLAC; Synergie; Technopole de ]'Aube 
en Champagne; THESAME- Mecatronique & 
Management; Toulon Var Technologies 
GERMANY: BIC Frankfurt (Oder) GmbH; BIC Kaiserslautern; BIC 
Leipzig; BIC Nordthüringen GmbH; BIC Zwickau GmbH; 
IGZ BIC Altmark GmbH; TZ Ludwigshafen - BIC Rhein- 
Neckar-Dreieck GmbH 
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GREECE: Bic Larissa; BIC of Attika; BIC of Epirus; BIC of Western 
Greece 
HUNGARY: Innostart- National Business and Innovation Centre 
ICELAND: IceTec (Technological Institute of Iceland) 
IRELAND: Cork Business and Innovation Centre; Dublin Business 
Innovation Centre; Innovation Centre Limerick; South East 
Business and Innovation Centre; West B. I. C. 
ITALY: Agenzia Lumetel; Agenzia per lo Sviluppo; B. I. C. 
Omega; B. I. C. Varese Polo Scientifico e Tecnologico 
Lombardo; BIC - Sviluppo Italia Friuli Venezia Giulia 
S. p. A.; BIC Lazio SpA; BIC Marche Scarl; BIC 
PROMOFIRENZE; Bic Puglia Sprind SpA; BIC Salerno 
Srl; BIC Sardegna S. p. A; Bic Sicilia sri. Centro Europeo 
di Impresa e Innovazione; BIC Umbria; C. I. I. Pistoia 
S. C. R. L.; CEI Calabria EUROBIC Scpa; CEII Trentino; 
CODEX Scrl; Creazione d'impresa - Tecnopolis; CSP - 
BIC Livorno S. R. L.; Euro-Bic Abruzzo e Molise Scrl; 
Euro-BIC Vallee D'Aoste; EUROBIC - Agenzia per lo 
Sviluppo del Territorio scrl; Eurobic Sud Sicilia - BIC 
Gela; Eurobic Toscana Sud S. p. A; Euroimpresa Legnano; 
Fondazione IDIS Cittä della Scienza; Innova BIC SpA; 
Parco Scientifico e delle Telecomunicazioni in Valle 
Scrivia; Sviluppo Italia Campania SpA; Sviluppo Italia 
Basilicata SpA; Sviluppo Italia Calabria S. C. p. A.; 
Sviluppo Italia Liguria; Sviluppo Italia Puglia SpA 
LUXEMBOURG: Centre de Recherche Public Henri Tudor 
NETHERLANDS: Bic Noord-Nederland; BIC Twente; Business 
Development Friesland 
NORWAY: Forskningsparken As 
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PORTUGAL: BIC Algarve Huelva; BIC do MINHO; CEISET Centro de 
Empresa e de Inovagao de Setubal; Centro de Empresas e 
Innovacao - B. I. C. Madeira; Centro Promotor de 
Innovacao e Negocios; CIEBI Centro de Innovagao 
Empresarial de Beira Interior; N. E. T. - Novas Empresas e 
Tecnologias, S. A. - BIC do Porto 
SLOVAKIA: BIC Bratislava; BIC Spisska Nova Ves s. r. o.; Cassovia 
BIC s. r. o. 
SPAIN: Barcelona Activa S. A.; Beaz S. A.; BIC Berrilan; Bic 
Euronova S. A.; Bic Galicia; BIC Granada; CEEI 
ALBACETE; CEEI Alcoy; CEEI Bahia de Cadiz Centro 
de Lanzamiento Economico; CEEI Baleares; CEEI 
BURGOS; CEEI Castellon; CEEI Ciudad Real; CEEI de 
Asturias; CEEI de Cartagena; CEEI de Castilla y Leon; 
CEEI de Navarra S. A.; CEEI de Valencia; CEEI Elche; 
CEEI Talavera de la Reina; CEEI ARAGON S. A.; Centro 
de Empresas e Innovaciön de Alava S. A.; Eurocei Centro 
Europeo de Empresas E Innovacion S. A.; Instituto 
Tecnolögico de Canarias 
SWEDEN: B. I. C Mid Sweden AB; Bic Sweden West AB 
SWITZERLAND: CimArk 
UNITED Birmingham B. I. C.; Coventry University Enterprises Ltd; 
KINGDOM: Greater Manchester Bic; Hertfordshire Business Incubation 
Centre Ltd; Innovation Centre Noribic; Technology 
Enterprise Kent; London BIC; North East of England 
B. I. C.; Pronovus Ltd - East Midlands BIC; St Johns 
Innovation Centre Ltd; Staffordshire and Black Country 
BIC; Tapton Park Innovation Centre 
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The number of BICs reported for the UK [and illustrated below] has been 
adjusted as this research has established that 2 of the 12 BICs listed by ebn as 
operating in the UK have ceased trading. Pronovus ceased trading on the 12`h of 
April 2005 while at the time of writing, as explained in Chapter 3, it is understood 
that the London BIC is in liquidation (PriceWaterhouseCoopers LLP acting as 
liquidators). 
As regards Pronovus, it is understood that Pronovus in Nottingham (like 
NEBIC a local TEC-led initiative backed by EU funding and financially supported 
in part by the City Council and which was formerly called the East Midlands 
Regional Technology Advisory Centre) provided counselling support to innovative 
small companies (technical advice, IPR issues, marketing and finance) ceased 
trading as it was unable to secure funding (public) to enable it to continue. 
While Pronovus was in essence a small virtual incubator with 
approximately 5 personnel, it evidently remained dependent on public subsidy. 
Further, it was seemingly unable to resist competition (for local and regional 
resources and patronage) given the increased number of new entrants to the 
industry (locally and regionally, e. g. universities developing incubator capacity 
and with physical infrastructure i. e. business units and thus with sustainable 
revenue streams (rents) -a model that has seemingly achieved a currency with the 
BIC community and found favour with sponsors as the preferred modality). It 
should also be noted that Pronovus is not the only virtual BIC to have failed as 
evidently so too has BIC SwedenWest. 
Notwithstanding this adjustment, as illustrated below, 56% of the BICs in 
the EU are, in fact, to be found in just three countries, namely Italy, France, Spain 
(21%, 19%, and 15%, respectively), three of the aforementioned `less-favoured 
regions'. The UK (another of the aforementioned `less-favoured' region) accounts 
for 6% of the BIC stock. 
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Figure 4.3: Distribution of BICs (2004) 
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Czech Republic 5 
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Germany 7 
Finland 7 
Belgium 8 
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France 30 
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According to EBN's 2004 BIC Observatory report (10`h of March 2005, 
page 12) 56% of the BICs are based in areas with less than 100,000 SMEs and less 
than one million inhabitants, with a ratio SME/population lower than 12%. 90% 
are located in an area with less than three million inhabitants with 15% SMEs. 
6 Source data: retrieved on 10.03.2005 from EBN website: www. ebn. be 
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Figure 4.4: Distribution of EU BICs 
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4.4 EU BIC Business Model 
Evidently, the financial models as they have developed for BIC operations 
across the EU are complex and diverse but may be said (albeit broadly) to be 
largely public-based. According to EBN data 54% of BICs received more than 
50% of their funding from public bodies, while EU programmes are also a 
principal source of revenue for approximately 25%. 71% of BIC revenue is 
derived from services (contracts) with public authorities (at European, national and 
regional level), however 17% of BICs now said to generate more than half their 
income from private sources: 
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Figure 4.5: BIC Business Model 
L. l "I 
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According to EBN the BIC network generated a total of 188M¬ revenue in 
2003; 55M¬ from private sources, 32M¬ from EU funds/programmes and 101M¬ 
from national or regional bodies (some of which may also be in part from EU 
programmes). More specifically, as illustrated below, 62% of total BIC income is 
derived from their involvement in broad EU, national or regional programmes - 
63% financed at the national or regional level and 47% at the EU level. 
Figure 4.6: BIC Revenue Streams 
Source 
Other private sector 
Client SMEs 
Housing & Services 
Other public income 
Consultancy 
EU programmes 
National & Regional Programmes 
Other Public 
Structural Funds 
National Regional & Local bodies 
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Source Data: EBN 2004 Observatory Report 
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A segmentation of EU BICs European programme revenues (see table 
below) is particularly revealing as to the place of EU BICs in EU policy, 
particularly regional policy and as an instrument in employment and social affairs. 
Indeed, this profile of revenue illustrates, perhaps better than anything else, the 
nature of BIC operations and their role in and relationship with efforts to promote 
regional, social and economic cohesion: 
Table 4.2 
Profile of BIC Revenue derived from EU Programmes (%) % 
DG Regional Policy 45.2 
DG Employment, Social Affairs & Equal Opportunities 26.9 
DG Research 7.2 
DG Enterprise & Industry 6.5 
DG Education & Culture 6.5 
DG Information Society & Media 2.5 
DG Enlargement 1.8 
DG Energy & Transport 1.1 
DG Europaid - Co-operation Office 1.1 
DG Fisheries & Maritime Affairs 0.4 
DG Environment 0.4 
DG Press & Communication 0.4 
Gen. EU Secr. 0.4 
Source Data: EBN www. ebn. be accessed on 24.11.2004 
The Chapter proceeds to consider the development and operation of 5 BICs 
which have been prepared via a combination of desk research, observation of BIC 
operations; and interviews (face-to-face (casual) and telephone (structured) with 
BIC personnel, clients, tenants and stakeholders. 
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The Case studies review the background (context for development); 
mission (aims and objectives); governance (management arrangements); facilities 
(including tenant profile where available) and resources; services and activities 
(including service contracts and projects representative of the BIC operation) and 
concludes with observations on each BIC studied. 
Of the BICs selected for study, NEBIC was prescribed for study in the 
terms of the ESRC Case Studentship; Coventry BIC was selected as an example of 
a university operated BIC and St John's Innovation Centre because of the 
economic prosperity of the region (which is in stark contrast to that of the North 
East of England). Kent BIC was selected for study as it operates from multiple 
locations (an emerging trend amongst the more mature incubators); and 
Hertfordshire BIC because at the time of writing it was the newest addition to the 
stock of BIC incubators. Also selected for study was London (Lee Valley) BIC 
given the novelty of the business model (taking equity in assisted businesses in 
exchange for the incubators assistance), however the BIC went into administration 
before any study could be undertaken. Pronovus (Nottingham BIC) and BIC 
SwedenWest were also selected for study as examples of BICs operating a `virtual 
incubator' model (providing no accommodation for assisted businesses). 
Unfortunately, both BICs closed seemingly for lack of patronage (political and/or 
financial) or had otherwise proved unsustainable before detailed study could be 
undertaken. The case studies are presented as follows: 
  Case Study 1: 
North East of England Business & Innovation Centre (NEBIC) - Extended 
  Case Study 2: 
Coventry University Enterprises Limited (Coventry BIC) 
  Case Study 3: 
Technology Enterprise Kent (Kent BIC) 
  Case Study 4: 
St Johns Innovation Centre, Cambridge 
" Case study 5: 
Hertfordshire Business & Innovation Centre (HBIC) 
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Case Study 1 
North East of England Business & Innovation Centre 
Background: 
The North East BIC was established at Sunderland Enterprise Park (East) 
in 1994, on the former Austin and Pickersgill shipyard on the banks of River Wear, 
by Sunderland City Training and Enterprise Council (TEC) and was the only TEC 
led BIC in the UK. Founded with a broad remit, which may be said to have 
reflected the competencies, strategic and operational objectives of the founding 
partners (see below) the collaborating partners were committed to: 
  the strengthening of manufacturing industry and the promotion of 
Sunderland as a major centre of Advanced Manufacturing Technology; 
  the expansion of the automotive sector; 
  meeting identified skill shortages and addressing the demand for 
managers, professionals and technicians in new technology, engineering 
and accounting disciples; 
  providing management skills for postgraduates - especially those from 
technical and scientific disciplines; 
  the pursuit of innovation and the expansion of the local R&D effort - 
recognizing the important role of R&D in regional economic development; 
the development of human resource capabilities, enterprise and 
interpersonal skills - awareness of technological, environmental and 
European issues for all; and 
  widening access and encouragement of life-time learning through 
education and training. 
The creation of the BIC was prompted by a number of factors. First, the 
decline of traditional industries in Wearside, notably shipbuilding and coal-mining 
had left a legacy of high structural unemployment. Further the pre-dominance of 
large-scale undertakings (employers) which accounted for approximately 90% of 
those considered economically active was considered to have ingrained throughout 
the sub-region an 'employee mentality' and a weak entrepreneurial culture (a 
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picture that could be observed throughout the US and Europe in or around this 
time). 
Secondly, a high proportion of those employed in services were then 
employed by the local (public) authority while in manufacturing which was 
characterised by a high degree of manual labour the capacity to generate added- 
value per employee (p. a. ) was less than two thirds of the regional average. 
Thirdly, Wearside's manufacturing capability and capacity (and thus a 
significant proportion of employment) was largely geared to motor vehicle 
assembly and components manufacturing, food processing, glassware, clothing, 
and mechanical engineering (e. g. aero engine components, offshore cranes, and 
industrial pumps). While accurate statistics were not available it was thought that 
approximately 40 firms in the sub-region employed over 200 people, a core 
element of around 15-20 were thought to engaged in advanced manufacturing. 
The vast majority of the estimated 6,000 enterprises in Wearside (>90%) were 
thought to be small businesses employing fewer than 20 people. 
The pressure to develop solutions to support economic regeneration and the 
diversification of indigenous industry was particularly acute. Further, it was 
acknowledged within Wearside Training & Enterprise Council, the lead sponsor of 
the BIC at the time, that it and fellow organisations with a significant competence 
or roles in the economic regeneration of the Wearside region including Sunderland 
City Council, The Wearside Opportunity, Tyne & Wear Development Corporation, 
Northern Development Company and English Estates were pursuing largely 
uncoordinated strategies although these organisations were collectively committed 
to developing Wearside as the `Advanced Manufacturing Centre of the North'. 
The lack of connectivity at the time is illustrated by the fact that the TEC, 
City Council and University of Sunderland were compelled to establish a joint 
working party (the `Wearside Euro Group') which commenced its work by 
reviewing the mission statements of each three organisations mission statements 
with a view to establishing: 
 a degree of mutual understanding; 
184 
 a mutually agreed common statement of objectives; 
  the development of a Wearside European Strategy (co-ordinate and 
improve the leverage, planning and deployment of European subsidies and 
grants, particularly structural funds); and 
  an agreed Wearside Strategy for Innovation and Enterprise. 
Significantly, the City of Sunderland had been awarded £37.5 million in 
grant aid (UK Government City Challenge funding) to support the regeneration of 
some of the most socio-economically deprived areas of the city located to the north 
of the River Wear by improving social conditions and the development of 
sustainable employment opportunities via self-employment, enhanced training and 
education provision, and empowerment initiatives. 
In summary, a combination of developments in the region and pressures 
(political, fiscal, social and economic) with and outwith the region demanded a 
clearer and more coherent strategy for economic development and closer 
coordination of development initiatives to . 
lever support from UK central 
government and European Community resources. Evidently, it was mutually 
agreed between the main economic development agencies that they should: 
  Promote and seek to build on Wearside's manufacturing traditions; 
  Persevere with attempts to attract inward investment to Wearside, but 
at the same time exploiting the indigenous potential for job and wealth 
creation by encouraging entrepreneurship and new business start-ups, 
thereby ensuring that an over-dependence on a few large employers is 
avoided; 
  Strengthen linkages between industry and higher education with a view 
to enhancing the capacity of firms to innovate and exploit new 
technologies; 
  Continue to develop the area's physical infrastructure, in particular by 
increasing the provision of high-quality industrial and business 
premises, to support strategies to attract inward investment and 
encourage business development; 
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  Support and enhance the indigenous skills base by supporting training, 
retraining so that the indigenous population remained sufficiently 
skilled to take up employment opportunities, thereby reducing the 
area's high unemployment rates. 
It was also determined that the (then) existing provision of managed 
workspace in Wearside was geared to serving the self-employed (the level of self- 
employment was lower than the national average) and small businesses engaged in 
basic manufacturing and artisanal activities. These enterprises, which were 
typically the recipients of `Business Boost' support, were considered to have a 
limited capacity to create jobs and wealth. 
Furthermore, it was explained in the course of interviews with NEBIC 
managers and staff that there was also "a growing recognition that strategies aimed 
at regenerating the sub-regional economy [Wearside - it is important to note that 
the NEBIC was originally conceived as a sub-regional instrument] were primarily 
concerned with attracting inward investment as a means of creating a modern, 
technology-orientated industrial base". In addition, it was acknowledged "the 
establishment of branch operations (largely assembly plants) had not been 
generally accompanied, however, by the transfer of high added value activities 
(e. g. R&D) into the area by parent companies. Similarly, it had been observed that 
local sub-contracting by these branch operations/inward investors accounted for a 
relatively low proportion of their procurement". In addition, "while a number of 
property developments in the sub-region had significantly increased the sub- 
regional stock of business units which were designed with a view to attracting 
further inward investment, only a small proportion of the available space was 
considered suitable for smaller businesses". 
Evidently, there was an increasing appreciation that alternative or 
complementary approaches to existing economic development strategies and plans 
concerned with supporting self-employment and attracting inward investors were 
required, specifically, to create the conditions to foster the development of 
innovative, high added value business start-ups with the capacity to have a 
significant impact in terms of local job and wealth creation. The stakeholders were 
186 
agreed that the sub-region was no different in terms of its entrepreneurial potential, 
to other areas that (then) qualified for assistance via the European Structural Funds 
(Objective 2). The drive to establish the BIC was also reinforced by a confidence 
that the modality was achieving results in comparable regions, specifically, 
Barcelona where the [then] Chief Executive of Sunderland City Training and 
Enterprise Council had apparently observed a flourishing BIC and returned with 
the determination to develop one for Sunderland and the North East of England. 
The aim was to create a business and technical support organisation geared 
towards developing new innovative companies, providing them with intensive 
support during the tentative early stages of development. Added to this, the aim 
was to have a physical presence of small business units allowing companies to 
start small and expand into larger units as they grew and prospered. However, as 
explained in the course of this research, "It took [however] two years to persuade 
all the relevant bodies that they needed to invest in this new concept of a BIC. 
Eventually £3 million was ploughed into the first phase with 50 per cent funding 
coming from the TEC's own financial coffers and the remainder from European 
Regional Development Funding and the Tyne & Wear Development Corporation". 
The North East of England Business & Innovation Centre (as it was then 
known - the name has recently been changed to North East Business & Innovation 
Centre) was subsequently founded with the following principles: 
  To work together [founding partners] towards an agreed development 
strategy; 
  To take an integrated approach to education, training, research and 
development and to business development; 
  To encourage enterprising attitudes, partnership and consortium working, 
and the development of networks; 
" To foster self-employment and the establishment of new small businesses; 
  To support the growth of expanding small and medium sized companies; 
  To exploit the indigenous potential of the area, including ideas and 
innovations on the one hand, and natural and man-made assets and features 
on the other; 
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  To raise the general cross-the-board level of education and training of the 
local population; 
  To encourage innovative approaches to education, training and business 
development; 
  To respond to the needs of industry and commerce - both home-grown 
companies and inward investors; 
  To widen access of opportunity to those presently excluded from the 
training and labour markets; 
  To exploit new technologies to these ends; and 
  To develop high quality infrastructure in support of the above, including 
improving the quality of training, research and enterprise development 
facilities. 
Mission Statement/Aim(s): 
To support the development of an innovation culture in the North East. 
Corporate Objective(s): 
  To achieve financial targets as set out the in annual plan thereby ensuing 
the Company continues to build upon its resources and provide a solid base 
from which to further develop in the future; 
  To maintain ISO 9001 and achieve the new standard 
  To achieve the Investors in People standard to reinforce the Company's 
commitment to quality improvement and its staff 
  To reinforce the BICs Regional Status by establishing business and 
technical support links to other parts of the North East 
To continue to develop and build upon existing relationships with decision 
makers/funders, including ONE, GONE, SBS and Europe 
  To improve overall customer satisfaction rating 
Operational Objective(s): 
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  To offer a co-ordinated integrated, comprehensive range of Business 
Support services to individuals and SMEs 
Governance: 
Following the abolition of the TECs in March 2001, a Charitable Company 
Limited by Guarantee was established to which the assets and liabilities of the 
TEC's BIC were transferred and the BIC has subsequently continued to operate as 
a going concern and as a not for profit, independent (private) entity. The Company 
has 5 directors, all male with an average (mean) age of 50.4 years 
Facilities: 
The BIC occupies a 14 acre site, providing 200,000+sqft of business 
accommodation. The BIC's physical assets include 9 buildings on the site which 
have been erected between 1994 and 2002 which includes Light industrial units 
from 355 - 6250 sq. ft (33 - 581.4m2); Offices from 100 -1500 sq. ft (9.6 - 140 
m2); and a range of Incubator units - specifically for start up businesses. 
The BIC site has been developed in 9 phases reflecting the evolution of 
regional strategic, economic and funding priorities (and the availability and 
accessibility of said funds particularly EU Structural Funds i. e. ERDF and ESF 
Objective 2, ESF Objective 3& 4). Local authority patronage (political and 
financial) has also been instrumental in the development of the overall scheme. 
Phase 1, the Main Building - which includes an all day nursery, restaurant 
and 43 business units, as well a central reception and atrium area was established 
in April 1994 and was followed by Phase 2 in March 1995 with the establishment 
of the Slipway Centre which [then and now] comprises 53 business units, 
including office and light industrial units. 1998 witnessed a significant expansion 
of facilities and resources wherein Phases 3-6 were established which comprised 
the creation of Industrial Units and the Product and Process Development Unit 
(October 1998) - to assist companies and individuals throughout the region to 
design, test and develop products and processes; 24 dedicated incubator units and 
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12 units for biotech businesses (November 1998); a Technology Complex 
accommodates mainly IT and energy efficient companies (December 1998) and 
the BIC's training and conference facility - The Jupiter Centre (December 1998). 
In subsequent years, an additional industrial unit was added in March 1999 (Phase 
7); Anderson House in April 2000 (grow on space) - Phase 8 and Innovator House 
(Phase 9- April 2002) incorporating 26 purpose built e-business offices and an 
ICT training suite. 
Tenant Profile: 
Initially, the BIC's target market/clientele was to be drawn from: 
  Graduates and staff from Sunderland University; 
  Referrals from the sub-regional network of existing managed 
workspaces and the Sunderland Business and Enterprise Centre; 
  Enterprises linked to large employers in the area, including spin-offs, 
businesses established by ex-employees, and those established to act as 
local suppliers; 
  Referrals from the North East Innovation Centre and projects that its 
clients may wish to pursue using the BIC as a proxy; and 
  Residents of North Sunderland and those affected by further 
rationalisation of the coal mining industry. 
This clientele has however been further extended as the BIC has evolved 
capabilities and capacity (services and accommodation) and as the BIC has sought 
to represent and service the whole of the North East of England. Tenants include 
other business support organisations, charities, social enterprises, and a range of 
new and established businesses (see Appendix 3 for full tenant profiles). 
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Resources: Personnel 
The BIC employs 45 personnel as follows: 
Table 4.3: NEBIC Personnel functions 
General Management 7 
Administration 3 
Entrepreneurs guidance and support 
(Evaluation, Business Planning, access to financing, follow-up) 
12 
EU / national / regional project management 3 
Incubator management (rent, common services) 12 
Communication, events, animation (e. g. inter-firm cooperation) 5 
Training entrepreneurs 3 
Other 
Total 45 
In addition, the BIC reports that it has assembled a people bank of 300+ 
associates/sources of supplemental and specialist expertise. 
Services: 
As noted above, the BIC provides a large portfolio of accommodation with 
24-hour access and security and onsite parking an attribute that has attracted the 
majority of tenants questioned in the course of this research to the site. As noted 
above the accommodation features a mix of offices & industrial units from 100 to 
6,250 sq ft (Hi-tech, IT and bio-tech accommodation), laboratories; Meeting, 
Conference and Training Rooms; and Incubator units. The accommodation is 
offered with all inclusive rental packages and `easy in - easy out' tenancy 
agreements, internet and e-mail access and I&CT Support (again considered key 
aspects of the NEBIC offer by tenants. In addition, the facility incorporates a 
restaurant, nursery, central administration (Mail & Package Handling) and 
reception support. The tenant package also includes access/support from a range 
of business support measures, technical services, business skills training and 
business mentoring. Other services include advice on European Legislation; 
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access to Video Conferencing facilities and the BIC ISDN Access and Digital 
telecoms network, networking events, technology demonstrations, and an 
innovation fund. 
The BIC is keen to distinguish itself from other forms of managed 
(principally office) accommodation and as part and parcel of its 
`industrial/manufacturing' credentials has operated a Product Process 
Development Unit (PPDU) since 1998. This facility comprises a large workshop 
facility (50m x 10m), equipped with machines for both light industrial and 
commercial work and is equipped with, for example, lathes, millers, a pillar drill, 
surface grinders, band saws, MIG / TIG welding units and gas cutting equipment. 
The Unit also has the capability and capacity to fabricate a wide range of materials, 
including steel, aluminium, brass, and stainless copper and manages a network of 
local contractors for specialist or high volume jobs, like CNC or laser cutting. The 
unit is also equipped with CAD packages including AutoCAD, Inventor, 
Solidworks, Rhino3D, OrCAD and Protel, and is staffed by an experienced team 
of engineers with a range of experience gained in industries such as explosion 
protection, car component manufacture, steel production and electronic component 
design. The unit boasts experts in industrial, mechanic, hydraulic, pneumatic, 
electronic and aesthetic fields assisting firms to `improve production output', 
`design and construct new production and process machinery', and assists client 
with `mechanical, electrical, electronic and industrial design', the production of 
`concept drawings and prototypes', `new product development', `intellectual 
property advice' and the `brokerage and management of joint venturing 
arrangements'. The BIC has supplemented this offering with the addition of a 
rapid prototyping facility and circuit board production service. 
The BIC has also established the 'Big Ideas Centre' (with support from the 
regional development agency One NorthEast and the Tyne & Wear Partnership). 
The Centre is based on the BIC site at premises formerly occupied buy the BIC's 
Technology Demonstration Centre7. The Big Ideas Centre's offering has been 
7 The TDC which previously employed experienced engineers advising businesses on a wide range 
of process technologies and energy and environmental best practices and provided consultancy vis- 
ä-vis process and production problems; and promoted of new and emerging technologies struggled 
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developed with TWEBLO Limited - the local arm of a national initiative to 
promote work-related learning among young people at school and operating in 5 
Local Authority areas in the region (Gateshead, Newcastle-upon-Tyne, North 
Tyneside, South Tyneside, and Sunderland). The offering has been developed in 
part to meet Department for Education and Skills priorities, namely: 
  Developing understanding of the world of work and thus improve 
employment; 
  To assist pupils to acquire the knowledge skills and attitudes that help 
to develop enterprise capability, financial literacy, and economic and 
business understanding; 
  To enhance the delivery of the National Curriculum, in particular the 
work related learning element at Key Stage 4; 
  To raise levels of achievement in schools and narrow the achievement 
gap; 
  To improve the behaviour, attendance and motivation of pupils; and 
  To contribute to the development of the school workforce. 
Additionally, the facility has also developed services geared to private sector 
enterprises and public sector organisations e. g. Ambulance Service. 
The BIC has also recently added to its portfolio `Virtual Office Space' 
offering eligible businesses i. e. business who accord with the BIC's entry criteria 
(and under 12 months old) comprising a business address on site with dedicated 
email and Web site location (POP3 accounts), telephone number and answering 
service, post, parcel and fax handling facilities, use of fax, photocopier and 
document binding services, discounted rates on meeting rooms, training and 
conference and video conferencing facilities and Access to business and technical 
support. The BIC has also developed new laboratories and occupants can also 
benefit from priority use of a wide range of facilities, including an extensive ICT 
platform and the support of a team of business professionals. 
for sustainability and when public sector support was withdrawn gave way to this new initiative 
which has found favour amongst public stakeholders and the business community - i. e. it is 
operating on a commercial basis. 
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Other significant elements of the NEBIC model include the development of 
a training arm (principally delivering 'off the shelf' training), a business 
consultancy arm (competencies include 'e-commerce'; 'finance'; 'franchising'; 
'ICT'; 'marketing'; 'production' and 'succession planning') and a Regional Award 
for Innovation ('Spirit of Innovation Awards') recognising and rewarding specific 
categories on innovator/entrepreneur i. e. 'Students of all ages including schools, 
colleges and universities'; 'Individuals over the age of 18'; 'Companies with less 
than 20 employees'; and 'Companies with more than 20 employees'. The BIC has 
attracted additional sponsorship for the scheme from the Regional Development 
Agency ONE NorthEast; the University of Newcastle; the University of 
Sunderland; the Royal Bank of Scotland; and Robert Muckle Solicitors. Further, 
the event attracts interest from the region's universities, colleges, government 
office north east, local authorities, schools, the business support community 
(public and private) and professional firms. 
Example Service Contracts: 
NEBIC has been contracted by Business Link Tyne & Wear to provide 
business start up advice to Business Link clients throughout Tyneside and 
Wearside. The BIC has also recently signed contracts with both Sunderland and 
Gateshead Colleges to educate budding young entrepreneurs in setting up in 
business. The North East BIC has also been contracted by OneNorthEast (regional 
development agency) to oversee the development of incubation properties in the 
north east; administer the OneNorthEast funded Business Link Micro Loan Fund 
(since April 2002) to provide financial support to expanding organisations, 
whether they are a new business, a young company started by graduates or a firm 
employing up to 250 people and also delivers the regional `Upstarts project' which 
aims to assist graduates to start up in business. The BIC has also arrived at an 
agreement with Northumberland County Council to administer their grant and loan 
scheme for start ups and is working with the University of Sunderland, assisting 
the New Entrepreneur Scholarships project, encouraging people from 
disadvantaged areas to attend university for the first time and learn about setting 
up in business for themselves. 
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In addition, the North East BIC has been commissioned by the regional 
development agency to map the region's innovation system/infrastructure and, in 
particular, the innovation process - as practised by regional practitioners - and 
including Intellectual Property Rights (Idea Creation, Idea Definition, IPR search, 
IPR Protection and Action Planning) Design (Technical Feasibility, Product 
Design, Prototype development, Product Testing, Design for Manufacture, 
Financial Viability and Funding); and Marketing (Market Research, Testing, 
Strategy and Launch). The BIC has also been contracted by Teesside Council to 
map incubator capacity and capability which includes facilitating consensus within 
the sub-region as to what amounts to incubation, an incubator and mapping the 
degree of variation within the incubator/incubation model as practised in the sub- 
region. 
The BIC has also developed services as an internet service provider 
managing IT, email and internet contracts throughout the region. The BIC has 
recently formed a partnership with Knowledge IT, a firm of IT specialists in 
Washington with whom the BIC has collaborated on a range of projects, to form 
Nexent Technology with the aim of offering a range on integrated communications 
packages for businesses including data, voice, mobile and internet services, data 
recovery and round to the clock network cover. 
The BIC is also instrumental in the development of facilities in and across 
the City of Sunderland to support scientific research and the bioscience research 
and industrial base under the banner `Sunderland Science Park' in conjunction 
with the University of Sunderland, the City of Sunderland Government Office for 
the North East and the Regional Development Agency - One Northeast, the Tyne 
and Wear Partnership and Sunderland Arc (the Urban Regeneration Company 
(URC), established in 2002 to guide and deliver the regeneration of large areas 
within the City of Sunderland). 
Example Projects: 
The BIC is executing a number of grant assisted projects which include 
in their number an INTERREG IIIC, entitled TouriSME. The project represents a 
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joint collaboration between four European Partner Regions from (i) North East 
England, (ii) Saxony Anhalt in Germany, (iii) Limburg in the Netherlands, and (iv) 
Valencia in Spain to give school pupils and teachers the opportunity to share and 
develop enterprise skills. The North East's participation is being headed by 
NEBIC's Big Ideas Centre in collaboration with two local SME partners (a 
training company (Treepax) and innovation assessment organisation (Denkraam). 
The BIC has/is also executing a range of ESF Objective 3 and ERDF 
Objective 2 projects that include, for example, the provision of: 
  One-to-one counselling / information / financial advice (AIM or full Stock 
Market Listing); 
  support to access (what were) SMART awards (in association with 
GONE), the Spirit of Innovation Award Scheme (NE-BIC) and the 
CRAFT Programme in collaboration with Beta Technologies Limited 
(National Contact Point); 
  IPR and Patent advice; 
  Technical expertise (guidance and facilities); 
  Access to a framework of support to identify business needs, the 
preparation of marketing and business plans, the development of new 
markets/products/services, etc. 
  Preparation of feasibility and risk assessments; 
  Identification of international collaborators; and 
  Support to implement organisational development techniques (e. g. 
Investors in People). 
In addition, the projects also seek to match technical product/process 
innovators to experienced businessmen and women (and vice versa) with a view to 
forming new enterprises with the requisite mix of business competencies and 
technical skills'. 
The BIC has developed and implemented the `Corporate Ventures 
Programme', a project designed to support business starts created by individuals 
with supervisory and/or middle management experience and requiring graduate 
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recruitment as part of their business plan. The project endeavours to combine the 
technical and commercial expertise (and experience) of senior managers with the 
technical skills of new graduates. According to the project manager Willie 
Herdman "The project is not a graduate placement programme or specifically 
targeted at Graduates looking to start their own business. It complements other 
graduate programmes in the area and offers graduates an additional opportunity to 
move into the SME sector.... The project provides education at start-up and 
includes business planning, financial planning, market analysis, entering new 
markets, product development, marketing etc and is available at each stage of the 
trading cycle during the first three years of operation [in addition] the project 
supports the development of new businesses as a result of outsourcing and similar 
developments in the regions larger firms and institutions and provides tailored and 
reactive business advice which stimulates entrepreneurial interest at the earliest 
opportunity and encourages SMEs to continue to seek advice throughout their first 
three years of operation". 
Observations: 
The BIC serves an immediate catchment area wherein the population is 
estimated to be 1,500,000 and there are approximately 30,000 SMEs. The BIC, 
reports that it `home to 156 companies with a collective turnover of £40million+ 
and has, in the last 10 years (as measured on November 10,2004), supported 2,053 
companies with a combined turnover of £300million'. 
Accommodation for start-ups AND growing AND existing businesses: 
The BIC services a broad client base (on and off site) which is not 
restricted to tenant businesses. Further, the BIC is not unduly fettered vis-ä-vis 
entry criteria that prohibit existing or established businesses from becoming 
tenants (provided they can demonstrate innovation within their business). As 
observed in the previous chapter incubators constrained to support only start-ups 
are by their very nature more vulnerable to cash flow difficulties as a consequence 
of `churn', i. e. it is more likely that there will be business failures amongst this 
category of business than more established businesses. Consequently, incubator 
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management may suffer from a lack of security re revenues derived from tenants 
i. e. established businesses and businesses which may be accommodated on site as 
they continue to grow support cash-flows (re rental income) and thus the tenant 
portfolio/revenue stream is not so precarious/at risk. Furthermore, the BIC has 
successfully persuaded a number of regional/public agencies to locate at the site, 
most notably Business Link and TWEBLO which are significant not only in 
financial terms (as tenants re a source of income) but also insofar as this physical 
co-location reinforces their working relationship. Further, both have access to 
funding streams and hold remits that the BIC (for and without a consideration) 
assists as both a partner and/or as their agent/contractor. 
Table 4.4: NEBIC Income 
Public Sector Income - subsidies Euros 
% 
From national, regional, local bodies 0 
EU structural funds (e. g. ERDF, ESF) 300000 6.59% 
Other public subsidies 200000 4.40% 
Public Sector Income - 
Programme or project management Euros % 
Public income through national & regional programmes 0 
Incomes from EU programmes (FP6, INTERREG, etc. ) 0 
Income from client-SMEs/Entrepreneurs 0 
Other public income 0 
Total of Public Sector Income 500000 10.99% 
Private Sector Income Euros % 
Income from client-SMEs/Entrepreneurs 300000 6.59% 
Other private income (service contracts) 700000 15.38% 
Private sponsoring 50000 1.10% 
Total of Private Sector Income 4050000 89.01% 
Total Income 4550000 100.00% 
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While SMEs are naturally a core client, so too are public and quasi-public 
authorities with an enterprise and latterly educational remit, concerned with 
developing a creative, entrepreneurial culture in the region. As may be observed 
from the above, the BIC received (in the last financial year) £500,000 (10.99% of 
all income) in the form of subsidies, 60% of which are destined to disappear as the 
structural funds are re-profiled post 2006 to accommodate the new European 
accession states. However, as noted above, 89% of NEBIC's income is 
independent of subsidy and is classified as private sector income of which 65.93% 
is derived from the accommodation/incubator services 6.59% from client 
SMEs/Entrepreneurs effectively buying BIC consultancy and 15.38 from other 
service contracts (with public and quasi public agencies and private sector 
enterprises). Clearly the scope and scale of the facility re the return on the asset 
value (property portfolio) is significant and it would appear that levering and 
targeting grants to support the development of the property portfolio and 
infrastructure has been (and will remain) key to assuring the BICs financial 
viability and independence and providing a base for all other operations/services. 
Grant Funding: 
The BIC has been particularly adept at attracting/levering grants 
(European, National, Regional and Local) to support development and delivery 
(capital and revenue). For example, the apparent success of the incubator in Phase 
IV and the subsequent allocation of space and IT kit to support e-business (via the 
E-business foundation) prompted the BIC to pursue and secure capital funding 
£1.17million for Phase VII from One NorthEast, ERDF from Government Office 
for the North East (GONE), SRB funding from Sunderland City Council and funds 
from the Internet incubator fund. Furthermore, the BIC has levered a range of 
grant and investment funding from within and outwith the region which has 
included, for example, ERDF in the order of £240,000+ p. a. to support tenant 
businesses and the range of services offered e. g. by the Product and Process 
Development Unit (see also income statement above). 
The BIC has clearly seized the opportunities presented by the EU structural 
funds to support the development of the property portfolio as a basis for the 
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financial sustainability of BIC operations though as indicated by a retired member 
of the executive management team, in the beginning not all incubator managers 
were agreed that property should form an integral part of the model. However, the 
availability particularly of structural funds (ERDF) and the apparent success 
enjoyed by those that secured property and with it an air or degree of permanence 
seemingly conferred by their physical assets was instrumental in changing this 
view and particularly within the BIC movement. 
Quality Standards: 
As essentially an SME seeking to be considered for public service 
contracts, the BIC has ensured that it has attained and maintained recognised 
quality standards - IiP and ISO 9001 accreditation - which feature with 
increased 
regularity as a pre-requisite or technical requirement for businesses seeking to 
enter public procurement service contracts/tender exercises with national, regional 
and local authorities. 
Stakeholder Relations: 
While quality standards are doubtless important, track record, reputation 
and standing within the community of economic and enterprise agencies are 
clearly critical as is the nature and level of relationships developed by NEBIC with 
other influential organisations and businesses which accord the BIC 
legitimacy/credibility and a profile within the regional/local stock of providers of 
business support, innovation, and incubation service providers. For example, the 
BIC clearly enjoys a critical relationship with Business Link Tyne and Wear which 
is cemented by the fact that the organisation is in one of the BIC's `anchor' 
tenants. In the UK, the relationship between incubators (particularly BICs) and 
their local Business Links organisation (and evidently elsewhere in Europe vis-ä- 
vis national/regional equivalents) is clearly significant (see subsequent case 
studies). 
Evidently, being part of the national/regional authority's fabric of business 
support providers/agents, is clearly critical as a source of revenue (BICs are often 
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contracted as Business Link agents (and in Europe by enterprise agency 
equivalents - national, regional and/or local) to provide a range of services that 
fall 
within the e. g. Business Link's remit. In addition, NEBIC has clearly earned the 
confidence of the Government Office North East, attracting financial support since 
its creation not only for development and expansion of the facility (capital grants) 
but also services (revenue funding) while the regional development agency has 
also supported the development of the BIC in financial (grant) terms and with a 
number of consultancy contracts/commissions e. g. Regional Innovation Services 
mapping exercise. As noted above, the BIC has also successfully built up 
credibility and rapport as a provider of services to local authorities (most recently 
Teesside vis-ä-vis the aforementioned incubator study), Universities (Sunderland 
and Newcastle - the BIC has/is partnering both on a range of projects and/or as a 
provider of services and/or working in collaboration on joint projects) and College. 
The BIC clearly acknowledges and recognises the importance of 
stakeholders and partnerships within their `community of interest'. Evidently, as 
may be observed from the above, the symbiotic relationships (which are sustained 
by its capability and capacity to deliver programmes, projects and initiatives) are 
critical to the development and sustainability of BIC operations and have been 
instrumental in the role the BIC has been accorded in the development of 
Sunderland Science Park with the University of Sunderland, City of Sunderland 
Council, One NorthEast, Government Office for the North East and Tyne and 
Wear Business Link. In addition, the BIC is assisting the University of Sunderland 
to develop the Bonnersfield site (part of Sunderland Science Park) to house spin- 
offs from their IT school and Digital Media Centre. The, BIC has also been 
working on a joint venture with the Employment Service with a view to 
developing/pursing additional contracts in Slovakia, Slovenia and Croatia. 
Regional Leadership: 
The BIC completed it first year of operation as a stand alone company as 
recently as 2002 wherein the company's corporate goals comprised a combination 
of stability and controlled growth. At all times, however, the BIC has been aware 
and concerned to ensure that it develop a more strategic sense and presence in the 
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region in order to become a major regional force in the business support arena, - 
increasingly imperative (now in commercial terms) given: 
a. The increased competition for patronage prompted by the number, nature 
and level of `new entrants' to the incubation industry. This will intensify 
by developments in UK (National and Regional) policy (and the attendant 
funding) re the central role that Universities are now to occupy/have been 
tasked with as `knowledge generators' and endowed with equipment and 
resources to develop incubator style facilities and services. 
b. The increased competition for grant funding to finance the provision of 
services which became more acute throughout the 1990s and will be 
exacerbated by the impending gradual diminution of the structural funds 
which will effectively cease post 2006; notwithstanding that transitional 
monies might be made available. Structural funds have been integral to so 
many business support/incubator schemes [throughout the region and 
Europe generally] and particularly the development, growth and operation 
of NEBIC. The concomitant increase in competition for funds 
necessitates the development of new services, facilities and markets. 
c. The opportunity presented by the number, nature and level of `new 
entrants' to the incubation industry. The evolution of (and legitimacy 
achieved by) the business incubator modality coupled with the fact that 
regional agencies will come under increasing pressure to be selective or 
discriminating in their support for incubators (given the diminution of the 
structural funds and the historic reliance of the incubator stock of this 
funding stream). The changing financial environment for incubator 
operations and the expectation/presumption that the regional innovation 
system/business support infrastructure should evolve as an efficient, 
cohesive whole (be more than the sum of its parts) provides the BIC with 
scope to take a lead in assisting, developing or leading this vision (and the 
attendant benefits that may accrue to those in the vanguard). 
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As part of the BIC's sustained effort to establish a degree of regional 
leadership the BIC has sought to extend the geographic base of the business by 
establishing satellite operations but has, thus far, been seemingly frustrated or has 
otherwise failed to attract political and/or financial support from the regional 
authorities. While the North East of England Business & Innovation Centre is 
(currently) the only BIC in the North East of England, there are now plans (to 
which NEBIC is party to) to establish another BIC in the north of the region 
(Northumberland). It remains to be seen whether this project will be developed as 
a stand-alone BIC or whether as a satellite of NEBIC however early indications 
would suggest that it is more likely to be the former. In the interim, the BIC has 
however initiated the development of a sub-regional network of incubators, 
seeking to develop collaborative projects and services with e. g. the Digital Factory 
in Bishop Auckland to mention but one. 
Image, Branding and Promotion: 
Given the aforementioned rate of addition and differentiation with the 
local/regional incubation `industry' and competition for patronage, favour and 
financial support, NEBIC evidently places great stock in promoting achievement 
and enhancing its public profile within and outwith the incubator community, 
reinforcing its position/image as a leading provider of business incubation 
services. Incubator operations are clearly geared to raising the awareness of the 
BIC and its brand and its regional role. In the period of observation (effectively 4 
years) the BICs profile in regional and local media has certainly increased. 
Methods of promotion now include efforts to target and develop links with the 
national media, high profile public relations campaigns in regional and local press 
which represent efforts to develop brand awareness locally, regionally, nationally 
and internationally but also achievement and work in progress (e. g. project 
launches) via direct mailing e. g. the Innovator Newsletter (an emailed bulletin with 
a pan-european and extended regional circulation), regional advertising and 
promotions, telemarketing, partnering initiatives (Spirit of Innovation, Sunderland 
Science Park and a range of other strategic and corporate events). 
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It is perhaps a mark of the BICs success in their endeavour to build brand 
brand awareness (particularly via the BIC's `Spirit of Innovation Awards') that the 
BIC has attracted private sponsorship. Evidently, legal firms are especially keen to 
involve themselves in BIC/incubator operations as for example one local firm 
provides a legal forum while a number of others have sponsored Spirit of 
Innovation Awards. Indeed, a number of incubators have been quick to exploit 
interest from providers of professional services e. g. lawyers, accountants for whom 
incubators represent a potentially lucrative fee stream vis-ä-vis, for example, 
commercial, employment law and the even more lucrative IPR and due diligence 
work accompanying mergers, acquisitions, business sales, technology licensing, 
stock market/AIM listings, etc. Further, the nature of their interest in NEBIC 
seems representative of the private sector interest in UK incubation as a whole 
(coupled with the positive public relations impact derived from their association). 
Human Capital: 
Human capital (knowledge and expertise) is critical to the provision of 
comprehensive and flexible incubation and business support services. As 
illustrated below, 72.02% of expenditure is incurred in connection with the people 
side of the business (10.29% is incurred on supplementary or specialist expertise). 
Table 4.5: NEBIC Expenditure 
Expenditure £ Relative % 
Payroll 1,500,000 61.73% 
Consultants and external experts 250,000 10.29% 
Subsidies to entrepreneurs 0 0.00% 
Overheads (furniture, travel, energy, IT, 
facilities, etc) 380,000 15.64% 
Cost of incubator building(s) 0 0.00% 
Financial costs (from loans, etc) 0 0.00% 
Other costs 300,000 12.35% 
Total expenditure 2,430,000 100.00% 
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The BIC has resisted the temptation to dispense with sub-contracting and 
increase the permanent staff as this resource gives the BIC scope to extend and/or 
assure variety in its array of specialist services and activities and provide clients 
(public and private) sector with access to a comprehensive portfolio of skills, 
expertise and flexible solutions which might otherwise be unduly prescribed by the 
competencies of personnel recruited to the permanent staff. Moreover, given the 
current uncertainties in the financial environment (and that extending the BIC's 
liabilities by appointing additional permanent staff might be `unwise'); and the fact 
that a great deal of funding is project specific, this `matrix' style of management 
sourcing expertise from a supplementary pool may in fact be a model that will 
become more common by necessity. 
Client Satisfaction: 
The BIC keeps services and activities in a constant state of review, 
conducting annual tenant surveys and invites tenant and client feedback vis-ä-vis 
service development and the development of new facilities. 
Service Development: Challenges 
The BIC is itself an entrepreneurial business, innovating new services and 
models of delivery (e. g. selected projects and services above). Indeed, given 
changes in the public funding framework and policy focus necessity may prove to 
be the mother of invention for incubators throughout the region and the UK. 
Historically, and in the main, the majority of successful start-ups at the BIC (as 
noted above) are observed as comprising / set up by individuals who are 40+ years 
of age with senior / middle management experience who readily accept that more 
than a nine-to-five commitment is required. These individuals tend to have a level 
of business skill, people management skills and technical expertise that must be 
underpinned by support in generic business areas. The majority have entered the 
BIC with a process, service, idea or method of production as opposed to finished 
product and are noted for their willingness to invite criticism from the support staff 
and to seek and take advice. They possess, by virtue of their experience, 
developed interpersonal skills and a level of credibility with suppliers and 
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customers. They also tend to have established networks of potential collaborators 
and more importantly start-up capital (derived from severance payments, early 
retirement/retirement lump sums, etc) that has rendered them financially 'secure'. 
This group of owner managers have in many cases achieved, what might be 
considered, a high standard of living that they wish to maintain and better. To that 
extent peer or social pressure to succeed has also been observed as an important 
driver in their success. 
However, as policy makers (setting regional strategic, economic and 
ultimately funding priorities) look to enlarge the scope of incubator operations to 
support, for example, University spin-offs, graduate start-ups (university and 
colleges) social enterprises, so the BIC must continue to evolve new approaches, 
programmes, knowledge and skills i. e. NEBIC will need to develop an 
understanding or profile of successful (likely to be successful) graduate 
entrepreneurs, social entrepreneurs, etc, i. e. variations on the current 
entrepreneurial profile or anatomy which may demand new services, approaches 
and modes of delivery. 
Case Study 2 
Coventry University Enterprises Ltd or Coventry BIC 
Background: 
Coventry University Enterprises Limited or `Coventry BIC' is a wholly 
owned subsidiary of Coventry University Higher Education Corporation and is the 
vehicle through which the University undertakes all commercial, income- 
generating work for the university is produced. In 1970, Lanchester College of 
Technology, Coventry College of Art and Rugby College of Engineering merged 
to form Lanchester Polytechnic. The title of Coventry Polytechnic was adopted in 
1987, and in 1992 the institution became a University. Coventry University 
Enterprises Limited (CUE Ltd) was established in 1992 and was formerly known 
as Coventry Polytechnic Enterprises Limited (established 1989). CUE Ltd is now 
the external face of Coventry University for all non-primary purpose activities. 
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Non-primary purpose involves commercial- related activity, such as: consultancy; 
contract research; trading; non-award bearing education (for example company 
training), and other forms of economic regeneration and business support projects. 
Mission Statement/Aim(s): 
The company's mission statement is stated as follows: "To be recognised 
by regional, national, European and international bodies as the most effective 
partner organisation in the region to support innovation and wealth creation 
through the provision of high quality, high value facilities and services. " 
Governance: 
The Governing Body of CUE Ltd comprises a Board of seven Directors 
(six male, 1 female with an average (mean) age of 55) from the staff of the 
University, including the Vice-Chancellor, the Pro-Vice-Chancellor with 
responsibility for research and consultancy, the Director of the University's 
Commercial Affairs Department (who is also the Managing Director of CUE Ltd) 
and three further Directors drawn from the University's Governing Body. The 
Company Secretary of CUE Ltd is also the University Secretary. The Board is 
constituted to represent the interests of the University group and its position in the 
public arena. Members of the Board also occupy similar positions in sub-regional 
organisations, such as the local LSC, Business Link and CSWP Ltd, as well as 
regional, national and international equivalents. 
Facilities: 
Like the NEBIC site in Sunderland, the site occupied by Coventry 
University Enterprises Limited (Coventry BIC) has an industrial past. The site 
was formerly occupied by the Deasy Motor Car Manufacturing Company, which 
took over premises formerly occupied by the Eden Car Company in 1906. The 
company seemingly went from strength to strength during the First World War and 
moved into the manufacture and development of aircraft and aero engines (the 
manufacture of cars at the site resumed in 1919) while engine production also 
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continued. The company expanded further with a range of acquisitions that 
include AN Roe Co and by a merger with Hawker Aircraft. However, 
rationalisation of the aircraft industry at the end of the Second World War (led 
largely by the Government) prompted a merger of Armstrong Siddeley and Bristol 
Aero Engines. In 1959 and 1966 saw the final merger of [then] Bristol Siddeley 
with Rolls-Royce. Production under the banner of Rolls-Royce continued on this 
site until 1995 when operations were transferred to nearby Ansty. 
The site has been redeveloped as Coventry University's Technology Park, 
as developed by the University in association with Coventry City Council and 
Advantage West Midlands formally English Partnerships with financial assistance 
from the European Regional Development Fund. The Park, which is managed by 
Coventry University Enterprises Ltd, comprises the TechnoCentre (housing the 
Innovation Centre (home to 50 self contained units accommodating both new and 
established businesses), Conference Centre, the Enterprise Centre (a grow-on unit 
for companies who have expanded beyond the Innovation Centre) and the 
`Innovation Village' (an £8million development - financed in part by the regional 
development agency and private sector sponsors - providing an additional 
4220 sq. 
metres of accommodation for larger companies with accommodation from 131 
square metres to 804 square metres). The BIC is also planning to develop a sector- 
specific design business incubator, which will link closely with the strengths of the 
University in industrial and automotive design. 
Built on three floors spanning 2,100 square metres, the `Innovation Centre' 
comprises of 30 entirely self-contained units, ranging in size from 17.3 square 
metres to 87 square metres and is constructed in a modular manner. Each unit is 
equipped with telephone ports, computer and electrical sockets, ADSL facilities, 
ISDN lines and Internet facilities, full access for wheelchair users, car parking 
provision and 24 hour security. The centre also features a staffed reception, 
message taking service, secretarial and office services. In addition, the Centre also 
provides meeting facilities, training and conference rooms, dedicated Conference 
Centre and auditorium and 100-seat restaurant. The Centre is staffed with 
personnel providing tenants with on hand advice, help and liaison with local, 
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regional and national organisations and support in the areas of european funding, 
research opportunities, marketing, exports and information technology. 
The 'Enterprise Centre' was the second building to be built on the 
Technology Park. The £3 million development - which received over £1 million 
worth of grant funding from the European Regional Development Fund, provides 
dedicated accommodation for small and medium sized enterprises. The 
accommodation comprises units that range in size from 54 sq m to 400-sq m which 
are offered on leases of between three-ten years. Like the Innovation Centre, it 
features secretarial and office services and a message-taking service. Each suite is 
fitted with single-phase electric power, State-of-the-art ISDN/ADSL telephone 
lines, Cat 6 structured cabling and s secure (accessed by digital keypads). 
The site also includes: 
  the `Design Cluster' an additional facility specifically designed to support 
design and innovation; the development of collaborative relationships 
alongside the CU-ADAM Lab (Coventry University's Advanced 
Digitisation and Modelling laboratory); and support knowledge and 
technology transfer through fostering academic and industry linkages; and 
  the Eliot Park Innovation Centre(EPIC) a £7 million project jointly funded 
by the European Regional Development Fund and Advantage West 
Midlands providing accommodation for than 40 small and growing 
innovatory businesses. 
Tenant profile: 
N/A 
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Services: 
The BIC offers a range of services that include: 
  Consultancy support to companies and other organisations (on and off- 
site) provided through BIC staff and associates and by levering resources 
from within the University (specialist expertise, facilities and services). 
Consultancy services also include participation in research projects 
(including academic and industrial collaborations); business consultancy 
including supplying personnel (e. g. as secondees) for the duration of a 
project: development and delivery of courses designed to meet specific 
training and development needs for industrial, commercial and community 
organisations; and provision of expertise in the area of funding 
opportunities, product design and business development. 
  Business innovation and technology transfer support. Specifically, the 
BIC, as a member of the European Union's Innovation Relay Network 
(representing both the East and West Midlands of England) since 1995, 
provides business assistance with innovation development, technology 
audits and technology transfer. 
  ICT business support - the BIC is a founder partner in 2WM 
(the West 
Midlands e-Portal) and provides a ranger of ICT support to business (e. g. 
e-business). 
  International Trade Assistance including the organisation and delivery of 
inward trade visits and outward trade missions throughout Europe 
focussing on trade, technology transfer and innovation development. 
  The BIC provides a range of entrepreneurship and business support, range 
of business support, business incubation and pre-incubation (integral to 
BIC status) and is working on a range of projects concerned with pre- 
incubation and virtual incubation. 
  The BIC has also developed a range of expertise in the development and 
management of projects concerned with the (business) application of ICT, 
innovation, business development and industry-academia collaborations. 
  Assisting business to prepare grant applications for research and 
development funding. 
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The Conference Centre provides the BIC with the ability to deliver events 
management services and the BIC reports that it is now a regular provider of 
events management services to regional and national government departments and 
is now an experienced deliverer of European level conferences. CUE has, for 
example, organised and delivered the Entrepreneurial Experts' meeting, annual 
events (for example the DTI's Innovation Lecture) and conferences for more local 
audiences (such as the launch of the Regional Innovation Strategy). 
Resources: Personnel 
As stated in Coventry University Enterprises Limited Report and financial 
statements for the year ended 31 July 2004 (page 9), the Company has no 
employees but buys services from Coventry University. CUE Ltd has however 
assembled a flexible proactive workforce of over 80 entrepreneurs, secondees, and 
experienced project managers, supported by over 500 academic experts. 
Example Service Contracts: 
Coventry University Enterprises Ltd is based in and is contracted to 
manage Coventry University Technology Park comprising 8.1 hectares of land and 
which provides high quality business accommodation; on site business support and 
advice; access to innovation and expertise; research and development opportunities 
via University links. Integral to the offering is the opportunity to develop and 
accommodate (literally) joint venture collaborative arrangements between 
academia and commerce in the areas of new product development and training. 
CUE is also tasked with promoting collaboration and joint venturing opportunities 
with the University to companies outwith the West Midlands and attracting 
existing businesses to locate and expand their operations on the Park. 
Tenants on the Technology Park and other external organisations are 
further supported with office services, including document typing, preparation of 
photocopying (black & white and colour), mailing facilities and survey analysis 
services (other services that are not normally provided by most Technology Parks 
including client surveys (online and offline), a personal shopping service, dry 
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cleaning and mobile phone top-up cards are also provided). Coventry University 
Enterprises Ltd (CUE) has also agreed in principle to manage Optima (a facility in 
Warwickshire) and provide both an on-site office bureau and business 
development services from the Techno Park (subject to adequate external support 
to meet any short fall in service charge income). 
Since the late 1980s, and prior to accreditation as BIC, Coventry University 
Enterprises Ltd (CUE Ltd) evolved a range of support services to business, 
academia, research organisations and the public sector (particularly EU oriented 
services). Prior to BIC accreditation, the company was the Midlands host for UK 
participation within the EC Cornett Programme and first published the EC 
Information Service -a monthly guide to calls for proposals and tenders for 
research, training, education and business support from the European Commission 
and associated bodies. In 1991, CUE established EDIT - European Databases 
Information and Training - which provided training, workshops, conferences and 
written reports on all aspects of EU information, and specialising in the EC 
Framework Programme for RTD. 
In 1993, CUE Ltd was awarded the contract to run the EC Eurotecnet 
Programme National Support Unit and in 1995 was awarded the Midlands 
Innovation Relay Centre contract under the EC Fourth Framework Programme for 
RTD, a contract now in its eighth year. CUE Ltd has delivered conferences and 
workshops on the Framework Programme since Framework Three and continues 
to collaborate with the EC, OST, DTI, and National Contact Point contractors - 
IETT, Beta Technology, Singlelmage, NPL, NEL, CRL as well as Business Links, 
RDAs, Universities and Research Organisations in the provision of such events. 
In addition to numerous call specific days at venues such as the British 
Geological Survey and East Midlands Electricity, CUE Ltd delivered a Framework 
Five road show for the launch of the programme in 1999 including venues in 
Northampton, Chesterfield, Loughborough, Leicester, Nottingham and Lincoln. 
CUE Ltd delivered the West Midlands FP6 launch on behalf of Advantage West 
Midlands in 2002 and continues to deliver regular proposal writing workshops for 
potential participants. Additionally, CUE provides occasional proposal writing 
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support on behalf of client companies. CUE Ltd has recently been contracted by 
the East Midlands Development Agency to facilitate regional SME involvement in 
the EU Commission's Framework Programme (VI) and prepare the regional 
businesses to engage in Framework Programme VII. CUE Ltd has contracted to 
perform the service in collaboration with NJM European, Economic & 
Management Consultants, Limited (Newcastle) and RTC North Limited 
(Sunderland) - the Innovation Relay Centre for the North East of England. Prior 
to this contract award, CUE developed capacity and capability in this area via an 
INTERREG IIIB programme with partners from France, Spain, Portugal and the 
Canaries. Called the `Centre for Innovation and Economic Intelligence' (CIEI) the 
project was developed to provide a free service to find international project 
partners/Small and Medium-size Enterprises (SMEs) in EU CRAFT/FP6 projects. 
CUE Ltd operates the Midlands Innovation Relay Centre, the local node of 
a network of 71 centres in Europe (8 located in the UK) containing approximately 
250 partner organisations, operating in 33 countries that include Member States of 
the European Union, much of Central and Eastern Europe, the Newly Associated 
Countries, Bulgaria, Chile, Iceland, Israel, Norway, Romania, Switzerland, Cyprus 
and Turkey (generally hosted by established regional organisations (Technology 
Centres, Chambers of Commerce, University Companies, Regional Agencies etc)) 
covering the entire European Union and much of Central/Eastern Europe. The 
Innovation Relay Centre network is the official EC innovation and technology 
brokerage and technology transfer support service (founded in 1993 by the 
European Commission), providing companies with access to European partners for 
technical cooperation, research, licensing, manufacturing and joint venture 
agreements. 
As the IRC for the Midlands (Coventry and Warwickshire, Derbyshire, 
Herefordshire, Leicestershire, Lincolnshire, Northamptonshire, Nottinghamshire, 
Rutland, Shropshire, Staffordshire, The West Midlands and Worcestershire) the 
BIC under this mantle offers a range of additional services that include: 
  Support for innovation and technology transfer (Outward Technology 
Transfer (the export and exploitation of technology from the Midlands to 
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other regions in Europe) and Inward Technology Transfer (the import of 
technology into the Midlands to meet the needs of local companies) - 
assistance is provided with the development of contacts as well as the 
negotiation of agreements between the providers and receivers of 
technology; 
  Support with the exploitation of research results; 
  Promotion of new technologies and innovations across Europe; 
  Assistance in finding solutions to technology needs; 
  Guidance with licensing, manufacturing, subcontracting and joint venture 
agreements; 
  Identification of partners to develop and implement new technologies; 
  Support with negotiating technology transfer agreements; 
  Advice on intellectual property rights, patent protection and copyright; 
"A technology audit service; 
 A technology watch service, comprising `Technology Offers' detailing 
technologies that a company or research institute has developed and is 
interested in transferring to other organisations throughout Europe and 
`Technology Requests', the reverse of technology offers, where an IRC 
posts the technologies that companies and research institutes in its region 
need; 
  Advice and support with the location of venture capital and innovative 
financing; 
  The organisation and delivery of brokerage and partnering events in the 
UK and across Europe; 
  The organisation and delivery of technology transfer missions and events 
(fairs, exhibitions, etc) in the UK and across Europe; and 
  Advisory services: signposting for FP enquiries and applications. 
Example Projects (selected): 
The BIC, via the M. O. N. T. A. G. E (Meeting Organisations Needs Through 
Audits, Grants and Exploration) project - partly funded by the European Regional 
Development Fund - supports SMEs in the West Midlands to engage and utilise 
regional research and development assets (personnel and facilities) to support 
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product and process development. The BIC provides regional firms with 
`technology/innovation audits'; and `technology watch service' assisting 
businesses to identify specific technologies, materials, research expertise, 
development facilities, etc., to meet their needs. 
The `Atlantech' project, a collaboration between CPIN (PT), EUROCEI 
(SP), CEIN (SP), and WESTBIC (IRL); is funded by the INTERREG European 
programme [Atlantic scheme] and Advantage West Midlands. Specifically, the 
project supports SMEs to identify, assess and select business opportunities by 
exploring their business and international competitive potential (e. g. via 
transnational missions, business forums and bilateral meetings); it resources the 
provision of specialist assistance to support business growth and the development 
of R&D capability and capacity; support international collaborations (R&D and 
joint commercial ventures); and the assistance of specialist networks for business 
innovation and technology transfer (e. g. ebn and IRC). 
The CETISME project is an EU funded transnational project, designed to 
promote co-operation between European SMEs (small to medium enterprises) in 
the field of Economic and Technological Intelligence (ETI). Again, this project 
supports regional SMEs with `technology watch' style services oriented towards 
the continuous acquisition and systematic analysis of information of strategic value 
about technologies and their applications and trends, together with Economic 
Intelligence that also covers information on the market (trends, competitors, 
regulation, etc) and the economic environment are increasingly becoming 
approaches used by every kind of company. 
CUE (with Trade Partners UK) is also delivering the `INTERACT project 
which supports SMEs in the West Midlands to increase their international sales 
using e-commerce. Training is provided (generally free of charge) for eligible 
companies in information technology (e-mail, databases, spreadsheets); customer 
skills (negotiating skills, sales presentations); export documentation (relevant 
paperwork explained, obtaining docs online); legal matters (making contracts on 
line, data protection); financial considerations (accounting procedures, use of 
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relevant software); and logistics (getting the goods to their destination, supply 
chain management). 
CUE is also operating a pilot project financed by the `Promoting SET for 
Women Unit' (supported by the Department of Trade and Industry's (DTI) Small 
Business Service) as part of the UK Governments Teaching Company Scheme to 
support and encourage women to return to the science, engineering and technology 
(SET) industries. 
Observations: 
The BIC reports that over 200 SMEs have been established with the 
support of the BIC since its creation with "many hundreds of new jobs established 
and thousands of existing jobs safeguarded". 
Accommodation for start ups AND Growing AND Existing Businesses: 
Like NEBIC, CUE provides accommodation for start-ups, growing and 
established businesses. As observed at NEBIC, securing anchor tenants has been 
instrumental to ensuring the integrity of cash-flows. In this case Marconi were 
persuaded to take up occupancy in two of the three floors of the original scheme 
(first phase) with the aim of attracting other high-technology firms to the site. 
Grant Funding: 
Like NEBIC, Coventry BIC is located in an `Objective 2' area and has 
successfully levered ERDF support to support the development of services 
(revenue funding) and facilities (capital funding). In addition, the BIC has 
successfully tapped into a range of other national (DTI), regional (Advantage West 
Midlands Regional Development Agency) and european programmes and 
initiatives (European Commission COMETT, INTERREG and the European 
Commission's Framework Programme for Research and Development 'FP6'). 
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Stakeholder Relations: 
Like NEBIC, Coventry BIC has invested heavily (time, money and 
resources) in the development of strategic and commercial partnerships. Like St 
Johns Innovation Centre (see below), the relationship the BIC enjoys with its 
University is critical as are relationships with the regional development agency, the 
DTI and Europe vis-ä-vis the Innovation Relay Centre network. 
Not surprisingly, a range of incubator activities reflect the close coupling of 
the BIC and the university. For example, the BIC is co-ordinating the 
Strengthening Academic and Industrial Links Thematic Network ('SAIL') project 
with Advantage West Midlands (the regional development agency) designed to 
support members of the network to exchange experience about academic and 
industrial cooperation across Europe and put innovation at the top of the regional 
policy agenda. As part of the European Commission backed Innovating Regions 
of Europe initiative (and one of one of only fourteen thematic networks funded by 
the European Commission within the framework of the "Promotion of innovation 
and encouragement of SME participation" programme), the project network 
comprises 15 members (participating Regions include: West Midlands, UK; 
Vaestra Goetaland, Sweden; North-East, Romania; Nicosia, Cyprus; North West, 
Ireland; Bucharest, Romania; South-East, Ireland; Cracow, Poland; Crete, Greece; 
Iceland; Lower Silesia, Poland; Stuttgart, Germany; Madrid, Spain; and Upper 
Galilee, Israel). The project also supports bilateral senior level secondments and 
regional study tours will involve the key 'movers and shakers' of innovation from 
the member regions'. 
Coventry University Enterprises Ltd has funded the development of a new 
3-year (part-time) MBA in Knowledge Transfer and Innovation Management 
designed to appeal to individuals in either public or private sector whose job 
involves the support and promotion of innovation and technological cooperation. 
The programme is delivered in with the mode of delivery being through blended 
learning. Eight new "level one" undergraduate modules have been developed. 
These are being aligned with the AURIL CPD framework established in response 
to comments made by the Business Interface Training Provision review (2002) and 
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the Lambert review (2003). Both reviews concluded that knowledge transfer is not 
only highly people-intensive but also that training provision would be required in 
order to supply the growing demand for skilled staff in this area, and to increase 
the skill levels of those already in post. The MBA is further evidence of the 
'professionalisation' of the industry and the fact that there are opportunities for 
members of the incubator community to be part of this vanguard. 
Regional Leadership: 
The Innovation Relay Centre has been an important part of CUE's portfolio 
extending the BICs strategic sphere of influence across two English regions (West 
& East Midlands). While both NEBIC and CUE operate from one physical base, 
CUE has derived a pan-regional authority/presence from the IRC (which in the 
North East is operated by an organisation other than the BIC (RTC North Limited 
a neighbour (and next door neighbour at that) on the same business park). 
Image, Branding and Promotion: 
The BIC brand is seemingly largely peripheral to the activity of Coventry 
University Enterprises Limited. The CUE identity/brand and the Innovation Relay 
Centre brand (`Midlands Innovation Relay Centre') are the brands that appear to 
feature most prominently in promotional material. 
Human Capital: 
The Company has no employees but buys services from Coventry 
University. 
Client Satisfaction: 
Like NEBIC, CUE places great stock in providing a client focussed service 
(public and private sector) and quality of service. Like NEBIC, track record, 
reputation and standing within the community of economic and enterprise agencies 
are clearly critical as are the nature and level of relationships developed by CUE 
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with other influential organisations and businesses which accord the BIC 
legitimacy/credibility and a profile within the regional/local stock of providers of 
business support, innovation, and incubation service providers and upon which a 
great deal of patronage (political and financial) rests. 
Service Development: Challenges: 
Like NEBIC, CUE is also confronted by changes in the funding 
framework, particularly the loss of structural funds, as sources of capital and 
revenue. Like NEBIC, CUE derives a substantial share of its income from tenants. 
CUE is currently embarked on a programme developing additional facilities on site 
(with the last vestiges of ERDF support) to expand capacity (and thus 
opportunities to generate revenue from tenants). 
Case Study 3 
Kent Business and Innovation Centre 
Background: 
Kent BIC is a non-profit making organisation incorporated within 
Technology Enterprise Kent, which itself incorporates Kent Technology Transfer 
Centre, the Enterprise Agency of East Kent and the South East England Innovation 
Relay Centre (SEEIRC). 
The BIC was formed by the consolidation of the Enterprise Agency of East 
Kent (EAEK) and Kent Technology Transfer Centre (organisations which formed 
as part of government initiatives in the 1980s) and through the initiative and 
support of Thanet and Dover District Councils, Canterbury City Council, Kent 
County Council, national companies with local outlets and local commerce and 
industry (as reflected in the BIC governance structure). 
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Mission Statement/Aim(s): 
"To generate profitable economic activity in East Kent, Kent and Medway, 
the wider region and Europe, through support for technology based businesses and 
start ups and established businesses in the community, in partnership with other 
8 local, county, regional and European organisations". 
Objective(s): 
Subsequently, the BIC has evolved a range of business interests and 
services which are enshrined in their objectives: 
  Strategic Objective One: Encourage and support start-ups, micro and 
technology based businesses that can add value to the local economy and 
create employment opportunities for local people. 
  Strategic Objective Two: Co-ordinate provision and management of 
incubator units for local businesses, including technology based and other 
high growth start-ups. 
  Strategic Objective Three: Help foster greater social and economic 
inclusion in East Kent through encouragement for e-business and 
innovative business practices, and by providing capacity building support 
for community economic development initiatives. 
  Strategic Objective Four: Improve the competitive performance of local 
businesses through supply chain and supplier development support for key 
sectors and the innovation supply chain and by encouraging clustering of 
technology based firms. 
  Strategic Objective Five: Maintain the long standing reputation for 
excellence in business support, through the development of systems and 
the introduction of best practice, to provide an efficient business support 
network and ensure the financial viability of the company. 
8 Technology Enterprise Kent www. technologyenterprise. co. uk 
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Governance: 
The BIC is managed by 20 directors (all male), comprising representatives 
of local industry, local authorities and the University of Kent at Canterbury 
Facilities: 
The BIC operates from 4 locations (James House, Castle Street, 
Canterbury, Kent CT1 2QD); White Cliffs Business Centre, Honeywood Road, 
Whitfield, Dover, Kent CT16 3EH; Kent Innovation Centre (a new £3.8 million 
purpose built facility - funded by Thanet District Council, the South 
East of 
England Development Agency (SEEDA) and ERDF- providing serviced 
incubation space and business support, encouraging the creation and growth of 
technology and knowledge based companies), Thanet Reach Business Park, 
Millennium Way, Broadstairs, Kent CT10 2QQ; and R&D Building, University 
of Kent, Canterbury, Kent CT2 7PD. 
The BIC manages 64 workshop units and offices across the region on 
behalf of the two district councils (Dover District Council and Thanet District 
Council) and Kent County Council (45 serviced offices on three floors, with 
power, lighting and wideband data points, for high-tech start-ups and providing 
tenants, with access to board/meeting facilities, Easy-in/easy-out tenancy terms 
and car parking for tenants and visitors), Thanet (22 units); Deal (9 units); and 
Whitfield (17 units and 16 offices) with over 250 tenants on three sites. 
Tenant profile: 
N/A 
Services: 
Services may be described, albeit broadly, as comprising the provision of 
Business Advice, Innovation and Technology Transfer, Enterprise Units, Start-up 
Services, Skills Development, Community Programmes. Service priorities include: 
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5 Business planning and counselling support to start-ups and established 
businesses; 
  Signposting and referral through Technology Enterprise Kent's network of 
access points; 
  Work with high growth start-ups; 
" Development of an Innovation Hub in East Kent; 
  Management of Technology Enterprise Kent's portfolio of enterprise units; 
  Use of expertise to advise other organisations on management of 
enterprise units; 
  Work with other partners to help establish incubator units for high growth 
start-ups; 
" County-wide management support for the Kent Co-operative Development 
Agency; 
  Capacity building for local community groups as a partner in the Thanet 
Community Development and Enterprise Consortium; 
" Delivering of Community Enterprise Development Projects across East 
Kent; 
  Management of the South East Office of the Regional Supply Network; 
  Delivering of Community Enterprise Development Projects across East 
Kent; 
" Management of and participation in a range of initiatives aimed at testing 
new approaches to supply chain and supplier development activities; 
  Continuing professional development for Technology Enterprise Kent 
staff in line with identified needs; 
  Continue to seek new business which will sustain Technology Enterprise 
Kent's capacity to deliver successful business support services; 
  Develop the Technology Enterprise Kent's capacity to deliver services and 
earn income through E-Commerce technologies; and 
" Achievement of Investors in People recognition extended to the whole 
company by 2002; and 
" Maintaining IS09001 quality standard. 
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The BIC also operates the Kent CDA (established in 1993 and is a full 
member organisation of 'Co-operatives UK, a national network of CDAs and co- 
operatives) and its regional arm, 'Co-operatives South East' to support co- 
operative businesses, co-operatives, social enterprises and community businesses 
with free advice and assistance. 
The BIC, via Kent CDA, has (and arguably before community 
enterprise/social enterprise became `fashionable') undertaken a range of actions to 
support such enterprises which have included the publication of a self-help guide 
on how to structure, form and register a co-operative business (funded through the 
Community Dividend Scheme) which the BIC reports is the only complete booklet 
in the UK for those considering a co-operative structure for their business. 
Resources: Personnel 
The BIC employs 17 personnel as follows: 
Table 4.6: TEK Personnel functions 
General Management 4 
Administration 5 
Entrepreneurs guidance and support 
(Evaluation, Business Planning, access to financing, follow-up) 
4 
EU / national / regional project management 1 
Incubator management (rent, common services) 1 
Communication, events, animation (e. g. inter-firm cooperation) 1 
Training entrepreneurs 1 
Total 17 
Example Service Contracts: 
The BIC has held and/or holds contracts to support the Regional Innovation 
and Technology Strategies for the South Great Plains of Hungary and Cyprus, and 
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similar activity (funded by the EC to support a similar programme in Poland) for 
the Malpolska Region of Poland. 
The BIC holds a contract to provide/manage the South East England 
Innovation Relay Centre (SEEIRC) contract servicing (primarily) technology 
oriented SMEs, but also PLCs, large companies, research institutes, universities, 
technology centres and innovation agencies and a contract with KCC to manage 
the Whitfield Business Centre. 
Selected Projects: 
The BIC is participating in the European Business Network's (EBN) 
DETECT-it project a collaboration between 42 partners in 15 countries, in 
particular 30 Business and Innovation Centres (BICs) including Kent BIC. Akin to 
a number of projects being operating by IRCs, the project is designed to identify 
ideas/innovations in the [partner] collective BIC client base for exploitation via the 
EU's Research and Technological Development (RTD) programmes (Framework 
VI). The project is also designed to counter the obstacles that confront SMEs and 
hinder the participation (e. g. inability to identify collaborators, engage with RTD 
Programme experts (e. g. National Contact Points (NCPs)), and prepare grant 
applications [that are prepared to the requisite standard] in the areas of IST, Energy 
and Environment and Food safety and Quality will then be grouped into clusters. 
The BIC recently completed `Aerospace 2004' an event supported by UK 
Trade and Investment and the South East England Innovation Relay Centre 
(SEEIRC) which aimed a showcase event for South East based aerospace 
organizations, and provide them with an opportunity to demonstrate innovation, 
engage with potential international business partners, promote trans-national 
technology transfer, and encourage cross-border cooperation between enterprises, 
universities and research institutes. The BIC reports that the event facilitated 117 
face-to-face meetings between technology providers and end users, with 
participants representing organisations not only in the UK but also France, 
Germany, Spain, Italy, Finland, Belgium, Czech Republic, Israel and the USA. 
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The BIC is operating a range of projects as part of the South East 
Programme of Innovative Actions (SEPIA) that includes: 
  `Brainstorming Innovation Groups (BIG)' - facilitated workshops 
applying state of the art technology and tools to facilitate creativity and 
problem solving; 
  `New Enabling Services' (in partnership with The Centre for Research in 
Innovation Management (CENTRIM) at the University of Brighton, and 
TVT Business Innovation Ltd based in Oxford and supported by the South 
East England Development Agency (SEEDA) and the European Regional 
Development Fund and delivered by three partners) delivering a mixture 
of hands on support including an innovation auditing process, innovation 
workshops, innovation strategy days, exemplar visits, and the signposting 
of companies to other existing support services; and 
  `Connectivity And Bandwidth (CAB)' (supported by SEEDA, the 
European Commission, Kent County Council, Thanet District Council and 
East Sussex County Council) improving connectivity of businesses in and 
around the Thanet to existing ICT facilities and a range of mobile 
communication devices to the Internet, and entry into broadband 
technologies. The project provides beneficiaries with one-to-one advice 
and support to select and implement technology solutions. 
The BIC operates a `Business Development Programme' comprising 
intensive company visits and the provision of business support and assistance 
delivered by SFEDI accredited advisors (funded by Business Link Kent). The BIC 
also delivers Local Enterprise Agency Counselling services (again funded by 
Business Link Kent) and delivered by SFEDI accredited advisors; and `BLK Start- 
Up Kent Workshops - the Business Link's `Look before you leap' programme 
uses the modern facilitation process to help would-be entrepreneurs find out about 
starting a business. 
The BIC in partnership with Canterbury City Council, local residents and 
statutory and volunteer sector organisations is operating the Northgate Community 
Regeneration, and Herne Bay & Whitstable Coastal Regeneration Programmes 
established to deliver tangible socio-economic impacts in the target wards. 
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TEK manages the New Entrepreneur Scholarship (NES) [Technology 
Enterprise Kent was involved with the initial National Pilot Study as lead 
contractor covering Thanet, Dover, Hastings and Brighton and TEK has recently 
also covered Shepway] a programme (funded by the Learning and Skills Council 
and "free at the point of delivery" and comprising 90 hours of part-time business 
and personal skills training over 4 to 6 months) in the South East of England 
designed to assist the communities of East Kent (Thanet -Pier, Ethelbert, 
Newington, Northdown Park, Cecil, Marine, Central Eastcliff, Northwood, Central 
Westcliff); Dover (Bucklands, St Radigunds, Town & Pier, Castle, Tower 
Hamlets); and Shipway (Folkestone Central, St Mary in the Marsh, Folkestone 
East, and Folkestone Harbour) to set up in business by offering comprehensive 
part-time, flexible support and finance (beneficiaries of the programme who 
progress and develop a business plan have the opportunity to apply for support of 
up to £2,500 for items of expenditure critical to the start-up). Notably, the 
programme supports commercial enterprise AND social enterprise. The BIC is 
also delivering the `Impact East Kent' project will assist disadvantaged people 
living, working or serving rural communities in East Kent with the preparation of 
letters, CVs, and other issues surrounding social skills. 
The BIC has also been involved as a partner or lead partner in a number of 
projects and networks funded by the European Commission which include/have 
included in their number: 
  `Industrial Property Europe' (IP Europe) a project designed to improve 
basic awareness within the European business community of how the 
patent and other IPR systems may be used to commercial advantage. 
  The 'Retina' project which was developed to enhance the capacity of 
indigenous SMEs to benefit from Economic and Technological 
Intelligence (ETI) and facilitate transnational collaboration in RTD. 
" The `Digital Contents Competition' (DICON) a multi-national competition 
to promote and stimulate business ideas wherein digital content is integral 
and encourage entrepreneurs to use venture capitalists 
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  The `Progress Pack', a project to support the development of the South 
Great Plains Area in Hungary. 
" `ENTRAIN' -a pan-european study investigating techniques for training 
entrepreneurs to start up a business 
The BIC also operates a Shell Technology Enterprise Programme (STEP) 
designed to help SMEs and community organisations develop their potential by 
using the skills of second year undergraduates. The BIC runs a 'Summer STEP' 
project running for 8 weeks during July/August and a 'Flexi-STEP' (non-summer 
placement scheme) that comprises anything from 20 working days to a year, full or 
part time. The BIC also promotes and supports clients to access to DTI Research 
and Development Grants (formerly SMART Awards) for: 
  Micro projects which fund 50% of a project to develop a prototype product 
or process. The maximum grant is £20,000 while the company must have 
less than 10 employees); 
  Research awards funding 60%-70% of technological and commercial 
feasibility costs for highly innovative technology product or processes. 
The maximum grant is £75,000 while the company must have less than 50 
employees; 
  Development awards -a grant of up to 35%-45% of costs 
(up to a 
maximum of £200,000) of development of pre-production prototypes of 
new product or process involving significant technological advances. The 
company must have less than 250 employees; 
  Exceptional awards (up to 35% of the project cost up to a maximum of 
£500,000) for projects that are akin to development awards but feature 
strategically important development work. 
In addition, the BIC also promotes and supports clients to access the DTI's 
`Investigating an Innovative Idea' scheme, a grant regime that provides 75% of the 
costs of feasibility studies and the development of action plans (up to a maximum of 
£12,000); The Princes Trust, supporting young entrepreneurs (18 to 30 years of age 
unemployed or under-employed) to access low interest loans (uptoE5,000), grants of 
up to £1,500, test marketing grants of up to £250, on-going advice from a volunteer 
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business mentor and marketing support and specialist advice; Royal British Legion 
Small Business Loan (in conjunction with the Small Business Advice Office) for 
those leaving the armed services and unemployed ex-Service people requiring 
financial help to start their own business; and the South East Grant Advisory 
Service. 
Finally, the BIC is operating a project to train teachers in entrepreneurship. 
Designed by the BIC in conjunction with the East Kent Education Business 
Partnership, to respond to changes in the 14-19 curriculum, the project is a 
development programme offered to local schools to meet the government's Work 
Related Learning statutory requirements which came into force in September 2004. 
The BIC reports that the project has received praise from the National Federation of 
Enterprise Agencies, while all Head teachers in East Kent have evidently signed up 
to register for the programme for their staff. 
Observations: 
TEK reports that in the past 12 months it has provided advice and support on 
a range of issues from starting a business to technology transfer and exploitation to 
over 1,500 individual entrepreneurs, new business start ups and established 
companies, while historical impacts are stated as the creation of over 4000 
businesses leading to well over 5000 jobs. Further, TEK reports that recent research 
has shown that over 70% of its clients (start-ups) are still in business after two years 
against a national average of 50%. 
Accommodation for start ups AND Growing AND Existing Businesses: 
Like NEBIC and CUE, TEK provides accommodation for start-ups, growing 
and established businesses. Like CUE, TEK enjoys a particularly close relationship 
with its local university (where the base of the operation is located), however unlike 
NEBIC and CUE, TEK has developed and/or manages accommodation at multiple 
sites. Evidently, TEK is also seeking to extend this property portfolio and at an 
additional location insofar as it considering the feasibility of converting Deal 
Barracks into enterprise village. 
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Grant Funding: 
Located in the South East region of the UK and considered to be a relatively 
prosperous part of Europe, there is nevertheless, diversity within the region leading 
to disparities and areas of severe deprivation. Thanet qualifies for Objective 2 
funding to support economic regeneration (wherein the BIC has established an 
office), while Leader+ is available in mid-Kent to support sustainable rural 
development programmes. In addition, INTERREG IIIa funding is available 
throughout Kent to support cross border projects aimed at economic and social 
cohesion and INTERREG IIIb and c (in Kent/Surrey and East Sussex/Thames 
Valley/Hants and IOW) for projects involving transnational and interregional co- 
operation. Like other BICs, TEK has levered a range of EU funds and resources 
(capital and revenue) to support business development and the delivery of 
incubator/business support services 
Quality Standards: 
As essentially an SME seeking to be considered for public service contracts, 
TEK like NEBIC has ensured that it has attained recognised standards e. g. ISO 
9001 accreditation which features with increased regularity as a pre-requisite or 
technical requirement for businesses seeking to enter public procurement service 
contracts/tender exercises with national, regional and local authorities. In addition, 
TEK has achieved 'Matrix' accreditation to provide information, advice and 
guidance services to those looking for work, training or business start-up and has 
been awarded a contract from the Kent Guidance Consortium to offer advice and 
guidance sessions. 
Stakeholder Relations: 
Like NEBIC, and Coventry BIC, TEK has invested heavily (time, money 
and resources) in the development of strategic and commercial partnerships. Like 
St Johns Innovation Centre below, the relationship the BIC enjoys with its 
University (TEK's collaborations are not in the University of Kent's Institutional 
Plan 2003-2006 (published July 2006, page 14) is critical as are relationships with 
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the regional development agency (SEEDA), Kent County Council, Medway 
Council, the Canterbury City Council, the Canterbury District Economic 
Partnership, other HEIs/FEIs in the region, the Learning Skills Council, Business 
Link Kent and South East Economic partnerships. 
Regional Leadership: 
Like NEBIC and CUE, the BIC recognises the importance of playing a 
proactive role in the development of an entrepreneurial culture and business support 
services. Like CUE, TEK operates the region's Innovation Relay Centre and in so 
doing also derives a regional sphere of influence from this competency. 
Image, Branding and Promotion: 
Like NEBIC (above) the BIC also operates an awards scheme and event 
`The Gala Awards for Excellence Ceremony' (in collaboration with The Kent 
Learning Partnership) to highlight the achievements of local companies, training 
providers and individuals recognising examples of good practice. Like NEBIC, 
TEK has attracted a range of supporters and commercial sponsors who include in 
their number Barclays Bank Plc; Bank of England; Burgess Hodgson; Canterbury 
City Council; Dover District Council; Folgate Risk Solutions; George Wilson 
Group Plc; HSBC Bank; Lloyds Bank plc; Natwest; fizer Ltd; Thanet District 
Council; and the University of Kent at Canterbury. Like CUE, the BIC brand is 
largely peripheral to the main TEK brand which incorporates Kent Technology 
Transfer Centre and the Enterprise Agency of East Kent, the BIC and also the South 
East of England Innovation Relay Centre. 
Human Capital: 
Of the BICs 20 Directors (see above), it is observed that 19 of the 20 are 
male. The balance or rather under-representation of females is stark and this 
observation (i. e. which first came to light in the preparation of the TEK case study) 
prompted a review of the composition of BIC management in the other case 
studies (see above and below). 
231 
Client Satisfaction: 
Again, client focus (public sector and private sector stakeholders) and 
businesses tenants and enterprises located outwith the BIC is considered key. 
Service Development: Challenges 
The BIC has pursued quality accreditation to support the development of 
an extended range of services which like NEBIC's `Big Ideas Centre and 
Programme' encompass the education sector (enterprise training programmes to 
both school staff and pupils). As noted above, the BIC operates the Kent CDA to 
support co-operative businesses, co-operatives, social enterprises and community 
businesses with free advice and assistance. The BIC, via Kent CDA, has (and 
arguably before community enterprise/social enterprise became `fashionable') 
undertaken a range of actions to support such enterprises. In the UK and 
elsewhere governments and regional agencies are according the development of 
social/community enterprises increased political importance and thus the funding 
initiatives being created to support this vision look set to assume increased 
importance for BICs looking to extend their array of services, client base, sources 
of revenue and regional influence. 
Case Study 4 
St Johns Innovation Centre, Cambridge 
Background: 
The BIC developed and established by St John's College, at the University 
of Cambridge from which it takes its name, is located on the `Innovation Park'. St 
John's Innovation Centre opened in 1987 and has, since that date, offered tenants 
flexible office and workshop accommodation (easy-in/easy-out tenancy 
agreements), communal facilities (conference rooms and restaurant) and provided 
a range of business support services. 
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Cambridge has developed (since the 1970s) an international reputation for 
high technology research and development. The `Cambridge Phenomenon' as it 
has become known (the incomparable growth of high technology businesses in the 
Cambridge area which is generally attributed to the University) is a case study in 
economic development (engineering a technopole) the world over. Prompted by 
the development and diffusion of Science Parks in the USA, St Johns College was 
prompted to establish the `Innovation Park', and more particularly, the Innovation 
Centre which was established in 1987 (on an 8 hectare plot owned by the College 
since 1534 and comprising a 2,800 sq. m building and 41 units ranging from 20- 
120 sq. m in size) and was extended in 1994 to incorporate a restaurant and 
conference facilities). 
Like the North East of England BIC it has been established in a number of 
phases (5); phase 2, Dirac House (a 2,300 sq. m extension to the Innovation 
Centre), was completed in July 1989 and phase 3, the Jeffreys Building (3,100 
sq. m) was completed in February 1990. Phases two and three were established 
specifically to accommodate more `mature' tenants, further along in the business 
development cycle. Facilities on the park were extended in 2001 with the 
completion of the Vitrum and Tality Buildings. Integral to the SJIC model is the 
layout of the facility which includes a generous communal space while each floor 
is laid out as a 'street' that allows tenants to `shop' for services from fellow 
tenants. 
St John's Innovation Centre has been financed almost exclusively by St. 
John's College of the University of Cambridge - reputedly the second richest 
College in the University -a major landowner with a reported income from 
its 
investment portfolio of around £6 million per annum. 
. The College, an educational charity with a legal responsibility to ensure 
that its investments produce commercial returns, applies entire rental income from 
the Park to support activities in line with its core objectives such as Fellowships, 
Bursaries, College Library and other educational purposes. To further develop and 
sustain activity on a commercial basis the College established a management 
company, `St John's Innovation Centre Ltd' in [DATE] to provide: 
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 a supportive environment for tenant businesses by providing quality, cost- 
effective services. 
  an environment in which technology transfer and innovation are promoted 
to assist small and medium-sized businesses at a local, national and 
international level. 
In 1995, St John's Innovation Centre Ltd was accredited as a Business 
Innovation Centre (BIC) by the European Commission and is a full member of the 
European Business and Innovation Centres Network (EBN). The Park has been a 
member of the United Kingdom Science Parks Association (UKSPA) since 1987 
and United Kingdom Business Incubation (UKBI) since 1999. 
Mission Statement/Aims: 
SJIC aims are stated as follows, namely, to: 
  Support the development of Cambridge as the catalyst to enable the East of 
England to become one of the top 5 regions in Europe within the next 20 
years in terms of GDP, 
  Develop, retain and attract world class businesses where we have a 
comparative advantage. 
  Focus on scientific and knowledge based businesses but we must ensure 
that the wealth created is spread to all parts of the community and where 
possible all parts of the region 
In this context St John's Innovation Centre's aims to assist and support the 
formation and growth of early stage knowledge based businesses by providing 
physical space and in-house management support. 
Governance: 
SJIC is managed by seven directors (6 male, 1 female), with an average age 
of 49.75 years. 
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Facilities: 
The Innovation Centre has a total net usable space of approximately 85,000 
sq. ft. over two buildings, housing around 65 companies employing over 500 
people. Over a five year period the survival rate for companies is over 88%, 
compared to about 50% for other similar businesses in the Cambridge area, and 
45% for businesses generally in the UK. The SJIC offers a range of facilities. 
Specifically, business accommodation is offered at three levels, which include: 
 A segmented rent-address service (similar to NEBIC's Virtual Office 
space) called the Star Service, which provides a business address, 
telephone, fax and post handling plus access to other SJIC facilities to 
`qualifying businesses' that desiring an Innovation Centre 'office' but are 
unable to take up residency on the Park. The SJIC's 3 Star service 
(£6+VAT per week) includes a business address on the site , post, parcel 
and fax handling, the use of fax, photocopier, document binding etc, hire 
of conference rooms, meeting rooms and boardroom at preferential rates 
and free access to the business support services of the Centre. The 5 star 
service (£13 + VAT per week) also includes use of a communal telephone 
line and all associated message-taking facilities while the 7 star service 
(E25 + VAT per week) features a client specific telephone number which 
can be forwarded or answered by SJIC staff but in the name of the client 
business (and take messages). 
" SJIC also provides hot-desking facilities which may be hired by the hour, 
day, week or month (at a cost of £5 per hour or thereafter by negotiation). 
Hot-desking facilities are available 24 hours a day and provide users with 
use of desktop computer running Microsoft Office XP Professional, 
broadband Internet Access, advice from the Innovation Centre support 
team., use of SJIC's cafeteria, meeting rooms(free), conference rooms (at 
tenant rates) and telephone access (on a pay when used basis) 
  Secure business units (office or workshop accommodation - from 10-500 
square metres) offered with easy-in/exit terms (offered for up to three 
years with the option to break on one month's notice). The units feature: 
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o Direct-dial telephones from a central switchboard 
o Broadband internet access 
o Individually monitored and controllable security and central heating 
systems 
o Hot and cold water and kitchenette facilities 
o Access panel ceilings and flooring 
o 24-hour access 
o 24-hour security 
o Three-phase electricity supply 
o Fire detection/smoke alarm systems 
o Goods access via individual loading bays (ground floor units only) 
o Most of the units are air conditioned. 
Tenants are also provided with a wide range of services, some of which are 
provided under the leasing agreement and others which are subject to additional 
charges: 
  Central Reception and Switchboard (staffed from 8.30 am until 5.30 pm) 
  Photocopying 
  Document binding 
  Fax handling 
  Post handling 
  Furnishing, heating, cleaning and lighting of all communal areas 
  External window cleaning 
  Refuse disposal 
  Management and maintenance of the buildings 
  Up-keep of the landscaped Park grounds 
 4 Conference Rooms 
 A Boardroom and 5 Meeting Rooms 
  Vending machines 
  Two, 2-tonne hoists to the first floor 
  Electronic security systems, CCTV and night/weekend security patrols 
  Provision of comprehensive services allows tenants to concentrate on their 
businesses without the distractions of non-core, property-related issues. 
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Tenant Profile: 
See Appendix 3 
Resources: Personnel 
N/A 
Services: 
The service model may be briefly summarised as comprising: 
  Product innovation, design and manufacture; 
  Marketing and public relations; 
  Corporate design; 
  Advertising; 
  Human resource development and management; 
  Training; and 
  Fund raising and other financial services. 
SJIC endeavours to act as a catalyst in promoting technology locally, 
regionally, nationally and internationally. The SJIC delivers free advice to tenants 
on business issues and supports tenants and non tenants via local programmes 
(with University Departments and Government Bodies) and supports entrepreneurs 
to access funding through Business Angel Networks and venture funds. In 
particular, SJIC is able to provide free networking advice to tenants and makes 
recommendations on: sources of assistance in the University; product innovation, 
design and manufacture; human resource management; the availability of bank 
finance, venture capital, UK and EC grants; marketing and public relations; and 
training and development. The Centre also provides (on a fee paying basis), 
administrative services including company secretarial (statutory reports) and 
accounting (bookkeeping, budgeting) services. 
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The BIC facilitates transnational technology transfer between SMEs and 
R&D organisations in the Eastern region on the one hand and similar organisations 
in the other countries of the European Union, Iceland, Norway and Israel, on the 
other. This activity is enhanced by the BIC's operation of the East of England 
Innovation Relay Centre which via the IRC Network of European Centres and 
member services enables SJIC to identify potentially suitable technology transfer 
partners. The IRC twinning arrangements which have extended the IRC network 
to 10 Central and Eastern European countries and the Baltic States has further 
enhanced this capability. The IRC employs staff at Hertfordshire Business 
Incubation Centre in Stevenage and at the Norfolk Network offices in Norwich 
and reportedly assisted East of England organisations to reach almost 30 
technology transfer partnerships in the last 12 months. 
In addition, SJIC provides information and advice on European grants and 
the identification of R&D partners for European collaborative projects (an activity 
which is part financed by the Regional Development Agency). Like CUE Ltd 
(above), SJIC promotes technology offers from the East of England, technology 
requests from the East of England and offers from the East of England's Higher 
Education Institutions. The East of England IRC is recognised as being 
particularly successful and recently won the award for'Best Performing IRC' at the 
IRC Network's 10th anniversary meeting in Brussels 
Example Service Contracts: 
In addition to providing services on site St John's Innovation Centre Ltd 
supports the Regional Development Agency (EEDA) and Business Link 
(Cambridgeshire Business Services), by running programmes for businesses in the 
region which include, for example, an `Investment Readiness Programme' - 
assisting with business planning and fund raising. Furthermore, SJIC holds or has 
held a range of service contacts that include: 
  Advising on Science Parks and Innovation Centre initiatives in the UK 
and overseas; 
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  Carrying out assignments for the EU in Economic Development (Italy) 
and technology transfer (Slovakia, Estonia, Romania); 
  Running workshops and seminars on technology transfer, innovation and 
business development; 
  Assisting the Department of Manufacturing and Management University 
of Cambridge in establishing an Institute for Manufacturing Industry; and 
  Assisting the Judge Institute of Management Studies in the establishment 
of the Cambridge Entrepreneurship Centre. 
Selected projects: 
St John's Innovation Centre (via the IRC) is one of two UK members of the 
Europe-wide Gate2Growth Regional Network (supported by the European 
Commission DG Enterprise - Innovation/SMEs programme) which secures 
preferential access for SJIC to a web-based brokerage system designed to link 
entrepreneurs with investment-ready business plans (looking for equity investment 
of £350,000 or more) to potential investors. 
SJIC, since 2003, has operated the Gateway2Innovate programme, funded 
by the East of England Development Agency, which aims to connect businesses in 
the region requiring innovation support, to organisations and networks on the 
supply side that can provide the nature and level of assistance required. 
The BIC via `Enterprise Link', a contract SJIC holds with Business Link 
for Cambridgeshire, provides advice and support for early-stage 
entrepreneurial/aspirational businesses (based predominantly, but not exclusively, 
in the Cambridge area). The project provides for the delivery of seminars and 
networking events, regular information, advisory and opportunity bulletins and 
access to specialists and contacts within the Cambridge business community and 
University. SJIC with support from the Gatsby Charitable Foundation, Cambridge 
Network Ltd and Business Link also operates `Skills Link' a project specifically 
designed to support Cambridge's `highly qualified' unemployed. 
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The BIC also operates Innovation East, the regional innovation and 
technology transfer service for the East of England, whose focus is the promotion 
of innovation and the transfer of innovative technologies, regionally, nationally 
and globally. Incorporating the East of England Innovation Relay Centre (EEIRC) 
and supported by the East of England Development Agency and the European 
Commission the service provide companies in the East of England to identify and 
source new technologies, processes or expertise; sell, license or commercialise 
newly developed technology; and start or join European collaborative R&D 
projects. 
The BIC also operates the `High Growth Start-up Support Programme' for 
Cambridgeshire (supported by Business Link); facilitating business starts with 
significant growth potential or embryonic enterprises that have been running such 
a business for less than 12 months. The programme provides beneficiaries with an 
initial diagnostic from which delegates accepted onto the programme will receive 
£750 worth of vouchers redeemable against master classes, support services and 
access to a specialised mentor. 
The BIC is an agent for the Shell Technology Enterprise Programme 
(STEP) a UK-wide programme offering penultimate-year undergraduates project- 
based work during the summer within small to medium sized businesses and 
community organisations. The STEP programme is designed to support small 
companies develop their potential by utilising the high level skills of 
undergraduates. As an agent of STEP, the BIC has a strong track record placing 
students in local SMEs including the winner of the Electronic Engineering Award 
at the STEP 2003 National Finals. In conjunction with the STEP student 
placement programme, SJIC (via the EEIRC - see above)) also runs STEP 
International, a programme (supported by the East of England Development 
Agency) for placing students in Innovation Relay Centres elsewhere in Europe 
during the summer. In a similar vein, SJIC also facilitates a number of 'Student 
Projects' per annum and in so doing supports a range of University of Cambridge 
courses that require students to work in local start-up companies. SJIC co- 
ordinates (for each university department) identifying, engaging local businesses 
and persuading them to accept students; and providing information on projects 
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operated by the Institute for Manufacturing, the Entrepreneurship Centre, Judge 
Institute and Engineering Department. 
SJIC is also partner in a joint venture `Cambridge Minds' a network of 
PhD, MBA and MPhil qualified personnel accessible to businesses and individual 
entrepreneurs seeking such skills for new ventures, interim or project work. 
Observations: 
Accommodation for start ups AND Growing AND Existing Businesses: 
Over 170 firms have been tenants of the Innovation Centre since its 
inception in 1987. With a high survival rate amongst those firms, their impact on 
the economy of the Cambridge area has been significant. The Cambridge Judge 
study of firm destinations found that the majority of movers from St. John's stayed 
within a 20 mile radius of Cambridge; only 20% had moved out of the area 
altogether. Most had also grown in terms of employment. There are currently 
about 70 companies resident on the Park, employing over 1,000 people, with a 
combined turnover in excess of £40 million per annum. Over a five-year period 
the survival rate for companies is over 88%, compared to about 50% for other 
similar businesses in the Cambridge area, and 45% for businesses generally in the 
UK. 
As with other BICs the tenant mix varies and includes, for example, 
business concerned with or offering product or services connected with 
biomedicine, energy, the environment, computer/telecoms, industrial technologies, 
materials and consultancy (technical). In the main, the majority of the activities of 
the tenant companies fall within the fields of Research and Development, design 
of new products and services, testing and analysis. 
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Grant Funding: 
SJIC is concerned to point out that the Centre is not in receipt of any direct 
public sector funding for its core activities and therefore has to take on 
consultancy assignments to build up its business support team and defray the costs 
of any expansion of its activities. For example, SJIC secured £300,000 from The 
Gatsby Charitable Foundation in 1998 in respect of the 'Developing 
Entrepreneurs' project which SJIC has designed and subsequently implemented: 
  To establish and manage a network of early-stage knowledge-intensive 
ventures and develop an on-line 'Resource Centre' to support such 
ventures. 
  To identify potential knowledge-intensive businesses within the 
University of Cambridge and to support these firms in the earliest 
stages of their development. 
  To ensure that the University of Cambridge develops appropriate 
capacity to respond to the emerging needs of early-stage knowledge- 
intensive ventures. 
The project has supported the development of 'Enterprise Link' in 1989 a 
business network of nearly 200 early-stage knowledge-intensive ventures in the 
Cambridge area which now comprises 400+ members; the 'Resource Centre for 
Technology Entrepreneurs' (developed for Cambridge and subsequently rolled-out 
to Oxford via The Oxford Trust); the University of Cambridge Entrepreneurship 
Centre (CEC) at the University of Cambridge 'to train, develop and support the 
people who will make new knowledge-based ventures successful' which in 2003 
was reformulated [to reflect two emergent but distinct remits] as the Centre for 
Entrepreneurial Learning for education programmes and Cambridge Enterprise for 
support for new venture creation. The project was also instrumental in supporting 
a number of strategic studies which included 'Funding Technology - Lessons from 
America'; 'Funding Technology - Israel and the Virtues of Necessity'; and 'The 
Cambridge Technopole: An overview of the UK's leading high technology 
business cluster'. 
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SJIC reports that the `Developing Entrepreneurs' project has attracted a 
second grant from the Gatsby Foundation to: 
  support the development and management of networking activities focused 
on knowledge-intensive entrepreneurship, 
  continue the research and dissemination of understanding on the 
development of support systems for knowledge-intensive entrepreneurship 
  enable new projects focused on the support of knowledge-intensive 
entrepreneurship to be identified and for resources to be accessed for such 
projects to be implemented 
  co-ordinate regular meetings of key representatives of the innovation 
support communities in the Cambridge area to help ensure effective 
integration of current and future activities. 
SJIC with funding from the Gatsby Foundation (and additional financial 
support from Cambridgeshire Business Services (Business Link)) has also levered 
additional business mentors from University of Cambridge Enterprise. SJIC 
provides enterprise-link members with monthly electronic newsletters and 
approximately 50-60 events per annum. In 2003 the events programme for 
October and November (2003) comprised: "Survival & Growth in a hostile 
business climate"; "Internal communications for small businesses"; "Early steps in 
internationalising your business"; "Specialist adviser day on Intellectual Property"; 
"Does your web site deliver business benefit? "; "Legal up-date for SMEs"; "EC 
`Gate2Growth' briefing"; and "Coaching skills workshop". In addition, the 
funding has enabled SJIC to continue to research and develop a regional 
(collective) understanding of the development of knowledge-intensive 
entrepreneurship support systems and infrastructure. 
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Stakeholder Relations: 
Integral to the SJIC's operation is its relationship with the University of 
Cambridge. SJIC has been active in the identification and delivery of support to 
university spin-outs. For example, between 1998 and 1999, pending the award of 
University Challenge Funding, SJIC assisted the University's Industrial Liaison 
Officer to identify and support university spin-out SMEs; and via the `Anglia 
Enterprise Network' SJIC employed two `venture scouts' in the University to 
identify potential businesses (spin-outs), assist in identifying and sourcing 
additional technical, commercial and management expertise and support fund 
raising activities. SJIC also supports businesses already established by or in 
University departments by providing them with e. g. an accommodation address, 
direct accounting or legal support. In addition, SJIC support the Judge Institute of 
Management Studies (the University Business School), providing reference 
material for research and has assisted in the establishment of the Cambridge 
Entrepreneurship Centre. SJIC also works in partnership with Business Link and 
the University in assisting embryonic businesses not resident on site. In 2002 SJIC 
housed 50 businesses in the Centre and worked with around 600 earlier stage or 
embryonic businesses. 
Regional Leadership: 
Funding from the aforementioned Gatsby Foundation has supported the 
production of a number of strategic studies and publications that include in their 
number: the `Cambridge Technopole Report', a biannual publication billed as 
incorporating "revised data to reflect the changing view of high technology 
business in Cambridge, and to highlight new services on offer; and 'Funding 
Technology' reports which have investigated approaches to technology 
development/transfer in the US, Israel, Germany ("Funding Technology - 
Germany: Better by Design? "), and UK. The latter strand of project activity 
(above) has also proved instrumental insofar as it has stimulated, nee prompted, 
the creation of the Cambridge Technopole Group, a network of business support 
organizations operating in the Greater Cambridge sub-region, comprising: 
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  SJIC 
  Greater Cambridgeshire Partnership 
  Regional Infrastructure for 
Innovation 
  Cambridge Science Park 
  University of Cambridge Enterprise 
Knowledge to Value 
  ERBI 
  Cambridgeshire Chamber of 
Commerce 
  Business Link 
  Cambridgeshire Enterprise 
Services Limited 
  University of Cambridge 
Corporate Liaison Office 
  University of Cambridge 
Institute for Manufacturing 
  www. CambridgeNetwork. co. uk 
This sub-regional network is committed to improving the range and quality 
of the business support services available in the sub-region, particularly for 
companies based on technology. More specifically, the Group aims: 
1. To encourage the flow of information on new projects and initiatives 
between the members of the Group and to work together for the benefit of 
business customers. 
2. To identify the key organisations involved in business support in the 
Greater Cambridge sub-region for the purposes of accurately signposting 
business customers. 
3. To publicise and explain the origins and growth of the `Cambridge 
Phenomenon' in order to attract and retain appropriate new businesses to 
the sub-region. 
4. To identify gaps in the provision of support for businesses, and to lobby 
for resources to fill such gaps. 
While the project has supported publications that contribute to advancing 
understanding and/of best practice, they have been particularly significant insofar 
as such actions support and/or reinforce the positioning of SJIC as a key player in 
the regional (and national and international) innovation/business support 
system/infrastructure. The project provides a mechanism for SJIC to engage 
policy makers, business support providers and funders (directly or indirectly) of 
business support (SJIC) activities. For example, SJIC found itself positioned to 
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co-ordinate Cambridge's response to Treasury's proposals for the establishment of 
BICs in the UK. Indeed, SJIC has developed a range of links with national, 
regional and local business support and innovation networks that include in their 
number: United Kingdom Business Incubation, Business Link University, 
Enterprise Panel Steering Committee; Oxford2Cambridge Arc, Innovation East, 
Cambridge to Ipswich Corridor, i10 (network of HEIs in the East of England); 
Cambridge University Local Industry Links, and the Greater Cambridge 
Partnership. 
As noted above, SJIC took over the responsibility for running the 
Innovation Relay Centre for the East of England in 1998, which has enhanced the 
SJIC model, particularly the technology facilitation and transfer function, pan- 
european linkages and networks and the ranger of SJIC services. 
Image, Branding and Promotion: 
In 1995, St John's Innovation Centre -Ltd was accredited as a Business 
Innovation Centre (BIC) by the European Commission and is a full member of the 
European Business and Innovation Centres Network (EBN). The Park has been a 
member of the United Kingdom Science Parks Association (UKSPA) since 1987 
and United Kingdom Business Incubation (UKBI) since 1999. Like CUE and 
TEK the BIC branding or accreditation while important to the organisation does 
not appear to be as central to the corporate identity/image as for example NEBIC. 
By virtue of its connectivity with the University of Cambridge and its 
historic pre-eminent intellectual tradition; its position within the Cambridge 
Technopole; and the public perception that the SJIC is situated in a location at the 
heart of knowledge-based industrial and economic development, SJIC finds itself 
(like MIT in the US) particularly well-positioned to attract patronage from outwith 
the region (national and international), particularly corporate and scholarly 
foundations that lie beyond the reach of incubators, particularly incubators not 
linked to universities and/or leading universities at that. 
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Human Capital: 
The provision of high-valued added services is critical to SJIC's standing 
within and outwith the business incubation/support community and thus personnel 
recruited permanent and consultants are considered key to client satisfaction. 
Client Satisfaction: 
See Human capital above 
Service Development: Challenges 
Like TEK, above, SJIC is developing a property portfolio and in this case, 
as a commercial joint venture with START International, a tenant business. SJIC 
with Start International are offering operational management services in respect of 
other business and innovation centres and creating investments through property 
development. To date the portfolio includes properties under management/in 
development in Bristol central, Bristol park, Cambridge, Chelmsford, Dartford, 
Edinburgh, Fareham, Harwell, Reading and Woolwich. 
Since 2003, the BIC is also an integral partner in 110', collaboration 
between 8 universities and 2 Higher Education Institutions in the East of England 
developed to improve the interface between the partners and the nature and level 
of their engagement with business and other organisations through funding, 
collaboration, facilitation and networking. St John's Innovation Centre's role 
within i10 is to assist in the development of the ability of the institutions to 
negotiate and sign commercialisation agreements with companies, and to identify 
specific opportunities for technology transfer between the institutions and 
companies from all over the world. 
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Case Study 5 
Hertfordshire Business Incubation Centre 
Background: 
The East of England Development Agency has placed Enterprise Hubs as 
one of its 4 priorities in developing the economic strategy for the region. The 
Hertfordshire Business Incubation Centre's (HBIC) Enterprise Hub, established in 
2003 is the first in the Eastern Region. Located in Stevenage, HBIC is funded 
through the East of England Development Agency (EEDA) to foster a culture of 
innovation among the regions small and medium sized businesses. Others include 
Babraham Bioscience Technologies Ltd, in Cambridge and a third to support the 
development of a third relating to spinning out innovation and products from the 
NHS in the region. Specifically, the BIC has been established as part of this 
network of hubs to provide access to office space or other facilities which the new 
companies can use; recruit specialists who can advise the new companies on key 
issues such as access to finance, marketing their products and protecting their 
ideas and intellectual property; and provide networking opportunities for the new 
companies so they can benefit from best practice and sharing information. 
Mission Statement/Aim(s): 
"HBIC has brought together expertise in the development of innovative 
companies and extensive links to corporate and end-user organisations to create an 
environment buzzing with the opportunity for growth"9. HBIC aims to provide 
Herefordshire and the East of England's business community with a "one stop 
shop" facility to access appropriate support relating to the needs of high growth 
companies primarily in three sectors, namely `Aerospace and Defence Industries'; 
'Biotechnology'; and `Information Communication Industries'. In addition to 
providing business support, HBIC also reports that it offers flexibly licensed office 
and workshop space allowing businesses to flourish in an entrepreneurial 
environment; engages organisations developing ideas seeking new business 
9Retrieved on 06.07.05 from FHBIC website: http: //www. hertsbic. co. uk/default. aspx 
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opportunities for commercialisation; and assists companies through established 
support networks and well developed industrial relationships. 
Governance: 
HBIC is managed by 15 directors (all male), with an average age of 
55 years. As may be observed from the previous case studies, BICs (in the UK at 
least), are seemingly largely male dominated enterprises, especially as regards 
their governance from which it might be inferred that the business 
incubator/incubation occupation is something of a male preserve. It has been 
suggested that the current structure of the industry merely reflects the historic 
organisation of industry and society in general (i. e. more males enter and reach 
executive positions in industry and/or economic development agencies) however it 
does beg the question as to whether this seeming under-representation of females 
involved in the industry and at an executive level is a source of weakness. 
Facilities: 
HBIC's office and workshops include 77 Individual office units start from 
12m2 and workshop units range from 10m2- 158m2. They feature: 
  Easy-in Easy-out License Terms 
  Shared Reception Services 
  24 Hour, 7 Days a Week Card Access 
  On Site Security 
  Parking 
  Two Air Conditioned Conference Rooms and 3 Meeting Rooms 
  On Site Cafe 
  Postbox Facilities 
  On Site Support Team 
  On-site Catering 
  IT Infrastructure 
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HBIC also operate `Chells Enterprise Village (CEV)' at a separate location 
4 miles from Stevenage town centre and comprising light industrial workshop 
units (ranging from 67m2 - 126m2) and a unit of small offices varying 
in size 
(ranging from 7m2 - 19m2). 
Tenant Profile: 
The Incubation Centre has been established with a specific technology 
focus, namely Aerospace and Defence; Biotechnology; and Information 
Communication Technology OCT). 
Resources: Personnel 
As noted previously, reviewing the composition of the TEK Board, the 
HBIC Board is also largely dominated by men; only 2 of the 16 are female. 
Similarly, only 2 of the 6 members of the executive team are female. 
Services: 
HBIC's Enterprise Hub seeks to foster, develop, support and promote the 
development of commercial technology with SMEs, Academia, Research, and 
Corporate organisations. In particular HBIC seeks to offer/offers: 
  Business Incubation [business planning, technology support]; 
  Access to Funding [Links with Venture Capital Associations, Business 
Angels and EU Funding]; 
  Exploitation of new technology [innovation relay centre]; 
  Targeted training, networking, events, presentations; 
  Flexible accommodation and facilities; and Regional, National and 
International projects to stimulate Innovation. 
As regards business incubation and technology support, HBIC offers to 
work with small and large companies, both onsite at the Business and Technology 
Centre and throughout the six counties in the East of England. Services to support 
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growth include assistance in the evolution of development plans; facilitating 
project development and collaborations, research assistance; technology transfer; 
seminars, brokering university linkages; management development; and 
facilitating industry partnerships. 
In addition to the business support services available, HBIC also offers 
assistance in the commercial development of ideas through: Technology 
Feasibility Profiling; End User Introductions; Commercial Agreement Definition; 
Project Collaboration Programme; Technology Audits; and a Technology 
Matching Service. 
Example Service Contracts: 
The East of England IRC was originally established in 1998 and has 
hitherto been delivered by SJIC. HBIC is now partnering SJIC providing the 
Innovation Relay Centre (IRC) services to companies in Hertfordshire and Essex. 
HBIC reports that in this endeavour it has worked with Anglian Water; Archer 
Trice; Asymptote; APU; Cambridge University; Cranfield University; Domino 
Printing Sciences; GlaxoSmithKline; Grant Instruments; Herbert Group; Kecrypt; 
Keronite; LTH Electronics; Pure Notes; Pursuit Dynamics; Scientific Generics; 
Sealed Air; Sensopad Technologies; Silsoe Research Institute; TWI; and 
Vexamus. 
Example Projects: 
HBIC is currently running a project as part of the NAVOBS programme, 
an initiative of the European Space Incubator Network (ESINET), supported by 
the European Space Agency and the European Commission to support SMEs to 
participate in the Research and Technology Development [RTD] activities relating 
to the development of innovation services based on space infrastructure, in the 
fields of Navigation, Security, Telecommunications, Tele-Medical, Tele- 
Education, Earth Observation and Environment, and Geo-Localisation and 
specifically as relating to relating to GALILEO, GMES and Space Telecom-based 
services. 
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Observations: 
It is evident from the participant observation conducted as part of this 
research and particularly of NEBIC operations (conducted between 2002 and 
2004) that the human capital for BICs (and other incubators alike) is a critical 
resource and has been highlighted as key to their development, success and/or 
failure. Like a great many knowledge-based micro-sized firms and SMEs (which 
many BICs are in essence), the fortunes of a BIC are contingent on the expertise, 
entrepreneurial skill, acumen, personal networks (within and outwith the private 
sector i. e. public stakeholders and other business support providers) and energy of 
BIC personnel (especially the founders of BIC during the start-up phase) and their 
business knowledge, know how, commitment to quality, ability to deliver client 
satisfaction (SME and also public sector stakeholders), especially at the 'fledgling' 
stage. 
As a relatively new BIC, HBIC has been quick to establish relations within 
the incubator community. The appointment a former President of EBN and 
Managing Director of Birmingham BIC, CEO of Aston Science Park, Director of 
the UK Science Park Association, and Director of the UK Business Incubation 
Limited, confers upon HBIC a profile and presence within a range of incubator 
networks and programmes originating from within the incubator/BIC community. 
Accommodation for start-ups AND growing AND existing businesses: 
HBIC provides accommodation for new starts and existing businesses (in 
the priority technology sectors mentioned above) 
Grant Funding: 
HBIC has been established with support from, amongst others, the regional 
development agency and local authority. 
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Quality Standards: 
N/A 
Stakeholder Relations: 
As NEBIC is home to a Business Link, SBI and the Herts Chamber of 
Commerce are tenants of HBIC. HBIC has also, reportedly, evolved a range of 
partnerships, linkages and networks with for example 'Photonics Cluster (UK)'; 
the 'Innovation Society for the East of England'; the 'Institute of Electrical 
Engineers'; the 'Institute of Nanotechnology'; the 'Royal Society of Chemistry'; 
the 'Eastern Aerospace Alliance'; 'Gateway2lnnovate'; 'Hertfordshire Chamber of 
Commerce'; 'UKBI'; 'ERBI'; 'European Business Network', the 'Innovation 
Relay Centres Network', 'Medilink'; 'MAS East'; 'REWARDS'; business angels, 
venture capitalists and other 'Enterprise Hubs'. 
Regional Leadership: 
HBIC presents itself as "EEDA's Flagship Enterprise Hub, providing 
EEDA with a model of best practice which we are disseminating to other 
Enterprise Hubs". HBIC reports that it has advised the Suffolk Enterprise Hub, 
Essex, and Luton and that it is also working with Babraham Bioscience Incubator 
(the second East of England Enterprise Hub). 
Service Development: Challenges: 
As a relatively new BIC, one of the key challenges for the incubator 
managers is evolve a sustainable business model, manage stakeholder 
expectations, retain and develop patronage within and outwith the immediate 
incubator community and continue to invest in business development. 
Demonstrating achievement, added value and impact is key during this `fledgling 
stage' and thus communications strategy and the management of stakeholder 
relations is particularly sensitive. 
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4.10 Summary 
BIC operations as developed by the 5 incubators studied above have each 
evolved against a back-drop of different political, economic and industry 
conditions and are very much a product of regional factor endowments. NEBIC 
was established at a time when the incubator modality and practice of incubation 
was relatively unknown and as such the process of obtaining consensus for the 
BIC initiative in Sunderland was something of a drawn out affair which 
nonetheless became a physical symbol of a then hitherto fractious and fragmented 
business support infrastructure evolving a common strategy and goal. This may be 
compared with the establishment of HBIC in 2003 wherein incubators and 
incubation is now an established modality, more readily understood by 
stakeholders and which is generally accepted as a worthy and successful medium 
for the delivery of business support. 
Each of the five incubators studied provide incubation from within (and 
outwith) a physical environment. While it had been hoped to study a virtual BIC 
in the course of this study both Pronovus (Nottingham) and BIC SwedenWest have 
in fact closed seemingly for lack of patronage, financial support or sustainability 
(i. e. having failed to achieve a level of financial sustainability to the satisfaction of 
their sponsors and/or in light of competition from new entrants in the industry who 
have generally adopted the `physical' model of incubation which has now found 
more favour than the 'virtual' model). 
BICs admit and assist a broad church of enterprises including new and 
existing businesses, high and low-tech businesses, industrial and service 
enterprises and other business support providers. As observed above, BICs are 
also host to social enterprises, charities, and graduate start-ups which have 
prompted the development of new approaches to reflect the broadening of their 
client portfolio and the nature of assistance these enterprises require (and the new 
services and approaches BICs are required to render by stakeholders). BICs are 
entrepreneurial by their very nature and their capacity to reinvent and renew 
themselves; developing new services to meet new markets (new social, political 
and economic priorities) are an undoubted factor in their success/longevity. 
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Equally, BIC facilities and their business development functions charged 
with securing grants or investment in the extension thereof and funding and/or 
commissions to support revenue operations are clearly critical. It is evident that 
despite the development of private revenue streams and notwithstanding the 
revenues BICs generate from their tenants, the importance of public funding (e. g. 
structural funds or an equivalent will remain critical to incubator revenues (see 
also Chapter 5). 
It has also been observed in broadening the scope of incubator operations 
(and thus incubator revenue streams) it is anticipated that the BICs (and other 
incubators) will be ever-more required to develop new services, skills and 
expertise, and alliances. Indeed, as observed above, it is evident that BICs are now 
working in fields of endeavour and in partnership with organisations as not 
originally envisaged. For example, BICs are working to develop social and 
community enterprises and with education providers vis-ä-vis developing 
entrepreneurial cultures and creativity in schools and in so doing have enhanced 
the range of agencies from which they can derive public funding. 
In the same vein, just as stakeholder relations management is increasingly 
important to the sustainability of incubators, so too is an incubator's public 
relations function in communicating achievement and success stories which 
further reinforce an incubator's position within the business support infrastructure 
and in the consciousness of agencies and individuals with authority and 
responsibility for policy, economic development and regeneration strategies; and 
funding for business support projects and/or policy priorities. In a new climate or 
context for business incubation and incubator operations (as explored in Chapter 
5) the ability of BICs to demonstrate added value and impact shall become 
increasingly important. 
However, increased competition for funding (especially between 
incubators) and the concomitant increase in fiscal pressures that will inevitably 
follow (in the UK at least) following the re-profiling and allocation of structural 
funds to the new EU Member States will demand that incubators must become less 
dependent on public subsidy and/or that competition for public patronage will 
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intensify. To this end, stakeholder relations management is evidently a critical 
incubator management discipline as is the task of embedding BIC operations 
within a regional authority's strategies and plans and as part of the local and 
regional business support infrastructure and in cultivating support for incubator 
operations within the business community in order to preserve patronage (largely 
public but also private) and so as to develop new business opportunities. 
It is anticipated that in any event, as competition for public support for 
incubation becomes more acute, public sector agencies may be required to become 
more exacting in their evaluation of incubator performance and return on their 
investment, so as to be more discriminating in their allocation of public funds. 
Interestingly, in the UK, the decision to transfer responsibility for the regional 
allocation of ERDF to the Regional Development Agencies coupled with their 
existing budget for economic development (derived from national government) 
may now put the Agencies in a position where they wield sufficient influence to 
compel or otherwise achieve coherence in the provision of business support 
services and incubator coverage in particular. 
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Chapter 5: The Added Value and Impact of Incubators 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter commences with a review of the context for incubator 
operations following observations thereof and with reference to interviews 
conducted with incubator managers and staff and incubator stakeholders. 
Subsequently, this chapter proceeds to consider the way in which incubators 
endeavour to add value to their localities and regions with a consideration of 
incubator rationales, objects, their focus and the nature of services they provide to 
support innovation and entrepreneurial ism. 
5.2 General 
A limited number of studies conducted over the past two decades have 
sought to investigate the impact and `added value' of business incubators and/or 
the incubation process and to research whether or not incubators are an effective 
economic development, regeneration or business support modality. Not 
surprisingly, the `answers' thus far appear as imprecise as the numerous 
[research] question(s) formulated in this area of study which are themselves 
inherently difficult to frame. These difficulties are compounded by the fact that 
the `business incubator' - `business incubation' concept does not readily lend 
itself to an either an objective or comparative evaluation insofar as incubators and 
the practise of business incubation caters to so many varied regional 
specifications and needs; operate in different conditions and locations, have 
different aims, objectives, purposes and mandates, employ different approaches 
and operate different business models, notwithstanding significant variations in 
the nature and level of resources at their disposal. 
Moreover, because of the many different types of incubator and the 
extreme variations in their operating conditions and mandates (which are 
constantly evolving and morphing - in response to stakeholder and sponsor 
instructions, market, client and local needs (Kuratko and LaFollette, 1987), 
political directives, funding priorities, opportunities and/or fiscal pressures, and 
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the regional specificity associated with each incubator) there is no standard 
industry model although a number of incubator associations such as NBIA, EBN, 
UKBI have published best practice guides, benchmarking studies and manuals. 
The amorphousness of the model and the various difficulties in 
establishing a definition of the form has been likened by economic developers and 
incubator practitioners contacted in the course of this research as `trying to pin a 
jelly to a wall' while another, referring to the increasing differentiations of the 
form, commented on the `bastardisation of the whole idea' which, regardless of 
motivation or point of view is a reflection of the fact that the business incubator 
concept and or the incubation process is a form that is constantly evolving and 
adapting to local conditions, strategies and plans and/or to fulfil new and different 
expectations. Indeed, the very process of differentiation and addition has 
prompted a number of incubators and incubator associations to re-stake their 
claim as to the ownership of the incubator form and endeavour to establish a 
fixed, conceptual understanding and definition as to what an incubator is (and is 
not) - see Chapter 3. 
A review of the literature (academic and practitioner), reveals that much of 
the work undertaken concerned with this subject is descriptive and is dominated 
by considerations of operational issues affecting the management of incubation 
schemes (see for example the European Commission Enterprise Directorate 
General's `Benchmarking Business Incubators' Final Report (February 2002) and 
UKBI's National Incubator Study 2000/2001 (Phase Two) or is largely 
promotional (generated by the incubator community) which while informative 
and asserting positive effects, is not particularly instructive. There is very little in 
the way of, for example, investigations concerned with the nature and extent of 
qualitative and quantitative effects (aggregated or not); and relative or 
comparative assessments of incubator efficiency or returns on investment. 
As regards the former, it may be that the range and/or potential 
combinations of incubator activities and interventions, i. e. the scale and 
complexity involved in mapping and describing - never mind evaluating - the 
multiple dimensions and layers of incubator activity (including intangibles and the 
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full range of multi-faceted benefits and aggregated effects) has acted as something 
of a deterrent. As regards the latter, this might be naturally explained by the fact 
that there has been little appetite or incentive within incubator and 
stakeholder/sponsor communities to reduce the performance of incubators to such 
metrics and/or a tacit acceptance that the nature, range and complexity of 
incubator activities cannot be neatly separated or compartmentalised to support 
such calculations. It was also observed in the course of this research that 
incubators are not generally prepared to voluntarily submit or participate in 
studies (and even studies such as this) that may seek to reduce their operations to 
uniform metrics unless they can be satisfied that: 
  they would not subsequently fall victim to third party agendas or provide 
stakeholders, sponsors and third parties (especially those with little or no 
locus-standi but developing an interest in their activities) with a `stick to 
beat the them with'; and/or 
  such quantitative measures would/could be properly adjusted to account 
for qualitative factors and effects including local conditions, the scope and 
differentiation of objectives, focus and other situational variables. 
Furthermore, there are inherent difficulties in defining in precise terms - 
using either qualitative or quantitative indicators (and/or using combinations 
thereof) - incubator activities (inputs), their application and interpreting individual 
and/or aggregated effects (outputs). Indeed, even some of the most traditional and 
widely applied metrics in the evaluation of economic development and/or regional 
policy and the reporting of incubator performance and impact e. g. `cost/public 
subsidy' per `job/enterprise'; costs relative to improved business performance et 
at are beset with difficulties. For example, such methodologies and metrics do 
not account for the fact that the effects may have occurred with or without the 
intervention/support of the incubator (i. e. they largely presume attribution or 
causation) and rarely consider additionality or make adjustments for displacement 
or the actions of other actors in the innovation and business support system (those 
that do tend to make rather arbitrary assumptions as regards multipliers and or 
adjustments for indirect effects). 
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It is evident from discussions and interviews with incubator managers and 
staff (conducted at the EBN Congress (October 2001), and UKBI events (e. g. 
UKBI's 2001 National Conference `Incubating Future Growth: Applying business 
incubation processes to meet local, regional and national development goals' (12th 
of November), individual incubator events (e. g. NEBIC Spirit of Innovation 
Awards 2001-2004, meeting of Loughborough Enterprise Club (5`" of May 2005)) 
that perhaps now, more than ever before, there is a new climate in which business 
incubation is being delivered in which, increasingly, a `results oriented' approach 
to understanding incubator performance is beginning to evolve although a results 
orientation/reporting of sorts has existed as a condition of structural funds e. g. 
ERDF Objective 2 (see below) which is generally quantitative by nature. This 
relatively new orientation is attributed in the main to: 
1. A drive to better understand the business incubation phenomenon 
(particularly amongst stakeholders (economic development managers and 
agencies), academic researchers and practitioners, especially as regards the 
nature, scope and scale of incubator activity; and 
2. A change in the dynamics of stakeholder/sponsor/incubator relations: 
a. Increased desire to manage/co-ordinate incubators; 
b. An increased desire to validate the incubator modality and the 
increasing maturity of the industry; and 
c. Change in the level of interest and oversight exercised or sought by 
stakeholders and sponsors and moreover the personnel that 
represent them 
3. New conditions for incubator operations 
1. A drive to better understand the business incubation phenomenon 
A number of incubator owner managers have indicated, most notably, that 
in the last three to five years, business incubator operations, their activities, 
capability and capacity has increasingly become the subject of varying levels of 
enquiry and discussion (by academics, practitioners and stakeholders/sponsors 
throughout the US, Europe and Asia). For the last 25 years despite a somewhat 
limited understanding of the modality amongst economic developers (for 
example, pan-european, national and regional government) it has, nevertheless, 
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been promoted or otherwise fostered as almost an `article of faith' which some 
have queried as little more than a "fad" (Lavrow and Sample, 2000) or fashion 
and "much ado about nothing" (Hulsink and Elfring, 2001). 
Increased interest, debate and research has, however, continued to inform 
our knowledge (if not our understanding) of the incubator phenomenon and/or 
spawned a number of wide-ranging debates (often semantic - especially with 
reference as to what `is' and `is not' an incubator see also Chapter 3) and has 
considered for example: 
  What is an incubator? 
  How have/are incubators developed? 
Other research has considered in more detail, incubators operations: 
  What life cycle model(s) can be extracted from analysis of business 
incubators? 
  What are the critical success factors for incubators-incubation? 
  How does the incubator-incubation concept work in practice? 
  How do incubators select incubatees? 
  What is the process of new venture development in an incubator context? 
  What is the role of planning and the business incubator manager? 
  What is the significance of relationships and how do they influence 
entrepreneurship? 
  What factors (and combinations thereof) are critical to incubator success 
(e. g., settings, networks, founder characteristics, group membership) and 
the effectiveness of the incubation process? " 
  What constitutes a model for a virtual incubator? 
  Is the network the location of the incubation process? 
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The subject of practitioner, stakeholder/sponsor enquires, especially tends to 
relate to: 
  How the incubator works 
  What services does it provide 
  What services might it provide 
  With whom does the incubator work (within and outwith the 
region/locality) 
In general, incubator managers and stakeholders when questioned in 
connection with the increased interest in the management, operation and effects of 
incubators, offered a range of observations and explanations for the increased 
interest and scrutiny: 
 A general increased awareness of the business incubator modality (largely 
a consequence of increased adoption and adaptation) and 
perception/presumption that the incubator concept is a significant and 
successful modality which merits/commands attention. 
  Increased adoption of the model throughout regions, and around the globe, 
as an instrument of regional and local economic policy and/or as part of 
urban and rural regeneration strategies (US, Europe, Asia). Undeniably, 
the modality has achieved a level of prominence, almost as the 'langue de 
preference' of government and economic developers (though not always 
particularly well understood by those who deploy it) and continues to 
attract interest and financial support. For example, Germany has, as noted 
above, obtained EU Commission approval to subsidise business 
incubation and incubated firms directly while elsewhere in Europe 
business incubation is clearly key to government policies designed to 
support job and wealth creation, in enhancing and accelerating new firm 
growth and supporting the transfer of technology and knowledge out from, 
in particular, the university sector and the achievement of social over 
economic objectives. For example, a recent speech given by Lord 
Sainsbury (2003), which speaks of a `celebration' of the 'progress' of 
business incubation and articulates the `value' and `contribution' which 
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business incubation can bring to the 'economic and social objectives' of 
local and regional communities (and the belief that it does so, without 
detailed exposition); and a belief that 'incubation can play a critical role' 
in improving the rate of successful business formation. Lord Sainsbury 
also expresses the general policy consensus that incubation has a very 
important role to play in regional policy; knowledge transfer from 
universities into profitable, commercial applications; and that incubation 
may also focus on 'social rather than economic objectives' and that 
incubation may not always require physical assets (buildings). 
The view that incubators will continue to assume a greater role in 
economic development strategies and plans is reinforced by the fact, for example, 
in the UK there are a number of new national policy initiatives aimed at 
encouraging incubator development, i. e. the DTI's bio-incubator funds, two 
rounds of the Science Enterprise Challenge, the Regional Internet Incubator Loan 
Fund, Higher Education Innovation Fund which are augmented by regional 
resources (single programme and local authority funds). Furthermore, as is 
evident from profusion of incubator associations and government pronouncements 
throughout the world as to the importance of SMEs to social cohesion and 
economic prosperity (see Chapter 2) that the world stock of incubators, as part of 
SME policy, will continue to increase. 
The apparently unfettered rate of adoption of the modality has, however, 
prompted a number of practitioners and commentators to question whether 
incubators been built up (too far) into a policy panacea and an all a pervading 
solution to a range of social and economic problems (see below). In the course of 
interviews with business incubator managers, stakeholders and sponsors a great 
many interviewees acknowledged or stated such concerns and the implications 
this is having insofar as it deconstructs a conceptual understanding of the 
(original) nature and role of incubators (for good or ill). In any event, the level of 
addition and differentiation which some perceive as a negative and others more 
positively (though often with provisos attached e. g. provided there is clarity and 
mutual understanding as to the nature and level of activity incubators should 
undertake or are capable of) complicates the challenge for those who seek not 
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only to understand but also manage or co-ordinate the work of incubators as part 
of a collective incubator infrastructure. 
It was noted in the course of interviews with incubator managers that the 
number of new entrants adopting or adapting the model or seeking to do so 
(regional development agencies, local authorities, enterprise agencies, 
universities, colleges, the voluntary sector, etc) has prompted inquiries in to the 
nature of incubation (what it is and what it might/should be) within and outwith 
the industry. Further, as the incubator `industry' has evolved/matured to now 
absorb such significant resources and assume such a significant role in economic 
development policy this has prompted a concern (especially amongst those with 
responsibility for policy) to better understand the nature and number additions and 
relative levels of differentiation. The interviews undertaken in the course of this 
research with incubator managers and stakeholders gave no indication that this 
initial interest amounts to, or represents, a pre-cursor to a more interventionist 
approach or endeavour to co-ordinate and manage the deployment of the modality 
(i. e. `regulate', 'standardise' or `quality assure' the industry notwithstanding the 
work undertaken by UKBI, NBIA and EBN in the production of industry 
benchmarks), however there is a presumption almost unspoken (and quite 
possibly valid) that were they [incubators] better understood they might be better 
co-ordinated and/or influenced and/or supported to co-ordinate their actions and 
be programmed as part of a cohesive system or infrastructure; 
2. A change in the dynamics of stakeholder/sponsor/incubator relations 
prompted by: 
a) Increased desire to manage/co-ordinate incubators 
As explained by delegates at the EBN congress in Porto there is evidently 
increased desire to validate (and/or promote) the incubator modality (particularly, 
the BIC model); and an increasing desire amongst national and regional 
government agencies and local authorities/enterprise agencies and incubator 
funders to better manage or co-ordinate the work of incubators, an initiative the 
BICs and EBN are ideally placed to facilitate. 
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There is little to suggest however, that in the early days of business 
incubation that stakeholders and sponsors of business incubation (e. g. national or 
regional authorities) evolved detailed strategies and plans for the development of 
an integrated incubator infrastructure (the degree and extent to which integration 
can now be achieved is debateable - see below) or one that is as widely 
differentiated and operating on the scale now observed. Indeed, incubation has 
seemingly evolved organically, often introduced by stakeholders and sponsors 
following the observation of the modality elsewhere any which they have 
subsequently adopted and more usually adapted to accord with local conditions 
and priorities. 
The growth of incubators, which has occurred by both addition and 
differentiation, and at such a rate, has, as noted above, blurred to some extent 
understanding and made it difficult for those who might now be presumed, 
expected or wish to oversee, the development and operation of the business 
incubator infrastructure and/or exercise any degree of management or control. 
This is understandable given how incubation has evolved in the last 25 years, 
promoted and supported across the globe by multiple stakeholders and sponsors 
and with different ambitions, mandates and resources. The development and 
deployment of the modality has been anything but uniform and the incubator 
community is now populated by organisations with a range of business models, 
levels of institutional independence (legal, political and financial) and 
resources/support. 
However, while conditions (political commitment and funding) continue 
to foster additions and differentiation to meet multiple and complex needs, in 
diverse contexts, and for multiple stakeholders (e. g. Regional Development 
Agencies, Local Authorities, Universities, Colleges and Enterprises Agencies), at 
any one point in time it remains difficult to work out how many incubators there 
are and, moreover, the nature, scope and scale of incubator operations (see 
Chapter 3) to say nothing of their impact or added value. Moreover, the 
extraordinary rate of development has prompted commentators, economic 
developers (confronted by an unparalleled rate of diffusion and adaptations of the 
incubator concept) and members of the incubation community to question: 
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  Whether the rush to build incubator capacity is a fad/fashion or a reasoned 
and well-understood response to economic and business needs; 
  Whether the incubators within the region's business support 
infrastructure/forming part of the region's economic development policy 
compliment or duplicate each other with reference to the nature and level 
of services they provide, their territorial coverage, their relative expertise 
and competencies), and whether or not they are in competition with each 
other for the same clients or resources; 
  Whether incubators can justify their existence and are they (BICs) doing 
enough vis-ä-vis the nature and level of services they provide to say 
nothing of the manner in which they provide their services? 
  How incubators are being supported/should be supported (and indeed 
whether they merit support) and the degree and extent to which they 
are/can be/can/should be expected to be self-sustaining; and 
  The degree and extent to which we risk over-supply i. e. increased capacity 
without a concomitant increase in incubator capability or demand. The 
rate of addition and differentiation is perceived by some as being driven 
by economic developers who merely seek to mirror approaches, capability 
and capacity as observed in other regions and seek to ensure the 
development of an infrastructure with regional coverage but with only a 
limited concern (at this stage) as to the development of a cohesive system. 
The latter is a query increasingly expressed within the incubator 
community (by existing incubator operators (confronted by increased competition 
- especially for funding and influence), sponsors confronted by multiple and 
competing requests for support and investment) and outwith the incubator 
community, especially by those who dispute the political and financial rationales 
for the intervention and, for example, advocate alternative modalities and further 
differentiation in approaches. Indeed, these very concerns fuel opinions that 
incubators, as currently deployed, might be better and more systematically 
organised and operated as a collective. 
Notwithstanding the above, it was explained that in any event, the 
incubator community, in the main, is relatively devolved and federal by nature 
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and few, if any, stakeholders and sponsors are now in a position to fully 
understand and wield influence and authority over the whole (either nationally, 
regionally or locally). Indeed, those that would wish to do so are confronted by 
the fact that many (though certainly not all) of the first generation of incubators 
(established by one or multiple stakeholders and sponsors) have achieved 
longevity and with it a level of institutional and financial security and 
independence (legal) and autonomy so that they are not as dependent - as perhaps 
they once were - on the patronage of one or more stakeholder(s) or sponsor(s), 
and thus it is more difficult to compel them act in a certain manner or even co- 
ordinate their work in what is a `zero-sum game'. A number of BIC and other 
incubator managers were careful to emphasise that although in many respects `a 
zero sum game', many incubators naturally elect to co-operate with each other 
and that in fact these working alliances enable incubators to present their funding 
agencies with what they most want -a cohesive business support infrastructure 
and, in so doing, collectively preserve patronage (political and financial), i. e. the 
status quo. 
b) An increased desire to validate the incubator modality and an 
increased maturity within the industry 
Various studies conducted over the past two decades have sought to 
determine whether or not incubators are an effective economic development tool 
and/or a successful modality for the delivery of business support. Although this 
research into incubator success, impact and effects (largely economic) is limited, 
such work that has been undertaken has postulated that the modality is: 
  cost effective insofar as the average public sector cost per direct job as 
created by an incubator compares favourably with other programmes, 
initiatives and intervention (DiGiovanna and Lewis, 1998); 
  instrumental in assuring the sustainability of businesses assisted i. e. failure 
rates among incubated firms are lower than comparable non-incubated 
firms (Campbell et al., 1988; Allen and Bazan, 1990; Fry, 1987; Kuratko 
and LaFollette, 1987; Lumpkin and Ireland, 1988; Markley and 
McNamara, 1995; Rice, 2002; Udell, 1990); and 
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  instrumental in accelerating and developing growth insofar as incubated 
firms outperform `comparable' non-incubated firms in terms of growth of 
sales and employment (Allen and Bazan, 1990); and Culp, 1996). 
As with much of the existing such research that has been undertaken 
including the citations above, much has attracted a range of criticisms. For 
example, it is suggested that the majority of such work (academic and 
practitioner) is largely descriptive and fails to explore or acknowledge causality or 
explain the influence or role of local, regional and national dynamics including, 
for example: 
  The nature, diversity and density of industry (historical and current), 
  R&TD specialisations, 
  Existence and/or performance of knowledge and technology generators, 
specifically intellectual assets as originating in or supported by 
universities, research laboratories (private and public), 
  Indigenous physical assets (geography and demographics) and human 
capital (competencies and skills) 
  Other intermediaries 
  Culture 
  Investment capital 
  Government investment (pubic funded research) and purchasing (e. g. 
Defence Procurement) which supports industry growth, development and 
R&TD 
In addition, another criticism levelled at existing research is that while it is 
occasionally acknowledged albeit without detailed definition that incubators also 
generate intangible and indirect effects e. g. improve regional image and 
community confidence, provide a physical manifestation of national, regional and 
local political and financial commitments to regeneration, employment and 
enterprise, the research does little to integrate or evaluate these effects. 
Notwithstanding such shortcomings, stakeholders and sponsors are 
becoming increasingly "results-oriented" (there is evidence that there is a 
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realization within the incubator community that this is the case) and they and 
those to whom they are accountable must be satisfied that the modalities they 
employ to support economic development and regeneration are valid and cost- 
effective as they are increasingly required to give careful and detailed 
consideration of the economic rationale for (continued) public investment in 
incubation (and explain the same) and; more specifically, concerned and 
interested to determine: 
  What incubators achieve and whether incubators achieve what they (and 
their stakeholders) assert they do 
  How business incubation programme outcomes may be evaluated 
  Whether business incubators impacted new venture survival rates, job 
creation rates, industrial innovation rates; and 
  The economic and fiscal impacts of an incubator. 
It was explained by a BIC manager at the aforementioned EBN congress 
in Porto that this awareness and acknowledgement from within the industry 
reflects an increased maturity in the industry wherein incubator managers are 
acutely aware, now more than ever that not only must incubators be effective they 
must also be seen to be so (by the communities they serve and especially by those 
stakeholders and sponsors on whom they rely for patronage and funding) and thus 
incubators (BICs) must endeavour to engage stakeholders and sponsors and 
demonstrate how they add value in qualitative and quantitative terms (and with 
respect to other modalities/organisations that may be employed to achieve similar 
ends); an endeavour EBN and other incubator associations are keen to support. 
Indeed, this increasing maturity might also be illustrated with reference to the 
profusion of incubator associations: 
  ADT - Association of German Technology and Business Incubation 
Centres (Germany) 
  AIBI - Indonesia 
  AIPyPT - Association of business parks and incubators (Argentina) 
  AMIEPAT - Mexico 
  ANCES - Asociaciön Nacional de CEEI Espanoles (Spain) 
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  ANIDE - Columbia 
  ANPROTEC - Brazilian Association of Science Parks and Incubators 
  ANZABI - Australian & New Zealand Association of Business Incubation 
  APSTI - Associazione Parchi Scientifici e Tecnologici Italiani (Italy) 
  APTE - Spain 
  ASOPARTEC - Venezuala 
  ASPA - Asian Science Park Association (Japan) 
  AURP - Association of University Research Parks (USA) 
  BARDA - Bulgaria 
  BASTIC - Baltic Association of Science/Technology Parks and Innovation 
Centres 
  BIAA - Business Innovation & Incubation Australia Inc. 
  BIA Europe - Pan-european association 
  BICRO - Croatia 
  BSBI - Belarus 
  Canadian University and College Related Incubator 
  CABI - Canadian Association of Business Incubators 
  CASTIP - China 
  DAICED - Dutch Incubator Association (The Netherlands) 
  EBN - European Business and Innovation Centre (BIC) Network 
  ELAN - Reseau des dirigeants de Pepinieres d'Entreprises (France) 
  ESINET - European Space Incubator Network 
  FiN - Norway 
  FISPA - Finnish Science Park Association 
  France Incubation 
  FRBIC - Romania 
  FTEI - France Technopoles Entreprises Innovation 
  IAFIN - Finland 
  International Association of Science Parks 
  Israeli Technology Business Incubators - Israel 
  ISTEPA - India 
  JANBO - Japan Association of New Business Incubation Organization 
  KABIIC - Kazakhstan 
  KOBIA - Korea 
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  LATPCBI - Latvia 
  NBIA - National Business Incubation Association (USA) 
  PABIC - Portugal 
  PBICA - Polish Business And Innovation Centres Association 
  SABACRAC - Slovakia 
  SPAT - Taiwan 
  SSBDC - Slovenia 
  SVTP - Czech Republic 
  SVILUPPO - Italy 
  Swedepark - Swedish Science & Technology Parks 
  SWEDSPIN - Swedish incubators 
  SwissPark - Switzerland 
  Tecnoparques - Associacäo Portuguesa de Parques de Ciencia e 
Tecnologia (Portugal) 
  TECHNOPARK - Russia 
  TEKEL - Finland 
  TPIA - Technology Parks and Incubators Association (Australia) 
  UBICA - Ukraine 
  UKSPA - (The United Kingdom Science Park Association) 
  ULBC - Lithuania 
  UNIDO -United Nations Industrial Development Organization 
  UKBI - UK Business Incubation 
  VISZ - Hungary 
  VTÖ - Verband der Technologiezentren Österreichs (Austria) 
The development and application of technical tools, the adoption of 
quality procedures and standards (ISO, ENV 14000, IiP), and the development of 
industry standards and best practice (e. g. the European Commission Enterprise 
Directorate General's `Benchmarking Business Incubators Final Report' (2002); 
EBN's 'VADE-MECUM for Business and Innovation Centres -A good practice 
manual for the management of Business & Innovation Centres', UKBI's 
'Identifying Best Practice: The UKBI National Incubator Study 2000/2001 Full 
Report' , NBIA's, `Best Practices in Action: Guidelines for Implementing First- 
Class Business Incubation Programs'; and the Local Government Association's 
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`Managed Workspace and Business Incubators A Good Practice Guide for Local 
Authorities'(undated) to mention but a few). Further, in the UK a benchmarking 
and standards project has recently been completed by the incubator community 
(led by UKBI and the national standards setting body, Small Firms Enterprise 
Development Initiative and supported by the Small Business Service, Scottish 
Enterprise, the Welsh Development Agency and Invest Northern Ireland to 
produce `Quality Benchmarks for Business Incubators' (see below). 
c) Change in the level of and/or a maturing interest and oversight 
exercised or sought by stakeholders and sponsors 
Whereas previously stakeholders and sponsors have had what has been 
described as little more than a `passing interest' in incubators/incubation and have 
been satisfied with reported headline results as validation of the modality, there is 
a sense that this is about to change/already changing. Evidently, stakeholders and 
sponsors are now increasingly keen not only to develop a more coherent 
understanding of incubator infrastructure `as is' but also strategies and plans for 
its development and - by implication - the resourcing thereof. As noted above, 
One North East recently commissioned NEBIC to map regional assets i. e. 
business incubators (capability and capacity) to support innovation. The 
'Innovation Mapping Exercise' has provided the agency with an overview of 
business support services within the region concerned with: 
Intellectual Property 
  The Generation of New Ideas (e. g. products, services, software, 
technologies, etc; 
  Conceptualising ideas/concepts for public consumption i. e. from "back of 
fag packet" through to production of professional concept drawings; 
  IPR searches (patent, trademark, design registrations); 
  Protection (preparing the idea/concept for registration with Patents 
Office); 
  Subsidies (financial support towards the cost of gaining full IPR); and 
  Action planning (preparing action list for implementation). 
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Design & Development 
  Technical Feasibility (i. e. can it be done); 
  Product Design (preparation of professional designs, detail drawings, 
visualisations etc of the idea/concept; 
  Prototype development (building functioning prototypes); 
  Product testing (materials testing, accelerated life testing, etc); 
  Design for Manufacture and large scale production (I, e. component 
design, assembly, capacity planning, supplier lists, factory layout, etc); 
  Financial viability (provision of full financial forecasts e. g. cash-flow, 
P&L, sales projections, etc; 
  Funding (grants, loans or equity funds); and 
  Government finance (assistance in the grant application process). 
Market Research 
  Market research on behalf of client; 
  Market testing on behalf of client; 
  Marketing strategies (preparation of action plans to take product to 
market); and 
  Market launch activities (PR, advertising campaigns, full market 
launches). 
The fact that this and comparable work (e. g. the `Innovation and 
Incubation Centre Survey (Innovation Centre Manifesto) carried out for the 
Alliance Strategic Sub-regional Partnership and the Greater Nottingham 
Partnership' in May 2005) is now being commissioned by stakeholders and 
sponsors illustrates not only: 
(a) the evident heightened interest in the modality but also; 
(b) the fact that national, regional and local authorities (certainly in the UK) 
have been relatively divorced from practitioner activities and are 
possessed of only a very limited understanding of the operations and 
practices -a failing which they now seek to correct; and 
(c) the fact that authorities are now beginning to consider/reconsider the 
nature and level of their approach to business incubation i. e. they may no 
longer be content (given increasing fiscal pressures i. e. new conditions) to 
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allow or support incubators operating in anything other than part of a 
coherent collective. 
3. New conditions for incubator operations 
In the course of this research, a change in the dynamics of the relationship 
between incubators and stakeholders/sponsors (and specifically, their 
representative(s)) has also been observed, prompted, in part, by a change in the 
conditions in which incubators are now launched and required to operate. 
A number of BIC managers who might be described as first generation 
incubator managers were at pains to point out that many of the first generation of 
incubator managers possessed unparalleled experience and authority derived from 
their role, as part of the first wave of incubators, leading stakeholder/sponsor 
forays into the world of incubation building local/regional capability, capacity, 
networks (political, technical, etc) and were able to lever financial support on this 
basis. At the forefront of incubation in their locality, providing a pragmatic `on 
the ground' lead in the development of stakeholder/sponsor policies (e. g. regional 
economic development and business support), this generation of incubator 
managers seemingly enjoyed a unique position insofar as they were able to 
develop the modality and attract support and investment in the modality by virtue 
of the fact that they led and operated flagship, high-profile projects with which a 
range of local, regional and national sponsors wished to be associated/affiliated. 
It has been suggested however, in the course of this research, that many (first 
generation) incubator managers and their incubators are less able than they were 
before to automatically command support (political and financial) as a 
consequence of: 
(a) the rate of addition which may dilute their pre-eminent position and the 
funding available, 
(b) differentiations in the additions (which may attract funding by virtue of 
their novelty and the fact that they extend (coverage), and 
(c) other `heavyweight' stakeholders developing their own incubator 
strategies and plans e. g. universities. 
274 
In addition, it has been observed that many of the first generation 
incubator managers were themselves highly entrepreneurial. Evidently this was/is 
considered a pre-requisite by the European Commission in the appointment of a 
BIC CEO1), and attracted support and fostered confidence in the modality by the 
force of their personalities (many possessed a credibility that went with previous 
commercial success) which was instrumental in the development of high quality 
trust relationships, political and institutional and financial support. Furthermore, 
many of the first wave of incubator managers were, it is reported, personally well- 
acquainted with their counterparts in sponsor and stakeholder organisations and 
their credibility and/or ability to influence and persuade stakeholders and sponsors 
to support their schemes was significant. 
There is also a perception that the conditions for funding in which the first 
generation of incubators operated were less onerous (there is a sense that there 
was more money/aid available and that the basis and competition for funding was 
less rigorous (there was competition between different approaches but not as 
much as between incubators). Evidently, the most savvy incubator managers 
levered funding from multiple sources to whom they offered a range of 
interventions (this remains the challenge for incubator managers (old and new) 
and explains in part the level and nature of differentiation). Further, it was 
candidly acknowledged by a `first-wave' BIC manager that as regards the first 
wave of incubators, stakeholders and sponsors were assured (relatively easily) of 
outcomes in the first instance to which they could point that included: 
  the remediation and utility of brown-field sites, 
  the creation of landmark buildings, 
  the revitalisation of the built landscape, 
 a physical demonstration of (and focal point for) policy, 
  occupancy and tenant incomes (i. e. the application of entry criteria could 
be balanced against ensuring the sustainability of the site and in any event 
1 GUIDE DES CENTRES EUROPEENS D'ENTREPRISE ET D'INNOVATION (CEEI), Fiche 
4. C 'Recrutement Du Directeur D'un CEEI' retrieved from EU Commissio website : 
http: //europa. eu. int/comm/regional_policy/innovation/innovating/pdf/fiche4c. pdf on 06.06.04 
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existing businesses with a capacity to pay were attracted by the incubator 
package which was not necessarily confined to start-ups). 
Evidently, stakeholders and sponsors could take comfort from the fact that 
this and potentially more could be achieved at a cost that could be shared between 
regional and local communities of interest (and, perhaps more significantly, could 
be subsidised with EU Structural Funds). This still remains the case, in part, as 
incubators are presented as a tried and tested approach to regenerating/developing 
sites that at worst become self-sustaining and at best produce a financial return on 
the capital investment. However, new approaches to regeneration are attracting 
political support and new alternative uses for derelict sites and industrial 
land/buildings that are perhaps more social than economic in orientation and 
include in their number, for example, cultural developments (e. g. galleries) 
environmental remediation and restoration of green spaces, etc 
However, it also emerged in the course of interviews conducted with 
incubator managers that there is a sense that business of incubation is increasingly 
executed in a different environment. The rate of additions has increased the 
general stock of incubators and has eroded, in part, the pre-eminent position 
previously enjoyed by the first wave of incubators and the influence they (and 
individual or pre-eminent incubator managers) have enjoyed. This is not to say 
that stakeholder relations, and the ability of incubator managers to lever support 
from stakeholders and sponsors is any less vital, it is merely an acknowledgment 
that, increasingly, stakeholders and sponsors have their own vision, expectations 
and targets for the development of incubators and take a more active role in 
specifying the scope, nature and level of operations that must be delivered as a 
condition of their support and that they may be more demanding insofar as they 
wish to see collectivism, networking and engagement across the 
stakeholder/business intermediary spectrum. In addition, new entrants continue to 
dilute the level of financial support as may be levered from sponsors and other 
stakeholders. Concurrently, stakeholders and sponsors are increasingly compelled 
to develop their own policies, strategies and funding priorities to support how 
they allocate funds to support incubation and specific incubators. 
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In the UK and Western Europe, however, much of the funding which these 
incubators have relied upon and/or enjoyed to establish and support incubator 
operations including capital expenditure (set-up costs and or expansion, 
remediation of industrial sites, building, refurbishment of existing buildings, 
infrastructure - installation of information and communications technology and 
services, etc) and revenue costs (delivery of services, staff salaries, business 
support initiatives, etc) - particularly in Less-Favoured Regions of Europe (ERDF 
& ESF) - is on the wane. Enlargement of the EU will prompt a significant 
readjustment of those EU funds utilized to address the socio-economic disparities 
between regions of the EU and support economic regeneration. This will 
doubtless prompt a scramble for such funding as there is/remains and much 
politicking by incubators to position themselves for the funding which may or 
may not replace it (in the UK, Government funding distributed to regional 
agencies is the most likely substitute, however, many incubators already lever 
funds from this source already and/or supply services to these agencies). A great 
many incubators that have historically relied upon structural fund programmes to 
cover or part subsidise their operating costs are seemingly in for `a hard-landing'. 
Thus stakeholders and sponsors of business incubators will be increasingly 
required (as the competition for their resources and potential to invest in 
incubators intensifies for their finite resources) to determine and distinguish 
between those incubators they will and will not support. It was explained by 
several incubator stakeholders interviewed that regional and local authorities and 
partnerships are now increasingly concerned to establish, for example: 
  `Where should public investment be targeted in the future to support the 
development of incubation, business innovation centres and managed 
workspace? ' a question which is part of a long standing debate as regards 
where investment should take place i. e. should investment be focused in 
areas that have the strength to capitalise on relatively larger economic 
multipliers, thus giving a greater return to public investment (see also 
Calzonatti and Gatrell, 2000) or, alternatively, knowing the difficulties, 
should investments be made in more rural areas seeking long-term returns 
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and increased diversification of economic activities in a rural location? ); 
and 
  Is there a clear need for integrating the existing and planned business 
centres and creating a network to support innovative business? and "Is 
there a need for an accommodation strategy to ensure that investment 
dedicated to creating an environment to promote innovative businesses is 
sustainable? " i. e. there is increased pressured to achieve a level of co- 
ordination and cohesion given fiscal pressures (e. g. withdrawl of structural 
funds and competition for existing funds as between increasing numbers 
of incubators (to support their capital and operating requirements) and the 
numerous programmes, initiatives, and services which they aim to deliver 
for which they frequently seek financial (public) support. 
The increased fiscal pressure in the UK and elsewhere in Western Europe, 
is evidently mirrored in the US where it is reported that federal and local fiscal 
pressures are impacting the resourcing of the incubator infrastructure. Dinah 
Adkins, President and Chief Executive Officer of the National Business 
Incubation Association recently commented that while incubators are common 
throughout the United States, NBIA has observed that investments budgets for 
incubator support are being cut throughout the country, "Every time the economy 
goes down, so does funding for all sorts of programs.. .A couple of years ago, 
many states were in massive deficits, and they used everything they had saved. 
Now we're seeing budget cuts ... I think it's extremely 
important for incubators to 
recognize that the nature of the beast is that these public funding sources available 
in good times tend to dissipate in bad times... Incubators need to operate as much 
"2 as possible in a business-like fashion. 
By way of illustration, it is further reported in Maine's local press, in the 
US State of Portland, which has - since 2000 - invested $7.7 million in seven 
incubators ($6.5 million on the acquisition and fitting out and $340,000 in 
management grants averaging about $48,500 a centre per annum), fiscal pressures 
have prompted the Department of Economic and Community Development to 
2 Wickenheiser, M. (2005) `Budget cuts clouding outlook for incubators', Portland Press Herald 
February 27, retrieved from website: http: //business. mainetoday. com/news/050227incubators. shtml 
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reduce the level of support for the incubator infrastructure, announcing budgetary 
cuts of approximately 25% and a review of incubator performance. 
In an interview with the Portland Press Herald, the Director of the state's 
Office of Innovation with responsibility for overseeing the incubator system Janet 
Yancey-Wrona revealed that "The state is evaluating whether or not they've been 
good investments... The original intent (was to provide) millions of dollars for 
bricks and mortar, and then small management grants each year to help with 
operations, but they should be moving toward figuring out how to support 
themselves". 
The article is worthy of note insofar as it reveals that just as in Europe 
where incubators have historically attracted significant funds, almost as an article 
of faith, stakeholders and sponsors are now looking to evaluate the 'return' on 
their investment. This apparent fracture in the relationship between incubators 
and their sponsors (i. e. a change in the nature and level of sponsor expectations 
and the way in which they exercise their interest) has prompted a range of 
reactions from within the incubator community there which reveal a number of 
reservations as to the nature of incubator evaluation and the metrics that might be 
imposed to assess their impact and the term over which such evaluations and 
assessments are made3: 
  "There should be evaluations of the centres but there should be flexibility 
in the comparisons, taking into account the locations of each and the needs 
of the region" - Debbie Neuman, Director of the Target Technology 
Centre in Orono. 
  Any evaluation should go beyond a basic count of tenants and how many 
companies "graduated" successfully out of the incubator... This is the go- 
to place, if you're talking about economic development, business 
development, work force development. We see ourselves as a community 
resource. " - Norm Maclntyre, Head of the Rumford Centre. 
3 Wickenheiser, M. (2005) 'Budget cuts clouding outlook for incubators', Portland Press Herald 
February 27, retrieved from website: http: //business. mainetoday. com/news/050227incubators. shtml 
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  "I don't think that we're doing a very good job supporting these 
incubators... we're not being very patient... Building an (research-and- 
development) economy isn't an instant result. It takes years. I'm 
disappointed, to be honest with you. " - Paul Tessier President and Chief 
Executive Officer of the International Northeast Biotech Corridor, a non- 
profit economic-development organization and tenant of the Fairfield 
Centre". 
5.3 The `Added Value' of Incubators: Rationale 
Against this backdrop, business incubators seek to add value by offering 
clients a combination of facilities and services that cannot be so easily obtained 
from other sources. The nature of these services and the way in which they are 
delivered, as noted by the European Commission in the `Benchmarking of 
Business Incubators Final Report' (2002) will usually have an important influence 
on the success of incubator tenants and hence the performance of the incubator 
(p. 48). The type and the range of support services provided by an incubator is 
believed to vary depending on the type of incubator and the objectives of the 
investors financing it (p. 49). 
As illustrated above, incubators have been established throughout the 
world by a multitude of stakeholders and sponsors on the basis of multiple social, 
economic and cultural rationales. This physical manifestation of policy and 
evidence of expenditure is an incredibly powerful symbol (and now almost a 
signature) of economic, cultural and regeneration strategies the world over and the 
way in which regional and local authorities seek to support and add value in the 
development of the indigenous SME sector. Indeed, as reported by Allen and 
Bazan (1990), there is some evidence that business incubation may help 
regenerate public confidence in the face of the loss of a major employer and 
overall decline. 
As investigated below, local and regional tiers of government concerned 
with economic development and regeneration have turned to business incubation 
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as a means of achieving a wide range of national, regional and local socio- 
economic objectives. Fundamental to the development and diffusion of business 
incubators/business incubation and the fact that they are now apparently integral 
to economic development and regeneration strategies are the contributions SMEs 
make to a region's entrepreneurial culture (Chinitz, 1961) and, more particularly 
their contributions to innovation and fostering economic growth (Birch, 1987, 
DiGiovanna and Lewis 1998; Shahidi 1998; Smilor and Gill 1986; and Tornatzky 
et al. 1996). In addition, it is postulated that SMEs and the nature (product and/or 
process), level (radicalness/novelty) and number of innovations for which they are 
responsible supports the creation of new industrial agglomerations, cluster and 
regional comparative advantages which in turn support wealth creation in the host 
region (Weber 1929; Markusen 1987, Marshall 1987 - see Chapter 2 above). 
In theory business incubation is rooted, according to Hackett and Dilts 
(2004), in the belief and expectation that incubators will result in more business 
start ups with fewer business failures (see also Fry, 1987; Kuratko and LaFollette, 
1987; Lumpkin and Ireland, 1988; Markley and McNamara, 1995; Rice, 1992; 
Udell, 1990). In Europe, for example, the role of incubators in the promotion of 
entrepreneurship, employment and economic growth is widely acknowledged 
with the 2000-06 Structural Fund guidelines highlighting business incubators as a 
key instrument of EU regional policy. However, given the rate of adoption and 
the level of adaptation and differentiation between incubator rationales, there are 
naturally implications for how incubators are tasked by stakeholders and 
sponsors, resourced and ultimately judged. As noted by Allen and McCluskey 
(1990) "Different resources, needs, constraints, opportunities affect incubator 
missions, policy, services and performance". As illustrated below by Lalkaka 
(2001) depending on sponsor goals the nature and level of an incubator's 
endeavour and contribution will be varied: 
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Table 5.1: Variation in Incubator Sponsor Goals 
Sponsor Desired Goals 
Technical University Innovation, faculty/graduate student involvement 
Research Institute Research commercialisation 
Public/private partnership Investment, employment, other social goods 
State sponsorship Regional development, poverty alleviation, equity 
Venture capital-based Winning enterprises, high portfolio returns 
Furthermore, the stated objectives of an incubator may not fully reflect the nature 
and level of activities. 
While Lalkaka's summary (above) has merit, a more detailed review of 
incubator rationales, mission statements and activity reports and those of 
incubator associations (e. g. UKSPA4, UKBI5, EBNE, NBIA7, UN8, SPICE9 & 
AABI10) reveals that incubator missions are not so readily condensed or neatly 
categorised as they are generally concerned to `add value' or `impact' local and 
regional economies in a myriad of areas as illustrated below: 
5.3.1 Business Incubator Added Value: Objects 
  National, regional and local economic development 
4 United Kingdom Science Park Association (UKSPA) http: //www. ukspa. org. uk/ 5 United Kingdom Business Incubation (UKBI) http: //www. ukbi. co. uk/ 6 European Business Innovation Centre Network (EBN) 
http: //www. ebn. be/content/default. asp? PageID=1 &MenuGroup=1 &MenuNum=1 7 National Business Incubation Association http: //www. nbia. org/ 8 United Nations Publication, Chapter 7 Strengths And Weaknesses Of Business Incubators, Sales 
No. E. 01. II. E. 9, ISBN 92-1-116777-9, page 73 9 Science Park and Innovation Centre Experts http: //www. spicegroup. de/ 10 Asian Association of Business Incubation http: //www. aabi. info/aabi_incu/index. html 
282 
  Enhancing industrial competitiveness and profitability 
  Building or accelerating growth of a local industry/sector(s) 
  Wealth creation and concomitant increase in tax revenues 
  Remediation and re-use of industrial (derelict) sites and real estate 
development 
  Re-use of redundant (landmark) buildings 
  Rural/Urban industrial regeneration, restructuring or development 
  Revitalising distressed neighbourhoods 
  SME creation and development (and improved rates thereof) 
  Retaining businesses in the local economy 
  Technology development and transfer 
  Innovation and commercialisation of technology 
  Supporting the innovation process 
  Combating Unemployment 
  Employment creation (and safeguarding employment) 
  Graduate retention (and/or retention of skilled personnel) 
  Providing a supportive environment for entrepreneurs 
  Stimulating, mobilising and assisting entrepreneurship 
  Enhancing a communities entrepreneurial climate and the value it 
attributes to entrepreneurship and innovation 
  Increased community pride and self-esteem 
  Cultural change (Creativity) including entrepreneurship and innovation 
  Community development/Empowering disadvantaged communities to 
develop social enterprises 
  Assisting socially disadvantaged groups - such as youth and minorities -, 
promote niche sectors including music and the arts 
  Identifying and supporting spin-in and spin-out business opportunities 
  Supporting academic, student/graduate entrepreneurship 
  Supporting and promoting the commercialisation of university research 
and strengthening interactions between university-research-industry, 
  Provision of Education and Training 
  Research, teaching and learning 
  Facilitating institutional linkages (Business-education, Business-Science, 
Innovation and Research) 
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  Upgrading the indigenous research base and the technological standing of 
firms in a given locality 
  Expanding and/or co-ordinating the supply of business support services 
  Generating Net Income for the Incubator or sponsoring organisation(s), 
founders and investors 
  Supporting indigenous businesses to access finance (including grants) and 
attract investment including FDI and joint venturing opportunities 
  Supporting cluster strategies and plans 
  Enhancing vertical and horizontal linkages (within and outwith supply 
chains), particularly collaboration between large and small firms; 
  Promoting national/regional technology, products and services; 
  Retaining businesses in the local economy; and 
  Attracting businesses to the local economy and supporting inward 
investment strategies/initiatives. 
5.3.2 The `Added Value' of Incubators: Focus 
In general terms, the majority of `first generation' incubators while 
focusing on a variety of technologies and combination of light industrial, 
technology and service firms tend to be what are generally referred to as `mixed- 
use' incubators. Subsequently, incubators have emerged targeting particular 
industries or sectors such as Food Processing, Aeronautics and Space, Ceramics, 
Arts and Crafts, Life Sciences, Genomics, Bioscience/Biotechnology, 
Nanotechnology, Telecommunications, and Defence related industries. Incubator 
sponsors have also developed and targeted the modality (and/or via new 
programmes delivered from the existing incubator stock) to support micro- 
enterprise creation, business creation by women, ethnic minorities, rural and other 
peripheral communities, and new and emerging technologies. In the US, for 
example, according to NBIA11 47% of incubators might be described as `mixed 
use'; 37% as specializing in [a] technology; 7% as concerned with manufacturing, 
6% as concerned with service businesses and 3% are reported to concentrate on 
community-revitalization projects or serve niche markets. In the EU the profile of 
11 National Business Incubation Association www. nbia. org/resource _center/what_is/index. 
php 
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incubation which has been the subject of an EU Commission study, is illustrated 
as follows: 
Table 5.2: Profile of EU Incubator Activities12 
Business Activities Number % 
(1) Sales, marketing and distribution 5 0.4 
(2) Business and financial services 8 0.6 
(3) Advanced/High tech manufacturing 263 18.6 
(4) Information & Communication Technologies 258 18.2 
(5) Research & Development 173 12.2 
(6) Biotechnology/Pharmaceuticals 201 14.2 
(7) Knowledge-based industries / New economy companies 162 11.5 
(8) Other Manufacturing Activities 86 6.1 
(9) Other Service Activities 124 8.8 
(10) A combination of some / all of these activities 134 9.5 
In addition, it is evident that in Europe, the US and Asia a number of other 
sectors, industries (and socio-political priorities) are increasingly entering the 
incubator mix and becoming an integral element of incubator operations. Just as 
ICT became significant in economic terms, especially in the late 90s at the height 
of the dot. com boom wherein a great many new and existing incubators oriented 
services and facilities (and/or developed new facilities) to support and add value 
to ICT start-ups13, now a number of additional sectors or industries are attracting 
interest from within the incubator community as it seeks to diversify its portfolio 
of interests, services and revenues (Public and Private) and from outwith the 
12 Source: European Commission Enterprise Directorate General, 2002, Benchmarking of 
Business Incubators Final Report Table 3: What sort of business activities does your business 
incubator specialise in? Centre for Strategy and Evaluation Services, p. 15. 13 As noted above, the rush to provide incubator support for ICT businesses was largely prompted, 
in the UK, by stakeholders (regional and local authorities) who as part of their regional economic 
development strategies sought to engineer ICT clusters, (and provided funding to incubators to 
further this pursuit (capital and revenue)) and irrespective of regional endowments/potentialities. It 
has been suggested in the course of this research that a 'lemming-like' pursuit of strategies to 
develop an indigenous ICT sector/clusters and a misplaced confidence and/or expectation as 
regards the likely rate of return on investment (which at the height of the dot. com prompted a 
number of incubators to take equity in tenant businesses as opposed to rental income) may account 
for a number of incubator failures in the UK. For example, it has been suggested that just as 
investors in dot. com businesses got their fingers burned by a natural correction in the market so too 
did a number of incubators. 
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incubator community as national, regional, local authorities seek to extend their 
incubators' brief. 
For example, and not surprisingly given the political and world context, 
the US has recently opened its first incubator/accelerator to support and add value 
to `Homeland Security' industries. Chesapeake Innovation Centre (CIC), in 
Maryland has been established with funding from the US National Security 
Agency (NSA)/Central Security Service 14. The nature and level of activity 
programmed for CIC clearly reflects the interest of the sponsor as it seeks to 
develop partnerships with federal agencies, universities, and LSEs as it seeks to 
develop new companies in the homeland security/defense, communications and 
information technology sectors. Aside from the more unusual focus, services 
included in the tenancies are akin to those generally found in incubators and 
comprise Coaching and Mentoring; Investor Preparation and Networking, Access 
to the incubators Resource Network, Entrepreneur Education and Peer-to-Peer 
Programmes. Similarly, the incubator features industrial partners (e. g. Northrop 
Grumman Corporation); educational partners (Johns Hopkins University; 
University of Maryland; and Anne Arundel Community College) and a number of 
corporate (cash and `in kind' sponsors). 
Elsewhere, in the UK for example, the North East of England's Regional 
Development Agency has programmed (with some of the residue of European 
Structural Funds (Measure 2.4, ERDF Capital & Revenue) the development of a 
number of technology incubators as part of the regional economic strategy and in 
collaboration with the UK Science and Industry Council. The technology 
incubators specifically include the New and renewable energy Centre of 
Excellence (NaREC); a Centre of Excellence for Nanotechnology (Cenamps); a 
Centre of Excellence for Life Sciences/Bioscience (CELS); a Centre of 
Excellence for Digital Technologies and Media (Codeworks); and the Centre for 
Process Innovation (CPI). 
14 The NSA "coordinates, directs, and performs highly specialized activities to protect U. S. 
government information systems and produce foreign signals intelligence information. A high 
technology organization, NSA is on the frontiers of communications and data processing. It is also 
one of the most important centres of foreign language analysis and research within the government" 
http: //www. nsa. gov/about/ 
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CENAMPs, for example, has been established as a technology incubator 
(housed within a `traditional' incubator (the ATMEL incubator at the Silverlink 
business park also part-funded by One NorthEast)) by the Regional Development 
Agency in partnership with the the Institute of Nanotechnology, Universities of 
Durham, Newcastle, Teesside, Sunderland and Northumbria, 
NanoMicroClub. com, ICI, Filtronic, ATMEL, Proctor and Gamble, Epigem, 
Azonano. com, and the Department for Trade and Industry (and the New and 
Renewable Energy Centre, Centre of Excellence for Life Sciences, the Centre for 
Process Innovation, Centre of Digital Excellence). The incubator is tasked with 
supporting and adding value to businesses throughout the region and in multiple 
sectors that include: Aerospace, Automotive, Biosciences, Chemicals, Computing, 
Cosmetics, Defence, Displays, Energy, Entertainment, Environment, Fashion, 
Materials, Textiles, Medical, Retail, Semi-conductor, Telecoms, and Transport. 
The incubator which provides a range of `high-added value' business 
support services that include facilitating access to public and private investment 
sources, state-of-the-art incubation facilities, technologists and international 
networks provides support for research and development; accelerating technology 
commercialisation; early stage investment; infrastructure development; and 
provision of knowledge management services to entrepreneurs, researchers, 
investors and established companies. Other, services include: brokering venture 
capital access; provision of business/market intelligence; project appraisal; 
business planning and incubation; business driven research and development; idea 
generation and marketing testing; product design and prototyping; product testing 
and acceptance; high-tech manufacturing facilities; value chain design and 
integration; IP planning and exploitation; training and knowledge development; 
and technology and project consultancy. 
During a visit to the Centre of Excellence for Nanotechnology15, it 
emerged that the ATMEL incubator in which CENAMPS is situated, is apparently 
little more than managed work-space, albeit comprising state of the art 
accommodation, security and ICT infrastructure and in a prime location (and 
housed in the building which was formerly built by Siemens to accommodate part 
15 Visited on 16.08.05 
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of its semi-conductor business - the aforementioned ill-fated inward investment 
project). However, of the other incubation services that might be expected at first 
sight of the ATMEL incubator, many of the high value functions (see below) are 
absent. Indeed, it appears that this incubator like many of the original incubators 
in the US was established simply to develop a use for underutilized and thus 
unproductive (in revenue terms) business premises. 
Incubators have also been developed and are being deployed to support 
and bring additional value to regeneration and cultural strategies. For example in 
the UK, MusicBias, an incubator dedicated to increasing economic growth in 
Merseyside's music and related industries, particularly for people from groups or 
communities under-represented in business operates programmes targeting, for 
example, under 18s in Liverpool & Merseyside to raise awareness of `benefits and 
opportunities of self-employment and entrepreneurship in the music sector; and, 
to provide high quality opportunities for under 18s in Liverpool & Merseyside to 
progress towards education & training, employment, and venture creation in the 
music sector'. 
Incubators are also being developed specifically to support the 
development of community/social enterprise. For example, MusicBias includes a 
`Social Enterprise Accelerator' designed to "support the development of music 
and arts-based ventures with the potential to have a far-reaching social impact, 
particularly among individuals from disadvantaged backgrounds and 
underrepresented groups". Services include assistance to: develop and refine the 
business activities; raise finance; bid for contracts; support and improve project 
management and administration systems; and achieve growth and long-term 
sustainability. The incubator also offers social enterprises free phone usage, 
broadband access, fax machines and mailbox service in a Hot-Desk Office 
environment, as well as IT training and facilities. 
Elsewhere, in Scotland for example, the Greater Easterhouse Development 
Company (GEDC) one of 8 local development companies (formed in 1991) to 
promote the regeneration of Glasgow most deprived areas has established a Social 
Economy Team which since 2003 is reported to have provided support and 
288 
assistance to over 40 community and voluntary organisations (e. g. co-operatives, 
community and social enterprises). With a remit to support the development and 
sustainability of social economy organisations the incubator provides a range of 
specialist services that include: Organisational Reviews and Business Planning; 
Health and Transport Programmes; Sourcing and Applying for Funding; 
Research; Business Planning and organisational reviews; Access to Quality 
Standard e. g. Investors in People; Development and planning of community 
initiatives; Business Skills Training for the Social Economy; Management of the 
Greater Easterhouse Key Fund. 
Incubators specialising in social enterprise may also be found, for 
example, in the US e. g. Social Fusion i n San Francisco, Social Enterprises 
Partnership (Melbourne, Australia), Kent Co-operative Development Agency 
(Kent CDA, England). As may also be observed from the BIC case studies 
(Chapter 4), a number of BICs are home to a number of charities and social 
enterprises. 
5.3.3 The `Added Value' of Incubators: Services 
According to Lalkaka, and considering the model business incubator 
"Counselling, skills development, provision of workspace and networking 
(internally between tenants and externally with other organizations, e. g. 
universities, large companies) constitute basic features of the `package' of 
services" as provided by incubators. Furthermore, Lalkaka postulates that 
"assistance is for a limited duration with exit criteria typically specifying that 
firms should `graduate' (e. g. in say three years)". Research conducted by the 
European Commission's Enterprise Directorate General which has endeavoured 
to establish benchmarks for the industry found a range of exit criteria: 
289 
Table 5.3: EU Average Length of Incubator Tenancies16 
What is the maximum length of time tenants can occupy incubator units? 
Time Period Number Percentage 
No maximum tenancy 6 7.7 
Less than 1 year 5 6.4 
1-2 years 10 12.8 
2-3 years 22 28.2 
3-4 years 13 16.7 
4-5 years 9 11.5 
Over 5 years 7 9.0 
No response/don't know 17 21.8 
Total 78 100 
However, as observed from a review of a sample of incubators operating 
in the East Midlands, evidently 19 of the 31 do not operate an exit policy and thus 
it might be surmised that the notion of business support for a limited duration `is a 
custom more honoured in the breach than in the observance'17: 
Table 5.4: East Midlands Incubator Sample, Exit Criteria' 8 
Facility Exit Criteria 
1. The Bearings No 
2. Boughton Pumping Station No 
3. Chadbum House No, 
4. Coney Green Business Centre No 
5. Dunston Innovation centre Yes 
6. Edwinstowe House No 
7. Mansfield Business centre No 
8. Mansfield I centre Yes 
16 European Commission Enterprise Directorate General, 2002, Benchmarking of Business 
Incubators Final Report, Centre for Strategy and Evaluation Services, Appendix, Table 36 
17 Shakespeare, W., Hamlet Act I, Scene IV 
18 Source: Alliance SSP Strategic Partnership and independently confirmed by telephone interviews 
conducted with incubator managers and staff on 28.04.05 
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9. Markham Environmental Technology Centre Yes 
10. Pleasley Vale Bussiness Park No 
11. Ransonwood Business Park No 
12. E- Centre, Sherwood Energy Village No 
13. Tapton Innovation Centre Yes 
14. Westthorpe Innovation Centre No 
15. Turbine Yes 
16. Bio City No 
17. Blue Coat Incubation Centre NBV Yes 
18. Broadway Media Centre No 
19. Castle Cavendish Yes 
20. Nottingham Fashion Centre No 
21. The Hive Yes 
22. Innovate Office No 
23. Lenton Business Centre No 
24. Mercury House Yes 
25. Nottinghamshire International Clothing Centre No 
26. UNIEI Lab Yes 
27. New Brook House No 
28. Nottingham Science and Technology Park No 
29. S. G. C. S. Business Park No 
30. Southglade Food and Drink Park Yes 
31. Strelley Hall Business Centre No 
Nevertheless the notion that incubators should or ordinarily operate exit 
strategies persists. In the UK, for example, UKBI's National Business Incubation 
Framework (2004, p. 4) suggests that incubators should operate exit policies which 
should include "setting a maximum time limits (e. g. three years); stepped rents 
(gradually increasing each year); incentives to exit; removal of subsidies; [and] 
setting growth targets which have to be met". Further, from the literature, Brooks 
(1986, pp. 24-29) submits that incubatees should enter an incubator continuum 
wherein start-ups enter an "economic growth incubator" in order to gain access to 
the incubator's external support network, shared support services, and the 
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resources of e. g. the local university affiliated with the incubator and that as they 
attain maturity should move into a real estate incubator which provides office 
space and shared services [i. e. services are withdrawn or provided at more 
commercial rates]. 
In the course of this research, however, there is little to suggest (as may be 
observed from the exit criteria operating amongst the East Midlands incubator 
sample, above) that exit policies are practised with any real vigour. In fact, it 
would appear that it is normally a case of incubated businesses outgrowing their 
incubator (i. e. requiring bigger premises) that prompts them to leave over and 
above anything an incubator `exit policy' might stipulate. 
It is noted however, that many incubators have been prompted to extend 
incubator accommodation to accommodate for as long as possible growing and 
maturing businesses thus extending their capacity to tap into what is an important 
(and potentially lucrative) source of revenue (i. e. as the businesses increase in 
scale, so too does the rental income that might be derived from them) and which 
can be used to cross-subsidise other incubator operations and services. Indeed, as 
incubators reach maturity and extend their capacity (accommodation) this has 
apparently prompted many to re-define facilities on site so as where previously 
the whole site may have been defined publicly as the incubator, distinctions are 
subsequently made on site between small units (space for start-ups and smaller 
`new' businesses (however `new' may be defined)) which are re-designated as 
incubator facilities and the larger units as `grow on space' and/or, for example, 
'accelerators' et al., for larger businesses further along in the incubation process. 
However, while a distinction might seemingly be drawn between 
businesses occupying the `incubator' space and thus being `incubated' and others, 
this physical distinction is seemingly superficial as in practice larger businesses 
outwith these smaller units are often still considered as being 
`incubated'/accessing incubator services albeit the nature and level of services 
they receive, access or require may differ which begs the question `when 
does/should incubation stop? '. 
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Again, just as entry criteria are somewhat `fluid', there is apparently no 
directive in for example the US, Europe or Asia that stipulates when support 
should cease (over and above, in Europe, for example State Aid rules which 
stipulate pursuant to the de minimis threshold, that private sector businesses 
should not receive more than ¬100k of State Aid over any three year period, 
taking account of all state aid that the organisation might receive from any 
source). However, even State Aid rules seem to have been sidestepped by the EU 
Commission's recent approval of a German scheme wherein the government will 
subsidise the provision of incubator accommodation and services to business. At 
the time of writing the businesses are said not receive the grant directly and 
consequently the scheme is said not to fall within the scope of State Aid rules and 
regulations 19. 
Notwithstanding, the debate as regards entry and exit policies and, 
moreover, when incubation should cease, at firm level, the services generally 
provided by incubators have been investigated variously by, for example, Bearse, 
1993; McKinnon and Hayhow, 1998 and in the course of a range of 
benchmarking studies conducted by national incubator associations). From a 
review of incubator operations, as stated by incubator associations, national and 
supranational, it may be discerned that services are generally concerned with 
promoting and supporting SMEs which includes the provision of incubator units 
and business support services. The range, nature and level of services and 
physical aspects (accommodation), however, varies widely within regions and by 
country due to different traditions, financing models, stakeholders expectations 
and mandates. 
The SPICE Group has identified the following areas where services should 
be/are rendered (United Nations, 2001), namely: start-up advisory (business 
planning) and company development consulting; letting of appropriate office, 
laboratory and/or production space (below market rents, favourable terms); 
technical and organizational services for young (innovative) enterprises (e. g. 
secretarial, conference facilities, telecommunication); innovation- and 
19 European Commission Press Release (2005), `State Aid: Commission endorses German aid 
scheme for tenants of technology centres and incubators', Reference: IP/05/536; 03/05/2005 
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technology-oriented services (technology transfer), as well as training and 
information; and financial services. In addition to the above basic set of services, 
an incubator can offer a wide range of technology and business community 
related services, such as: international innovation- and technology-oriented 
services (technology transfer), as well as training and access to information; 
market-oriented services (access to information, training, contacts, 
representation); location in the future market in a flexible manner according to the 
needs of foreign partners; local, regional, national and global networking, 
(technical and human). 
As noted in the second edition of the United Nation's `Guidelines on Best 
Practice in Business Incubation', business incubators do however generally 
comprise premises (real estate) where national or local Governments, 
municipalities, or groups of large-scale enterprises provide on-site workshop 
office and administrative services, and assistance in various areas such as 
technical support services, access to financing, counselling, marketing, access to 
equipment, and management assistance. Evidently, however, the range of 
services available at the different kinds of institution varies greatly, depending on 
the model and the objectives of the stakeholders (and nature and level of 
resources. However, in most countries, the services may, according to the United 
Nations, (2001, p. 48-49) cover a combination of services listed below and in so 
doing offer different combinations of utility: 
  Physical infrastructure includes offices or workshop space on an 
affordable basis. Having a registered business place is the first essential 
step in starting one's business; 
  Secretarial services are provided for newly established small enterprises 
along with access to a mailbox, libraries and related services; 
  Telecommunications and information technology services usually include 
access to telephone, telefax, e-mail, and the Internet; 
  Business planning, assistance, resources, counselling services as one of the 
main tasks of a business incubator is to help make a business plan and 
advise on bookkeeping and filling in tax forms; 
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  Advertising and marketing services such as the provision of lists of 
potential suppliers, businesses, potential investors, and distributors; 
  Financial advice services advising businesses on their funding and 
investments, as well as on their daily financial transactions; 
  Training services providing insight into the principles of market economy, 
as well as upgraded professional and technical skills; 
  Know-how services may be needed to help the tenants through the legal 
processes linked to the use of licences and know-how; 
  Network services are very important at a business incubator, in particular 
in a virtual business incubator, providing links and relationships with other 
organizations that can promote and sustain the interests of its client 
businesses; 
  Industrial infrastructure including roads, water, electricity, 
telecommunication, buildings and industrial machines can be provided. 
This is most common in technoparks; 
  Aftercare services after the incubation period. Successful companies are 
financially viable and free-standing when they leave the incubator, usually 
after two to three years; and 
  Security services particularly for companies dealing with intellectual 
property, hi-tech products etc. at risk of being targets of industrial 
espionage - both physical in situ as well as hackers on the Internet. In 
addition, the risk of "ordinary" burglaries or thefts may be very high in 
some countries or certain areas or cities. An incubator can provide 
physical security services much more cheaply than an individual company 
could and generally have access to the latest systems of computer and 
related security that individual businesses alone might not be able to 
acquire. 
More specifically, however, in the EU, the profile of incubator services has been 
researched and quantified as follows: 
295 
Table 5.5. Types of Business Support Services20 
In house External 
Types of Business Support Services No. % No % 
Pre-incubation services 66 11.7 15 3.3 
Business planning and forming a company 62 11.0 25 5.5 
Training to develop business skills 36 6.4 47 10.3 
Accounting, legal and other related services 16 2.8 57 12.5 
Market research, sales and marketing 31 5.5 52 11.4 
Help with exporting and/or partner search abroad 28 5.0 42 9.2 
Help with e-business and other aspects of ICT 39 6.9 35 7.7 
Advice on development of new products and 
services 43 7.7 35 7.7 
Help with raising bank finance, grants, venture 
capital 68 12.1 28 6.1 
Incubator venture capital fund, business angel 
network 31 5.5 32 7.0 
Advice on recruitment of staff and personnel 
management 32 5.7 35 7.7 
Networking, e. g. with other entrepreneurs, 
customers 64 11.4 24 5.3 
Mentors, board members and other senior 
advisers 38 6.8 27 5.9 
Other Services 8 1.4 3 0.7 
As may be observed from the above, pre-incubation and business 
planning/formation are prominent elements of the EU model (and core provision 
vis-ä-vis the provision of services "in-house") as too are raising finance and 
networking. As regards services and expertise sourced externally, training, 
professional services, marketing and exports are particularly noteworthy. 
20 Source: European Commission Enterprise Directorate General (2002) Benchmarking of Business 
Incubators Final Report, Table 28, page 49 
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In the course of this research incubator managers and staff have stressed 
that amongst some of the highest `added value' work they provide (and the most 
resource intensive and skilled) is their pre-incubation work. Pre-incubation as 
practiced throughout the incubator community is evidently varied and can he 
highly proceduralised or intuitive or may feature a combination of both and is 
illustrated below with reference to the pre-incubation stage of the incubation 
process practised at the Hive incubator at the Nottingham Trent University, which 
may be summarized is as follows: 
Figure 5.1: HIVE Incubation Model 
STAGE 1 STAGE 2 STAGE 3 
Phase la: 
Opportunity 
Identification 
Phase lb: 
Opportunity Evaluation 
I Pre-incubation 
Building Venture 
Capability 
Incubating the 
Venture 
It was explained by HIVE staff that Phase la (above) is concerned with 
clarifying with candidates/clients the nature and scope of the opportunity to 
enable both parties (the University and client) to arrive at a more considered 
understanding of the opportunity and the way in which it may be progressed. At 
this stage, the HIVE's staff: 
  Explore the nature of client's work and the origins of the business idea 
  Investigate with the client, why business idea/product is desirable and 
identify main problems to be overcome and the technology required/to be 
employed 
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  Consider competitive products and the nature of the technology used in 
them. Consider limitations of technologies and products and identify 
competitors 
  Explore with the client the level of significant technological advance 
present in the proposed product, process or service and how the new 
product/business addresses demands not answered by existing product, 
services or processes. Clarify IPR issues, and confirm whether patent 
searches have been carried out/applied for or been granted in relation to 
this proposal 
  Outline the potential applications for the end product, service or process 
and identify main customers for it 
  Determine the nature and level of assistance required to progress the 
concept further. 
In addition, HIVE staff applies a mix of intuitive (but nevertheless 
proceduralised) judgements before accepting a client business i. e. Is there 
evidence of a strong entrepreneurial drive from the project champion? Is there a 
recognized need or want in the market place that is currently unfulfilled? Is there 
an innovative product or service response to this market need or want? And Is this 
a business opportunity that could benefit from having access to the knowledge 
resource base of the University? 
Phase lb of the pre-incubation stage (see above) is facilitated by the 
University's germinator unit which assists individuals and teams to firstly refine 
their business concepts, ensuring they are credible in the market place. With a 
credible business concept, the entrepreneurs are then provided with learning 
support and the environment to research and evaluate their opportunities. 
Specifically, what is sought is confirmation that the market opportunities exist for 
which the proposed business provides commercially viable solutions. With that 
confirmation milestone reached and working with partner organisations, the 
University germinator will provide support for the entrepreneurs to prepare 
business proposals. Entrepreneurs are subsequently assisted to develop `A 
Business Concept Document'; `An Opportunity Evaluation Report'; and 
`Business Proposals'. 
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The Business Concept Document comprises a number of elements: 
  Identification and Definition of Business Opportunity 
  Identification and Definition of Customers 
  Indication of Customer need(s) and how need(s) are currently serviced 
  Identification of competitor products and deficiencies in competitor 
market offering 
  Identification of competitors (SWOT) 
  Consideration of degrees of Novelty & Exploration of value added 
element and IPR as appropriate 
  Proposals to commercially exploit perceived opportunity 
  Identify Revenue streams and potential collaborators 
  Assessment of Personal competencies/skills & Investor pitch 
The Opportunity Evaluation Report seeks confirmation that the market 
opportunities exist for which the proposed business provides commercially viable 
solutions. The Opportunity Evaluation Report is concerned to establish the 
following in detail: 
  Market Definition i. e. Is there potentially a market for the proposed 
product? What does it look like? How big is it? What is the market worth? 
  With what can the market be served? i. e. What is the product/service? 
What does it look like, do? How will it be produced? What will it cost to 
produce it and get it to the distributors? 
  How can the market be captured? How will the potential customers be 
turned into real customers? How will they be persuaded to buy? What 
advertising/selling routes will be used to bring the customer in contact 
with the product? 
  How can the market be reached? What do the distribution outlets look 
like? How do they rank in order of perceived importance? What mark-ups 
do such outlets look for? 
Upon completion of the evaluation report, and where appropriate, 
entrepreneurs will be supported to prepare detailed Business Proposals as to how 
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they intend to go about exploiting their business opportunity. Specifically, the 
business proposals so developed comprise: 
  An Executive Summary featuring explanations of where the business 
idea has come from? (Background), what the business is planning to do 
(Business Concept), what the business proposes to achieve and by when 
(In Market & financial terms), an indication of the assistance required to 
achieve the business objectives (Investment support, management 
expertise, other) 
  An exposition of the Market & Competition i. e. how the market is 
defined, proposals to reach and capture this market 
 A Product/Service Plan explaining how the business proposes to serve its 
market and how the business proposes to produce or supply its 
product/service? 
 A description of the Business Structure explaining who will be the 
stakeholders in the business? (Company, shareholders), what the business 
will look like (i. e. Premises, virtual entity, geographic) and how it will be 
controlled (Management, operations & support team) 
  Financial Forecasts including Capital Requirements Budget, Operational 
Profit & Loss, Balance Sheet, and Cashflow Forecasts 
It is only upon the completion of the `Business Concept Document'; the 
`Opportunity Evaluation Report'; and `Business Proposals' that businesses 
progress through this pre-incubation stage, into the "Building Venture Capacity" 
stage wherein the client is supported to implement their business proposals. 
Essentially a 'proof of principle' stage that seeks to establish that there is indeed a 
market for the proposed product or service, proof that the business can capture 
that market, proof that the product or service 'works' for customers in the market 
place, and proof that the management of the new enterprise is capable of 
commercially exploiting the opportunity. During this phase the Hive staff assist 
entrepreneurs to structure their business; enact marketing strategy; implement 
operational functions; secure the IPR position; establish operating environment, 
systems and procedures; and achieve financial fitness. 
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Subsequently, the incubated businesses move into the `Incubating The 
Venture' stage wherein the businesses benefit from the supportive growth 
environment, provided by Hive incubator partners which include in their number 
Broadway Media, Nottinghamshire Business Ventures (local enterprise agency), 
LloydsTSB and HSBC (bankers), Internova UK (WWW consultants), Business 
Link, IP21 (Intellectual Property specialists), Blythens, Spirit and The Church 
Partnership (Chartered Accountants and Business Strategy Advisers), GTN 
(Grasp the Nettle -a Nottingham based business support organisation), Berryman 
Shacklock and Eversheds (Solicitors) and GOEM (ESF grant providers). During 
this phase of the incubation process the Hive's Growth Management Team assists 
the entrepreneurs to develop business plans and - where necessary - help them 
secure 2nd-stage investment capital. 
As may be observed from the above, the incubator provides (particularly 
during phases la and lb) an intensity of support which is accorded a high-added 
value by incubator personnel and by the incubated firms. Notwithstanding this 
model of the incubation process and the somewhat linear model of incubation 
featured in Chapter 4 (WestBIC's `New Business Development Path'), in reality 
incubation is not always such a straightforward affair as businesses may seek an 
incubators support and services at different stages in their development i. e. not all 
businesses `incubated' by incubators begin life in the incubator and may for 
example originate elsewhere i. e. seek to locate within an incubator to access 
support to accelerate growth. 
The notion of high-valued added services or indeed a distinction between 
lower and higher value services is explored for example by Lalkaka (2003) 
(illustrated below) who suggests that incubators should endeavour to provide a 
combination of low and high value added services (higher value added functions 
feature at the top of the pyramid). 
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Figure 5.2: Added Value Incubator Business Functions 
Services on legal! security and IP issues 
Seed sourcing 
Skills dey'elopment, mentoring and 
on information and international nets äb rking 
among clients through exchange 
Shared office facilities, equipment pre and post incubation 
Smart space that is functional, affordable and on flexible terms 
Source: Lalkaka, R., 2003, 
National Workshop on Technology Parks and Business Incubators 
However, Lalkaka's service or model of incubator functions seemingly 
omits consideration of those other client services provided by an incubator e. g. to 
public and regional authorities i. e. economic development, work to build 
entrepreneurial cultures, etc, which are so integral to a great many incubator 
service models and objectives but are not so neatly modeled (see The `Added 
Value' of Incubators: Rationale (above)). As part of the research undertaken in 
the course of this study a simplified service model of business support services 
and functions was hypothesized in consultation with incubator staff at NEBIC to 
explore notions of value-added and utility (see below) with NEBIC tenants: 
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Figure 5.3: Draft Model of NEBIC Business Support Functions 
by Added Value 
Lower Value Business Support Functions 
Added 
  Business Planning & Company Formation 
  Information Services; 
  Training (General Management & Business 
Administration); 
  Business planning, mentoring, counselling and 
advisory services; 
  Raising Finance (e. g. R&TD grants) 
  Raising Finance (e. g. seed-corn funding/investment 
capital) 
  Pre-incubation 
Higher Value 
Added 
Subsequently, the accuracy of this notional construct of added value was 
investigated with NEBIC tenants to determine whether this accorded with their 
perception of i. e. as regards what they viewed as `high value added' support i. e. 
support with the most utility. 
Using a graded four point scale, adjusted for the valid percentage response 
and weighted accordingly (Most valued accorded a value of +2, Least Valued -2 
and the intervening points on the scale of +1 and -1, respectively), tenants were 
invited to express their view (in the coufse of a tenant survey and structured 
interview) as regards the utility of NEBICs Pre-incubation services; Business 
planning and company formation services; Training services; Information 
services; Advisory Services and Support in development of new products, 
services and/or processes; Help with raising finance; Help with accessing R&TD 
Grants and Grants to support Innovation; and Assistance to access seed-corn 
funding and venture capital funding. The tenant responses are illustrated below: 
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Figure 5.4: NEBIC Tenant Interview Responses 
Tenant Expression of Service Utility 
uct dwelopmsnt 
a company 
u icm 
As may be observed from the chart above, Pre-Incubation Services, 
Information Services, Advice and Support for product development, Business 
Planning and company formation services were rated most highly vis-a-vis their 
utility. Particularly notable was the response received as regards Information 
Services that, while profiled above as perhaps being a less valued added function, 
was accorded a high value/utility by tenants. Raising finance (access to R&D 
grants and seed-corn funding) although generally regarded as a high value activity 
within the incubator community was marked for a lack of utility and despite being 
profiled (in the model and other literature e. g. Lalkaka above) as a high-value 
added function. 
This was not however a reflection on the incubator's service and while a 
range of explanations were offered by tenants they can be broadly summarised as 
a combination of factors which include a lack of interest or general reluctance to 
raise finance in exchange for equity and/or that there were in the view of the 
majority of incubated businesses interviewed relatively few grant instruments for 
which they were eligible or, more often, few that they were prepared to pursue 
(i. e. grant systems such as EU Commission Framework programmes had 
evidently been dismissed by many as too complex, overly bureaucratic as regards 
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reporting requirements to say nothing of onerous application processes, and the 
limited chances of success (reportedly only 1 in 6). 
In the course of the interviews with NEBIC tenants (41) a number of other 
elements of the incubator service/functions were highlighted for their utility and 
the model has been amended below to admit the additional elements. For 
example, as illustrated below, of the 41 respondents located at NEBIC, 31 
indicated that key to their decision to locate and remain at NEBIC was/is the 
location of the incubator and the image that premises at the incubator lends their 
business. While attributed a slightly lesser value by respondents the 
accommodation and the nature and quality of the accommodation (and flexible 
terms), was clearly significant to 20 of the 41 incubator tenants interviewed in the 
course of this study (one respondent, a female business owner explained "Because 
I am a woman and arrive early in the morning and work late into the evening 
when there are few people around the security at NEBIC is key for me and I know 
for most other women working at the site". 
Figure 5.5: NEBIC tenant interview responses 
Value of Incubator Functions and Services 
Other 
Opportunity to network 
Availability of business support 
services 
Quality, price and flexible terms 
Incubator Location & Image 
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Perhaps surprisingly, the nature and level of business services provided 
was accorded a lesser value than premises (only 12 of the 41 businesses 
interviewed considered them significant although one respondent in particular 
was keen to emphasise that the assistance available to her "as a woman is 
priceless"). 
Further, the opportunity to network with other businesses (much vaunted 
in the literature and within the business incubator community) was not regarded 
as being particularly significant (only 5 of the 41 respondents interviewed 
considered this aspect of the incubator environment as being of particular value). 
Other services and functions cited by the tenants as having particular utility 
included: 
  proximity or relationship with the region's universities; 
" the ability of the incubator to facilitate links/collaborations with other 
business support agencies; 
  assistance with the development of partnerships/technology 
collaborations; 
  the availability of specialist facilities (e. g. access to rapid prototyping 
technology/equipment) and personnel i. e. technology specialists 
(engineers); 
  co-location with similar businesses at similar stages in their development; 
and 
  the knowledge that pragmatic, `hands-on' intensive interventions and 
business assistance general and specialist/technical (over and above 
provision of advice) is available. 
The model was subsequently amended, in consultation with NEBIC staff, and is 
presented overleaf and incorporates incubator facilities. 
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Figure 5.6: Model of NEBIC Business Support Functions (Value Added) 
Lower Value Business Support Function(s) 
Added 
  Physical infrastructure (accommodation - nature and location); 
Communal facilities 
  Telecommunications and information technology services usually 
including access to telephone, telefax, e-mail, and the Internet; 
  Property Management & Administrative Services (e. g. secretarial, 
security, mail-box/handling); 
  Opportunity to network with other co-located incubated 
businesses; 
  Advertising, marketing and publicity services; 
  Assistance with identification and engaging e. g. collaborators 
(technology providers/partners); 
  Training (General Management & Business Administration); 
  Access to incubator networks (personnel, facilities, equipment 
and other specialist business support providers); 
  Facilitation of collaborations with research centers/specialists e. g. 
within affiliated universities 
  Raising Finance (e. g. R&TD grants); Raising Finance (e. g. seed- 
corn funding/investment capital); 
  Business planning, mentoring, counselling and advisory services; 
  Specialist facilities and infrastructure (e. g. access to rapid 
prototyping technology/equipment); 
  Know-how services i. e. technology specialists (engineers) and 
other technical/professional services; 
  Business planning & Company Formation 
  Information Services; 
  Pre-incubation; 
  Hands-on intensive interventions and business assistance (over 
Higher Value and above provision of advice) - general and specialist/technical. 
Added 
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5.4 Summary 
This chapter has explored the development of support for indigenous firms 
from protectionism and economic engineering (i. e. the promotion of mergers and 
acquisitions and cluster strategies), subsidies for inward and/foreign direct 
investors and systems of grant aid through to the development of services to 
support small businesses, specifically business incubation and the ways in which 
incubators seek to add value and impact/support the growth and development of 
indigenous SMEs. 
A noted above, while definitions as to what is and is not an incubator vary, 
incubators have been established, predominantly by national, regional and local 
government and public agencies e. g. universities (and combinations thereof), to 
achieve a range of socio-economic ends. Further, and while it is difficult to get a 
fix upon the number of incubators world-wide, by country or indeed by region (a 
problem compounded by the degree of variation within the incubator model, the 
rate of addition and the fact that not all incubators naturally elect to enumerate 
themselves as such while others that do so may in fact offer an array of services 
that amount to something less than business incubation as now understood and 
defined within the incubation industry), it is evident that in policy terms they 
command significant interest, support (political and financial) and are 
increasingly perceived as an instrument that can remedy a range of economic and 
social ills by supporting indigenous firms, specifically SMEs (for the reasons 
enumerated above and in Chapter 2). 
In general terms, an incubator may be said to comprise, according to 
Lalkaka (2001, p. 5): 
"a micro-environment with a small management team that provides 
physical work-space, shared office facilities, counselling, 
information, training and access to finance and professional 
services in one affordable package. Incubators vary widely in their 
sponsors (state, economic development group, university, business, 
venture capital), objectives (from empowerment to technology 
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commercialization), location (urban, suburban, rural, and 
international), sectoral focus (technology and mixed, now 
including kitchen and arts incubators) and business model (not-for- 
profit or for-profit)" 
While this definition seemingly omits consideration of `virtual 
incubators', it has been suggested in the course of this research and is seemingly 
implicit in the word employed to describe the form that an 'incubator' comprises 
i. e. a physical environment within which the process of incubation occurs (and 
from which incubation services may be delivered (i. e. outwith the walls of the 
incubator)). While a number of authors have suggested that 'virtual incubators' 
should be considered as part of the model, this appears to corrupt the basic 
concept in an effort to admit what are in effect other business support providers or 
essentially consulting organizations (public entities or otherwise). This is not to 
dispute or devalue the incubation services being provided by business support 
organizations without business accommodation i. e. it is accepted that they are 
providing incubator services. 
However, it is evident from the course of this research and interviews 
conducted with incubator managers that there are serious doubts as to whether the 
`virtual incubator' model is ultimately sustainable (without significant and 
sustained subsidy). It is perhaps telling that of the two `virtual incubators' 
identified at the outset of the research and 'BIC accredited' (Pronovus and BIC 
SwedenWest - see Chapter 4), both have folded apparently for lack of (public 
funds) i. e. have proved unsustainable or have otherwise failed to develop other 
revenue streams so as to dilute their reliance on the public purse. 
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Indeed, while incubation is now an established business support 
mechanism and further that within, for example, the European and US stock of 
incubators a great many should, it might be thought, have achieved a level of 
maturity and financial security/sustainability - subsidy still evidently remains key 
to US and European incubator operations, though perhaps more so as regards the 
latter. In the EU, as illustrated below, subsidy is generally integral to the EU 
model: 
Table 5.6: EU Incubators Sources of Funding21 
Sources of Funding % 
(1) Subsidies - EU and other international agencies 10.1 
(2) Subsidies - National authorities and public agencies 27.3 
(3) Payments from banks and other private sector organisations 2.6 
(4) Payments from universities and other R%D organisations 3.0 
(5) Rental income and other incubator charges 39.5 
(6) Other revenue, e. g. from service contracts 11.1 
(7) Investment income, e. g. royalties, equity returns 0.8 
(8) Other sources 5.6 
Total 100.00 
Indeed, of the incubators surveyed in the EU Commission Enterprise 
Directorate General's Benchmarking of Business Incubators Final Report (2002) 
more than 60% of respondents indicated that subsidy was integral to their 
business model (as compared to 36% as reported in a US study - Lalkaka (2003)), 
while 21.8% indicated that without subsidy incubator operations would cease 
completely (as compared on only 13.5% in the US) 
Source: European Commission Enterprise Directorate General (2002) 'Benchrnarking of 
Business Incubators Final Report', Centre for Strategy and Evaluation Services, p. 44 
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Table 5.7: Importance of Cash subsidies to Incubator Operations22 
Europe US 
Importance of Cash subsidies Number % Number %e 
(1) Incubators activities could be 
maintained at current levels 
6 7.7 9 17.3 
(2) Incubator activities would have to be 
reduced significantly 
31 39.7 12 23.1 
(3) Incubator activities would stop 
altogether 
17 21.8 7 13.5 
(4) Not relevant - incubator does not 
receive subsidies 
9 11.5 18 34.6 
(5) Don't know / No answer 15 19.2 6 11.5 
Total 78 100 52 100 
Given the level of subsidy and its importance to the modality in Europe, it 
is not perhaps surprising that `break even' i. e. the objective of becoming self- 
sustaining is absent from so many EU business incubator models: 
Table 5.8: Is `break even' part of (EU) Business Incubator's business plan? 23 
Part of Business Plan Number Percentage 
Yes 51 40.8 
No 62 49.6 
No answer / don't know 12 9.6 
Total 125 100.00 
As noted above and notwithstanding European State Aid Rules the 
European Commission has in fact recently given its approval to a German 
proposal to support the users of technology centres and incubators with state aid 
u Source Data: European Commission Enterprise Directorate General (2002) 'Benchmarking of 
Business Incubators Final Report', Centre for Strategy and Evaluation Services, p. 46; and Lalkaka, 
R. (2003) 'Technology Business Incubation: Role, Performance, Linkages, Trends, National 
Workshop on Technology Parks and Business Incubators', Isfahan Science & Technology Town, 
Isfahan Iran, 20 - 21 May, 2003 23 Source Data: European Commission Enterprise Directorate General (2002) 'Benchmarking of 
Business Incubators Final Report', Centre for Strategy and Evaluation Services, p. 45 
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by allocating 120 million euro per year for newly created or technology-oriented 
small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) that use these centres. Under this 
national scheme, the costs of office rental, consultancy services, research 
accommodation, networking with other companies, and cooperation with 
universities and research institutes - all services provided by technology and 
incubation centres - will all be met by the government. 
Notwithstanding business incubator finance, the nature of stake-holding 
and stakeholder objectives (as explored above) it is possible to derive, from a 
consideration of the literature (industry and academic) and from observation of 
incubator operations visited in the course of this research, a model as to what 
characterises an `incubator' as distinct from `providers of incubation style 
services': 
1. Accommodation: A site or sites featuring managed accommodation 
(that may service multiple tenants, and business sectors and featuring shared 
space and services) let on flexible terms (easy in/out clauses) and offered at 
highly competitive and/or often subsidised rates; 
2. Business Support Services: An array of business development services 
(including information services) provided from within and outwith the incubator's 
permanent staff and specifically services that can be provided with an intensity 
and in a pragmatic, interventionist manner (if required) wherein mentoring, 
coaching and/or training can be supplemented with 'hands-on' support and 
assistance to develop e. g. business plans, raise finance, apply for R&D grants, 
prepare commercial tenders, make a `sales pitch', production of `prototypes', etc. 
For example, in the course of this research and, specifically in the course 
of a visit to the `Digital Factory', Alan Kersh (Bishop Auckland College Assistant 
Principal and Director of Corporate Development and Partnerships) explained that 
a firm (assisted by the Digital Factory) which had been invited to tender for the 
supply of automotive components to a major automotive manufacturer (wherein 
the terms of the tender process required responses in less than 10 working days) 
was able to attend and make a sales presentation which not only featured 
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drawings and a CAD/CAM illustration of the components (an activity also 
supported by Digital Factory staff) but also a physical prototype of the component 
(assembled using the Digital Factory's Thermojet "wax deposition rapid 
prototyping capability") a feat, which given the timescale for tender respondents 
was instrumental in winning the contract evidencing this firms imagination, 
commitment to the contractor and rate of work; 
3. Linkages throughout the supranational, national, regional and local 
innovation/business support infrastructure: Access to broader networks of 
other business support intermediaries/experts, programmes and facilities (e. g. 
from within national, regional and sub-regional incubator associations, 
universities, venture capitalists, etc); 
4. Provision of pre-incubation services i. e. whereby incubator 
personnel assist in the development of business ideas and appraise 
commercial viability, etc, - see HIVE example above. 
5. The application of selection policies or entry criteria: A number of 
incubator studies within and outwith the industry have suggested that incubators 
should operate selection policies (entry criteria) which may include not only a 
consideration of the viability of the tenant business but also, for example, a 
designated technology sector, the businesses capacity to grow (i. e. at an 
accelerated rate) and the capacity/ability of the incubator to assist in the firms' 
development. 
It has been observed in the course of this research, that selection is 
generally a calculation of the commercial viability of the business and (especially 
amongst experienced incubator managers) a range of other intuitive factors. For 
example, at NEBIC tenant business must demonstrate innovation in their product, 
processes or services and potential for growth or otherwise present an innovative 
business idea with job creation potential to fit with the ethos of the BIC (which is 
specifically concerned to support innovative businesses)the BIC's decision as 
whether or not to accept an application is generally informed by a consideration 
of commercial viability: 
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  the number of years the business has been trading; the number of 
employees (current and projected including an explanation of their 
roles/duties); 
 a description of the uniqueness of the applicant's product/services; 
  the level of technical innovation and its context within the relevant 
business sector (and whether patents gave been sought or granted); 
 a definition of the market (including market research as may have been 
undertaken by the applicant); 
  competitive advantages of the applicant's product(s)/service(s); 
  the nature and level of business assistance the applicant has received 
(including grants and awards); 
  the applicant's estimated need for premises (immediate and projected with 
reference to business development forecasts) and additional staff; 
  funding required in next 12 months to two years; 
  the nature and level of assistance the applicant is likely to seek in pursuit 
of their business development objectives; and 
 a consideration of the applicants accounts (Turnover, profit and loss, fixed 
assets, current assets and liabilities, long term liabilities, share capital and 
profit and loss balance). 
In addition, a number of intuitive factors were identified in the course of 
interviews with incubator managers and staff as forming part of the profile of 
what a prospective tenant might `look like'. Evidently, at NEBIC this is generally 
held to be as follows: 
  In the main, the majority of successful start-ups at the BIC have been 
observed as comprising / set up by individuals who are 40+ years of age 
with senior / middle management experience who readily accept that more 
than a nine-to-five commitment is required; 
  These individuals tend to have a level of business skill, people 
management skills and technical expertise that must be underpinned by 
support in generic business areas; 
  The majority have entered the BIC with a process, service, idea or method 
of production as opposed to finished product; 
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  They are noted for their willingness to invite criticism from the support 
staff and to seek and take advice; 
  They possess, by virtue of their experience, developed interpersonal skills 
and a level of credibility with suppliers and customers; 
  They also tend to have established networks of potential collaborators and 
more importantly, start-up capital (derived from severance payments, early 
retirement/retirement lump sums, etc) that has rendered them financially 
`secure'; and 
  This group of owner managers have in many cases achieved, what might 
be considered, a high standard of living that they wish to maintain and 
better. To that extent peer or social pressure to succeed has also been 
observed as an important driver in their success. 
Herein however lies one of the challenges for incubator managers being 
tasked by stakeholders to support new `types' of entrepreneur (e. g. social 
enterprises) or classes of entrepreneur (e. g. graduate businesses) who do not 
accord with, for example, the profile of entrepreneur they have evolved to support 
naturally and by virtue of their experience. The new entrepreneurs e. g. social 
entrepreneurs or graduate entrepreneurs which many incubators are increasingly 
seeking to support (with the encouragement of funding agencies) present new 
challenges, frequently requiring new approaches and new levels of understanding 
as regards the nature of e. g. graduate incubation. 
For example, considering the anatomy of the model entrepreneur 
supported by NEBIC (as per the profile above), a graduate start-up, 
notwithstanding the quality of the business idea, generally lacks the business 
experience and moreover the financial resources. Indeed one of the main 
challenges for graduate start-ups in the UK is surely the level of debt a graduate 
may be carrying on completion of their studies to say nothing of the capital assets 
they lack against which to borrow or invest in their business. 
Furthermore, with for example, graduate incubation as observed in the 
course of this research as being practised by, for example, university incubators, 
the financial position and level of experience of the graduate may also present the 
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incubation industry with an ethical challenge as graduate start-up business owner 
managers may be under significantly more economic duress vis-a-vis any 
negotiation with their incubator for the provision of services in exchange for 
equity and it has been queried, in the course of this research, whether the conduct 
of incubator operations, in this aspect at least, should be regulated. 
Notwithstanding, it is however very rare within the European incubation industry 
for incubators to take an equity position in their client businesses (7.7% in Europe 
(European Commission Enterprise Directorate General, 2002, Benchmarking of 
Business Incubators Final Report) as compared to 34.6% in the US (National 
Business Incubation Association, 2002, State of the Incubation Industry). Indeed, 
within Europe and particularly the UK graduate incubation is largely subsidised 
with European Structural Funds (e. g. Objective 2) and by Regional Development 
Agencies (see the HIVE at the Nottingham Trent University). 
6. The application of exit policies or criteria. Finally, in a similar vein 
to entry policies or criteria, it is frequently postulated that exit policies do/should 
form part of the incubator model i. e. UKBI's Incubation Framework - "critical 
elements and core principles" (Appendix) - and part and parcel of a "true 
incubation environment" (p. 4). However, in practice this appears to be rarely the 
case with incubators keen to preserve revenue streams from the incubated 
businesses as they grow in scope and scale. 
In reality, as tenant demand for premises increases and they generally 
become more financially secure (and thus incubator management can be more 
confident in their ability and capacity to pay), they may also become less reliant 
on incubator services provided often as part of the tenancy agreement, 
(particularly resource intensive activities such as pre-incubation and services 
provided at the fledgling stage). Thus, the `margin', in the provision of services 
provided to the incubatees (provided they can still be accommodated) may be said 
to improve which may be used to cross-subsidise less economic activities. 
In the course of this research, it has become evident that those incubators 
providing an array of business support services and other strategic services, that 
are regional in scope i. e. outwith their immediate locality such as the Big Ideas 
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programme featured in Appendix 3 derive strength (financial and thus political) 
from their scale, and moreover, their ability to accommodate and/or incubate or 
provide services to existing businesses i. e. mixing an ability/capacity to incubate 
fledgling firms as akin to a `hatchery' and provide an environment and business 
support services suited to more mature firms. 
As observed in the course of this research, heavily or wholly subsidised 
incubator operations are seemingly content to provide the former, however with 
increased uncertainty surrounding the funding of incubation (exacerbated by the 
hitherto unknown consequences of the loss of structural fund status throughout 
parts of Northern and Western Europe) there is seemingly an increased sense of 
urgency to develop the latter aspect of operations to more readily assure 
sustainability (i. e. increase their incubator property portfolio to accommodate 
businesses at less risk of failure (and an increased capacity to pay)). 
Further as stakeholders increasingly expect incubators to be self-sustaining 
which seemingly denies the basic rationale for incubation services, that of a 
market failure within the business support sector. This market failure may be said 
to comprise the fact that: 
(a) the provision of incubation services (by which we mean the incubation of 
`fledgling' companies) is inherently non-commercial insofar as it is 
ultimately unlikely to generate an adequate rate of return to be sustainable 
of itself; and 
(b) incubatees can ill afford business support services that are not subsidised 
i. e. charged at commercial rates. 
It is therefore not surprising, that as stakeholders apply commercial 
metrics to the incubation process that incubators are generally developing and 
maturing so as to operate not only as hatcheries but also as providers of business 
support and accommodation to established enterprises. Those incubators visited 
in the course of this research that have integrated these two spheres of operation 
have seemingly achieved levels of regional leadership (See Chapter 4 BIC Case 
Studies) unmatched by their peers who confine their activity to `hatchery' style 
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activities only - they are seemingly much smaller in scope and scale and perhaps 
more vulnerable to changes in the political and financial climate (new political 
priorities and fiscal pressures). 
Thus, the notion of exit criteria seems hardly appropriate particularly in the 
current incubation `business' climate. Further, and notwithstanding a public policy 
concern that particular firms do not benefit, disproportionately, from 'public' 
assistance (see also, European Commission State Aid regulations), a number of 
incubator operations visited in the course of this research have however managed 
to pay at least lip service to and/or conform to the notion of exit policies by 
designating/re-designating small units/parts of their property portfolio as their 
`incubator' (i. e. an incubator (in effect a hatchery) within an incubator) from which 
tenants exit into `grow on' space elsewhere in the `incubator' i. e. effectively move 
into the rest of the incubator's portfolio of accommodation. However, it does not 
necessarily follow that the incubatee having left the designated 'incubator' 
property is no longer being `incubated'- in reality they have merely changed their 
address (but are living on the same street). 
318 
Chapter 6: Incubator Impact (North East Business & Innovation Centre) 
6.1 Introduction 
This Chapter seeks to explore the way in which incubators impact their 
client base (and considers the contribution of NEBIC against qualitative and 
traditional quantitative metrics. The chapter concludes with an assessment of the 
way in which incubators have added value or rather impacted the performance of 
incubated firms with reference to their 'behaviour(s)' as compared with businesses 
located outwith business incubators. 
6.2 Evaluating Regional and Local Added Value and Impact 
Naturally, the measurement of the effectiveness, success or impact of 
business incubators depends in part upon the focus and nature of the measurement 
and more specifically 
  what and how `success' or `impact' (impact on what? ) is measured; 
  whether the measurement is quantitative and/or qualitative; 
  the nature of the measurement (e. g. Goal-based (Etzioni, 1964), systems 
Georgopolous and Tannenbaum, 1957) and multiple constituency 
(Thompson, 1967; Pennings and Goodman, 1977) approaches which 
examine performance with reference to the incubator's goals, multiple 
parameters and stakeholder agendas, respectively) 
  scope, scale and range of measurements taken; 
  whether they are comparative/intended for comparison/benchmarking; 
  the perspective of the measurer (by whom) which itself may influence the 
nature, selection and analysis; 
  the purpose for the measurement/interest in and/or the potential application 
of the results (why and to what end, see also perspective) and the manner in 
which this may effect the availability, collection, interpretation and 
analysis of date; 
  the availability of data and comparable data; and 
319 
  the degree and extent to which causation or linkages between cause and 
effect can be established 
Goal based approaches are however complicated by the predilections of 
stakeholders and sponsors which ultimately influence incubator strategies 
(objectives) and plans. For example, venture capital based facilities seek profit 
and high portfolio returns patents, spin-offs, equity in clients; a university sponsor 
may seek to commercialise university intellectual assets or IPR and/or support 
graduate and academic entrepreneurship and retention (Students and staff); a 
private developer or indeed a local authority property department may have the 
development of its property portfolio (redundant or derelict sites) and income 
generation; a regional economic development agency may seek employment, 
regeneration, enhancing the spirit of enterprise, while an educational authority may 
seek services to supplement the teaching (national) curriculum - see Appendix 3). 
All too frequently, incubator stakeholders may include all these interests. 
Notwithstanding the above, a number of studies have explored incubator 
outputs, outcomes and indicative measures of performance. Incubator outputs, 
outcomes and impacts have been generally reported to include: 
  economic development and diversification; 
  technological development and advances; 
  job creation; 
  enterprise creation; 
  number of businesses created and/or assisted; 
  improved sustainability of enterprises; 
  increased profitability; 
  improved growth; 
  creation of taxable incomes; 
  the performance of the incubator; 
  interactions between incubator and the research base (universities); and 
  other community benefits. 
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A number of studies have however queried whether it is possible to 
determine (objectively) whether: 
  assisted firms would have performed as they have without incubator 
assistance - see Bearse(1988, p, 332-333); 
  the performance of assisted firms can be accurately (objectively) measured 
against comparable businesses that have not received assistance (difficulty 
in identifying directly comparable firms); and 
  incubators increase the local stock of innovative and/or high growth 
enterprises (i. e. there are irresolvable difficulties vis-ä-vis attribution and 
establishing causality - other factors may in fact play a more significant 
role). 
Previous research has also noted not only the difficulty in assessing 
economic effects (direct and indirect impacts on competitiveness (sales of 
products, exports, etc) at a macro or, indeed, micro level), but also less tangible 
impacts and non-economic effects including the degree and extent to which 
incubators have, for example: 
  mobilised and affected the behaviour of indigenous businesses, institutions 
and regional organizations; 
  created public-private partnerships; 
  enhanced networks and connectivity between regional actors; 
  contributed to the creation of an entrepreneurial, research or innovation 
culture, 
  improved local/regional image (within and outwith the region/locality); 
  increased regional aspirations; 
  informed the regional political agenda; and 
  contributed to the policy making process. 
Evidently, both the literature dealing with effects and those self reported by 
the community tend to assert or lay claim to direct results and in so doing rather 
fail to acknowledge or dismiss the fact that incubators tend to work and make their 
contributions as part of a regional system of actors and as part of a surrounding 
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environment in which there are multiple inter-relations between conditions and the 
different actions of many regional agents and institutions involved and 
combinations thereof and deny the level and complexities of such interactions. 
Furthermore, much of the literature (from within and outwith the incubator 
community) when it does assert positive effects and impacts as generated by 
incubators fails to account or adjust or interpret `results' for other regional 
dynamics (not least other actors in the innovation system/business support 
infrastructure) 
Furthermore, it is evident from the literature (that exists) and research 
undertaken to date that much of the consideration and evaluation of quantitative 
and qualitative effects is drawn largely with reference to quantitative outputs. For 
example, examining the metrics applied to report and `assess' the performance of 
incubator projects and programmes delivered by the North East Business and 
Innovation Centre (with Structural Fund support) the performance measures as 
required by various and multiple funding agencies have included: 
Job/employment creation (directly, indirectly and multiplier effects) 
  Number of Jobs generated in the incubator (no. of employees per tenant), 
measured by employment years and/or fractions thereof and last e. g. at 
least one calendar year; 
  Number of Jobs created by companies after leaving the incubator 
(graduates), measured by employment years; 
  Jobs and/or fractions thereof created in supplier businesses by creation and 
sustainability of incubated firms 
  Jobs safeguarded in incubated/assisted firms (directly) and/or 
connected/supplier businesses (indirectly) 
  Number of jobless beneficiaries securing employment 
Enterprise creation and development 
  Number of new business starts facilitated 
  Number of new business start sustainable after 3 years/Incubatee survival 
rates (relative to non-incubated business stock), measured by numbers of 
firms incubated and number of discontinued businesses. 
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Education and training 
  Number of unemployed people trained 
  Number of self-employed people trained 
  Number of employed people trained 
  Number of unemployed people gaining a vocational qualifications 
  Number of self-employed people trained 
  Number of employed people gaining a vocational qualifications 
Information, Advice and Guidance 
  Number of awareness raising events/activities for local employers 
  Number of SMEs advised 
  Number of graduates advised 
  Number of unemployed persons advised 
  Number of persons over the age of 45 receiving guidance/assistance 
SME assistance (Mentored) 
  Number of New SMEs assisted 
  Number of SMEs assisted 
  Number of SMEs assisted to obtain financial support (grants and/or 
investment) 
  Number of SMEs assisted to export 
  Number of SMEs assisted to undertake joint ventures 
  Value of SME Investments 
Community Development 
  Number of community groups and organisations assisted 
  Number of new community enterprises assisted 
  Number of community facilities created/improved 
Environmental 
  Number of environmental schemes developed 
  Number of new or existing SMEs assisted in the green economy sector" 
  Number of SMEs undertaking environmental audits or reviews 
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  Number of projects incorporating Sustainable Drainage Systems (SuDS) - 
the number of projects actively managing the surface water run-off from 
their site or premises. 
  Metres squared of green space created or improved that has wildlife value 
  Number of SMEs obtaining their energy from renewable sources 
  Use of brownfield sites, remediation of land, addition(s) to 
townscape/landscape (new build) refurbishment of underutilized/derelict 
premises 
Research & Technological Development 
  Value of business expenditure on research and development 
  Number of designs/prototypes/products/processes developed 
  Number of IP Protections (Patents, Copyright, Trademarks) 
  Research commercialized through development work (by firms) at the 
incubator, measured in numbers of projects and economic activity 
(employment years, total cumulative revenues) 
Economic activity (directly, indirectly and multiplier effects) 
  Value of new sales in SMEs (£s) 
  Value of safeguarded sales in SMEs (£s) 
  Value of sales generated in the incubator and thereafter (following 
graduation) (Es) 
  Increase in turnover/profitability (Es) 
Other 
  Number of enterprises assisted to achieve IiP, ISO, ENV, etc 
  Taxes and other "social" contributions by incubator tenants and graduates, 
measured by property, income, employment and other direct tax revenues 
attributable to incubator, tenants, and graduates: 
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6.3 The Impact of European Business and Innovation Centres 
EBN, the EU BIC incubator association reports impacts or the degree and 
extent to which the EU stock of European Business and Innovation Centres have 
added value and impacted their locality in similar terms. For example, in the 2004 
BIC Observatory Report', EBN draws the impact and added value of BICs with 
reference to a host of quantitative indicators: 
Creating innovative new businesses 
  450,000 projects pre-selected for start-up support 
  98,000 selected projects following feasibility study 
  42,000 Business plans completed 
  27,000 Enterprises created 
  132,000 Jobs created 
Developing entrepreneurial innovation in existing SMEs 
  Specialised and hands-on assistance provided to 25,000 SMEs 
  17,000 innovation diagnostics completed 
  72,000 SMEs attended training schemes run by BICs 
  39,000 SMEs involved in innovative programs 
Maximising efficiency and synergy among entrepreneurial innovation service 
providers 
  300,000 projects sign-posted 
  3,200 programmes designed and implemented 
  11,300 awareness events organized by BICs 
  192,000 attendees to BICs events 
Such measures (and figures) reported above are however perhaps more 
revealing of the nature of BIC activity, as opposed to supporting a meaningful 
evaluation of their contribution in either qualitative or quantitative terms i. e. there 
is no effort to compute, for example, value for money (vis-ä-vis inputs) or with 
1 EBN (2005) 'EBN 2004 BIC Observatory - An overview of the BIC approach in its 20th year'. 
retrieved on 27.03.05 from website: 
h tp: lLquality. ebn. bc/Documents/2004%20BIC%200bservatory pdf p. 22 
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reference to other schemes or modalities, nor are the results disaggregated to 
permit comparable assessments of one BIC against another. More generally, while 
for example an incubator such as NEBIC may be required from time to time to 
report outputs and outcomes against such frameworks and measures by funding 
agencies in respect of discrete projects, these measures are not applied to the whole 
of NEBIC operations. 
In any event, it is submitted that such quantitative measurements (as 
applied within or to the incubator community) are rarely properly or adequately 
descriptive i. e. job creation figures may or may not relate to high value- 
added/quality jobs or reveal, of themselves, the local conditions in which the result 
has been achieved (to say nothing of attribution and the basis upon which job 
creation claims are being made). For example, a high rate of start-ups may of itself 
be impressive but less so if survival rates are poor or if these start-ups evolve into 
only marginal survivors or are in fact only lifestyle businesses with no ambition 
for growth, employment generation, innovation, etc. Further, in the course of this 
research, on more than one occasion it has been queried, perhaps legitimately, as to 
whether it is possible, desirable, meaningful or legitimate to apply classical 
evaluation frameworks that might, for example assess costs per output in a 
deprived community or less-favoured region (characterised by significant market 
failures) against the input/outputs achieved in a more naturally abundant 
communities (i. e. rich in human capital, intellectual/innovation assets and other 
regional/local endowments (e. g. vigorous public/private sector research base)) and 
moreover, whether it is worth the effort! 
As regards those incubators observed in the course of this research as 
offering and reporting quantitative estimations of economic effects e. g. gross 
impacts, they rarely consider additionality or adjustments for displacement and 
indirect effects. Further those that do offer estimates of net effects vis-ä-vis for 
example job creation, cost-per-job created/protected seemingly presume a very 
linear relationship between cause and effect. In addition, such figures are 
generally allowed to stand without any interpretation as there is little or no frame 
of reference to assess whether such results represent an unparalleled return on the 
activity or investment or are no more or less than might be expected with/without 
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reference to other available modalities i. e. it might be said that they report activity 
as much as achievement, but again there is nothing against which to judge these 
reports. 
In general, it is evident from this research that most incubators (European 
and UK) do not use sophisticated methods or highly quantifiable or comparable 
techniques to document and/or validate their impact and/or the degree and extent 
to which they have `added-value'. Evidently, many incubators do however rely on 
the positive press associated with their incubator, client testimonials and success 
stories which are highlighted and widely disseminated to stakeholders, sponsors, 
peer groups and associations within and outwith the business support/incubator 
community and the locality served by the incubator to communicate impacts and 
added value. 
Figure 6.1: Example: North East Business and Innovation Centre 
`Bakers Save Their Dough' 
A local factory has used its loaf to slice rising costs and save over £9,000 
per year. Allied Bakeries, based on Team Valley in Gateshead, supplies bread, 
including Kingsmill, Allinson, and Sunblest, across the UK and when some of 
their packaging was modified to a wax based paper they decided to review their 
processes in order to save operator time. David Hunt (33), Plant Engineer and 
Manager, has worked at the factory for over seventeen years where he began his 
career as an apprentice. He commented: "We were loosing hundreds of loaves a 
day as they got damaged on the production line and additional checks tied our 
operators up for hours at a time when they were needed elsewhere in the factory. 
We were particularly concerned about the increasing level of wastage during the 
production process and so approached the North East Business and Innovation 
Centre's (BIC) Product and Process Development Unit (PPDU) for support. The 
PPDU engineers redesigned our conveyor system to reduce damage by ensuring 
there was a smooth transportation of loaves from the wax wrapping machine to the 
checkweigh. These adjustments have made this process much more efficient and 
cost effective as loaves are no longer being damaged. " 
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The PPDU offers constructive appraisal of production processes and 
equipment to economically and safely achieve more efficient production. 
Recognised by the DTI's Manufacturing Advisory Service as a Centre of Expertise 
in Manufacturing the PPDU is staffed by a strong team of mechanical, electrical, 
electronics and industrial design engineers, all of whom are keen to keep up with 
advances in technology. 
Peter Warriner, Electrical Engineer, commented: "Often it takes another set 
of eyes to find a simple solution to a problem that could be costing a company 
thousands of pounds. It has been fantastic to work with Allied and I am thrilled 
that we have found a way to save them so much money and cut down waste. " 
Incubators employ a variety of media that include, the internet, features in 
local and regional press, circulars (paper and online) and with varied circulations 
(local, regional, pan-european) and/or contribute to others, events within and 
outwith the region served by the incubator and award schemes which aside from 
promoting and rewarding innovation, recognizing indigenous assets, etc also 
engage stakeholders, sponsors in a high visibility example of incubator activity as 
regards one of the ways incubators (and stakeholder/sponsors, collectively) add 
value. Many incubators do however prepare annual report(s) featuring notable 
accomplishments, outcomes, the progress of strategies and plans with reference to 
local conditions and their regional/local mandate(s). Such reports also feature 
relatively limited quantitative information that may or may not include statements 
and/or an explication of income and expenditure, number of jobs and enterprises 
created, number of businesses assisted (and featuring the nature, level and outcome 
of selected examples of assistance), occupancy rates, and tenant surveys. Such 
reports tend to have a varied and sometimes restricted circulation. 
The most likely explanations advanced in the course of this research for the 
fact that incubators do not produce such detailed studies of their own activity or 
that detailed studies have not been carried out, have included: 
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  Stakeholders and/or sponsors (i. e. that matter) are evidently content - 
for the moment - with incubator performance as currently reported 
(they do not require any more sophisticated reporting or they accept 
that howsoever `sophisticated' an alternative evaluation framework 
might be, it will nevertheless have no additional utility - for example - 
there is no framework or data against which to judge results); 
  Stakeholders and/or sponsors are not satisfied that other more rigorous 
metrics or considerations will dispose satisfactorily of the cause-effect 
issue and that such efforts will produce nothing other than protracted 
academic discourse as regards attribution. Kuratko and Lafollette 
(1987, p. 49-55) query attribution and note that incubator results may 
be no more than a product or factor of the degree and extent to which 
the incubator has been adept at screening and selecting the firms they 
support. This concept is developed by Bearse (1998, p. 322-333) who 
queries and compares the selection of incubatees and the selection of 
students for admission to Harvard University. Bearse queries whether 
Harvard students (the incubatees) achieve success because of the 
Harvard experience/environment or because Harvard has selected 
students who would be successful in any event. It is noted that 
attribution and the difficulties in establishing a legitimate claim to 
causation and effect is not meaningfully pursued or disposed of in 
practitioner reporting; 
  By incorporating and engaging the expectations, interest and support of 
their constituents incubators and stakeholders/sponsors are partners in 
the incubation process. Stakeholders and/or sponsors are tied into, or 
are active in, incubator activity and therefore share responsibility for 
success and failure and in any event it is in the mutual interest of all 
parties to agree upon the success of the modality and promote the same. 
  There is a level of mutual appreciation, respect and understanding, 
between stakeholders and/or sponsors and incubation personnel that 
regardless of outcomes, incubator activity represents an earnest and 
genuine endeavour (especially in the absence of genuine alternatives); 
  Incubation is perceived and accepted as a successful modality. Not 
only do incubators provide a physical manifestation of policy they also 
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produce physical exemplars as representative of the fruits of their 
labours. This is as important for stakeholders and/or sponsors as the 
incubator personnel directly involved in the incubation process who 
bask in the reflected glory of individual incubatee achievements; 
  Stakeholders and/or sponsors accept or understand that incubators 
rarely have the time, resources or the inclination to devote to protracted 
introspection to say nothing of `as to what end or purpose' could such 
data and analysis be put. 
  The nature or organisation of the industry does not lend itself to the 
imposition of evaluation metrics that are overly prescriptive or rigid 
and fail to capture the nature and level of incubator interventions in all 
their variety. 
  Further, while there are those that might wish to evaluate the 
performance and contribution of incubators they generally lack the 
influence and authority (including national, regional and local 
government) across the industry to require incubators to co-operate 
with or submit to detailed scrutiny. In any event, as noted above, it has 
also been suggested that incubators are reluctant to submit to 
evaluations, metrics or standards that unduly fetter their operations or 
surrender their independence to a would-be over-arching executive or 
regulatory authority, a point seemingly acknowledged by the UK 
Government and acknowledged by Lord Sainsbury's announcement of 
the `Quality Benchmarks for Business Incubators': "[there] is evidence 
that the business incubation community is maturing - that they want 
something to measure themselves against... However, there have also 
been concerns expressed within the incubation community about the 
introduction of a standard. At national level, we have listened to these 
concerns and I would like to reassure those people that it is not our 
intention to impose the standard upon you. We recognise that 
incubators will always be at various stages of development and not all 
will be able to meet the criteria of a standard from the outset. The 
sensible and most pragmatic way forward, in my view, is to proceed on 
an evolutionary basis and allow stakeholders, partners and the 
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incubation community, to determine the pace of progress according to 
individual circumstances. 2 
Notwithstanding, such reservations and a general lack of detailed 
evaluations of incubator performance, incubators and particularly BICs are 
credited with and/or claim a range of qualitative and quantitative effects. As 
regards an example of the former, BICs are said to have made a meaningful 
contribution to supporting a move from top-down approach to regional 
development (largely characterised by public interventions designed to facilitate 
transfers of mobile capital and jobs from prosperous or prospering regions to 
underdeveloped or declining regions), to a bottom-up approach focused on 
maximising the indigenous potential for economic development and led by those at 
the interface between public policy and the provision of direct support. Further, as 
reported by the European Commission Directorate-General for Regional Policy's 
External evaluation study of the BIC programme (1984-97)3: 
  Compared with similar organisations, BICs carry out outstanding 
work and are in tune with the needs of small businesses and 
potential entrepreneurs in the less-favoured regions. This is thanks to a 
common model governed by Community standards, a European 
network and an evaluation procedure, all rewarded by a European 
quality label. 
  Their integrated business advisory services are perfectly suited to the 
development of innovative policies in the Member States which has 
allowed them to participate in the implementation of Structural Funds 
measures and in other Community programmes in favour of SMEs, 
including ERDF Article 10 pilot projects. 
  The public/private partnerships that support BICs, usually with a 
majority public interest, can have a great influence at the interface 
between public policy and private interests. At the same time, 
2 Retrieved on 19.04.2005 from DTI website: 
t :Iw 11 is SSS 
European Commission Directorate-General for Regional Policy's External evaluation study of the 
BIC programme, cited in European Commission Guide to European Business Innovation Centres 
Factsheet 5 
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operational BICs get their resources to implement measures in favour 
of SMEs both from the market, i. e. by providing services to businesses, 
and from public bodies. A large portion of BICs also have access to 
risk-capital for financing innovative projects. 
As regards, an example of the latter, EBN (2004) reports that in 2003 155 
BICs providing business start-up creation and incubation support AND business 
and innovation support to existing SMEs were responsible for: 
Table 6.1 
Total BIC Collective Interventions (2003) 
Average 
per BIC 
(155) 
(Mean) 
64,000 Contacts with potential entrepreneurs 412.9 
14,000 Projects/business ideas investigated i. e. feasibility studies 
undertaken 
90.3 
6,000 Business plans completed 38.7 
3,800 Business start-ups facilitated or assisted 24.5 
10,500 Jobs created during the business start up phase 67.7 
3,200 BIC tenant businesses 20.6 
17,400 Jobs created by businesses hosted by BIC incubators (after the 
start up) 
112.2 
26,000 People attending training seminars for potential entrepreneurs 167.7 
16,000 Existing businesses supported by the BICs 103.2 
9,000 Business supported with strategic advice and guidance 58 
2,300 SME innovation diagnostics 14.8 
6,000 SMEs involved in BIC programmes, initiatives or schemes 38.7 
10,000 SMEs benefited from a BIC training programme 64.5 
Source Data: EBN 20054 
° Source Data: EBN (2005) 'EBN2004 BIC Observatory - An overview of the BIC approach 
in its 
20th year, retrieved on 06.05.2005from EBN website 
htt2: //auality, ebn. be/Documents/2004%20BIC%200bservatory pdf 
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Again while descriptive of the nature of selected activity, the level of 
impact/added value is difficult to discern, as for example the aforementioned 
outputs and outcomes are not subject to comparative assessment. 
6.4 The Contribution of NEBIC (Local added value and Impact) 
As regards the performance and contribution of the North East Business 
Innovation Centre, a number of qualitative and quantitative indicators were 
selected against which to report NEBIC's local added value or impact. The former 
were selected so as to capture and define the nature of NEBIC operations i. e. 
develop an overview as to the nature of NEBIC's contribution or `added-value' in 
the locality and region. The Quantitative measures were selected as they generally 
accord with economic development programme metrics against which to report 
activity. 
6.4.1 Qualitative Indictors 
NEBIC's general aims and objectives are explored in Case Study 1 
(Chapter 4). Plotted against the framework of incubator objects as developed in 
Chapter 5, NEBIC was found to generally deliver a programme of activities and 
endeavour that may be said to reflect 36 of the 38 objects presented below. 
Table 6.2: Incubator Objects NEBIC 
1. Contribution to national, regional and local economic development 
2. Enhancing industrial competitiveness and profitability 
3. Building or accelerating growth of a local industry/sector(s) V 
4. Wealth creation and concomitant increase in tax revenues V 
5. Remediation and re-use of industrial (derelict) sites and real estate 
development 
6. Re-use of redundant (landmark) buildings x 
7. Rural/Urban industrial regeneration, restructuring or development 
8. Revitalising distressed neighbourhoods 
9. SME creation and development (and improved rates thereof) 
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10. Retaining businesses in the local economy  
11. Technology development and transfer  
12. Innovation and commercialisation of technology  
13. Supporting the innovation process  
14. Combating Unemployment  
15. Employment creation (and safeguarding employment)  
16. Graduate retention (and/or retention of skilled personnel)  
17. Providing a supportive environment for entrepreneurs  
18. Stimulating, mobilising and assisting entrepreneurship  
19. Enhancing a communities entrepreneurial climate and the value it 
attributes to entrepreneurship and innovation 
 
20. Increased community pride and self-esteem 
21. Cultural change (promoting creativity, entrepreneurship and 
innovation 
 
22. Community development/Empowering disadvantaged communities 
to develop social enterprises 
 
23. Assisting socially disadvantaged groups - such as youth and 
minorities -, promote niche sectors including music and the arts 
 
24. Identifying and supporting spin-in and spin-out business 
opportunities 
 
25. Supporting academic, student/graduate entrepreneurship V 
26. Supporting and promoting the commercialisation of university 
research and strengthening interactions between university-research- 
industry 
 
27. Provision of Education, Training and Continuous Professional 
Development 
 
28. Research, teaching and learning `11 
29. Facilitating institutional linkages (Business-education, Business- 
Science, Innovation and Research) 
`/ 
30. Upgrading the indigenous research base and the technological 
standing of firms in a given locality 
`" 
31. Expanding and/or co-ordinating the supply of business support 
infrastructure 
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32. Generating Net Income for the Incubator or sponsoring  
organisation(s), founders and investors 
33. Supporting indigenous businesses to access finance (including  
grants) and attract investment including FDI and joint venturing 
opportunities 
34. Supporting cluster strategies and plans  
35. Enhancing vertical and horizontal linkages (within and outwith  
supply chains), particularly collaboration between large and small 
firms 
36. Promoting national/regional technology, products and services;  
37. Retaining businesses in the local economy;  
38. Attracting businesses to the local economy and supporting inward  
investment strategies/initiatives; 
While the Case Study and the framework of objects above describes, the nature of 
BIC activity it does little however to illuminate the impact of the incubator within 
the locality or region e. g. in macro-economic or micro-economic terms. 
6.4.2 Quantitative Indicators 
The Operations Director David Howell reports that the BIC, "home to 156 
companies with a collective turnover of £40million+ and has, in the last 10 years 
(as measured on November 10,2004), supported 2,053 companies with a 
combined turnover of £300million+". In an effort, however, to better understand 
and quantify NEBIC activities a reporting framework was developed against which 
incubator activities for the period 2004/2005 were plotted. 
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Table 6.3: Performance Outputs NEBIC 2004/2005 
Enterprise creation 
Enterprise creation with individual entrepreneurs 300 
Development of existing SMEs 500 
Industrial spin-offs facilitated or assisted 10 
Academic spin- facilitated or assisted 10 
Business/Project Opportunities 
Projects screened 500 
Projects selected for support 300 
Technological based projects i. e. "Technology push" 50 
New non-technological activities (marketing, financing, quality, 
intemationlisation... ) considered as "innovative" for the catchment area 
i. e. "Market Pull" 50 
Others (non-innovative) - 
Profile of projects launched in 2004 by new and existing enterprises 
Number of enterprises assisted with innovative projects 100 
Number of enterprises assisted with innovative/innovation diagnostics 85 
% comprising Technological innovation 75 
% Non technological innovation (services, local development oriented) 25 
% Other 
% technology pushed 75 
As may be observed from the table above, the BIC supported both new 
venture creation and existing SMEs. Approximately 60% of business development 
projects assessed by NEBIC received support from NEBIC in one shape or form. 
20% of projects were said to comprise an innovation of which 75% comprised a 
technological innovation. As illustrated, in the table below, 60% of business 
development projects assisted originated within the ICT sector, 12% in the Life 
sciences, genomic & biotech for health sector and 12% concerned Mechantronics. 
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Table 6.4: Profile of innovative projects by sector 
(By new and existing enterprises) % 
Life sciences, genomic & biotech for health 12 
ICT/IT 60 
Nano technologies, nano-sciences, micro-systems 8 
Agro+Agri Technologies (Food quality & safety, packaging, agriculture) 0 
Energy and environmental technologies 8 
Advanced materials 0 
Mechantronics 12 
Other 0 
However, while these reports describe the nature and profile of NEBIC 
`added value' activities, they too however do little to enhance understanding as to 
their nature and level of impact in real terms. NEBIC was therefore invited to 
report cumulative effects or historical impacts as presented below: 
Table 6.5: Historical Impacts 
NEBIC 
Nos. of enterprises created with BIC assistance since BIC created 3,500 
Nos. of jobs created by these enterprises 7,500 
% of enterprises created with BIC support surviving after 3 years 75% 
Nos. of tenants located at the BIC 160 
Nos. of incubatees that have passed through incubator since BIC created 400 
Total number of employees of tenant businesses 1,125 
Computing basic economic effects of job creation as reported above and 
using the average salary for north-east (£20,3535) - and notwithstanding debates as 
to additionality and or attribution - NEBIC might lay claim to, for example, 
responsibility for/being instrumental to personal income generation of the order of 
£114,485,625 ((£20,353 x 7,500 jobs) x 0.75 (adjusting for business failures (see 
I The Guardian Online `Londoners wealthiest in UK' Wednesday February 16, 
2005 http: //money. puardian. co. uk/pay/story/0.13871.1415864.00. html 
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above)); and personal taxation (NI and Income Tax) calculated on basis of single 
persons tax code (489L) and at the basic rate of tax (24% of salary - 15% PAYE 
income tax and 8% National Insurance Contributions) of £27,476,550, to say 
nothing of indirect effects (i. e. job creation in supplier businesses). In a similar 
vein, a calculation of income generation amongst BIC tenants for this year might 
also be made (£20,353 x 1,125 (full-time equivalent posts) = £22,897,125 that in 
turn generates £5,495,310 for the state (Income Tax and National Insurance)). 
In addition, in calculating the number of jobs safeguarded in NEBIC client 
companies this year as reported by NEBIC, a value may also be placed on the 
incomes so protected and the taxes preserved (£20,353 x 1000 = £20,353,000 
(Personal Incomes) and £4,884,720 (Income Tax and National Insurance). Again, 
however, while according these activities or rather outputs `economic values', as 
measures of incubator performance they nevertheless do not adequately illuminate 
NEBIC's impact (or otherwise) on assisted businesses. 
To this end, an interview questionnaire was devised to investigate the 
following hypotheses and/or queries in an effort to ascertain the impact of 
incubators on incubated firms (relative to other firms located in other incubators 
and non-incubated firms), i. e. whether the conduct, values, etc, of their business 
differed from non-incubated firms: 
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6.5 Hypotheses/Queries to identify different behaviours between incubated 
and non incubated firms vis-ä-vis innovation and general conduct of 
their businesses 
The hypotheses were evolved with reference to (i) incubators are generally 
believed to prioritise innovation in the way they select the businesses they support 
and (ii) key `values' or `behaviours generally considered to promoted or supported 
by business incubators and/or instilled in their tenants as best business practice. 
1. Incubated firms are more innovatory than non-incubated firms (as 
measured by novelty); 
2. Incubated firms are more innovatory than non-incubated firms (as 
measured by their propensity to innovate); 
3. Incubated firms are more likely to invest/incur business expenditure related 
to R&D (BERD); 
4. R&D/Innovation effort is more likely to be commercial i. e. market 
led/focused in incubated firms and the than non-incubated firms; 
5. Innovation within incubated firms is more likely to be the outcome of 
strategies and plans than non-incubated firms; and 
6. Incubated firms are more likely to accord a value (a higher value) to 
product/service innovations and, for example, their role in/importance to 
extending product/service ranges, market share and penetration and quality 
than non-incubated firms 
7. Incubated firms are more likely to accord a value (a higher value) to 
process innovations and, for example, their role in/importance to reducing 
operating costs (materials, energy and labour), improving flexibility and 
increasing capacity. 
8. Incubated firms are more likely to lever public support or collaborate in the 
development of innovatory products and processes than non-incubated 
firms. 
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6.6 Hypotheses/Queries to identify different behaviours between incubated 
and non incubated firms vis-a-vis the general conduct of their business 
9. Incubated firms are more likey to adopt flatter management structures. 
10. Incubated firms are more likely to value and protect IPR than non 
incubated firms 
11. Incubated firms are more likely to employ ICT in their business, 
particularly advanced ICT applications; 
12. Incubated firms are more likely to be quality conscious and have secured 
quality accreditation than non-incubated firms; 
13. Incubated firms are more likely to engage with and avail themselves of 
public support for business and technology development; 
14. Incubated firms are more likely to have experienced growth than non- 
incubated firms as measured by increases in turnover; and 
15. Incubated firms are more likely to have experienced growth than non- 
incubated firms as measured by increases in employment. 
6.7 Data Analysis: About the Sample 
The sample (respondent profile) comprised 78 firms located in business 
incubators in the North East of England and 124 businesses located in the North 
East but outwith business incubator environments. The data collected by postal 
survey, telephone interview and face-to-face interviews, was disaggregated and is 
presented by type of respondent i. e. resident at an incubator in the North East, and 
resident within the North East but outwith all business incubator environments. 
SPSS was used to cross-tabulate the data and calculate the Chi-Square (a 
probability level equal to or less than 0.05 was considered to be significant). In 
addition, where as a consequence of the sample size the calculation of the Chi- 
Square returned a result where one or more cells had an expected count less than 5, 
this is noted and reflected in the analysis and the conclusions drawn hereafter. 
Therein, the average size of firms per size class (as measured by total employment) 
was, as follows: 
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Table 6.6: Respondent Size as measured by total employment (Average) 
Full-time Equivalents 
N=No. of Cases Mean Median Total N 
Incubator Respondents 12.38 7 78 
Non-incubated Respondents 25.29 11.50 124 
While the difference in size of firm as between types of respondent 
(Median) may not appear significant the difference between their relative turnovers 
is, as illustrated below, more marked: 
Table 6.7: Respondent Size as measured by total turnover (Average) 
Turnover 
N=No. of Cases Mean Median Total N 
Incubator Respondents 924,714 250,000 42 
Non-incubated Respondents 3,116,933 780,000.00 60 
The data presented in the table above, relates to values as reported by 
almost half of the respondents (there was a general reticence amongst respondents 
to disclose financial information relating to their business). It may nevertheless be 
observed that turnover, as reported by incubator respondents compared to non- 
incubated firms was substantially less than half of the latter. The difference might 
be explained by the apparent difference in their respective trade histories or rather 
their longevity. 
As illustrated below, there are significant differences between both the 
types of respondent. Interestingly their is a presumption in much of the literature 
that incubation is/should be a three-year process and yet the median age of 
incubator respondents was 5 years. 
Table 6.8: Average Age of Respondent Businesses 
N=No. of Cases Mean Median Total N 
Incubator Respondents 8.23 5 77 
Non-incubated Respondents 27.74 16 123 
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6.7.1 Innovation and Novelty: Product Innovators 
Hypothesis 1: Incubated firms are more innovatory than non-incubated 
firms (as measured by novelty). 
Respondents were invited to report whether product innovation had 
occurred within their business in the last two years and, if so, characterize the level 
of novelty i. e. whether product innovations occurring in the business were merely 
new to their firm, and/or were new to their market, and/or new to their industry. 
Table 6.9: Innovation and Novelty: Product Innovators 
N=No. of Cases No Yes 
New to their Firm N % N % Total N 
Incubator Respondents 46 58 33 42 79 
Non-incubated Respondents 72 58 53 42 125 
Pearson Chi-Square . 008(b) 
Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) . 930 
Continuity Correction (a) . 000 
a Computed only for 2x2 table 
b0 cells (. 0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected counted is 33.30 
N=No. of Cases No Yes 
New to their Market N % N % Total N 
Incubator Respondents 57 73 21 27 78 
Non-incubated Respondents 115 92 10 8 125 
Pearson Chi-Square 13.292(b) 
Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) . 000 
Continuity Correction (a) 11.870 
a Computed only for 2x2 table 
b0 cells (. 0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected counted is 11.91 
N=No. of Cases No Yes 
New to their Industry N % N % Total N 
Incubator Respondents 58 74 20 26 78 
Non-incubated Respondents 124 99 1 1 125 
Pearson Chi-Square 31.956(b) 
Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) . 000 
Continuity Correction (a) 29.334 
a Computed only for 2x2 table 
b0 cells (. 0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected counted is 8.07 
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Using SPSS to conduct bivariate analyses and calculate the Chi-Square was 
calculated for the two types of respondent reporting product innovations `New to 
their firm', 'New to their market' and `New to their industry'. A significant 
relationship was noted as regards respondents reporting product innovations `New 
to their market' and `New to their industry' with proportionately more incubator 
respondents than non-incubated respondents reporting product innovation `new to 
their market' (27% of incubator respondents compared to 8% non-incubated 
respondents) and New to their industry' (26% of incubator respondents compared 
to 1% of non-incubated respondents). 
6.7.2 Innovation and Novelty: Process Innovators 
Hypothesis 1: Incubated firms are more innovatory than non-incubated 
firms (as measured by novelty. 
Respondents were invited to report whether process innovation had 
occurred within their business in the last two years and, if so, characterize the level 
of novelty i. e. whether process innovations occurring in the business were merely 
`new to their firm', and/or were `new to their market', and/or `new to their 
industry'. Using SPSS to calculate the Chi-Square for the two types of 
respondents reporting process innovations `New to their firm', `New to their 
market' and `New to their industry' (as illustrated in Table 6.10 below), a 
significant relationship was found as regards respondents reporting process 
innovations `New to their market' and `New to their industry' with 31% of 
incubator respondents reporting process innovation `New to their market' 
compared to 14% of non-incubated respondents and 23% of incubator respondents 
reporting process innovation `New to their industry' compared to 3% of non- 
incubated respondents. As regards respondents reporting process innovations `new 
to their industry', however, it is noted than one of the cells had an expected count 
less than 5 and this is reflected in the analysis. 
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Table 6.10: Innovation and Novelty: Process Innovators 
N=No. of Cases No Yes 
New to their Firm N % N % Total N 
Incubator Respondents 30 60 20 40 50 
Non-incubated Respondents 23 58 17 42 40 
Pearson Chi-Square . 057(b) 
Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) . 811 
Continuity Correction (a) . 001 
a Computed only for 2x2 table 
b0 cells (. 0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected counted is 16.44 
N=No. of Cases No Yes 
New to their Market N % N % Total N 
Incubator Respondents 27 69 12 31 39 
Non-incubated Respondents 12 86 2 14 14 
Pearson Chi-Square 6.967(b) 
Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) . 008 
Continuity Correction (a) 5.479 
a Computed only for 2x2 table 
b0 cells (. 0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected counted is 6.42 
N=No. of Cases No Yes 
New to their Industry N % N % Total N 
Incubator Respondents 30 77 9 23 39 
Non-incubated Respondents 32 97 1 3 33 
Pearson Chi-Square 6.006(b) 
Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) . 014 
Continuity Correction (a) 4.447 
a Computed only for 2x2 table 
b1 cells (25.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected counted is 4.58 
6.7.3 Innovation and Novelty: Administrative Innovators 
Hypothesis 1: Incubated firms are more innovatory than non-incubated 
firms (as measured by novelty. 
Respondents were also invited to report whether administrative innovations 
had occurred within their business in the last two years and, if so, characterize the 
level of novelty i. e. whether administrative innovations occurring in the business 
were merely `new to their firm', and/or 'new to their industry'. As regards 
administrative innovations and the degree of novelty therein, incubated firms again 
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reported higher incidence of innovation than non-incubated firms. 54% of 
incubator respondents reported administrative innovations `new to their firm' and 
21% administrative innovations `new to their industry' compared to 25% and 12% 
of non-incubated respondents, respectively. 
Table 6.11: Innovation and Novelty: Administrative Innovators 
N=No. of Cases No Yes 
New to their Firm N % N % Total N 
Incubator Respondents 21 46 25 54 46 
Non-incubated Respondents 15 79 4 21 19 
Pearson Chi-Square 6.032(b) 
Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) . 000 
Continuity Correction (a) 4.760 
a Computed only for 2x2 table 
b0 cells (. 0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected counted is 8.48 
N=No. of Cases No Yes 
New to their Industry N % N % Total N 
Incubator Respondents 27 75 9 25 36 
Non-incubated Respondents 15 88 2 12 17 
Pearson Chi-Square 1.230(b) 
Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) . 014 
Continuity Correction (a) . 557 
a Computed only for 2x2 table 
b1 cells (25.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected counted is 3.53 
Again, using SPSS to conduct bivariate analyses, and to calculate the Chi- 
Square for the two types of respondent reporting administrative innovations 'New 
to their firm' and 'New to their industry', as illustrated in Table 6.11 (above), a 
significant relationship was found as regards respondents reporting administrative 
innovations `New to their firm'. No significant relationship was found in relation 
to administrative innovations 'New to their Industry'. 
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6.7.4 Innovation and Novelty: General 
Hypothesis 1: Incubated firms are more innovatory than non-incubated 
firms (as measured by novelty. 
Finally, as regards the level of innovation i. e. novelty, respondents were 
also invited to characterise innovation(s) as occurring within their businesses (in 
the last two years) as to whether they amounted to: 
  New and Original Breakthroughs advancing the state of the art in their 
industry or technology; or 
" Extensions of the businesses own products, processes or practices to which 
the firm is making incremental improvements on a continuous basis; or 
  The introduction of products, processes or practices which the firm has 
observed elsewhere and has sought to adopt and adapt the same (i. e. not 
just copying but adapting/improving it - adding new features/stripping out 
features) and introduce it to customers; or 
  The introduction of products, processes or practices which have been 
observed elsewhere and adopted (copied/mirrored) and introduced by the 
business (observed elsewhere e. g. competitor/non-competitor businesses, 
business journal, newspaper, industry best practice exemplars, etc). 
The responses are presented below. 
As is evident from the responses collected and presented above (Tables 
6.9-11), in general terms, more incubated respondents reported a higher level of 
novelty than non-incubated respondents. Prima facie, it therefore appears that 
incubated firms are more innovative as measured with reference to the novelty 
reported by them as inherent in their product and/or process and/or administrative 
innovations. 
Using SPSS to calcuate the Chi-Square for the two types of respondent vis- 
ä-vis the level (novelty) of innovation they reported (Table 6.12) a significant 
relationship was found for the two types of respondents reporting `New & Original 
Breakthrough(s)' and `Adoptions'. With proportionately more incubator 
respondents reporting the former (19%) than non-incubated respondents (7%). 
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Table 6.12: Novelty: Respondents reporting innovation(s) as... 
N=No. of Cases No Yes 
New & Original 
Breakthrough(s) 
N % N % Total N 
Incubator Respondents 54 81 13 19 67 
Non-incubated Respondents 55 93 4 7 59 
Pearson Chi-Square 4.283(b) 
Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) . 038 
Continuity Correction (a) 3.270 
a Computed only for 2x2 table 
b0 cells (. 0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected counted is 7.96 
N=No. of Cases No Yes 
Extension of own 
product(s)/service(s) 
N % N % Total N 
Incubator Respondents 23 34 45 66 68 
Non-incubated Respondents 21 34 41 66 62 
Pearson Chi-Square . 000(b) 
Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) . 995 
Continuity Correction (a) . 000 
a Computed only for 2x2 table 
b0 cells (. 0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected counted is 20.98 
N=No. of Cases No Yes 
Adapted Adoptions N % N % Total N 
Incubator Respondents 59 88 8 12 67 
Non-incubated Respondents 45 76 14 24 59 
Pearson Chi-Square 3.025(b) 
Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) . 082 
Continuity Correction (a) 2.263 
a Computed only for 2x2 table 
b0 cells (. 0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected counted is 10.30 
N=No. of Cases No Yes 
Adoptions N % N % Total N 
Incubator Respondents 63 94 4 6 67 
Non-incubated Respondents 49 83 10 17 59 
Pearson Chi-Square 3.829(b) 
Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) . 050 
Continuity Correction (a) 2.798 
a Computed only for 2x2 table 
b0 cells (. 0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected counted is 6.56 
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It was expected that incubated firms at least would, by their very nature, 
exhibit more innovative behaviours (i. e. it is assumed that incubators are focused 
on supporting only/the most innovative businesses - see also Chapter 4). 
However, as explained in Chapter 4 this is not prescribed. Indeed, a number of 
other factors are considered when, for example, NEBIC selects a firm to support. 
6.7.5 Innovation and Propensity to Innovate: Product Innovators 
Hypothesis 2: Incubated firms are more innovatory than non-incubated 
firms (as measured by their propensity to innovate). 
Respondents were also invited to report their propensity to innovate i. e. 
whether innovation is a continuous aspect of their business, regularly recurring, 
occasional or rare. The results are presented below as per product, process and 
administrative innovators. 
Table 6.13 Propensity to Innovate: Product Innovators 
N=No. of Cases No Yes 
Constant N % N % Total N 
Incubator Respondents 16 37 27 63 43 
Non-incubated Respondents 64 88 9 12 73 
N=No. of Cases No Yes 
Regular N % N % Total N 
Incubator Respondents 34 79 9 21 43 
Non-incubated Respondents 64 88 9 12 73 
N=No. of Cases No Yes 
Occasional N % N % Total N 
Incubator Respondents 36 84 7 16 43 
Non-incubated Respondents 54 74 19 26 73 
N=No. of Cases No Yes 
Rare N % N % Total N 
Incubator Respondents 43 100 0 0 43 
Non-incubated Respondents 37 51 36 49 73 
Pearson Chi-Square 45.846(a) 
Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) 
. 000 
Continuity Correction 
a0 cells (. 0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 6.67. 
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As may be observed from the data presented above, incubated businesses 
reporting product innovation also reported a higher propensity to innovate than 
non-incubated businesses. Using SPSS to conduct bivariate analyses and calculate 
the Chi-Square for the two types of respondent, a significant relationship was 
found for the types of respondents and their propensity to innovate new products. 
As may be observed from Table 6.13 (above), proportionately more of the 
incubator respondents reported that product innovation was constant or regular 
while a higher proportion of non-incubated respondents reported that product 
innovation was only occasional or rare. 
6.7.6 Innovation and Propensity to Innovate: Process Innovators 
Hypothesis 2: Incubated firms are more innovatory than non-incubated 
firms (as measured by their propensity to innovate). 
Prima facie, as is evident from the data presented below, incubated 
businesses reporting process innovation, also report a higher propensity to 
innovate than non-incubated businesses: 
Table 6: 14 Propensity to Innovate: Process Innovators 
N=No. of Cases No Yes 
Constant N % N % Total N 
Incubator Respondents 7 27 19 73 26 
Non-incubated Respondents 59 95 3 5 62 
N=No. of Cases No Yes 
Regular N % N % Total N 
Incubator Respondents 21 81 5 19 26 
Non-incubated Respondents 59 95 3 5 62 
N=No. of Cases No Yes 
Occasional N % N % Total N 
Incubator Respondents 26 100 0 0 26 
Non-incubated Respondents 55 89 7 11 62 
N=No. of Cases No Yes 
Rare N % N % Total N 
Incubator Respondents 24 92 2 8 26 
Non-incubated Respondents 13 21 49 79 62 
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Pearson Chi-Square 57.315(a) 
Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) . 000 
Continuity Correction - 
a3 cells (37.5%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 2.07. 
Using SPSS to conduct bivariate analyses and calculate the Chi-Square for 
the two types of respondent, a significant relationship was found between the types 
of respondents and their propensity to innovate new processes. As may be 
observed from the Table above, like the propensity to innovate new products, 
proportionately more of the incubator respondents reported that process innovation 
was a constant or regular feature of their business while a higher proportion of 
non-incubated respondents reported that process innovation was only occasional or 
rare. It is noted however that three of the cells (above) had an expected count less 
than 5. 
6.7.7 Innovation and Propensity to Innovate: Administrative Innovators 
Hypothesis 2: Incubated firms are more innovatory than non-incubated 
firms (as measured by their propensity to innovate). 
Finally, respondents were also invited to report the propensity to generate 
administrative innovations in their business. 
Table 6.15: Propensity to Innovate: Administrative Innovations 
N=No. of Cases No Yes 
Constant N % N % Total N 
Incubator Respondents 15 48 16 52 31 
Non-incubated Respondents 52 96 2 4 54 
N=No. of Cases No Yes 
Regular N % N % Total N 
Incubator Respondents 26 84 5 6 31 
Non-incubated Respondents 53 98 1 2 54 
N=No. of Cases No Yes 
Occasional N % N % Total N 
Incubator Respondents 24 77 7 23 31 
Non-incubated Respondents 53 98 1 2 54 
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N=No. of Cases No Yes 
Rare N % N % Total N 
Incubator Respondents 28 90 3 10 31 
Non-incubated Respondents 4 74 50 26 54 
Pearson Chi-Square 57.739(a) 
Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) 
Continuity Correction 
a3 cells (37.5%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 2.19. 
Again incubated firms, proportionately, reported a higher propensity to 
innovate than non-incubated firms. Using SPSS to conduct bivariate analyses and 
calculate the Chi-Square for the two types of respondent no relationship was found 
as between the types of respondents and their propensity to innovate administrative 
innovations. 
6.7.8 Innovation and Investment in R&D (BERD) 
Hypothesis 3: Incubated firms are more likely to invest/incur business 
expenditure related to R&D (BERD). 
As regards the priority accorded innovation by indigenous businesses, 
respondents were invited to indicate whether they incurred expenditure on R&D in 
the last two years in the pursuit of product, process or administrative innovations. 
As may be observed from Table 6.16 (below), a greater proportion of incubated 
businesses reported expenditure on R&D (BERD) than non-incubated businesses. 
Table 6.16: Respondents reporting investment in R&D (BERD) 
N=No. of Cases No Yes 
In-House N % N % Total N 
Incubator Respondents 35 58 25 42 60 
Non-incubated Respondents 71 90 8 10 79 
Pearson Chi-Square 18.737(b) 
Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) . 000 
Continuity Correction (a) 17.035 
a Computed only for 2x2 table 
b0 cells (. 0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected counted is 14.24 
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N=No. of Cases No Yes 
Acquisition of External 
R&D 
N % N % Total N 
Incubator Respondents 44 73 16 27 60 
Non-incubated Respondents 73 92 6 8 79 
Pearson Chi-Square 9.310(b) 
Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) . 002 
Continuity Correction (a) 7.934 
a Computed only for 2x2 table 
b0 cells (. 0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected counted is 9.50 
N=No. of Cases No Yes 
Acquisition of Machinery & 
Equipment 
N % N % Total N 
Incubator Respondents 12 19 50 81 62 
Non-incubated Respondents 63 80 16 20 79 
Pearson Chi-Square 50.885(b) 
Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) . 000 
Continuity Correction (a) 48.489 
a Computed only for 2x2 table 
b0 cells (. 0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected counted is 29.02 
N=No. of Cases No Yes 
Acquisition of external 
Knowledge 
N % N % Total N 
Incubator Respondents 32 54 27 46 59 
Non-incubated Respondents 75 95 4 5 79 
Pearson Chi-Square 32.121(b) 
Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) . 000 
Continuity Correction (a) 29.827 
a Computed only for 2x2 table 
b0 cells (. 0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected counted is 13.25 
N=No. of Cases No Yes 
Design functions N % N % Total N 
Incubator Respondents 42 71 17 29 59 
Non-incubated Respondents 76 96 3 4 79 
Pearson Chi-Square 17.056(b) 
Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) . 000 
Continuity Correction (a) 15.097 
a Computed only for 2x2 table 
b0 cells (. 0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected counted is 8.55 
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N=No. of Cases No Yes 
Training N % N % Total N 
Incubator Respondents 25 42 37 58 62 
Non-incubated Respondents 73 92 6 8 79 
Pearson Chi-Square 44.456(b) 
Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) . 000 
Continuity Correction (a) 42.032 
a Computed only for 2x2 table 
b0 cells (. 0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected counted is 18.91 
N=No. of Cases No Yes 
Internal/External marketing N % N % Total N 
Incubator Respondents 28 45 34 55 62 
Non-incubated Respondents 74 94 5 6 79 
Pearson Chi-Square 40.853(b) 
Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) . 000 
Continuity Correction (a) 38.465 
a Computed only for 2x2 table 
b0 cells (. 0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected counted is 17.15 
Notwithstanding the fact, as expressed in chapter 2, that there are severe 
limitations in the utilty of BERD as a definitive descriptor of innovation or 
innovativeness, as illustated in Table 6.16 (above) proportionately more `Incubator 
Respondents' reported BERD than 'Non-incubated Respondents'. Using SPSS to 
conduct bivariate analyses and calculate the Chi-Square for the two types of 
respondent, a significant relationship was found between the types of respondent 
reporting BERD, specifically `In-House', 'Acquisition of External R&D', 
`Acquisition of Machinery & Equipment', `Acquisition of External Knowledge' 
`Training' and `Internal External marketing'. With proportionately more incubator 
respondents than non-incubated respondents reporting expenditure on: 
  R&D `In-House' (42% compared to 10%, respectively); 
  Acquisition of External R&D'(27% compared to 8%, respectively); 
Acquisition of Machinery & Equipment (81% compared to 20%, respectively); 
  Acquisition of External Knowledge (46% compared to 5%, respectively); 
  Training (58% compared to 8%, respectively) 
  Internal/External marketing' (55% compared to 6%, respectively) 
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6.7.9 Innovation & Market Focus 
Hypothesis 4: R&D/Innovation effort is more likely to be commercial i. e. 
market led/focused in incubated firms and the than non-incubated firms. 
Aside from novelty and the intensity of innovation, respondents were 
invited to explain whether innovation in their business was 'market led/pull' or 
`discovery-push' and whether innovation was generally the outcome of strategies 
and plans or more organic by nature. It was assumed that innovation in incubated 
firms was more likely to be market led/focused than non-incubated firms. A visual 
inspection of the data is not particularly telling. 
Table 6.17: Innovation & Market Focus 
N=No. of Cases No Yes 
Discovery-Push N % N % Total N 
Incubator Respondents 38 59 26 41 64 
Non-incubated Respondents 43 58 31 42 74 
Pearson Chi-Square . 023(b) 
Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) . 880 
Continuity Correction (a) . 000 
a Computed only for 2x2 table 
b0 cells (. 0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected counted is 26.43 
N=No. of Cases No Yes 
Market-Pull N % N % Total N 
Incubator Respondents 28 44 35 56 63 
Non-incubated Respondents 31 43 41 57 72 
Pearson Chi-Square . 026(b) 
Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) . 871 
Continuity Correction (a) . 000 
a Computed only for 2x2 table 
b0 cells (. 0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected counted is 27.53 
Moreover, when the Chi-Square was calculated using SPSS no significant 
relationship could be found. 
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6.7.10 Innovation as the outcome of strategies and plans 
Hypothesis 5: Innovation within incubated firms is more likely to be the 
outcome of strategies and plans than non-incubated firms. 
A greater proportion of incubator respondents reported that innovation was 
the outcome of strategies and plans in incubated firms than non-incubated firms. 
Using SPSS to conduct bivariate analyses and calculate the Chi-Square for both 
classes of respondent, no relationship could be found betweeen the type of 
respondent and whether innovation in respondent firms was the outcome of 
strategies and plans i. e. programmed. 
Table 6.18: Innovation Programmed as part of a strategy or plan 
N=No. of Cases No Yes 
Programmed N % N % Total N 
Incubator Respondents 37 57 28 43 65 
Non-incubated Respondents 45 67 22 33 67 
Pearson Chi-Square 1.471(b) 
Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) . 225 
Continuity Correction (a) 1.068 
a Computed only for 2x2 table 
b0 cells (. 0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected counted is 24.62 
N=No. of Cases No Yes 
Unprogrammed i. e. organic N % N % Total N 
Incubator Respondents 32 50 32 50 64 
Non-incubated Respondents 26 38 43 62 69 
Pearson Chi-Square 2.049(b) 
Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) . 152 
Continuity Correction (a) 1.579 
a Computed only for 2x2 table 
b0 cells (. 0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected counted is 27.91 
Moreover, no relation could be found as between the nature of innovations 
occurring as the outcomes of strategies and plans, and their degree of novelty, 
propensity to innovate or indeed growth (as measured by increases in employment 
or tumover). 
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6.7.11 Importance of Product Innovation. 
Hypothesis 6: Incubated firms are more likely to accord a value (a higher 
value) to productlservice innovations and, for example, their role 
in/importance to extending productlservice ranges, market share and 
penetration and quality than non-incubated firms. 
Respondents were invited to ascribe a value to the contribution product 
and/or service innovation had made to extending their product/service range(s), 
opening new markets/increasing market share, and enhancing quality. 
Table 6.19: Importance of Product Innovation to... 
N=No. of Cases Not Significant Significant 
Extending Product Range N % N % Total N 
Incubator Respondents 10 23 33 77 43 
Non-incubated Respondents 39 48 42 52 81 
Pearson Chi-Square 12.708(a) 
Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) . 005 
Continuity Correction 
a0 cells (. 0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 7.28. 
N=No. of Cases Not Significant Significant 
Opening new markets and/or 
increasing market share 
N % N % Total N 
Incubator Respondents 11 26 31 74 42 
Non-incubated Respondents 46 58 34 42 80 
Pearson Chi-Square 17.197(a) 
Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) . 001 
Continuity Correction - 
a0 cells (. 0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 6.89. 
N=No. of Cases Not Significant Significant 
Improved quality N % N % Total N 
Incubator Respondents 12 29 30 71 42 
Non-incubated Respondents 38 48 42 52 80 
Pearson Chi-Square 13.812(a) 
Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) . 003 
Continuity Correction - 
a0 cells (. 0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 7.23. 
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Using SPSS to calculate the Chi-Square, a significant relationship was 
identified between the type of respondent and the reported importance of product 
innovation to `Extending product range', `Opening new markets and/or increasing 
market share' and `Improving quality'. 
Again, proportionately more 'incubator respondents' than 'non-incubated 
respondents' accorded a high importance to product innovation, specifically its 
role in 'Extending product range' (77% compared to 52%), 'Opening new markets 
and/or increasing market share' (74% compared to 42%) and 'Improving quality' 
(71% compared to 52%). 
6.7.12 Importance of Process Innovation 
Hypothesis 7. " Incubated firms are more likely to accord a value (a higher 
value) to process innovations and, for example, their role in/importance to 
reducing operating costs (materials, energy and labour), improving 
flexibility and increasing capacity. 
Further, respondents were also invited to consider the importance or 
significance of process innovations in their business and specifically the 
contribution of process innovation to efficiencies, economies and increasing 
flexibility and capacity. Again, using SPSS to conduct bivariate analyses, the Chi- 
Square was calculated for the two types of respondent vis-a-vis the importance 
ascribed by each type of respondent to process innovation vis-a-vis `reduced 
materials/energy costs', `improved flexibility', `reduced labour costs', and 
`increased capacity'. As may be observed from Table 6.20 (overleaf), a significant 
relationship between type of respondent and the importance accorded to process 
innovation's role in generating `reduced materials/energy costs', `improved 
flexibility', `reduced labour costs', and `increased capacity' was noted. 
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Table 6.20: Importance of Process Innovation... 
N=No. of Cases Not Significant Significant 
Reduced materials/Energy 
costs 
N % N % Total N 
Incubator Respondents 15 52 14 48 29 
Non-incubated Respondents 65 T 97 2 3 67 Pearson Chi-Square 35.883(a) 
Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) . 000 
Continuity Correction (a) - 
a1 cell (25%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is . 91. 
N=No. of Cases Not Significant Significant 
Improved flexibility N % N % Total N 
Incubator Respondents 13 46 15 54 28 
Non-incubated Respondents 61 91 6 9 67 
Pearson Chi-Square 30.486(a) 
Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) . 000 
Continuity Correction 
a0 ells (0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is . 59. 
N=No. of Cases Not Significant Significant 
Reduced labour costs N % N % Total N 
Incubator Respondents 19 68 9 32 28 
Non-incubated Respondents 67 100 0 0 67 
Pearson Chi-Square 33.789(a) 
Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) . 000 
Continuity Correction 
a1 cell (25%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is . 59. 
N=No. of Cases Not Significant Significant 
Increased Capacity N % N % Total N 
Incubator Respondents 11 39 17 61 28 
Non-incubated Respondents 62 93 5 7 67 
Pearson Chi-Square 36.146(a) 
Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) . 000 
Continuity Correction (a) 
a0 cells (0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is . 88. 
As may be observed from the data presented above (Table 6.20), incubator 
respondents generally accorded process innovations a higher value than non- 
incubated respondents vis-ä-vis their contribution to reducing materials/energy 
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costs (48% compared to 3%), reducing labour costs (54% compared to 9%) and 
improving flexibility (32% compared to 0%) and increasing capacity (61% 
compared to 7%). It is noted however that one or more cells had an expected 
count less than 5 and thus the data supports no definitive conclusions in this 
regard. 
6.7.13 How businesses innovate 
Hypothesis 8: Incubated firms are more likely to lever public support or 
collaborate in the development of innovatory products and processes than 
non-incubated firms. 
It was postulated that incubated firms would be more likely to lever public 
support or collaborate in the development of innovatory products and processes, 
than non-incubated firms as a factor of the incubator environment/culture they 
inhabit. This was investigated with respondents who indicated that had introduced 
product and/or process innovations. They were invited to specify whether they 
had, for example, collaborated with customers, suppliers, business support agency 
staff or, levered grants to support the development of innovative products, 
processes, etc. Their responses are presented below. As may be observed from the 
data below, a visual inspection of the data is not particularly instructive. 
Table 6.21: Collaborative R&D (Product Innovation) 
N=No. of Cases No Yes 
In house N % N % Total N 
Incubator Respondents 48 61 31 39 79 
Non-incubated Respondents 77 62 48 38 125 
Pearson Chi-Square 0.14(b) 
Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) . 904 
Continuity Correction (a) . 000 
a Computed only for 2x2 table 
b0 cells (. 0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected counted is 30.59 
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N=No. of Cases No Yes Total N 
Developed by other 
businesses/institutions and 
Implemented by respondent 
N % N % Total N 
Incubator Respondents 71 90 8 10 79 
Non-incubated Respondents 110 88 15 12 125 
Pearson Chi-Square . 170(b) 
Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) . 680 
Continuity Correction (a) . 034 
a Computed only for 2x2 table 
b0 cells (. 0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected counted is 8.91 
N=No. of Cases No Yes 
Developed in co-operation 
with other businesses 
N % N % Total N 
Incubator Respondents 73 92 6 8 79 
Non-incubated Respondents 118 94 7 6 125 
Pearson Chi-Square . 323(b) 
Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) . 570 
Continuity Correction (a) . 075 
a Computed only for 2x2 table 
b0 cells (. 0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected counted is 5.03 
N=No. of Cases No Yes 
Developed in consultation 
with suppliers 
N % N % Total N 
Incubator Respondents 76 96 3 4 79 
Non-incubated Respondents 120 96 5 4 125 
Pearson Chi-Square . 005(b) 
Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) . 942 
Continuity Correction (a) . 000 
a Computed only for 2x2 table 
b2 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected counted is 3.10 
N=No. of Cases No Yes 
Developed in consultation 
with customers 
N % N % Total N 
Incubator Respondents 70 89 9 11 79 
Non-incubated Respondents 120 96 5 4 125 
Pearson Chi-Square 4.139(b) 
Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) . 042 
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Continuity Correction (a) 3.063 
a Computed only for 2x2 table 
b0 cells (. 0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected counted is 5.42 
N=No. of Cases No Yes 
Developed in co-operation 
with other institutions 
N % N % 
Total N 
Incubator Respondents 76 96 3 4 79 
Non-incubated Respondents 125 100 0 0 125 
Pearson Chi-Square 4.818(b) 
Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) . 028 
Continuity Correction (a) 2.553 
a Computed only for 2x2 table 
b2 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected counted is 1.16 
N=No. of Cases No Yes 
Developed with the 
assistance of business 
support agency staff 
N % N % Total N 
Incubator Respondents 73 92 6 8 79 
Non-incubated Respondents 124 99 1 1 125 
Pearson Chi-Square 6.745(b) 
Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) . 009 
Continuity Correction (a) 4.850 
a Computed only for 2x2 table 
b2 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected counted is 2.71 
N=No. of Cases No Yes 
Developed with financial 
assistance/grants 
N % N % Total N 
Incubator Respondents 73 94 5 6 78 
Non-incubated Respondents 121 100 0 0 121 
Pearson Chi-Square 7.956(b) 
Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) . 005 
Continuity Correction (a) 5.554 
a Computed only for 2x2 table 
b2 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected counted is 1.96 
Using SPSS to conduct bivariate analyses, the Chi-Square was calculated 
for the two types of respondent and a significant relationship observed between 
type of respondent reporting innovations 'Developed in consultation with 
customers', 'Developed in co-operation with other institutions', 'Developed with 
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the assistance of business support agency staff' and 'Developed with financial 
assistance/grants'. 11% of business incubator respondents reported that they had 
collaborated with customers, 4% had collaborated with other institutions, 8% had 
received assistance from business support agency staff and 6% had benefited from 
financial assistance compared with 4%, 0%, 1% and 0% of non-incubated 
respondents respectively. It is noted that in each of the four cases, namely 
`Product innovation developed in consultation with suppliers', `Product innovation 
developed in co-operation with other institutions', `Product innovation developed 
with the assistance of business support agency staff' and 'Product innovation 
developed with financial assistance/grants' two cells (50%) had an expected count 
less than 5 and thus due caution must be exercised in the interpretation of these 
results. 
Respondents reporting process innovation were similary invited to explain 
further, how process innovation is developed in their business. Again, upon a 
visual inspection of the data, incubated firms appeared to be exhibiting the 
`collaborative' behaviours as had been expected of them, more so than non- 
incubated firms. 
Table 6.22: Collaborative R&D (Process Innovation) 
N=No. of Cases No Yes 
In house N % N % Total N 
Incubator Respondents 25 61 16 39 41 
Non-incubated Respondents 23 59 16 41 39 
Pearson Chi-Square . 033(b) 
Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) . 885 
Continuity Correction (a) . 000 
a Computed only for 2x2 table 
b0 cells (. 0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected counted is 15.60 
N=No. of Cases No Yes 
Developed by other 
businesses/institutions and 
Implemented by respondent 
N % N % Total N 
Incubator Respondents 21 78 6 22 27 
Non-incubated Respondents 30 96 1 4 31 
Pearson Chi-Square 4.907(b) 
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Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) . 027 
Continuity Correction (a) 3.280 
a Computed only for 2x2 table 
b2 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected counted is 3.26 
N=No. of Cases No Yes 
Developed in co-operation 
with other businesses 
N % N % Total N 
Incubator Respondents 23 85 4 15 27 
Non-incubated Respondents 29 93 2 7 31 
Pearson Chi-Square 1.088(b) 
Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) . 297 
Continuity Correction (a) . 373 
a Computed only for 2x2 table 
b2 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected counted is 2.79 
N=No. of Cases No Yes 
Developed in consultation 
with suppliers 
N % N % Total N 
Incubator Respondents 24 89 3 11 27 
Non-incubated Respondents 30 97 1 3 31 
Pearson Chi-Square 1.397(b) 
Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) . 237 
Continuity Correction (a) . 439 
a Computed only for 2x2 table 
b2 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected counted is 1.86 
N=No. of Cases No Yes 
Developed in consultation 
with customers 
N % N % Total N 
Incubator Respondents 24 89 3 11 27 
Non-incubated Respondents 29 94 2 6 31 
Pearson Chi-Square . 398(b) 
Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) . 528 
Continuity Correction (a) . 026 
a Computed only for 2x2 table 
b0 cells (. 0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected counted is 2.33 
N=No. of Cases No Yes 
Developed in co-operation 
with other institutions 
N % N % Total N 
Incubator Respondents 26 96 1 4 27 
Non-incubated Respondents 30 100 0 0 30 
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Pearson Chi-Square 1.131(b) 
Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) . 288 
Continuity Correction (a) . 003 
a Computed only for 2x2 table 
b2 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected counted is . 47 
N=No. of Cases No Yes 
Developed with the 
assistance of business 
support agency staff 
N % N % Total N 
Incubator Respondents 24 89 3 11 27 
Non-incubated Respondents 30 100 0 0 30 
Pearson Chi-Square 3.519(b) 
Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) . 061 
Continuity Correction (a) 1.643 
a Computed only for 2x2 table 
b2 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected counted is 1.42 
N=No. of Cases No Yes 
Developed with the financial 
assistance/grants 
N % N % Total N 
Incubator Respondents 25 93 2 7 27 
Non-incubated Respondents 30 100 0 0 30 
Pearson Chi-Square 2.303(b) 
Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) . 129 
Continuity Correction (a) . 635 
a Computed only for 2x2 table 
b2 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected counted is . 95 
However, when the Chi-Square was calculated for each type of respondent 
(Table 6.22) the only significant relationship identified was as regards respondents 
reporting innovation `Developed by other businesses/institutions and implemented 
by respondent' with 22% of incubator respondents and only 4% of non-incubated 
respondents reporting this behaviour. However, two cells (50%) had an expected 
count less than 5 and thus due caution must and has been exercised in the 
interpretation of these results. 
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6.7.14 Delineation of management responsibilities 
Hypothesis 9: Incubated firms are more likey to adopt flatter management 
structures. 
Management characteristics of incubated and non-incubated firms were 
also compared. Respondents were invited to explain whether the management 
team tasked on functional lines i. e. Director of Finance, Sales, HR, R&TD, etc, 
and whether this was reflected in practice or whether management arrangements 
were more informal i. e. more of a shared and collective undertaking with 
interchangeable roles, tasks, specialities. 
Table 6.23: Management Characteristics 
N=No. of Cases No Yes 
Management Tasked On 
Funtlonal Lines 
N % N % Total N 
Incubator Respondents 46 64 26 36 72 
Non-incubated Respondents 75 T 67 37 33 112 Pearson Chi-Square . 184(b) 
Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) . 668 
Continuity Correction (a) . 073 
a Computed only for 2x2 table 
b0 cells (. 0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected counted is 24.65 
N=No. of Cases No Yes 
Informal N % N % Total N 
Incubator Respondents 28 38 46 62 74 
Non-incubated Respondents 44 37 74 63 118 
Pearson Chi-Square . 006(b) 
Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) . 939 
Continuity Correction (a) . 000 
a Computed only for 2x2 table 
b0 cells (. 0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected counted is 27.75 
However, when the Chi-Square was calculated for each type of respondent 
no relationship could be identified between the type of respondent and the 
responses collected. 
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6.7.14 Importance of Intellectual Property Rights (Protections) 
Hypothesis 10: Incubated firms are more likely to value and protect IPR 
than non incubated firms. 
Respondents were also invited to indicate the importance/relevance of IPR 
to their business, and specifically IPR protections. As illustrated below, incubated 
respondents generally accorded a higher value to patent protection, trademarks, 
copyright and confidentiality agreements than non-incubated businesses. 
However, somewhat unexpectedly, non-incubated businesses, as illustrated below, 
accorded a high value to pay and reward strategies as a means of 
protecting/retaining IPR than incubated firms. 
Table 6.24: Importance of Patents & Patent Protection to Respondents 
N=No. of Cases No Yes 
Very Important N % N % Total N 
Incubator Respondents 56 73 21 27 77 
Non-incubated Respondents 107 87 16 13 123 
Important N % N % Total N 
Incubator Respondents 72 94 5 6 77 
Non-incubated Respondents 110 89 13 11 123 
Not Very Important N % N % Total N 
Incubator Respondents 69 90 8 10 77 
Non-incubated Respondents 114 93 9 7 123 
Not Important N % N % Total N 
Incubator Respondents 34 44 43 56 77 
Non-incubated Respondents 38 31 55 69 123 
Pearson Chi-Square 7.910(a) 
Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) . 048 
Continuity Correction (a) - 
a0 cells (. 0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected counted is 6.55 
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Table 6.25: Importance of Trademarks & Trademark Protection to 
Respondents 
N=No. of Cases No Yes 
Very Important N % N % Total N 
Incubator Respondents 56 73 21 27 77 
Non-incubated Respondents 108 88 15 12 123 
Important N % N % Total N 
Incubator Respondents 73 95 4 5 77 
Non-incubated Respondents 107 87 16 13 123 
Not Very Important N % N % Total N 
Incubator Respondents 69 90 8 10 77 
Non-incubated Respondents 110 89 13 11 123 
Not Important N % N % Total N 
Incubator Respondents 33 43 44 57 77 
Non-incubated Respondents 44 36 79 64 123 
Pearson Chi-Square 9.260(a) 
Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) . 026 
Continuity Correction (a) - 
a0 cells (. 0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected counted is 7.70 
Table 6.26: Importance of Copyright & Copyright Protection to Respondents 
N=No. of Cases No Yes 
Very Important N % N % Total N 
Incubator Respondents 47 58 31 42 78 
Non-incubated Respondents 107 87 16 13 123 
Important N % N % Total N 
Incubator Respondents 71 91 7 9 78 
Non-incubated Respondents 106 86 17 14 123 
Not Very Important N % N % Total N 
Incubator Respondents 71 92 7 8 78 
Non-incubated Respondents 112 91 11 9 123 
Not Important N % N % Total N 
Incubator Respondents 45 58 33 42 78 
Non-incubated Respondents 44 36 79 64 123 
Pearson Chi-Square 19.646(a) 
Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) . 000 
Continuity Correction (a) - 
a0 cells (. 0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected counted is 6.99 
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Table 6.27: Importance of Confidentiality & Protecting Confidentiality 
to Respondents 
N=No. of Cases No Yes 
Very Important N % N % Total N 
Incubator Respondents 36 46 42 54 78 
Non-incubated Respondents 61 49 62 51 123 
Important N % N % Total N 
Incubator Respondents 61 78 17 22 78 
Non-incubated Respondents 95 77 28 23 123 
Not Very Important N % N % Total N 
Incubator Respondents 76 97 2 3 78 
Non-incubated Respondents 113 92 10 8 123 
Not Important N % N % Total N 
Incubator Respondents 61 78 17 22 78 
Non-incubated Respondents 100 81 23 19 123 
Pearson Chi-Square 2.836(a) 
Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) . 418 
Continuity Correction (a) 
a1 cells (12.5%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected counted is 4.66 
Table 6.28: Importance of Pay & Reward Strategy to Respondents as a Means 
of Protectign IPR/Know-How 
N=No. of Cases No Yes 
Very Important N % N % Total N 
Incubator Respondents 53 68 25 32 78 
Non-incubated Respondents 76 62 47 38 123 
Important N % N % Total N 
Incubator Respondents 62 79 16 21 78 
Non-incubated Respondents 94 76 29 24 123 
Not Very Important N % N % Total N 
Incubator Respondents 58 74 20 26 78 
Non-incubated Respondents 101 82 22 18 123 
Not Important N % N % Total N 
Incubator Respondents 61 78 17 22 78 
Non-incubated Respondents 98 80 25 20 123 
Pearson Chi-Square 2.129(a) 
Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) 
. 546 
Continuity Correction (a) - 
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Ia0 cells (. 0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected counted is 16.30 
The Chi-Square was calculated for both types of respondent as regards the 
importance of IPR protection to their business. Significant relationships were 
observed as between the type of respondent and respondents according importance 
to `Patents & Patent Protection', 'Trademarks & Trademark Protection' and 
'Copyright & Copyright Protection' though not 'Confidentiality Agreements'or 
`Pay and reward strategies' as a means of protecting IPR. 
It had been assumed that incubated respondents would exhibit these 
arguably more `sophisticated' or `advanced' behaviours by virtue of the 
environment they inhabit and the values and behaviours said to be promoted 
therein. Incubated respondents were proportionately more likely to accord a 
higher importance of protecting Patents, Trademarks, Copyright but only 
marginally so as regards the importance they attached to protecting 
Confidentiality. It is noted, however, that in respect of confidentiality agreements 
one of the cells had an expected count less than 5 and thus it is not appropriate to 
draw any definitive conclusion from this specific result. 
6.7.16 Application of ICT 
Hypothesis 11: Incubated firms are more likely to employ ICT in their 
business, particularly advanced ICT applications. 
In order to compare and contrast the application of technology in north east 
businesses, and investigate whether incubated firms were more likely to apply ICT 
and particularly advanced ICT applications in their businesses than non-incubated 
businesses, respondents were invited to indicate whether they employed, for 
example, a website, an intranet and/or extranet, utilized CAD, CAM, CAE 
software applications and other advanced ICT applications. The results are 
presented below (Table 6.29): 
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Table 6.29: Application of ICT 
N=No. of Cases No Yes 
Website providing basic info 
(i. e. brochure-ware) 
N % N % Total N 
Incubator Respondents 16 21 60 79 76 
Non-incubated Respondents 12 12 89 88 101 
Pearson Chi-Square 2.739(b) 
Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) . 098 
Continuity Correction (a) 2.094 
a Computed only for 2x2 table 
b0 cells (. 0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected counted is 12.02 
N=No. of Cases No Yes 
Website enabling customers 
to place orders/make payment 
N % N % Total N 
Incubator Respondents 57 76 18 24 75 
Non-incubated Respondents 69-T ' 83 14 17 83 
Pearson Chi-Square 1.241(b) 
Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) . 265 
Continuity Correction (a) . 839 
a Computed only for 2x2 table 
b0 cells (. 0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected counted is 15.19 
N=No. of Cases No Yes 
Website supporting business 
to business 
N % N % Total N 
Incubator Respondents 61 81 14 19 75 
Non-incubated Respondents 74 91 7 9 81 
Pearson Chi-Square 3.359(b) 
Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) . 067 
Continuity Correction (a) 2.554 
a Computed only for 2x2 table 
b0 cells (. 0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected counted is 10.10 
N=No. of Cases No Yes 
Intranet N % N % Total N 
Incubator Respondents 51 67 25 33 76 
Non-incubated Respondents 77 92 7 8 84 
Pearson Chi-Square 15.044(b) 
Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) 
. 000 
Continuity Correction (a) 13.548 
a Computed only for 2x2 table 
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b0 cells (. 0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected counted is 15.20 
N=No. of Cases No Yes 
Extranet N % N % Total N 
Incubator Respondents 68 91 7 9 
_ 
75 
Non-incubated Respondents 78 96 3 :7 7 81 
Pearson Chi-Square 2.057(b) 
Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) . 151 
Continuity Correction (a) 1.226 
a Computed only for 2x2 table 
b0 cells (. 0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected counted is 
N=No. of Cases No Yes 
Computer Assisted Design N % N % Total N 
Incubator Respondents 49 64 27 36 76 
Non-incubated Respondents 66 80 66 20 82 
Pearson Chi-Square 5.107 (b) 
Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) . 024 
Continuity Correction (a) 4.330 
a Computed only for 2x2 table 
b0 cells (. 0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected counted is 20.68 
N=No. of Cases No Yes 
Computer Assisted 
Manufacturing 
N % N % Total N 
Incubator Respondents 67 89 8 11 
__ 
75 
Non-incubated Respondents 76 94 5 _ 6 F 81 
Pearson Chi-Square 1.029(b) 
Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) . 310 
Continuity Correction (a) . 525 
a Computed only for 2x2 table 
b0 cells (. 0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected counted is 6.25 
N=No. of Cases No Yes 
Computer Assisted 
Engineering 
N % N % Total N 
Incubator Respondents 65 87 10 13 75 
Non-incubated Respondents 76 94 5 6 81 
Pearson Chi-Square 2.297(b) 
Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) 
. 130 
Continuity Correction (a) 1.547 
a Computed only for 2x2 table 
b0 cells (. 0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected counted is 7.21 
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N=No. of Cases No Yes 
Other Advanced ICT 
Applications 
N % N % Total N 
Incubator Respondents 32 42 44 58 76 
Non-incubated Respondents 70 82 15 18 85 
Pearson Chi-Square 27.995(b) 
Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) . 000 
Continuity Correction (a) 26.289 
a Computed only for 2x2 table 
b0 cells (. 0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected counted is 27.85 
As may be observed from the results above (Table 6.29), notwithstanding 
the fact that a greater proportion of non-incubated firms reported that they had 
established a website featuring basic information i. e. brochure-ware than incubated 
business, a greater proportion of incubated businesses that had established an on- 
line presence reported that it also featured additional and more advanced utilities 
supporting more advanced functions e. g. supporting orders and sales (ordering and 
payment) and/or tele-working, and/or an extranet, etc was higher than non- 
incubated businesses. 
The Chi-Square was again calculated using SPSS for the two types of 
respondent, however, only significant relationships were found as between 
respondents reporting that they operated an `Intranet', `Computer Assisted Design' 
and `Other Advanced ICT Applications'. 33% of incubator respondents reported 
that they operated an `Intranet' compared to 8% of non-incubated respondents. 
36% of incubator respondents reported that they utilised `Computer Assisted 
Design compared to 20% of non-incubated respondents. 58% of incubator 
respondents reported that they operated `Other Advanced ICT Applications' 
compared to 18% of non-incubated respondents. 
16.7.17Quality Accreditation 
Hypothesis 12: Incubated firms are more likely to be quality conscious and 
have secured quality accreditation than non-incubated firms. 
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Arrangements for and a commitment to quality (and accreditation thereof) 
was also selected as a `model' behaviour for investigation as between incubated 
and non-incubated businesses. The Chi-Square was calculated using SPSS for the 
two types of respondent. As illustrated below, significant relationships were found 
as regards respondents reporting that they held 'ISO 9000' accreditation, 
`Environmental standard(s)' and 'Accreditation with private sector businesses as a 
preferred supplier'. 
Table 6.30: Quality Accreditation 
N=No. of Cases No Yes 
ISO 9000 N % N % Total N 
Incubator Respondents 41 62 25 38 66 
Non-incubated Respondents 21 28 53 72 74 
Pearson Chi-Square 16.098(b) 
Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) . 000 
Continuity Correction (a) 14.760 
a Computed only for 2x2 table 
b0 cells (. 0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected counted is 29.23 
N=No. of Cases No Yes 
Investors in People N % N % Total N 
Incubator Respondents 46 79 12 21 58 
Non-incubated Respondents 49 72 19 28 68 
Pearson Chi-Square . 887(b) 
Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) . 346 
Continuity Correction (a) . 539 
a Computed only for 2x2 table 
b0 cells (. 0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected counted is 14.27 
N=No. of Cases No Yes 
Environmental Standard(s) N % N % Total N 
Incubator Respondents 41 72 16 28 57 
Non-incubated Respondents 59 88 8 12 67 
Pearson Chi-Square 5.134(b) 
Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) . 023 
Continuity Correction (a) 4.152 
a Computed only for 2x2 table 
b0 cells (. 0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected counted is 11.03 
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N=No. of Cases No Yes 
Accreditation with public 
agencies as an accredited or 
preferred supplier 
N % N % Total N 
Incubator Respondents 46 82 10 18 56 
Non-incubated Respondents 49 72 19 28 68 
Pearson Chi-Square 1.743(b) 
Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) . 187 
Continuity Correction (a) 1.226 
a Computed only for 2x2 table 
b0 cells (. 0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected counted is 13.10 
N=No. of Cases No Yes 
Accreditation with private 
sector businesses as a 
preferred supplier 
N % N % Total N 
Incubator Respondents 34 60 23 40 57 
Non-incubated Respondents 57 84 11 16 68 
Pearson Chi-Square 9.151(b) 
Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) . 002 
Continuity Correction (a) 7.971 
a Computed only for 2x2 table 
b0 cells (. 0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected counted is 15.50 
N=No. of Cases No Yes 
Other N % N % Total N 
Incubator Respondents 51 86 8 14 59 
Non-incubated Respondents 62 94 4 6 66 
Pearson Chi-Square 2.018(b) 
Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) . 155 
Continuity Correction (a) 1.247 
a Computed only for 2x2 table 
b0 cells (. 0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected counted is 5.66 
As is evident from the data above, incubated firms generally demonstrate a 
higher commitment to achieving accreditation with private sector businesses as an 
accredited or preferred supplier than non-incubated respondents(40% compared to 
16%) and environmental standards (28% compared to 12%). However, a greater 
proportion of non-incubated firms (72%) reported ISO 9000 accreditation 
compared to incubator respondents (38%). 
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6.7.18 Engagement with public sector business support infrastructure 
Hypothesis 13: Incubated firms are more likely to engage with and avail 
themselves of public support for business and technology development. 
It was postulated that incubated firms should/would be more likely to be 
aware of and able to lever public-sector business support (given that they are 
physically located within the public sector business support infrastructure) 
including Technology Acquisition Schemes (Teaching Company Schemes (TCS), 
Knowledge Transfer Partnerships (KTPs), Technology Demonstration Projects, 
etc). The results are presented below. 
Table 6.31: Respondents reporting that they have benefited from public 
sector business support programmes 
N=No. of Cases No Yes 
Technology Development 
Programmes 
N % N % Total N 
Incubator Respondents 54 90 6 10 60 
Non-incubated Respondents 37 70 16 30 53 
Pearson Chi-Square 7.316(b) 
Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) . 007 
Continuity Correction (a) 6.085 
a Computed only for 2x2 table 
b0 cells (. 0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected counted is 10.32 
N=No. of Cases No Yes 
Technology Acquisition 
Schemes 
N % N % Total N 
Incubator Respondents 39 89 5 11 44 
Non-incubated Respondents 45 100 0 0 45 
Pearson Chi-Square 5.418(b) 
Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) . 020 
Continuity Correction (a) 3.487 
a Computed only for 2x2 table 
b2 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected counted is 2.47 
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N=No. of Cases No Yes 
Management Information 
Programmes 
N % N % Total N 
Incubator Respondents 33 75 11 25 44 
Non-incubated Respondents 17 __ 36 F 30 64 47 
Pearson Chi-Square 13.841(b) 
Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) . 000 
Continuity Correction (a) 12.317 
a Computed only for 2x2 table 
b0 cells (. 0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected counted is 19.82 
N=No. of Cases No Yes 
European Programmes N % N % Total N 
Incubator Respondents 39 89 5 11 44 
Non-incubated Respondents 44 98 1 2 45 
Pearson Chi-Square 2.957(b) 
Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) . 086 
Continuity Correction (a) 1.682 
a Computed only for 2x2 table 
b2 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected counted is 2.97 
N=No. of Cases No Yes 
Other public-innovation 
related support 
N % N % Total N 
Incubator Respondents 33 75 11 25 44 
Non-incubated Respondents 42 T 94 3 6 45 Pearson Chi-Square 5.641(b) 
Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) . 018 
Continuity Correction (a) 4.343 
a Computed only for 2x2 table 
b0 cells (. 0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected counted is 6.92 
Evidently, as may be observed from the data collected and presented above, 
a higher proportion of non-incubated firms had availed themselves of Technology 
Development Programmes (30% compared to 10%) and Management Information 
Programmes (64% compared to 25%) while a greater proportion of incubator 
respondents had received support from Technology Acquisition Schemes (11% 
compared to 0%), European Programmes (11% compared to 2%) and Other 
public-innovation related support (25% compared to 6%). Given the plethora of 
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business support agencies in the region and the multitude of services and 
programmes the low-level of take-up of support was generally surprising. This is 
consistent with Bannock's observation (2005) that not only is there almost 
universal availability of SME support systems and instruments, the low level of 
take-up of such policies is almost universally low. He concludes that `there is no 
reason to suppose that if most subsidy and assistance programmes were abolished 
altogether, it would make a significant difference to the shape and prosperity of the 
SME sector anywhere (Bannock, 2005, p. 133). 
The data was subsequently analysed using SPSS and the Chi-Square 
calculated for both types of respondent. As may be noted from the results 
presented above (Table 6.31), a significant relationship was noted between 
respondents reporting that they had benefited from `Technology Development 
Programmes', `Technology Acquisition Schemes', `Management Information 
Programmes' and `Other public-innovation related support'. It is noted however, 
in respect of both Technology Acquisition Schemes and European Programmes 
two cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5 and thus these specific results 
do not support definitive conclusions. 
6.7.19 Businesses reporting Growth as measured by increase in turnover 
Hypothesis 14: Incubated firms are more likely to have experienced growth 
than non-incubated fines as measured by increases in turnover. 
A key variable selected to test as to whether incubators have positively 
impacted tenant firms, was growth. The data collected, contrary to expectation, 
did not suggest that incubated firms were more likely to report growth as measured 
by an increase in turnover. SPSS was again used to calculate the Chi-Square, 
however no relationship was found. 
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Table 6.32: Businesses reporting Growth as measured by increase in turnover 
N=No. of Cases No Yes 
Reporting Increase In 
Turnover 
N % N % Total N 
Incubator Respondents 17 36 30 64 47 
Non-incubated Respondents 50 46 58 54 108 
N=No. of Cases No Yes 
Reporting Decrease In 
Turnover 
N % N % Total N 
Incubator Respondents 42 89 5 11 47 
Non-incubated Respondents 92 85 16 15 108 
N=No. of Cases No Yes 
Reporting No Change In 
Turnover 
N % N % Total N 
Incubator Respondents 35 74 12 26 47 
Non-incubated Respondents 74 69 34 31 108 
Pearson Chi-Square 1.404(a) 
Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) . 496 
Continuity Correction - 
a0 cells (. 0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 6.37. 
Interestingly, when invited to indicate whether their turnover had 
increased, decreased or remained the same both incubator respondents (N=47) and 
non-incubated respondents (N=108) generally reported that their turnover was up 
on the figure of two years ago. 
Of the Incubator Respondents who reported and quantified an increase in 
their turnover (N=26) the average increase was 45% (Mean) and 20% (Median) 
compared to Non-incubated Respondents (N=29) reporting increases of 13.50% 
(Mean) and 10% (Median). 
Of the Incubator Respondents who reported and quantified a reduction in 
their turnover (N=2) the average reduction was 2.00% (Mean) and 2.00% 
(Median) compared to Non-incubated Respondents (N=3) of 5.17% (Mean) and 
5.00% (Median) 
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6.7.20 Businesses reporting Growth as measured by increase in employment 
Hypothesis 15. " Incubated firms are more likely to have experienced growth 
than non-incubated firms as measured by increases in employment. 
Similarly, it was assumed that incubated firms were more likely to report 
growth as measured by an increase in employment. Using SPSS to calculated the 
Chi-Square no significant relationship was found. 
Table 6.33: Businesses reporting Growth as measured by 
increase in employment 
N=No. of Cases No Yes 
Reporting Increase In 
Employment 
N % N % Total N 
Incubator Respondents 46 61 30 39 76 
Non-incubated Respondents 78 63 46 37 124 
N=No. of Cases No Yes 
Reporting Decrease In 
Employment 
N % N % Total N 
Incubator Respondents 62 82 14 18 76 
Non-incubated Respondents 107 86 17 14 124 
N=No. of Cases No Yes 
Reporting No Change In 
Employment 
N % N % Total N 
Incubator Respondents 44 58 32 42 76 
Non-incubated Respondents 63 51 61 49 124 
Pearson Chi-Square 1.254(a) 
Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) . 534 
Continuity Correction - 
a0 cells (. 0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 11.78. 
Interestingly, when invited to indicate whether the number of full-time staff 
employed by the respondent has increased, decreased or remained the same both 
incubator respondents (N=76) and non-incubated respondents (N=124) generally 
reported that their staffing levels were down on the figure of two years ago. 
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Of the Incubator Respondents who reported and quantified an increase in 
the number of full-time staff (N=34) they employed the average increase was 
60.89% (Mean) and 36.67% (Median) compared to Non-incubated Respondents 
(N=30) reporting increases of 15.50% (Mean) and 10% (Median) increase. 
Of the Incubator Respondents who reported and quantified a reduction in 
the number of full-time staff (N=5) the average reduction was 18.40% (Mean) and 
20.00% (Median) compared to Non-incubated Respondents (N=5) of 6.4% (Mean) 
and 1.00% (Median) 
6.8 Innovation and the Conduct of business in sampled firms 
Upon a visual inspection of the data, a greater proportion of incubated 
firms reported higher levels of novelty vis-a-vis product, process and aministrative 
innovations; a higher propensity to innovate and were proportionately more likely 
to report expenditure on research and development. Using SPSS to calculate the 
Chi-Square in order to test for statistically significant relationships between 
respondent types and variables associated with `innovative' or `enterprising' 
behaviours, significant relationships were observed as regards respondents 
reporting: 
  product innovations `New to their market' and `New to their industry'; 
  process innovations `New to their market' and `New to their industry'; and 
  administrative innovations `New to their market' and `New to their 
industry'. 
It is noted however that in respect of those respondents reporting process 
innovations `new to their industry' one of the cells had an expected count less than 
5 and thus proper caution should be exercised in the interpretation of this result. 
A significant relationship was also found as between respondents reporting 
`New & Original Breakthrough(s)' and `Adoptions'; respondents reporting a 
propensity to innovate new products and processes but not as regards a propensity 
to innovate administrative innovations. Therein, incubated respondents were 
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proportionately more likely to report these `innovative' or `enterprising' 
behaviours than non-incubated firms. 
As noted above, significant relationships were also found between 
respondents reporting BERD, specifically 'In-House', 'Acquisition of External 
R&D', 'Acquisition of Machinery & Equipment', 'Acquisition of External 
Knowledge', 'Training' and 'Internal/External Marketing'. Incubated respondents 
were again proportionately more likely to report these 'innovative' or 
'enterprising' behaviours than non-incubated firms. 
Significant relationships were also identified between respondents 
according importance to product innovation and its role in `Extending product 
range', `Opening new markets and/or increasing market share' and `Improving 
quality'. Incubated respondents were again proportionately more likely to report 
these `innovative' or `enterprising' behaviours than non-incubated firms and this 
was particularly notable as regards the importance the incubated respondents 
attached to the importance of process innovation in their businesses compared to 
non-incubated respondents. However, while significant relationships were found 
vis-a-vis the contribution of process innovation to `Reduced materials/energy 
costs', `Improved flexibility', `Reduced labour costs', and `Increased capacity' it 
was noted that one or more cells had an expected count less than 5 and thus it must 
therefore be acknowledged that the size of the sample supports no definitive 
conclusion as regards the importance attached to process innovation by the 
respondents. 
There was little to indicate, from a visual inspection of the data, that 
incubated respondents worked more collaboratively in the development of product 
or process innovation than non-incubated respondents. Significant relationships 
were however observed as between type of respondent reporting product 
innovations `Developed in consultation with customers', `Developed in co- 
operation with other institutions', `Developed with the assistance of business 
support agency staff' and `Developed with financial assistance/grants'. However 
with regards to three of these variables, namely product innovation `Developed in 
co-operation with other institutions', 'Developed with the assistance of business 
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support agency staff' and `Developed with financial assistance/grants', two cells 
(50%) had an expected count less than 5 and this must therefore be reflected in the 
analysis. 
As regards respondents reporting collaboration in connection with process 
innovations the only significant relationship identified in was in respect of product 
innovation `Developed by other businesses/institutions and implemented by 
respondents'. In any event, again due to the sample size, two cells (50%) had an 
expected count less than 5 and thus caution must be exercised in the interpretation 
of this result. 
No relationship could be found as regards innovation and market focus and 
no relationship could be found between the type of respondent and whether 
innovation in respondent firms was the outcome of strategies and plans nor could 
any relationship be identified as regards type of respondent and their management 
characterstics. There was little to indicate, however, that the occurence of 
innovation in respondent businesses varied significantly by type i. e. incubated and 
non-incubated. 
Significant relationships were observed as between respondents according 
importance to `Patents & Patent Protection', `Trademarks & Trademark 
Protection' and `Copyright & Copyright Protection' but not `Confidentiality 
Agreements'or `Pay and reward strategies' as a means of protecting IPR. 
Incubated respondents were proportionately more likely to accord a high 
importance of protecting Patents, Trademarks, Copyright but only marginally so as 
regards the importance they attached to protecting Confidentiality. It is noted, 
however, that in respect of confidentiality agreements one of the cells had an 
expected count less than 5 and thus it is not appropriate to draw any definitive 
conclusion from this particular result. 
As regards other `innovative' or `enterprising' behaviours significant 
relationships detected concerned the application of ICT in respondent businesses 
were the operation of 'Intranets', `Computer Assisted Design' and 'Other 
Advanced ICT Applications'. While proportionately more incubated respondents 
382 
reported that they operated an 'Intranet' or 'Other Advanced ICT Applications' 
than non-incubated respondents, the reverse was true of 'Computer Assisted 
Design'. 
Significant relationships were also found in connection with respondent's 
commitment to quality, specifically 'ISO 9000' accreditation, 'Environmental 
standard(s)' and 'Accreditation with private sector businesses as a preferred 
suppliers'. Proportionately more incubated respondents reported that they held 
'Environmental standard(s)' and enjoyed 'Accreditation with private sector 
businesses as a preferred suppliers', however, the reverse was true as regards 'ISO 
9000' accreditation. 
Finally, with reference to the degree and extent to which respondents had 
availed themselves of public-sector business support and assistance, a significant 
relationship was noted between respondents reporting that they had benefited from 
`Technology Development Programmes', `Technology Acquisition Schemes', 
`Management Information Programmes' and `Other public-innovation related 
support'. While proportionately fewer incubator respondents than non-incubated 
respondents reported that they had benefited from 'Technology Development 
Programmes' and `Management Information Programmes', a higher proportion 
reported that they had benefited from `Technology Acquisition Schemes' and 
`Other public-innovation related support'. 
In an effort to explain whether this difference in behaviour can be 
attributed to the impact incubators have had on the operation of incubated 
businesses or is otherwise a factor of a selection bias (NEBIC, for example, selects 
businesses or rather individuals who are inherently more likely be innovative and 
more likely to be growth orientated), respondents were also invited to report 
previous experience (one of the factors in the selection of tenants admitted to the 
BIC as identified in Chapter 5) and their level of educational qualifications (a 
factor frequently cited in the literature as being associated with high growth, 
innovative firms - see, for example, Fothergill and Gudgin (1982, p. 3) who assert 
that SMEs created by university qualified individuals tend to grow quicker than 
those created by individuals with less formal educations). 
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6.9 Founder Characteristics of sampled firms 
Previous joint work experience amongst business founders was found to be 
notably higher amongst the incubated firms than non-incubated firms. Conversely, 
founders of non-incubated businesses were apparently more likely to have known 
each other socially but have no previous history of working together. 
Table 6.34: Founder joint work experience 
N=No. of Cases No Yes 
Worked together in same 
firm 
N % N % Total N 
Incubator Respondents 32 74 11 26 43 
Non-incubated Respondents 44 77 13 23 57 
Pearson Chi-Square . 103(b) 
Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) . 748 
Continuity Correction (a) . 007 
a Computed only for 2x2 table 
b0 cells (. 0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected counted is 10.32 
N=No. of Cases No Yes 
Worked together but in 
different firms 
N % N % Total N 
Incubator Respondents 28 72 11 28 39 
Non-incubated Respondents 42 79 11 21 53 
Pearson Chi-Square . 685(b) 
Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) . 408 
Continuity Correction (a) . 337 
a Computed only for 2x2 table 
b0 cells (. 0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected counted is 9.33 
N=No. of Cases No Yes 
Knew each other socially 
but never worked together 
N % N % Total N 
Incubator Respondents 36 90 4 10 40 
Non-incubated Respondents 31 57 23 43 54 
Pearson Chi-Square 11.923(b) 
Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) . 001 
Continuity Correction (a) 10.384 
a Computed only for 2x2 table 
b0 cells (. 0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected counted is 11.49 
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The Chi-Square was calculated for the two types of respondent revealed a 
significant relationship as regards respondents reporting that they 'Knew each 
other socially but never worked together'. It is striking that proportionately more 
non-incubated respondents (43%) than incubator respondents (10%) reported the 
founders of the business had known each other socially but never worked together. 
A higher proportion incubated business founders indicated that they were 
much more likely to have previous management, R&D, and sales and marketing 
experience at start-up than the non-incubated business founders (Table 6.35). 
Table 6.35: Founder Previous Work Experience (i) 
N=No. of Cases No Yes 
Previous Management 
Experience 
N % N % Total N 
Incubator Respondents 10 22 36 78 46 
Non-incubated Respondents 37 44 48 56 85 
Pearson Chi-Square 6.160(b) 
Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) . 013 
Continuity Correction (a) 5.249 
a Computed only for 2x2 table 
b0 cells (. 0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected counted is 16.50 
N=No. of Cases No Yes 
Previous Experience in 
R&D 
N % N % Total N 
Incubator Respondents 33 70 14 30 47 
Non-incubated Respondents 72 92 6 8 78 
Pearson Chi-Square 10.653(b) 
Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) . 001 
Continuity Correction (a) 9.072 
a Computed only for 2x2 table 
b0 cells (. 0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected counted is 7.52 
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N=No. of Cases No Yes 
Previous experience In Sales 
& Marketing 
N % N % Total N 
Incubator Respondents 17 37 29 63 46 
Non-incubated Respondents 54 68 26 32 80 
Pearson Chi-Square 11.077(b) 
Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) . 001 
Continuity Correction (a) 9.870 
a Computed only for 2x2 table 
b0 cells (. 0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected counted is 20.08 
On calculating the Chi-Square for the two types of respondent a significant 
relationship was noted as regards respondents reporting `Previous Management 
Experience', `Previous Experience in R&D ' and `Previous experience in Sales & 
Marketing' with proportionately more incubator respondents than non-incubated 
respondents reporting these founder characteristics (78% compared to 56%, 30% 
compared to 8% and 63% compared to 32%, respectively). 
As may be observed from the data presented in Table 6.36 (below), a 
significantly higher proportion of incubated business founders indicated that they 
had previous experience in `Consultancy' (52% compared to 9%) and `Higher 
Education' (61% compared to 17%) than non-incubated business founders. 
Table 6.36: Founder Previous Work Experience (ii) 
N=No. of Cases No Yes 
Previous experience in 
Consultancy 
N % N % Total N 
Incubator Respondents 22 48 24 52 46 
Non-incubated Respondents 71 91 7 9 78 
Pearson Chi-Square 28.800(b) 
Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) . 000 
Continuity Correction (a) 26.542 
a Computed only for 2x2 table 
b0 cells (. 0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected counted is 11.50 
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N=No. of Cases No Yes 
Previous experience In 
Higher Education 
N % N % Total N 
Incubator Respondents 18 39 28 61 46 
Non-incubated Respondents 66 83 14 17 80 
Pearson Chi-Square 24.721(b) 
Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) . 000 
Continuity Correction (a) 22.808 
a Computed only for 2x2 table 
b0 cells (. 0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected counted is 15.33 
In calculating the Chi-Square for the two types of respondent, significant 
relationships were noted as regards `Previous experience in Consultancy' and 
`Previous experience in Higher Education' (see Table 6.36) and `Previous 
experience in a large firm' (see Table 6.37). 
A significantly higher proportion of incubator respondents (72%) than non- 
incubated respondents (38%) reported that the business founder has previous 
experience in a large firm and the Chi-Square reveals that there is a significant 
relationship vis-a-vis respondents reporting this characterstic. No significant 
relationship was identified as regards respondents reporting founder experience in 
small firms. 
Table 6.37: Founder Previous Work Experience (iii) 
N=No. of Cases No Yes 
Previous experience in a 
large firm 
N % N % Total N 
Incubator Respondents 13 28 33 72 46 
Non-incubated Respondents 51 62 31 38 82 
Pearson Chi-Square 13.574(b) 
Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) . 000 
Continuity Correction (a) 12.250 
a Computed only for 2x2 table 
b0 cells (. 0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected counted is 23.00 
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N=No. of Cases No Yes 
Previous experience in a 
small firm 
N % N % Total N 
Incubator Respondents 25 54 21 46 46 
Non-incubated Respondents 50 60 33 40 83 
Pearson Chi-Square . 422(b) 
Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) . 516 
Continuity Correction (a) . 215 
a Computed only for 2x2 table 
b0 cells (. 0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected counted is 19.26 
As regards, founder's previous experience of new venture creation (Table 
6.38 below), the Chi-Square revealed a significant relationship as regards 
respondents reporting `previous experience in new venture creation', however, no 
significant relationship was found as regards respondents who reported that their 
founder had `previous experience of setting up a firm within the same sector'. 
Table 6.38: Founder Previous Work Experience (iv) 
N=No. of Cases No Yes 
Previous experience in new 
venture creation 
N % N % Total N 
Incubator Respondents 31 67 15 33 46 
Non-incubated Respondents 71 92 6 8 77 
Pearson Chi-Square 12.526(b) 
Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) . 000 
Continuity Correction (a) 10.835 
a Computed only for 2x2 table 
b0 cells (. 0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected counted is 7.85 
N=No. of Cases No Yes 
Previous experience of 
setting up a firm within the 
same sector 
N % N % Total N 
Incubator Respondents 35 78 10 22 45 
Non-incubated Respondents 58 70 25 30 83 
Pearson Chi-Square 
. 916(b) 
Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) . 338 
Continuity Correction (a) . 563 
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a Computed only for 2x2 table 
b0 cells (. 0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected counted is 12.30 
A significantly higher proportion of incubated firms reported previous 
experience than non-incubated firms (33% compared to 8%). 
As is evident from the data below (Table 6.39), a significantly higher 
proportion of incubated respondent (founders) (33%) also reported previous 
experience as self-employed (compared to 15% of non-incubated respondents), 
however, 23% of non-incubated respondents reported that their founder's had 
previous experience in family businesses compared to 27% of incubator 
respondents. 
Table 6.39: Founder Previous Work Experience (v) 
N=No. of Cases No Yes 
Previous experience as self- 
employed 
N % N % Total N 
Incubator Respondents 31 67 15 33 46 
Non-incubated Respondents 67 85 12 15 79 
Pearson Chi-Square 5.209(b) 
Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) . 022 
Continuity Correction (a) 4.231 
a Computed only for 2x2 table 
b0 cells (. 0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected counted is 9.94 
N=No. of Cases No Yes 
Previous experience in a 
family business 
N % N % Total N 
Incubator Respondents 33 73 12 27 45 
Non-incubated Respondents 62 77 19 23 81 
Pearson Chi-Square . 161(b) 
Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) 
. 689 
Continuity Correction (a) 
. 034 
a Computed only for 2x2 table 
b0 cells (. 0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected counted is 11.07 
As may be observed from the Table above, the Chi-Square was calculated 
and a significant relationship was found as regards founders with `Previous 
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experience as self-employed' but not as regards `Previous experience in a family 
business'. As stated above, the educational level (academic) of the founders was 
also investigated in an effort to determine whether this might account for 
differences in behaviour between incubated and non-incubated businesses. 
Table 6.40: Founder's Level of Educational Attainment 
N=No. of Cases No Yes 
Postgraduate (PhD) N % N % Total N 
Incubator Respondents 46 100 0 0 46 
Non-incubated Respondents 52 88 7 12 59 
Pearson Chi-Square 5.847(b) 
Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) . 016 
Continuity Correction (a) 4.096 
a Computed only for 2x2 table 
b2 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected counted is 3.07 
N=No. of Cases No Yes 
MBA N % N % Total N 
Incubator Respondents 40 89 5 11 45 
Non-incubated Respondents 52 95 3 5 55 
Pearson Chi-Square 1.076(b) 
Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) . 300 
Continuity Correction (a) . 445 
a Computed only for 2x2 table 
b2 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected counted is 3.60 
N=No. of Cases No Yes 
MSc N % N % Total N 
Incubator Respondents 41 91 4 9 45 
Non-incubated Respondents 52 93 4 7 56 
Pearson Chi-Square . 104(b) 
Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) 
. 747 
Continuity Correction (a) . 000 
a Computed only for 2x2 table 
b2 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected counted is 3.56 
N=No. of Cases No Yes 
MA N % N % Total N 
Incubator Respondents 43 96 2 4 45 
Non-incubated Respondents 53 96 2 4 55 
Pearson Chi-Square 
. 042(b) 
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Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) . 837 
Continuity Correction (a) . 000 
a Computed only for 2x2 table 
b2 cells (. 0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected counted is 1.80 
N=No. of Cases No Yes 
Undergraduate degree N % N % Total N 
Incubator Respondents 39 87 6 13 45 
Non-incubated Respondents 45 76 14 24 59 
Pearson Chi-Square 1.776(b) 
Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) . 183 
Continuity Correction (a) 1.170 
a Computed only for 2x2 table 
b0 cells (. 0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected counted is 8.65 
N=No. of Cases No Yes 
A level N % N % Total N 
Incubator Respondents 26 58 19 42 45 
Non-incubated Respondents 43 74 15 26 58 
Pearson Chi-Square 3.067(b) 
Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) 0.80 
Continuity Correction (a) 2.372 
a Computed only for 2x2 table 
b0 cells (. 0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected counted is 14.85 
N=No. of Cases No Yes 
O level/GCSE N % N % Total N 
Incubator Respondents 30 67 15 33 45 
Non-incubated Respondents 33 60 22 40 55 
Pearson Chi-Square 3.028(b) 
Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) . 082 
Continuity Correction (a) 2.387 
a Computed only for 2x2 table 
b0 cells (. 0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected counted is 19.46 
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N=No. of Cases No Yes 
Vocational Trade 
Qualifications 
N % N % Total N 
Incubator Respondents 27 57 20 43 47 
Non-incubated Respondents 20 26 56 74 76 
Pearson Chi-Square 11.920(b) 
Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) . 001 
Continuity Correction (a) 10.638 
a Computed only for 2x2 table 
b0 cells (. 0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected counted is 17.96 
As may be noted from the data table above (Table 6.40), a higher 
proportion of non incubated respondents reported that the founder(s) of their 
business had vocational trade qualifications than incubated firms (74% compared 
to 43%) and/or were qualified to degree level and or postgraduate level (PhD) than 
incubated firms (0% compared to 12%). The Chi-Square was calculated for both 
types of respondent (Table 6.40, above) but the only significant relationships that 
were found were as between respondents reporting that the founders were educated 
to `Postgraduate (PhD)' level and those with `Vocational Trade Qualifications'. In 
respect of the former, however, two cells (50%) had an expected count less than 5 
and thus does not support a definitive conclusion. 
In summary, as illustrated above, prima face a higher proportion of 
incubated firms reported `more innovatory' behaviours than their non-incubated 
counterparts. The difference in behaviours might however be attributed to the 
individual characteristics of the founders, however, as regards the characterstics 
explored in this research (see above) these were not found to be particularly 
telling. Nevertheless, it still might be true that the performance (difference in 
behaviours) of the incubated firms is no more than a factor of a selection bias, as 
for example NEBIC endeavours to support innovatory companies or rather 
businesses with an innovatory idea. 
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Unable to account for the difference in behaviours with reference to 
founder's education, experience and other personal characteristics, motive was also 
examined in the light of NEBIC (intuitive) selection criteria, specifically whether 
the founder was prompted to establish their business by: 
 a perceived a market opportunity, desire for personal challenge, 
achievement, independence, improved social status, profit, etc; and/or 
  unemployment or a previous unsatisfactory professional experience. 
The results are presented below: 
Table 6.41: Founder Motivation at Start-Up 
N=No. of Cases No Yes 
Perceived Market 
Opportunity 
N % N % Total N 
Incubator Respondents 12 25 36 75 48 
Non-incubated Respondents 14 13 97 87 111 
Pearson Chi-Square 3.759(b) 
Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) 
. 053 
Continuity Correction (a) 2.908 
a Computed only for a 2x2 table 
b0 cells (. 0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 7.85. 
N=No. of Cases No Yes 
Unsatisfactory professional 
experience 
N % N % Total N 
Incubator Respondents 33 72 13 28 46 
Non-incubated Respondents 84 87 13 13 97 
Pearson Chi-Square 4.631(b) 
Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) . 031 
Continuity Correction (a) 3.686 
a Computed only for a 2x2 table 
b0 cells (. 0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 8.36. 
Interestingly, a higher proportion of incubated founders (28% compared to 
13% of non-incubated respondents) reported unsatisfactory professional 
experience and a significant relationship was noted in connection with this variable 
but not `Perceived Market Opportunity' as the founder's motivation at start-up. 
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6.10 Summary 
In summary, while it was expected that that incubator respondents would 
demonstrate more `innovative' or `advanced' behaviours as a consequence of 
being in the incubator environment (which might equally be attributed to incubator 
selection bias vis-a-vis the nature of firms they elect to support) evidence was 
found for the following propositions: 
Hypothesis 1: Incubated firms are more innovatory than non-incubated firms (as 
measured by novelty). 
Hypothesis 2: Incubated firms are more innovatory than non-incubated firms (as 
measured by their propensity to innovate). While the data 
supports the proposition in respect of incubated firms' higher 
propensity for product innovation the sample size does not support 
the same conclusion as regards process innovation. 
Hypothesis 3: Incubated firms are more likely to invest/incur business 
expenditure related to R&D (BERD). 
Hypothesis 6: Incubated firms are more likely to accord a value (a higher value) 
to product/service innovations and, for example, their role 
in/importance to extending product/service ranges, market share 
and penetration and quality than non-incubated firms. 
Hypothesis 10: Incubated firms are more likely to value and protect IPR than non 
incubated firms. 
Only limited evidence was found for: 
Hypothesis 7: Incubated firms are more likely to accord a value (a higher value) 
to process innovations and, for example, their role in/importance 
to reducing operating costs (materials, energy and labour), 
improving flexibility and increasing capacity. 
Hypothesis 8: Incubated firms are more likely than non-incubated firms to lever 
public support or collaborate in the development of innovatory 
products and processes than non-incubated firms. 
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Hypothesis 11: Incubated firms are more likely to employ ICT in their business, 
particularly advanced ICT applications than non-incubated firms. 
Hypothesis 12: Incubated firms are more likely to be quality conscious and have 
secured quality accreditation than non-incubated firms. 
Hypothesis 13: Incubated firms are more likely than non-incubated firms to 
engage with and avail themselves of public support for business 
and technology development. 
No evidence was found for: 
Hypothesis 4: R&D/Innovation effort is more likely to be commercial i. e. market 
led/focused in incubated firms and the than non-incubated firms. 
Hypothesis 5: Innovation within incubated firms is more likely to be the outcome 
of strategies and plans than non-incubated firms. 
Hypothesis 9: Incubated firms are more likely to adopt flatter management 
structures. 
Hypothesis 14: Incubated firms are more likely to have experienced growth than 
non-incubated firms as measured by increases in turnover. 
Hypothesis 15: Incubated firms are more likely to have experienced growth than 
non-incubated firms as measured by increases in employment. 
As illustrated in the case studies presented in chapter 4 and as explored in 
chapter 5, (and not withstanding the difficulty of attribution, i. e. that the 
aforementioned `innovative' or `enterprising' behaviour or characteristics are a 
direct product of the incubator environment) it is questionable however whether 
the activity of business incubators can be or should be reduced to simple firm-level 
metrics. Indeed, incubators (including NEBIC) can point to a range of activities 
and impacts at both a micro level (vis-a-vis the performance of incubated firms) 
and at a macro level re programmes and initiatives designed to support the broader 
business community (see Chapter 4), boost entrepreneurial ism (e. g. NEBICs 
Annual Spirit of Innovation Awards scheme) and provide a range of additional 
services to the satisfaction of multiple of stakeholders and with diverse interests, 
which are not so neatly compartmentalised or translated into quantitative or 
qualitative metrics. 
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It is in any event inherently difficult to benchmark the results as might be 
obtained given the complexity of adjusting for different levels of input, regional 
factor conditions and endowments, incubator objectives, etc, notwithstanding 
obvious difficulties in establishing attribution and the nature and level of these 
effects at a macro or indeed micro (firm) level. However, for the reasons set out in 
chapters 1,3,4, and 5 it is anticipated that as a matter of necessity, stakeholders 
(particularly funding agancies) will become more exacting in their evaluation of 
incubator performance. 
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Chapter 7: Conclusions 
7.1 Introduction 
As required under the terms of this ESRC Case Studentship, this research 
has investigated the development of business incubation and has examined the 
policy rationale for the modality, specifically, the role and contribution of SMEs to 
regional economic dynamics. This investigation has also considered the nature 
and scope of business incubation operations (which are said to enhance regional 
economic competitiveness by supporting indigenous businesses) and has sought to 
understand the degree and extent to which business incubators add value to their 
regional/local economy using qualitative and quantitative approaches and 
techniques. 
Moreover, this research has sought to establish an evidential foundation for 
public confidence in the incubator modality by examining 'incubation' as practised 
by European Business and Innovation Centres, specifically NEBIC (the industrial 
sponsor of the this Case Studentship), and the degree and extent to which NEBIC 
impacts the growth and development of the Small and Medium-sized enterprises it 
assists by comparing the characteristics, performance and the innovative behaviour 
of the firms it incubates against non-incubated firms. 
7.2 Policy Review 
In an endeavour to understand the context for the evolution of `business 
incubators/incubation' this research has reviewed policy and the nature of policy 
instruments up until the 1970/80s (wherein we might identify the genesis of 
incubation, see Chapter 3) which are generally critiqued as being largely reactive 
and concerned with `fire-fighting' and/or protecting - as opposed to necessarily 
advancing - indigenous business i. e. combating international competition or 
attempting to alleviate the effects of economic restructuring. 
It is evident from the academic and policy literature that with economic 
restructuring proceeding apace throughout the 1980s, the largely academic 
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convergence-divergence debate that coloured so much of the neoclassical 
economic literature was increasingly confined to the literature by the collapse of so 
many industries and industrial giants; this compounded the erosion of neo-classical 
economic theory and policy approaches rooted therein and fostered the emergence 
of new approaches, prompted by a new focus upon the potential of enterprise, 
innovation, and new firm formation to produce endogenous growth (Eisinger, 
1988; Massey et al., 1992; Atkinson, 1991)) as policy makers were required to 
develop new prescriptions and instruments (and quickly) to ameliorate their socio- 
economic effects. 
SMEs - which had hitherto been largely peripheral considerations in 
industrial geography and policy that accorded the promotion and development of 
large firms exploiting economies of scale as of primary importance - became 
increasingly significant as the decline of traditional industries and the emergence 
of the SMEs prompted a new focus and a concern to develop facilities and services 
to support their development (particularly, according to Amirahmadi and Saff 
(1993, p. 108), in high value added technologies). 
In policy terms, as noted in Chapter 2 and notwithstanding dissent e. g. 
"Small business is, apparently, the opposite of the weather: Everybody praises it, 
and everybody does something about it. But all this posturing is based on bad 
economics and worse politics" (Postrel, 1994), SMEs are now seemingly central to 
economic policy worldwide and are accorded a pivotal role in for example, 
Europe, the US and Asia in securing national competitiveness, embedding the 
entrepreneurial spirit, securing economic growth and mass employment - 
`European SMEs are a key to delivering stronger growth and more and better jobs 
- they make up a large part of Europe's economy: there are some 23 million SMEs 
in the EU, providing around 75 million jobs and accounting for 99% of all 
enterprises"; a significant demographic (in economic and social terms). 
Furthermore, they are considered to be one of the principal driving forces in 
economic development and are said to form the `backbone' of the market 
economy. 
1 European Commission (DG Enterprise) website: 
http: //ec. europa. eu/enterprise/entrepreneurship/index_en. htm retrieved on 18.12.04 
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Notwithstanding, the industrial structure of regions and largely 'academic' 
debates as to the contribution of SMEs to job creation, specifically 'net job 
creation' and/or 'job destruction' (a subject that seems to have occupied scholars 
more than policy makers), a competitive SME sector is now heralded as key to 
sustainable development, innovation and productivity (regardless of the empirical 
evidence that supports or undermines this proposition). In addition, SMEs are 
considered to endow national, regional and local economic structures with resilient 
industrial systems. For example, Jacobs (1969) and M. Porter (1990) note that 
concentrations or intensities of enterprises in e. g. a particular sector or region 
endow that sector or region with competitive advantages (re competition for 
knowledge and new ideas) while Rothwell (1983 and 1984) emphasises that large 
and small firms complement and succeed each other in the innovation and 
diffusion process. 
SMEs are also lauded for their flexibility and ability to adapt quickly to 
changing market demand and supply situations. Cohen and Levinthal (1989) 
suggest that small firms are particularly adept at developing the capacity to adapt 
new technology and ideas developed in other firms and are therefore able to 
appropriate some of the returns accruing to investments in new knowledge made 
externally, while Luetkenhorst (2004) and others explain that as compared to 
larger firms SMEs are more naturally flexible, enjoy a closer proximity to 
customers and a therefore more responsive to customer needs and are not 
encumbered by layers of management and bureaucracy (see also Scherer above) 
which enable them to make decisions more quickly. 
It also generally asserted (and accepted by policy makers) that SMEs 
provide positive externalities to their surrounding (local or national) economy, 
complementing scale-intensive large firms, and that they make input factors 
available at higher quality or lower prices, or create innovations on which 
consumers or other producers in the value chain (upstream or downstream) may 
build. Indeed, according to for example Audretsch (1995) and others (see above) 
small firms account for a disproportionate share of new product innovations, given 
their low R&D expenditures. 
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Throughout Asia, SMEs are lauded for their ability to provide employment, 
support economic growth and thus economic and political emancipation of 
minorities, contribute to the alleviation of poverty and assure more equitable 
distributions of wealth and democratic power throughout society and support 
economic growth (as explored variously by, for example, Jovanovic (1982,2001); 
Ericson and Pakes (1995); Audretsch (1995); Hopenhayn (1992); Lambson (1991); 
and Klepper (1996)). 
This major shift in public policy focus, during the early 1980s, towards the 
promotion and development of new small firms as the vehicle for job creation, 
which it is largely attributed to Birch's work in 1979 ensured that the SME sector 
would be a key focus for policy makers, politicians, academics and has sustained 
the diffusion of the incubator concept throughout the world. This investigation has 
noted that later empirical evidence that has challenged both Birch's findings and 
other contemporary notions, for example that SMEs are more innovative than large 
firms, etc, and which might reasonably be expected to have dented policy maker's 
continued enthusiasm for SME friendly initiatives has evidently failed to do so. 
7.3 Observations on Business Incubation 
Virtually every country in the world now has a government department, (or 
division) or governmental agency tasked specifically with promoting the viability 
of the SME sector. These ministries and agencies have now developed a well- 
established arsenal of policy instruments to promote SMEs. Irrespective of 
context, however, SME related policies - including the current widespread support 
for the incubator modality - have generally evolved via a process driven by 
local/regional crises (e. g. industrial restructuring) or underdevelopment, a lack of 
alternative development models, and as flowing from an expectation that regional 
and local authorities with direct responsibility for regional economic affairs i. e. 
regeneration, should be seen to implementing strategies and plans to arrest 
industrial decline and revitalise their communities. 
As is evident from the literature reviewed in Chapter 2, in fostering 
conditions to support and enhance the SME contribution to regional economic 
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dynamics, economic developers and planners aim to derive a range of other social 
benefits that are also frequently attributed as products of a vibrant SME sector. 
Consequently, definitions of business incubation reflect significant variations in 
the nature, level, aims and objectives, roles and mandates of an 'incubator' 
(explored in Chapter 3-5) which illustrate the level of definitional and conceptual 
heterogeneity that pervades both the literature and the nature and organisation of 
the industry. This has included, as observed in Chapter 3, the evolution of 
incubators not only concerned with supporting specific high-tech industries or 
sectors but also social economy incubators, incubators supporting arts, crafts and 
cultural businesses and incubators targeting specific types of entrepreneur (e. g. 
graduates, academics, etc). 
The socio-economic-political pressure to develop and implement new 
approaches to support industrial restructuring and regional regeneration that 
characterised so much of the policies and politics of the 1980s (in the UK and the 
USA) provided not only the context in which business incubation evolved but 
explains, in part, the rate at which business incubation has been diffused and 
adopted within a largely neo-liberal macroeconomic policy framework by regional 
authorities looking to stimulate regional economic growth dynamics. It is, 
however, unclear as to when the deployment of business incubators became a 
programmed policy action as opposed to an organic development in response to 
local needs and conditions driven by local energetic actors/institutions keen to 
develop new approaches. 
As noted in Chapter 1 (Figure 1), the development of business incubation 
at the conceptual level and as a specific instrument of policy has occurred within a 
'fast policy' environment (Peck and Tickell, 2002) wherein new concepts are 
generally diffused and adopted (often in the absence of detailed or even 
compelling empirical evidence that would justify the nature or scale of public 
investment) by regional policy makers hungry for new solutions and an apparent 
boundless enthusiasm for new approaches. It is also noted that the diffusion and 
adoption of the modality throughout the 1980s, 1990s and into the 21" century, has 
occurred at a time when the nature of governance, particularly economic 
governance has been changing with responsibility for the design and execution of 
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economic strategies and plans increasingly devolved to regional authorities and 
agencies (Frenz and Oughton, 2005). In the UK, as elsewhere in Europe, this 
coincided with the evolution of the European Union, the development of EU 
regional policy and the creation of the structural funds with local attendant 
regional and local structures that evolved to administer them. The EU structural 
funds, as noted in Chapter 3-5, have been particularly instrumental in supporting 
the formulation and execution of economic policy at the regional level and fuelling 
the proliferation of business incubators (including BICs) in Europe; providing 
significant sums for the creation of the infrastructure and provision of incubator 
services (channelled into incubators as part of regional/urban regeneration 
strategies and plans - as noted in Chapter 3, the concentration of incubators 
generally accords with population density and there are relatively few incubators in 
areas with a relatively low population density). 
Moreover, the regional and local technocracies that have evolved to 
administer these funds have became increasingly empowered and instrumental in 
the development of regional economic and strategies and plans negotiated within 
the framework for national economic and social policy agreed between the EU 
Commission and national governments. As regards the adoption of business 
incubation/incubators as an instrument of regional policies, there also appears to be 
something of a `magpie-like' quality in the appreciation and appropriation of the 
modality by policy makers insofar as business incubation/incubators have been 
(and arguably still are) perceived as an `attractive solution in that they are regarded 
as a legitimate, worthwhile endeavour (particularly in the absence of convincing 
alternative approaches) and as being a form of intervention that works (or at least 
does less harm than good). It is a feature of this `magpie-like' approach to policy 
making that policy makers are seemingly quick to assume a notion or concept 
observed or rather perceived as successful in a specific context may be 
immediately transplanted and installed in a new environment irrespective of the 
different factor conditions that prevail therein. 
The physical dimension of incubators/incubation relative to the perception 
that incubators/incubation delivers results should also not be underestimated. 
Incubators are often `bright and shiny', eye-catching' developments programmed 
402 
as flagship regeneration projects that arrest the attention of the public and other 
policy makers alike. Unlike so many other business support programmes and 
interventions, business incubators are tangible i. e. they are clearly visible to 
stakeholders who might otherwise be unable to identify policy in action. In 
addition, the pressure to be doing something about industrial decline, regeneration, 
the SME sector, etc, and being seen to be doing so, is also a powerful driver (as 
illustrated in Chapter 1, Figure 1 with reference to 'growth machine' theory and 
the 'economic theory of bureaucracy'). The physical dimension would appear to 
have assumed increased significance, particularly business accommodations 
portfolios to sustainability as the virtual incubators identified for study (see chapter 
5) had apparently ceased to be sustainable. 
The rate of diffusion and adoption of the incubator modality by policy 
makers was found to be increasingly difficult to quantify. It was found that the 
number of incubators in the UK as reported by the UK's national incubator 
association may be significantly understated (by as much as 343%). While largely 
driven in the early stages of the industry by regional policy makers and now 
increasingly endorsed by national governments business incubation/incubators 
account for increasing levels of public investment. Given the increased scale of 
the industry, increasing competition for patronage - political and financial, finds 
the industry and individual incubators under increasing pressure to produce more 
compelling rationales, definitions and performance metrics to attract and sustain 
public sector support. 
There is an anxiety within and outwith the community, in the UK at least 
(and observed in the US), that the rate at which incubators are being set up and the 
level of addition will ultimately undermine the ability of funding agencies i. e. local 
authorities and regional development/enterprise agencies) to adequately resource 
them all. Moreover, as noted in Chapter 5, as the additions (which in any event 
dilutes the available public investment) and in particular the level of differentiation 
within the industry increases, there are those within the industry that are concerned 
that the concept is being deconstructed, compromising its integrity and thus 
eroding or confusing public sector understanding of the modality and potentially 
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undermining the support (political and financial) that the modality currently 
commands. 
It was evident, during this research, that a number of incubators and 
incubator associations are increasingly keen to establish a fixed, conceptual 
understanding and definition as to what an incubator is, and is not, as a means of 
differentiating or rather distinguishing the form of business support they provide 
(for the benefit of their stakeholders and sponsors) from other provision that is 
erroneously perceived as comparable i. e. organisations that adopt the name 
`incubator' without providing the attendant services (or services of a nature or 
level that are considered within the incubator community as integral to the 
incubator identity). 
However, to better establish a discernible level of 'daylight' between what 
a maturing incubator community perceives 'incubators' and 'incubation' is or 
should be, incubator associations may find that they will need to be more 
discriminating themselves as regards who or what they admit to their rank and file. 
In their infancy, and as a bid to assure their own sustainability, it might be argued 
that incubator associations have defined themselves by the 'lowest common 
denominator' so as not to delineate the standard or criteria for membership at too 
exacting a level so as not to deny membership (and the associated revenue stream 
derived from member subscriptions at a stage in the association's development 
when they are endeavouring to establish a critical mass). 
Pursuant to the entry policies explored above, and notwithstanding the 
suggestion that business incubation should be concerned with new businesses, it is 
suggested in the incubator literature (generated within and outwith the incubator 
community) that incubators should operate selection policies i. e. apply 
admission/entry criteria and focus or select where they add value. In the UK, 
according to UKBI's National Business Incubation Framework (2004, p. 4) while it 
is acknowledged therein that incubator clients should be appropriate to the 
"objectives of the incubation environment and its stakeholders" and that "the 
selection policy will differ from one incubation environment to another, depending 
on the mission statement and overall objectives [it is assumed that most clients 
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admitted to incubation environments] should be admitted on the basis that they 
demonstrate the following characteristics: 
  Exhibit potential for growth; 
  Meet specified targets; 
  Be able to put forward a business idea/plan; 
  Be willing to accept and act upon the advice/mentoring provided; and 
  Have (or be able to develop) the capacity to pay for the facilities and 
services". 
In any event, and in consideration of the incubator operations visited in the 
course of this research and discussions with incubator managers, it is submitted 
that this and such other 'entry criteria' as may be applied within or required of the 
industry are generally less than exacting and that they often appear little more than 
a nod to the notion that an incubator should be selective as regards who they elect 
to support. Naturally incubators look to provide accommodation and services to 
viable propositions with the potential for growth not least because of the revenue 
an incubator hopes to secure vis-ä-vis rents and from the provision of other 
services (whether they be subsidised or provided at commercial rates). Further, the 
notion of a 'capacity to pay' is in any event generally imperative for incubator 
management insofar as they are largely dependent on the revenue from tenants 
(unless wholly subsidised and that the future of the subsidy is secure) to support 
the bulk of all incubator operations including personnel costs i. e. their own jobs 
(i. e. patronage may be temporary and outwith an incubators control whereas 
income from tenants is something over which they have and can exercise direct 
control). 
This undeniable financial imperative may in fact explain the nature of 
incubator entry criteria being espoused by incubator associations i. e. that the 
`selection' of tenants is based on their commercial viability without necessarily 
prescribing degrees of innovation or the nature and level of growth that an 
incubated firm must achieve (over and above that required to pay their rent/for 
services). Indeed, as may be observed from the UKBI criteria (above) the fact that 
an incubated business be `new' is not in fact a stipulation. 
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In practice the measure of `newness' as applied by incubators is, in any 
event, arbitrary or remains (deliberately) ill-defined so as to be not unduly 
prescriptive. Further it has been suggested that incubator models focussed 
exclusively at supporting new businesses may be fundamentally flawed as being 
unsustainable without significant subsidy insofar as the rental income and the level 
at which this is may be charged to start-up businesses is unlikely - of itself - to 
support the delivery and development of substantive incubator services over and 
above limited firm-level benefits to the tenants (i. e. incubator operations and 
services are not merely a factor of the aims and objectives of the incubator but also 
the level of financial return that can be generated from tenants and assisted 
businesses). 
As regards those incubators that do present themselves as prima facie 
concerned with supporting for example only `innovative' businesses (a stipulation 
of EU BICs) or for example specific technologies and as having a more rigorous or 
selective criteria for admission over and above basic commercial viability, they too 
are nevertheless largely subject to an overriding financial imperative. It has been 
suggested that unless an incubator is financially secure and has established revenue 
streams from e. g. anchor tenants, incubated and 'grown' businesses and other off- 
site activities such as public commissions/service contracts and consultancy (or 
unless heavily subsidised) it must favour businesses with a capacity to pay as 
opposed to perhaps those businesses or innovators developing/hoping to 
commercialise, for example, blue sky research (in a particular technology) as the 
return may be so far removed from the present and/or the technology so 
insufficiently mature to support the generation of revenues. This is perhaps 
illustrated by Lee Valley BIC's decision to defer a return on its investment - i. e. in 
exchange for assistance (services and accommodation) the BIC took equity in 
assisted businesses instead of rent); a decision which ultimately forced it into 
administration as the rate of return was in no way adequate to cover the BICs 
operating costs. In other words, in practice, incubators are often forced `pass' on 
radically innovative propositions or technologies in favour of perhaps a `less 
exciting' or less radically innovative businesses which have the capacity to pay 
their incubator bills. 
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Indeed, herein lies one of the dichotomies observed in the course of this 
research, as while incubators are often understood to be concerned with innovatory 
high-technology businesses and are often perceived and/or presented by 
stakeholders as there to offer specialist support to innovating high-technology 
companies, the importance of the technology or 'radicalness' or 'novelty' of the 
innovation is often overplayed and it would be more true to say that they are in fact 
concerned with supporting commercially viable propositions (high-tech or 
otherwise) i. e. the commercial viability of tenants and businesses assisted is key to 
the viability of the incubator and more so than the degree of innovation present in 
the business. Of the multiple incubators visited in the course of this research, they 
have been found to be incubating or providing homes for high-tech and low-tech 
businesses in a myriad of technologies to social enterprises, charities, and other 
business support organisations including virtual incubators and virtual technology 
incubators (e. g. CENAMPs). 
The notion that incubated firms are supported and ultimately released or 
moved on from their incubator, or that incubators should or ordinarily operate exit 
strategies, is one that persists in the literature and in the stakeholder community. 
This understanding or assumption although, prima facie, consistent with the 
notion that incubated firms evolve beyond a fragile `infant' state and reach a level 
of development where they are robust enough to survive outwith the incubator, is 
somewhat erroneous insofar as this was not generally observed in practice (It is a 
misconception, however, that few within the incubator community have been 
concerned to correct given the importance of mature businesses to incubator 
revenues (see below)). 
In the UK, for example, UKBI's National Business Incubation Framework 
(2004, p. 4) suggests that incubators should operate exit policies which should 
include "setting a maximum time limits (e. g. three years); stepped rents (gradually 
increasing each year); incentives to exit; removal of subsidies; [and] setting 
growth targets which have to be met". Further, from the literature, Brooks (1986, 
pp. 24-29) submits that incubatees should enter an incubator continuum wherein 
start-ups enter an "economic growth incubator" in order to gain access to the 
incubator's external support network, shared support services, and the resources 
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of e. g. the local university affiliated with the incubator and that as they attain 
maturity should move into a real estate incubator which provides office space and 
shared services [i. e. services are withdrawn or provided at more commercial 
rates]. 
In the course of this research, however, there is little to suggest (as may be 
observed from the exit criteria operating amongst, for example, the East Midlands 
incubator sample, above) that exit policies are practised or enforced with any real 
vigour. In fact, it would appear that it is normally a case of incubated businesses 
outgrowing their incubator (i. e. requiring bigger premises) that prompts them to 
leave over and above anything an incubator `exit policy' might stipulate. 
Moreover, in practice many incubators have been prompted to extend their 
accommodation portfolio to accommodate, for as long as possible, growing and 
maturing businesses - including businesses that are anything but 'fledglings' - 
thus extending their capacity to tap into what is an important and potentially 
lucrative source of revenue (i. e. as the businesses increase in scale, so too does the 
rental income that might be derived from them) and which can then be used to 
cross-subsidise other incubator operations and services. Indeed, as incubators 
reach maturity and extend their capacity (accommodation portfolio) this has 
apparently prompted many to re-define facilities and operations on site so as 
where previously the whole site may have been defined publicly as the incubator, 
a distinction might be drawn on-site between 'fledgling' or start-up businesses 
accommodated in smaller 'incubator units' and more mature businesses which are 
often presented as occupying larger units i. e. 'grow-on space'. Again this would 
appear to be consistent with the presumption that incubated firms move along a 
continuum of incubators services as they grow and that some incubated firms may 
reach a point where assistance is still required to grow the business beyond this 
'infant' state. In practice, however, grow on space is often occupied by 
businesses that have not started life in the incubator and may have been 
established and trading for years. 
Again, just as entry criteria are somewhat 'fluid', there is apparently no 
directive in for example the US, Europe or Asia that stipulates when support 
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should cease (over and above, in Europe, for example State Aid rules which 
stipulate pursuant to the de minimis threshold, that private sector businesses 
should not receive more than ¬100k of State Aid over any three year period, 
taking account of all state aid that the organisation might receive from any 
source). It is arguable as to whether this is effectively policed by the EU and/or 
within the incubator community with any real vigour. In any event, even State 
Aid rules seem to have been sidestepped by the EU Commission's recent approval 
of a German scheme wherein the government will subsidise the provision of 
incubator accommodation and services to business. At the time of writing the 
businesses are said not receive the grant directly and consequently the scheme is 
said not to fall within the scope of State Aid rules and regulations2. 
It should also be noted, as observed in Chapter 3, that contrary to the 
general assumption that incubators are exclusively concerned with the provision of 
services to start-ups/new businesses, many of today's incubators were actually 
conceived as facilities for the provision of an integrated package of services and 
accommodation for new AND existing businesses (e. g. technology businesses 
and/or businesses with 'growth potential'). Of the business incubators studied in 
the course of this investigation (European and UK) it is clear, notwithstanding a 
popular misconception to the contrary, that facilitating business start-ups is but one 
facet of their operation (see case studies above) and that this activity is an 
important constituent in the incubator's business portfolio and as a generator of 
revenues. 
Further, it has been noted in the course of this research that a number of 
BICs and other incubators are developing increased accommodation portfolios that 
are not necessarily concerned exclusively with supporting fledgling firms. 
Moreover, a number of BICs and other incubators lacking the capital (political or 
financial) to extend their range of `owned' accommodation are however being 
contracted by stakeholders to manage other publicly owned business 
accommodation which again is not necessarily for exclusive occupation by new or 
fledgling businesses. 
2 European Commission Press Release, 2005, State aid: Commission endorses German aid scheme 
for tenants of technology centres and incubators, Reference: IP/05/536; Date: 03/05/2005. 
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7.4 The Impact of Business Incubators 
As illustrated in Figure 1 (Chapter 1), it is anticipated that evaluation and 
standardisation or regulation are a foreseeable response to the scope, scale and 
maturity of the industry and, moreover, the fiscal pressure that will escalate as the 
industry becomes more competitive and as public funding is stretched to continue 
to support the proliferation of incubators within the economy. As such, and as 
articulated by a number of stakeholders interviewed in the course of this research, 
the incubator community should be braced to withstand more detailed and 
penetrating scrutiny and be prepared for a more penetrating analysis of its 
activities. 
However, with more than 20 years of regional economic development and 
providing SME support instruments including business incubation, part financed in 
Europe by the EU structural funds, there is relatively little evidence or rather 
compelling evidence (at either a macro or micro level) that can identify enhanced 
regional economic performance attributable to these programmes or instruments 
i. e. that calculates a return for the EU's investment. It should be acknowledged, 
that the apparent absence of an evidential foundation (let alone a convincing 
evidential foundation) for so much policy and public. investment is not confined to 
Europe and was equally found to be lacking in the US and Asia. 
A review of the rather limited literature that purports to `evaluate' the 
impact of business incubators reveals that the quantitative measures, as applied 
within or to the incubator community, are rarely properly or adequately 
descriptive. Indeed, most incubators (European and UK) and external or 
independent evaluations do not use sophisticated methods or highly quantifiable or 
comparable techniques to document and/or validate their impact and/or the degree 
and extent to which they have `added-value' and instead rely more on publicising 
specific success stories. 
Surprisingly, given the level of public investment in the practise of 
business incubation in the US, EU and elsewhere in the world, there seems to have 
been little appetite within or outwith the incubation industry for a more systematic 
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and exacting evaluation that would provide evidence that the level of commitment 
to business incubation (political and/or financial) is warranted. A number of 
explanations have been offered, during the course of this investigation, by 
incubator management, staff and stakeholders. It has been suggested, for example, 
that the nature or organisation of the industry and the scope of incubator operations 
does not lend itself to the imposition of evaluation metrics that are overly 
prescriptive or rigid and fail to capture the nature and level of incubator 
interventions in all their variety. Another and more candid explanation offered 
during this research acknowledged that while there are those that might wish to 
evaluate the performance and contribution of incubators they generally lack the 
influence and authority (including national, regional and local government) across 
the industry to require incubators to co-operate with or submit to detailed scrutiny; 
this may change in the UK as regional development agencies are not only 
responsible for allocating national government funds at the regional level but also 
EU structural funds. 
In the absence of a more systematic and exacting evaluation that would 
provide evidence that the level of commitment to business incubation is warranted 
it should nevertheless be noted that incubation is being delivered in an 
increasingly `results oriented' environment. This relatively new orientation is 
attributed in the main to: 
(a) drive to better understand the business incubation phenomenon, 
particularly amongst stakeholders (economic development managers and 
agencies, academic researchers and practitioners), especially as regards the 
nature, scope and scale of incubator activity; 
(b) a change in the level of interest and oversight exercised or sought by 
stakeholders and sponsors; 
(c) a change in the dynamics of stakeholder/sponsor/incubator relations i. e. 
the increasing maturity of the industry, an increased desire to validate the 
incubator modality and manage/co-ordinate the work of incubators; and 
(d) new conditions for incubator operations that include the increased scope 
and scale of the industry, new entrants and increased competition for 
patronage (political and financial). 
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7.5 Qualitative & Quantitative Results 
Notwithstanding problems associated with attribution; inherent difficulties 
in defining in precise terms - using either qualitative or quantitative indicators 
(and/or using combinations thereof) - incubator activities (inputs), their application 
and interpreting individual and/or aggregated effects (outputs); this research has 
nevertheless (with the support of NEBIC) sought to investigate the impact of 
incubators on assisted firms, specifically NEBIC assisted firms. 
Given the general consensus found within literature for the proposition that 
SMEs are engines of growth that energise the dynamics of regional economic 
development and the prevailing policy consensus that business incubation is a 
positive force in the regional economy addressing a market failure by supporting 
and enhancing the performance of incubated firms, this research tested the 
following propositions with a view to establishing an evidential base for public 
confidence in the modality: 
1. Incubated firms are more innovatory than non-incubated firms (as 
measured by novelty); 
2. Incubated firms are more innovatory than non-incubated firms (as 
measured by their propensity to innovate); 
3. Incubated firms are more likely to invest/incur business expenditure related 
to R&D (BERD); 
4. Incubated firms and the R&D/Innovation effort is more likely to be 
commercial i. e. market led/focused than non-incubated firms; 
5. Innovation within incubated firms is more likely to be the outcome of 
strategies and plans than non-incubated firms; 
6. Incubated firms are more likely to accord a value (a higher value) to 
product/service innovations and, for example, their role in/importance to 
extending product/service ranges, market share and penetration and 
product/service quality than non-incubated firms; 
7. Incubated firms are more likely to accord a value (a higher value) to 
process innovations and, for example, their role in/importance to reducing 
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operating costs (materials, energy and labour), improving flexibility and 
increasing capacity. 
8. Incubated firms are more likely to lever public support or collaborate in the 
development of innovatory products and processes than non-incubated 
firms. 
9. Incubated firms are more likely to adopt flatter management structures that 
will enhance business performance as measured with reference to 
innovation and/or growth 
10. Incubated firms are more likely to value and protect IPR than non 
incubated firms 
11. Incubated firms are more likely to employ ICT in their business, 
particularly advanced ICT applications; 
12. Incubated firms are more likely to be quality conscious and have secured 
quality accreditation than non-incubated firms; 
13. Incubated firms are more likely to engage with and avail themselves of 
public support for business and technology development; 
14. Incubated firms will experience higher rates of growth than non-incubated 
firms as measured by average increases in turnover; and 
15. Incubated firms will experience higher rates of growth than non-incubated 
firms as measured by average increases in employment. 
As noted in Chapter 6, from a visual inspection of the data many of the 
hypotheses tested apparently held true i. e. the proportion of BIC incubated firms in 
the study demonstrating the aforementioned behaviours and characteristics was 
generally higher than the non-incubated firms that participated in the study. The 
data was however examined further. Data was cross-tabulated (by respondent type, 
and bivariate analyses were conducted (e. g. the Chi-Square was calculated) to 
identify relationships between variables and to identify statistically significant 
results. 
Using SPSS to calculate the Chi-Square in order to test for statistically 
significant relationships between respondent types and variables associated with 
`innovative' or `enterprising' behaviours. 
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In summary, while it was expected that incubator respondents would 
demonstrate more `innovative' or `advanced' behaviours as a consequence of 
being in the incubator environment evidence was found for `Hypothesis 1: 
Incubated firms are more innovatory than non-incubated firms (as measured by 
novelty)' and `Hypothesis 2: Incubated firms are more innovatory than non- 
incubated firms (as measured by their propensity to innovate)'. 
For example, significant relationships were found between respondents 
reporting product, process and administrative innovation with a greater proportion 
of incubated firms reporting the highest levels of novelty i. e. innovations (product, 
process and administrative) `New to their market' and `New to their industry'. 
Significant relationships were also found as between respondents reporting `New 
& Original Breakthrough(s)' and for respondent propensities to innovate new 
products. However while the data supports `Hypothesis 2' in respect of incubated 
firms' higher propensity for product innovation the sample size does not support 
the same conclusion as regards process innovation. 
Evidence was also found for'Hypothesis 3: Incubated firms are more 
likely to invest/incur business expenditure related to R&D (BERD)' with 
significant relationships found between respondents reporting BERD, specifically 
`In-House', 'Acquisition of External R&D', `Acquisition of Machinery & 
Equipment', `Acquisition of External Knowledge', 'Training' and 
`Internal/External Marketing'. Incubated respondents were again proportionately 
more likely to report these `innovative' or 'enterprising' behaviours than non- 
incubated firms. 
Evidence was also found for `Hypothesis 6: Incubated firms are more 
likely to accord a value (a higher value) to product/service innovations and, for 
example, their role in/importance to extending product/service ranges, market 
share and penetration and quality than non-incubated firms'. Significant 
relationships were identified between respondents according importance to product 
innovation and its role in `Extending product range', `Opening new markets and/or 
increasing market share' and `Improving quality'. Incubated respondents were 
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again proportionately more likely to report these 'innovative' or 'enterprising' 
behaviours than non-incubated firms. 
Evidence was also found for `Hypothesis 10: Incubated firms are more 
likely to value and protect IPR than non incubated firms' with significant 
relationships observed as between respondents according importance to 'Patents & 
Patent Protection', `Trademarks & Trademark Protection' and 'Copyright & 
Copyright Protection' but not `Confidentiality Agreements' or `Pay and reward 
strategies' as a means of protecting IPR. Incubated respondents were 
proportionately more likely to accord a high importance to protecting Patents, 
Trademarks, and Copyright. 
Some evidence was found for `Hypothesis 7: Incubated firms are more 
likely to accord a value (a higher value) to process innovations and, for example, 
their role in/importance to reducing operating costs (materials, energy and labour), 
improving flexibility and increasing capacity'. However, the sample size did not 
support a substantive conclusion in respect of the results obtained. 
Similarly, some evidence was found for 'Hypothesis 8: Incubated firms are 
more likely than non-incubated firms to lever public support or collaborate in the 
development of innovatory products and processes than non-incubated firms'. 
Again, while significant relationships were observed for a number of the variables 
tested to explore this proposition, the sample size does not support substantive 
conclusions in respect of the results obtained. For example, there was little to 
indicate from a visual inspection of the data, that incubated respondents worked 
more collaboratively in the development of product or process innovation than 
non-incubated respondents. Significant relationships were nevertheless observed 
as between type of respondent reporting product innovations 'Developed in 
consultation with customers', 'Developed in co-operation with other institutions', 
'Developed with the assistance of business support agency staff' and 'Developed 
with financial assistance/grants'. However with regards to three of these variables, 
namely product innovation `Developed in co-operation with other institutions', 
'Developed with the assistance of business support agency staff' and 'Developed 
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with financial assistance/grants', two cells (50%) had an expected count less than 5 
and thus do not support a substantive finding. 
As regards respondents reporting collaboration in connection with process 
innovations the only significant relationship identified was in respect of product 
innovation `Developed by other businesses/institutions and implemented by 
respondents'. However, again due to the sample size, two cells (50%) had an 
expected count less than 5 and again this has not been interpreted as being 
sufficiently evidential to support the hypothesis. 
No relationship could be found as regards innovation and market focus and 
no relationship could be found between the types of respondent and whether 
innovation in respondent firms was the outcome of strategies and plans nor could 
any relationship be identified as regards type of respondent and their management 
characteristics. There was little to indicate, however, that the occurrence of 
innovation in respondent businesses varied significantly by respondent type i. e. 
incubated and non-incubated. 
Some evidence was however found for 'Hypothesis 11: Incubated firms are 
more likely to employ ICT in their business, particularly advanced ICT 
applications than non-incubated firms'. Significant relationships were detected 
concerning the application of ICT in respondent businesses, specifically in 
connection with the operation of `Intranets', the application of 'Computer Assisted 
Design' and `Other Advanced ICT Applications'. While proportionately more 
incubated respondents reported that they operated an `Intranet' or `Other 
Advanced ICT Applications' than non-incubated respondents, the reverse was 
however true of `Computer Assisted Design'. The results obtained therefore 
neither support nor disprove the hypothesis. 
Some evidence was also found for `Hypothesis 12: Incubated firms are 
more likely to be quality conscious and have secured quality accreditation than 
non-incubated firms'. Significant relationships were also found in connection with 
respondent's commitment to quality, specifically `ISO 9000' accreditation, 
`Environmental standard(s)' and 'Accreditation with private sector businesses as a 
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preferred supplier'. However, as noted above, while proportionately more 
incubated respondents reported that they held `Environmental standard(s)' and had 
secured `Accreditation with private sector businesses as a preferred supplier', it 
must also be acknowledged that proportionately more non-incubated respondents 
had secured 'ISO 9000' accreditation. Again, the results obtained neither support 
nor disprove the hypothesis. 
Similarly, some evidence was found for `Hypothesis 13: Incubated firms 
are more likely than non-incubated firms to engage with and avail themselves of 
public support for business and technology development'. With reference to the 
degree and extent to which respondents had availed themselves of public-sector 
business support and assistance, a significant relationship was noted between 
respondents reporting that they had benefited from `Technology Development 
Programmes', `Technology Acquisition Schemes', `Management Information 
Programmes' and 'Other public-innovation related support'. While 
proportionately fewer incubator respondents than non-incubated respondents 
reported that they had benefited from 'Technology Development Programmes' and 
`Management Information Programmes', a higher proportion reported that they 
had benefited from 'Technology Acquisition Schemes' and `Other public- 
innovation related support'. The results obtained neither support nor disprove the 
hypothesis. 
No evidence was found for: 
Hypothesis 4: R&D/Innovation effort is more likely to be commercial i. e. market 
led/focused in incubated firms and than non-incubated firms. 
Hypothesis 5: Innovation within incubated firms is more likely to be the outcome 
of strategies and plans than non-incubated firms. 
Hypothesis 9: Incubated firms are more likely to adopt flatter management 
structures. 
Hypothesis 14: Incubated firms are more likely to have experienced growth than 
non-incubated firms as measured by increases in turnover. 
Hypothesis 15: Incubated firms are more likely to have experienced growth than 
non-incubated firms as measured by increases in employment. 
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It is acknowledged, however, that any and all results obtained to test the 
hypotheses (above) could be explained by a selection bias inherent in the sample 
i. e. NEBIC selects businesses or individuals - deliberately by the application of 
specific criteria and supported by other intuitive judgements (see Chapter 6) - who 
are likely to be more innovative and likely to be growth orientated. 
Incubated firms and stakeholders did, however, maintain that the BIC 
provided significant added value enhancing individual firm performance (albeit 
not necessarily in readily quantifiable or comparable ways) though interestingly 
the perception of incubated firms did differ to an extent from presumptions in the 
existing literature and indeed with the perception of incubator (BIC) staff as to 
which services in the BIC portfolio added more value than others. As noted in 
Chapter 5, (see Figure 5.6), BIC tenants accorded a high value to 'Pre-Incubation 
Services', `Information Services', `Advice and Support for product development', 
`Business Planning and Company Formation Services'. Interestingly, and 
contrary to the importance accorded to it in much of the literature (generated 
within and outwith the incubator community) `Raising finance (access to R&D 
grants and seed-corn funding)' was marked for a lack of utility amongst BIC 
tenants. 
In the course of the interviews with NEBIC tenants (41) a number of other 
elements of the incubator service/functions were highlighted for their utility. As 
noted in Chapter 5 (above) 41 respondents located at 31 of the 41 tenants 
interviewed indicated that key to their decision to locate and remain at NEBIC 
was/is the location of the incubator and the image that premises at the incubator 
lends their business. NEBIC tenants also pointed to the nature and quality of the 
accommodation (and flexible terms), as being important to the conduct of their 
business. Most surprisingly, however, was the fact that NEBIC tenants 
considered the nature and level of business services provided as less significant 
than the premises themselves. Moreover, the opportunity to network with other 
businesses (much vaunted in the literature generated within and outwith the 
business incubator community) was not regarded as being particularly significant. 
However, a number of other services and functions were cited by NEBIC tenants 
as being important to the conduct of their business: 
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  proximity or relationship with the region's universities; 
  the ability of the incubator to facilitate links/collaborations with other 
business support agencies; 
  assistance with the development of partnerships/technology 
collaborations; 
  the availability of specialist facilities (e. g. access to rapid prototyping 
technology/equipment) and personnel i. e. technology specialists 
(engineers); 
  co-location with similar businesses at similar stages in their development; 
and 
  the knowledge that pragmatic, `hands-on', intensive interventions and 
business assistance - general and specialist/technical - over and above the 
provision of information and advice, is immediately available. 
While much of the public funding flowing into incubators prescribes the 
nature and level of assistance provided to tenants (particularly if the support is 
part funded by the European Regional Development Fund which somewhat 
absurdly assumes that an intervention or assistance is only meaningful if it 
requires 5 working days of assistance), clearly, it is their proximity to ad hoc, 
flexible support that incubated firms value most. 
For example, one of the NEBIC tenants interviewed in the course of this 
research pointed to the fact that having responded to an invitation to tender from 
an automotive manufacturer to supply engine components (with a very short 
deadline for responses), they were assisted to prepare their business proposal by 
NEBIC staff experienced in the preparation and presentation of commercial 
tenders. Having made it to the shortlist, the NEBIC tenant was subsequently 
invited to present their proposals. 
However, whereas as many of their competitors attended the presentation 
and presented technical drawings of the component to be supplied, the NEBIC 
tenant business was able to present, with support from the NEBIC staff and with 
immediate access to the NEBIC's rapid prototyping facilities, a 3D physical 
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mock-up of the component in addition to their technical drawings. This was cited 
by the NEBIC tenant as being particularly influential in the decision of the 
manufacturer to award them the contract as they were the only business 
shortlisted that had, in the timescale available to them, prepared technical 
drawings and tabled a 3D physical model. 
The NEBIC tenant was at pains to stress that the impact of the support 
received from the NEBIC on their business and in the local economy should not 
be underestimated given that this has been instrumental in assisting the tenant to 
secure its first contract with a major automotive OEM providing a platform from 
which to diversify and grow the business and at the same time safeguard and 
create new jobs. The NEBIC tenant was also careful to explain that presenting a 
physical 3D model might not have occurred to them but for the NEBIC staff's 
suggestion but also that they were at an advantage insofar as the rapid prototyping 
equipment (which would be prohibitively expensive for them and any other 
comparable business to invest in) was immediately available on the NEBIC site 
enabling them to be more competitive insofar as this allowed them to project that, 
notwithstanding their size, they had the capability and capacity to respond quickly 
to the OEM's requirements which, it emerged was and is a key attribute the OEM 
looks for when selecting businesses to admit to its supply chain. 
In conclusion, while this study attempted to find compelling evidence via 
this empirical investigation and elsewhere in the literature that would justify the 
current commitment to business incubation, notwithstanding anecdotal examples 
of intervention and effect (as outlined, by way of example, above) it has ultimately 
failed to do so. Indeed, where the evidence has pointed to significant differences 
between incubated and non-incubated firms there is nothing to suggest that these 
differences reflect anything more than differences in their character which, we 
must acknowledge, are not necessarily effects of being in an incubator 
environment (i. e. the results may simply be the product of a selection bias inherent 
in the nature of firms selected by incubators to admit to their facilities). 
In addition, and as noted above, there appears to be a `magpie-like' quality 
driving the proliferation of business incubators and a policy consensus or 
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confidence in the modality that appears to be based more on an article of faith' 
than a detailed understanding of their effectiveness. In any event, as competition 
for patronage (political and financial) becomes more acute, exacerbated in Europe 
by the redistribution of the structural funds and the number of new additions in the 
industry, it shall become increasingly important for policy makers to be more 
discriminating in their allocation of resources. As is evident, from a review of 
relevant literature - as illustrated in Figure 1- the increased national scrutiny of 
regional economic development authorities and associated reporting requirements 
is expected, in turn, to prompt increased scrutiny of their agents (those executing 
regional economic, strategies, plans and their instruments). Whereas historically 
stakeholders may have been generally satisfied that incubation represent at least a 
genuine endeavour, public authorities in particularly are increasingly likely to 
pressed to report quantified economic effects. 
Moreover as noted in Chapter 1, in the UK, regional development agencies 
are increasingly evaluated against new metrics stipulated by the Department for 
Trade and Industry (dti), namely `public service agreements'. In addition, `best 
value' performance indicators are being adopted (or imposed) across the public 
sector - in particular, regional and local government - to assess the return on 
public investment. This is likely to force regional economic authorities and 
development agencies to be more measured vis-a-vis their selection of approaches 
and projects to support. Indeed it may prompt them to seek consider whether the 
incubators within their region's business support infrastructure compliment or 
duplicate each other with reference to the nature and level of services they provide, 
their territorial coverage, their relative expertise and competencies; and whether or 
not they are in competition with each other for the same clients or resources and 
the degree and extent to which they risk over-supply i. e. whether incubator 
capacity is increasing without a concomitant increase in incubator capability or 
demand. 
Fortuitously these new conditions appear to coincide with an increased 
concern to establish and communicate best practice and achievement within the 
incubator community and to stakeholders thus reinforcing the image and public 
sector confidence in the industry. This is motivated, in no small part, by a concern 
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to encourage and enable sponsors and policy makers with responsibility for 
allocating regional resources to be more discriminating in their investment 
decisions. This is, arguably, representative of the growing maturity of the industry 
as evidenced by the creation of national incubator associations; the establishment 
of business incubation as occupation with attendant professional standards and best 
practice frameworks. It is anticipated that eventually universities shall offer degree 
programmes with business incubation as their subject (though given the range of 
incubator objectives, communities served and different approaches this would 
require a rather broad curriculum) which may play an important part in educating 
incubator stakeholders to a point where they may become more sophisticated and 
discerning vis-a-vis the nature of 'incubators' they elect to support i. e. more able 
to draw a distinction, for example, between providers of accommodation and 
providers of accommodation and incubation services. 
As for BICs in particular, it is evident from this research that they admit 
and assist a broad church of enterprises including new and existing businesses, 
high and low-tech businesses, industrial and service enterprises and other business 
support providers. As observed above, BICs are also host to social enterprises, 
charities, and graduate start-ups which have prompted the development of new 
approaches to reflect the broadening of their client portfolio and the nature of 
assistance these enterprises require. 
BICs are entrepreneurial by their very nature and their capacity to reinvent 
and renew themselves; developing new services to meet new markets (new social, 
political and economic priorities) are an undoubted factor in their 
success/longevity. As regards their future, BIC facilities and their business 
development functions charged with securing grants or investment in the extension 
thereof and funding and/or commissions to support revenue operations are clearly 
critical. It is evident that despite the development of private revenue streams and 
notwithstanding the revenues BICs generate from their tenants, the importance of 
public funding (e. g. structural funds) will remain critical to incubator revenues (see 
also Chapter 5). To this end, stakeholder relations management is evidently a 
critical incubator management discipline, as is the task of embedding BIC 
operations within a regional authority's strategies and plans and as part of the local 
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and regional business support infrastructure and, so too is cultivating support for 
incubator operations within the business community in order to preserve patronage 
(political and financial - public and private) and so as to develop new business 
opportunities. 
In the same vein, just as stakeholder relations management is increasingly 
important to the sustainability of incubators, so too is an incubator's public 
relations function in communicating achievement and success stories which further 
reinforce the `incubator approach' as a valid endeavour and modality and, more 
specifically, an incubator's position within the business support infrastructure and 
in the consciousness of agencies and individuals with authority and responsibility 
for policy, economic development and regeneration strategies; and funding for 
business support projects and/or policy priorities. In a new climate for business 
incubation and incubator operations (as explored in Chapter 5) the ability of BICs 
to demonstrate added value and impact (if not a truly evidential base for support) 
shall become increasingly important and thus it may equally be in their interest to 
research and establish more appropriate and telling quantitative measures. 
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SECTION 1 
GENERAL 
Name of Respondent: 
Company Name: 
Postcode: 
WWW Site: 
ABOUT THE BUSINESS: 
These questions are asked to establish baseline data for the sample and to ensure that the sample is 
representative 
QUESTION 1.1 
When was the firm founded: Year 
QUESTION 1.2 
Which term(s) best describes your 
businesslapply to your business?: For Profit? Q OR Not for profit? Q 
Industrial e. g. Manufacturing, construction, engineering)? Q Services? Q 
Charitable? Q Social Enterprise? Q 
Quasi-Public Enterprise 0 Public Enterprise Q 
A business with subsidiary businesses i. e. a Holding Company Q Subsidiary Q 
QUESTION 1.3 
What best describes your business: 
Subcontractor (you supply goods and services to other businesses who use your input as part of the Q 
product or service they provide to their customer) 
OR 
Principal Contractor (you undertake work in your own right and name) Q 
QUESTION 1.4 
In percentage terms how much of your customer base is.... 
Private Sector Businesses? 
0-5% 6-10% 11-20% 21-30% 31-40% 41-50% 51-60% 61-70% 71-80% 81-90% 91-100% 
QQQQQQQQQQQ 
Public Sector Organisations? 
0-5% 6-10% 11-20% 21-30% 31-4001o 41-50% 51-60% 61-70% 71-80% 81-90% 91-100% 
QQQQQQQQQQQ 
Private Consumers? 
0-5% 6-10% 11-20% 21-30% 31-40% 41-50% 51-60% 61-70% 71-80% 81-90% 91-100% 
QQQQQQQQQQQ 
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QUESTION 1.5 
In percentage terms how much of your customer base Is 
Global/International (outside the UK) 
0-5% 6-10% 11-20% 21-30% 31-40% 41-50% 51-60% 61-70% 71-80% 81-90% 91-100% 
QQQQQQQQQQQ 
National (within the UK) 
0-5% 6-10% 11-20% 21-30% 31-40% 41-50% 51-60% 61-70% 71-80% 81-90% 91-100% 
QQQQQQQQQQQ 
Regional (in the North East) 
0-5% 6-10% 11-20% 21-30% 31-40% 41-50% 51-60% 61-70% 71-80% 81-90% 91-100% 
QQQQQQQQQQQ 
SECTION 2 
The following questions are concerned with the nature and level(s) of innovation as they may occur in 
your business which we categorise (for the purposes of this research) as follows: 
  Product or Service Innovations (new or significantly improved products or services) 
  Process Innovations i. e. technologically new processes employed in the production of products or 
services) 
  Organisational or administrative innovations 
Example: Changes in the structure of the organisation, business culture, goals, rules, roles, 
procedures, and structures etc i. e. the people side of the business 
Example: New pay and rexard scheme, New bonus or incentive scheme, Investors in People 
Accreditation, Introduction of a new Quality System, Extranet, Intranet 
Considering Product Innovations.... 
QUESTION 2.1: 
In the last two years has your business introduced any new or significantly improved products or 
services which were: 
Tick as appropriate 
New to your firm Q New to your market Q New to your Industry Q 
453 
IFANSWER NO - GOTO QUESTIONS 
IF YES... 
QUESTION 2.2 
Were these products or services developed...? *May tick more than one box 
In-house Q 
B other businesses or institutions and then rolled out by your business 
In co-operation with other businesses 
In consultation with suppliers (equipment, materials, components or software) 
In consultation with clients or customers Li 
In co-operation with other institutions (e. g. Universities, Research Centres) Li 
With the assistance of Business Support Agency staff (e. g. as part of a business support programme 
or public sector business advisors/consultants) 
With financial assistance form European, National or Regional Research Grants or Awards 
13 
Occasional; OR U 
Rare 
Tick one box 
QUESTION 2.4 
How much of your turnover would you estimate is now attributable to... 
Products that have remained largely unchanged or have only been marginally modified in 
the last two years? Tick one box 
0-5% 6-10% 11-20% 21-30% 31-40% 41-50% 51-60% 61-70% 71-80% 81-90% 91-100% 
QQQQQQQQQQQ 
Products significantly improved in the last two years? Tick one box 
0-5% 6-10% 11-20% 21-30% 31-40% 41-50% 51-60% 61-70% 71-80% 81-90% 91-100% 
QQQQQQQQQQQ 
Products new to your firm introduced in the last two years? Tick one box 
0-5% 6-10% 11-20% 21-30% 31-40% 41-50% 51-60% 61-70% 71-80% 81-90% 91-100% 
QQQQQQQQQQQ 
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QUESTION 2.3 
Thinking of product innovations in your business, would you describe them as...? 
Question 2.4 
Thinking about the effects of the product innovations in your businesses 
Would you say product innovation has made a 'Very Significant', 'Significant', 'Not particularly 
significant' or 'Insignificant' contribution to extending your range of goods or services. Tick one box 
Very Significant Significant Not particularly Insignificant 
significant 
QQQQ 
Would you say product innovation has made a 'Very Significant', 'Significant', 'Not particularly 
significant' or 'Insignificant' contribution to opening new markets or increasing your market share 
Tick one box 
Very Significant Significant Not particularly Insignificant 
significant 
QQQQ 
Would you say product innovation has made a 'Very Significant', 'Significant', 'Not particularly 
significant' or 'Insignificant' contribution to generally improving the quality of goods or services Tick 
one box 
Very Significant Significant Not particularly Insignificant 
Qý 
significant 
Q 
Considering Process Innovations.... 
QUESTION 3.1 
In the last two years did your business introduce any technologically new or significantly improved 
processes for producing (goods or services) that were 
New to your firm Q 
IFANS NO GOTO 4 
IF YES GOTO 3.2 overleaf 
New to your market Q New to your Industry Q 
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QUESTION 3.2 
Were these PROCESSES developed... 
In-house 
*May tick more than one box 13 
By other businesses or institutions and then rolled out by your business U 
In co-operation with other businesses U 
In consultation with suppliers (equipment, materials, components or software) 
In consultation with clients or customers 
13 
In co-operation with other institutions (e. g. Universities, Research Centres) U 
With the assistance of Business Support Agency staff (e. g. as part of a business support programme 
or public sector business advisors/consultants) 
With financial assistance form European, National or Regional Research Grants or Awards 
QUESTION 3.3 
Thinking of process innovations in your business, are they ... 
Constant and ongoing (i. e. one or multiple projects in development); OR U 
Regular (but not a constant); OR CJ 
Occasional; OR U 
Rare 
Tick one box 
Question 3.4 
How much of your turnover would you estimate (in percentage terms) Is attributable to: 
Processes that have largely remained unchanged or have been only marginally modified in 
the last two years Tick one box 
0-5% 6-10% 11-20% 21-30% 31-40% 41-50% 51-60% 61-70% 71-80% 81-90% 91-100% 
QQQQQQQQQQQ 
Processes significantly improved in the last two years Tick one box 
0-5% 6-10% 11-20% 21-30% 31-40% 41-50% 51-60% 61-70% 71-80% 81-90% 91-100% 
QQQQQQQQQQQ 
Processes New to your Firm in the last two years Tick one box 
0-5% 6-10% 11-20% 21-30% 31-40% 41-50% 51-60% 61-70% 71-80% 81-90% 91-100% 
QQQQQQQQQQQ 
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Question 3.5 
Thinking about the effects of the process innovations you have reported above... 
Would you say process innovations have made a 'Very Significant'. 'Significant', 'Not very 
significant' or 'Insignificant' contribution to reducing materials costs and/or energy per produced 
unit 
Very Significant Significant Not particularly Insignificant 
significant 
QQQQ 
Would you say process innovations have made a 'Very Significant', 'Significant', 'Not very 
significant' or 'Insignificant' contribution to improved production flexibility 
Very Significant Significant Not particularly Insignificant 
significant 
QQQQ 
Would you say process Innova(ions have made a 'Very Significant', 'Significant', 'Not very 
significant' or 'Insignificant' contribution to reducing labour costs 
Very Significant Significant Not particularly Insignificant 
significant 
QQQQ 
Would you say process innovations have made a 'Very Significant', 'Significant', `Not very 
significant' or `Insignificant' contribution to increasing capacity 
Very Significant 
13 
Significant 
13 
Not particularly 
significant 
13 
Insignificant 
0 
Considering 
Innovations 
Administrative or Organisational 
Examples would include 
New pay and reward scheme, New bonus or incentive scheme, New share option scheme, Investors in 
People Accreditation, Introduction of a new Quality System, Introduction of new technologies (Extranet, 
Intranet), Home working, New Training Programme or arrangements for Continuous Professional 
Development 
QUESTION 4.1: Administrative Innovations 
In the last two years have you made any significant changes in the structure of the organisation, business 
culture, goals, rules, roles, procedures, and structures etc i. e. the people side of the business? 
YES Q NO Q 
IF NO GOTO QUESTION 5 
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IF YES 
QUESTION 4.1.1 
Were these changes In practice or procedures: 
Tick as appropriate 
New to your firm Q New to your Industry Q 
Question 4.2 
Were these changes e. g. to structure or systems made: 
In-house 0 
By other businesses or institutions and then rolled out by your business LU 
In co-operation with other businesses 
In consultation with suppliers (equipment, materials, components or software) 
In consultation with clients or customers 
In co-operation with other institutions (e. g. Universities, Research Centres) 
With the assistance of Business Support Agency staff (e. g. as part of a business support programme 
or public sector business advisors/consultants) 
With financial assistance form European, National or Regional Research Grants or Awards Q 
QUESTION 4.3 
Thinking of administrative innovations in your business, are they ... 
Constant and ongoing (i. e. one or multiple projects in development); OR Q 
Regular (but not a constant); OR 
Occasional; OR 
Rare 
Tick one box 
IF YOU DID NOT IDENTIFY 
A PRODUCT INNOVATION (ABOVE) 
OR 
A PROCESS INNOVATION (ABOVE) 
OR 
AN ADMINISTRATIVE INNOVATION (ABOVE) 
PLEASE GOTO QUESTION 12 
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Question 5 
Please read the four statements below and indicate which is most applicable: 
TICK 
" Innovations as they occur in our business are more usually... 
A product or process that represents a New and Original Breakthrough advancing the state of 
the art in our industry or technology Q 
" Innovations as they occur in our business are more usually... 
An extension of our own product, processes or practices to which we have made or are making 
incremental improvements all the time Q 
" Innovations as they occur in our business are more usually... 
The introduction of a product, process or practice which we have observed elsewhere which o 
we have sought to adopt and ADAPT it (i. e. not just copy but ADAPT it, improve it, add new 
features or strip out features) and then introduce it to our business/customers. 
" Innovations as they occur in our business are more usually... 
The introduction of a product, process or practice which we have observed elsewhere which 
we have sought to adopt (copy/mirror) and introduce into our business or to customers. 
Q 
(Observed elsewhere could be by a competitor, or in a different country, or in a business 
journal, newspaper, industry best practice exemplar) 
QUESTION 6 
Would you say that the innovations that occur within your business: 
Generally occur as part of a programme, strategy or plan 
0 
OR 
Occur more naturally or organically as a product of the work culture, o 
team dynamics, etc i. e. not really programmed per se. 
QUESTION 7. 
Please consider the degree and extent to which you agree or disagree with the following statements 
Please tick as appropriate 
Strongly Agree Disagree Strongly 
Agree Disagree 
Our ability to innovate is largely dependent on our ability o o 0 
to generate surpluses (£cash) 
Our ability to innovate is largely dependent on the o 13 0 0 
availability of spare time to do so 
We tend to innovate when we determine that an existing 13 13 0 13 
product or service is no longer performing as it should 
Innovation in our business tends to be driven by one or 13 1 0 13 
more energetic individuals 
QUESTION 8 
How would you categorise the innovations that occur in your business: 
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Do they tend to be 'Discovery style projects' where you research and develop ideas for products or o 
services and then take them to market/customers i. e. test the market? 
OR 
Do they tend to be 'Pull-driven projects' i. e. very much to order (flow from a customer request) or 
Q 
in response to a particularly defined market need? 
QUESTION 9 
In the last two years, did your business have any projects to develop or introduce new or significantly 
improved products (goods or services) or processes that were: 
Abandoned: OR 
Tick as 
That have yet to be completed but are on time; OR Q 
Not yet completed but seriously delayed; OR 
Not even started; OR 
No/Not Applicable 
QUESTION 10 
During the last two years, did your enterprise have any other innovation activities to develop or 
implement technological change not directly aimed at imminent new products or processes eg. basic 
R&D, technology watching i. e. slow-burn or more long term investments? 
YESQ NOD 
QUESTION 11 
Ac fl hncinacc dirt vnn cnanrl sine mnnav in tha tact twn vaarc nn___? 
YES NO 
Research & experimental development (R&D) - IN HOUSE 
Acquisition of external R&D 
Acquisition of machinery and equipment (including computer hardware) in connection 
with product or process innovation. 
Acquisition of other external knowledge such as licences to use intellectual property (eg. 
patents, know-how) or specialised services (e. g. consultants, Universities, business support 
agencies 
All design functions, including industrial, product, process and service design and 
specifications for production or delivery. - Internal or external training for your personnel directly related to innovation activity. 
13 
Internal or external marketing activities aimed at the introduction of your enterprises 
innovations. Include market research and advertising of new innovations but exclude 
routine marketin¢ activity. v 
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SECTION 3 
The following questions are about you business, specifically about the size of your business and aim to assist 
us to understand whether the businesses sampled in this study which have and have not reported innovatory 
activity are or have been experiencing a period of growth, consolidation or contraction. 
QUESTION 12.1 
How many full time staff does your business employ: F-I Total Number of FTEs 
QUESTION 12.2 
Is this MORE or LESS than the figure two years ago? 
MORE Q HOW MUCH MORE? 
LESS 0 HOW MUCH LESS? N Go to 12.2.1 Go to 12.2.2 
SAME Q 
12.2.1 Tick 
Is the increase attributable to the acquisition of another business or YES Q NO Q 
part of it? 
Go to 13 
12.2.2 
Is the decrease attributable to the closure of part of business or a YES Q NO Q 
sale of part of the business? 
Go to 13 
Question 13.1 
How many of your employees would you say are directly concerned with Number of 
innovation i. e. research and technological development, product/process Employees 
development (innovation) e. g. product designers, engineers, scientists, developers 
i. e. creative-technical types)? Or 
Percentage of 
all 
Employees 
Question 13.2 
What percentage of your workforce are qualified scientists or engineers? Percentage 
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QUESTION 14.1 
What was your turnover in most recent financial car? 
Millions Thousands 
QUESTION 14.2 
Is this MORE or LESS or just about the same as the figure two years ago? 
MORE Q IN PERCENTAGE TERMS - HOW MUCH MORE? % Go to 14.2.1 
LESS Q IN PERCENTAGE TERMS - HOW MUCH LESS? % Go to 14.2.2 
SAME Q i. e. in line with inflation Go to 15.1 
QUESTION 14.2.1 Tick 
Is the increase attributable to acquisition of another business or part of YES Q NO Q 
It? 
Go to Question 15 
QUESTION 14.2.2 
Is the decrease attributable to the closure of part of business or a sale of YES Q NO Q 
part of the business? 
Go to Question 15 
QUESTION 15.1 
What proportion/percentage of your turnover (if any) would you estimate is °Io 
Invested in research and development (developing new ideas, products, processes 
and/or ways of doing things)? 
QUESTION 15.2 
What proportion/percentage of your turnover (if any) would you estimate is °10 
invested in training? 
QUESTION 15.3 
In the last two years how many new products or services would you say your business has launched? 
Prompt: None, None really, 1,2-3,4-5, more than 5 
QUESTION 15.4 
How many of these would you say have been successful? 
Prompt: None, None really, 1,2-3,4-5, more than 5 
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QUESTION 16.1 
Does your business hold any Quality Standards: Tick as applicable 
ISO 9000 standards 
Investors in 
Environmental Standards u 
Accreditation with other public agencies e. g. Business Support Agencies as an accredited 
supplier 
Accreditation with private sector businesses as a preferred supplier 
Other 
QUESTION 16.2 
ilnn. vý.. w F.. IC fl aCo Iaovn nn nnarotn 
VN. 
Website(providing basic information) Q 
CAD 
(Computer Assisted Design) 
Q 
Website (allowing customers to place orders & Q CAM Q 
make payment) (Computer Assisted Manufacturin ) 
Web-site through which you do business with Q 
CAE Q 
other businesses/clients e. g. file-sharing (Computer Assisted Engineering) 
Intranet Other advanced IT applications 
(Interconnected computers and networks within Q (Over and above Microsoft Office Suite of 
Q 
an organization) Tools and applications) 
Extranet 
(An extranet can be viewed as part of a Q ITick all that apply) 
company's intranet that is extended to users 
outside the company) 
OTTFATTON 16.1 
In terms of protecting your businesses intellectual assets and know-how - On a scale of 1-4 (1 = Not 
Important, 4= Very Important) how Important to your business is? 
_ 1 2 3 4 
Patent Protection Q Q Q Q 
1 2 3 4 
Registration of Trademarks Q Q Q 
Q 
1 2 3 4 
Copyright Q Q Q Q 
_ 1 2 3 4 
Confidentiality Agreements Li [1 0 Li 
_ 
1 2 3 4 Pay & Reward strategies (Salaries. Bonuses, share option schemes and Q 
other benefits i. e. looking after your key personnel) 
riease . w& "a w, vr#fV-- - 
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QUESTION 16.4 
Has your enterprise participated in or received assistance from any of the following types of 
innovation-related public programmes in the last two years 
SMART) 
(please tick all that apply) 
Technology Acquisition (e. g. Teaching Company Scheme - Knowledge Transfer Partnership 
U 
Projects, Demonstration Projects) 
Management Information Programmes (e. g. Industry Clubs, Business Clubs and 
Associations (Chamber of Commerce, Institute of Directors), University and/or 
Local Sector network events, 
Other '-' 
QUESTION 16.5 
How many people constitute your management team 
(e. g. Board of Directors, Partners)? 
iv urrtucr 
QUESTION 16.6 
How many members of the management team own or have a stake in the 
ownership of the business? 
ivumvei 
QUESTION 16.7 
Tick as appropriate 
Is the management team tasked on functional lines i. e. 
Director of Finance, Sales, HR, R&TD, etc 
13 
(and is this reflected in practice)? 
OR 
Is it more informal i. e. more of a shared and collective undertaking 
0 
with interchangeable roles, tasks, specialties? 
QUESTION 16.8 YES NO 
Do any members of the business (outside the management team) own or have aoo 
stake in the ownership of the business? 
QUESTION 16.9 
How many of your employees are female? 
wumver 
_Question 
16.10 
How many of your management/executive team are female? 
lvuinori 
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QUESTION 17 
Business Support 
Did your enterprise receive or benefit from any public support (financial or other assistance and advice) 
for INNOVATION-RELATED activities in the last two years? 
YES 
Financial support Q Other 
YES 
13 
Did this include? 
Grants Q 
Loans Q 
Access to bank finance, seed and venture Q 
capital 
Financial forecasts, cash-flow, profit &Q 
loss, sales projections, etc 
Other Q 
Did this Include support for? 
Idea Creation Q 
Idea definition Q 
Idea Protection 11 
Technical Feasibility 0 
Product design Q 
Prototype development Q 
Product testing 
(e. g. material testing, accelerated life Q 
testing) 
Design for manufacture 
(e. g. Component design, assembly, capacity Q 
planning, supplier lists, factory layout) 
Other Q 
QUESTION 18 
Did your enterprise receive or benefit from any public support (financial or other assistance and advice) 
for GENERAL BUSINESS activities in the last two years 
YES 
Financial support Q Other 
Example 
Grants Q 
Loans Q 
Access to bank finance, seed and venture Q 
capital 
Financial forecasts, cash-flow, profit &Q 
loss, sales projections, etc 
Other Q 
YES 
13 
Example 
Training Q_ 
Consultancy Q 
Information Q 
Networking Q 
Marketing Q 
ICT Q 
IPR 
Tender Preparation U 
Other Q 
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SECTION 4 
QUESTION 19.1 
Are you located at Science Park E. G. North East Business Innovation Centre 
Or Other Business Incubator Park, Business Centre or 
specialist business park/site 
YES Q NO Q 
If YES: Name of facility: 
QUESTION 19.2 
Why did your company decide to obtain premises at the incubator? 
i. e. what was the most significant factor - was it.. 
Favourable location and image; OR Q 
Quality, price and flexible terms for incubator units; OR Q 
Availability of professional business support services; OR Q 
Clustering and opportunity to network with similar businesses; OR Q 
Other factors - please specify below: o 
Other: [details] 
QUESTION 19.3 
What sort of incubator services have been particularly useful? 
(1= Most Useful, 4= Least Useful) 
RANK 
Pre-incubation Services 
Business planning and forming a company 
Training 
Information 
Advice and Support in development of new products, services and/or processes 
Help with raising finance 
_Help 
with accessing R&TD Grants and Grants to support Innovation 
Access to seed-com funding and venture capital funding 
Advice and support in recruitment and personnel management E E Other: (please specify: 
Other: [details] 
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SECTION 5 
These questions are asked to inform our understanding of why and how businesses are started with the 
region 
QUESTION 20.1 
About the FOUNDERS 
Was the firm founded by: 1 person Q 
A partnership of more than one person Q 
QUESTION 20.2 
What was the motivation at the start 
Perceived a market opportunity, meeting a challenge, personal achievement, independence, o 
improvement of social status, search for profit or a growth target 
Unemployment or a previous unsatisfactory professional experience 
QUESTION 20.3 
Was the founder/How many of the founders were aged? 
0 
(Insert t ure(s) depending on number of personnel) 
Under 20 
Years old Age 21-30 Age 31-40 Age 41-50 Age 51-60 Age 60+ 
Number Number Number Number ivumber lvumv r 
QUESTION 20.4 
When the firm was established did the founder(s) have other means/income/jobs/business interests? 
YES Q NO Q 
QUESTION 20.4 
Have the founder(s) maintained or developed other means/income/Jobs/business interests in 
addition to this business? 
YES Q NO Q 
QUESTION 20.5 
How was firm start financed (Tick as appropriate) 
Through Sales/Advanced Orders? Q 
Overdraft? Q 
Bank Loan? Q 
Personal Loan (e. g. family)? Q 
Savings or Investment by partners? 
Redundancy Settlement/Gratuity? 
Investors (in exchange for equity)? 
Mortgage on home? 
QUESTION 20.6 
Did founder(s) work previously together... (Tick as appropriate) 
For same firm or organization? Q 
Different firms or organizations? Q 
Know each other socially but not worked together? Q 
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0 
0 
0 
0 
QUESTION 20.7 
Did the founder(s) have previous: (Tick as appropriate) Q Management experience prior to business (i. e. executive or supervisory)? 
Experience in R&D? 
Experience in Sales and Marketing 
Experience in the field of consultancy? 
Experience in higher education? 
Experience in a large firm? 
Experience in a small firm? 
13 
- 
Experience in new venture creation, business development, 
13 
commercialisation of research/new products/ processes, etc? 
Experience as a self-emoloved? 
Experience in setting up a firm within the same sector? Li 
Experience in a family business 
13 
QUESTION 20.8 
Founder Education & Qualifications: (Tick as appropriate) 
Postgraduate PhD/Mphil Q Undergraduate Q 
MBA QA level Q 
Q MSc Q0 level/GCSE 
MA Q Vocational/Trade Qualification(s) Q 
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Appendix 2 
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NEBIC Tenant Case Studies 
Company Name: Images/Edect 
Date Founded: 1999 
About the Business: Digital Imaging, retouching, manipulation and creative 
output - Business and market intelligence services 
About the Founders: The business was established with an investment from 
the founders who at the time of formation had other 
means/income/jobs/business interests which they have 
continued to maintain. The founders had worked 
together previously albeit in different businesses and 
between them brought a range of management and sales 
and marketing experience. The founders had also 
worked in small firms and large enterprises and had 
previous experience of establishing a business in this 
sector. 
Founder(s) Education and Qualifications: 'A' Level 
Number of Employees: 3 FrEs of which two are described as directly concerned 
with innovation i. e. research and technological 
development 
Turnover: Not disclosed 
Customer Profile: 21-30% International, 71-80% National of which 71- 
80% based in North East of England. Private sector 
businesses account for 71-80% and 6-10% public sector 
organisations. 
Innovation: The business reports product innovations (new to the 
firm) in the last two years developed not only 'in-house' 
but also by other businesses (and then implemented by 
the Company), and in co-operation with other businesses 
and with the support of business support agency staff. 
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Product innovation is described as a constant activity 
with one or multiple projects in development and is said 
to have made particularly significant contributions to 
extending the product/service range. The Company 
attributes 41-50% of current turnover to products 
introduced in the last two years. 
The business also reports process innovations (new to the 
market) developed by other businesses and implemented 
by the Company. Process innovation is also described as 
a constant activity with one or multiple projects in 
development which are reported to have made a 
significant contribution to increased capacity. 
The business characterises innovation in the business as 
generally seeking to advance the state of the art in the 
industry. While generally `market-led/pull' (as opposed 
to `discovery-push') the Company describes innovation 
as generally occurring organically i. e. the product of the 
work culture, team dynamics and often the drive of one 
or more energetic individuals. Further, innovation is 
often prompted when a product or service is determined 
to be no longer performing as it should relative to 
customer requirements and/or competitor 
products/services. 
To support innovation and R&D, the business reported 
expenditure on machinery and equipment, design, 
training and marketing. 
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The Company estimates that approximately 5% of 
turnover is invested research and development and a 
further 5% in training. 
Quality Accreditation: The Company is an accredited supplier to public 
agencies e. g. Business Links. 
Application of ICT: The Company has established a web-site featuring 
'brochure-ware' an extranet and utilises CAD, CAM, 
CAE and other advanced ICT applications. 
Intellectual Assets & IPR The business accords a high value to confidentiality 
Protection: agreements. 
Business Support: In the last two years the Company has received a range 
of public sector business support that has included 
training, information and support for marketing. 
Views on NEBIC Services: The significant factor in the Company's decision to 
locate at NEBIC was the quality, price and flexible terms 
of the incubator units. 
The Company accords a high utility or value to 'Pre- 
incubation Services'; 'Business planning and forming a 
Company'; 'Training'; 'Information'; and 'Advice and 
Support in the development of New products, services 
and/or processes'. The Company ascribes a lesser value 
to other incubator services such as 'Help with raising 
finance'; 'Help with accessing R&TD grants and grants 
to support innovation'; 'Access to seed-corn funding and 
venture capital funding'; and 'Advice and support in 
recruitment and personnel management. 
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Company Name: Heat Trace 
Date Founded: 2001 
About the Business: Heat Tracing Specialists 
About the Founders: The business was founded by the current owner and was 
initially financed with a bank loan. The founder's 
previous experience included management, R&D, sales 
and marketing and experience of working in higher 
education. The founders also indicated that they had 
experiencd working in a large firm and as self-employed. 
Founder(s) Education and Qualifications: `A'Level, '0' 
Level and Vocational/Trade Qualifications. 
Number of Employees: 46 FTEs, a 20% increase on the figure of two years ago. 
4 members of staff were reported as directly concerned 
with R&D and 6 as qualified scientists or engineers. 
Turnover: £10,000,000 (up 40% on figure of two years ago) 
Customer Profile: UK only, 81-90% Private Sector Business. 
Innovation: The business reports product innovations in the last two 
years with relatively high levels of novelty (new to their 
market) and developed 'in-house'. 
Product innovation is described as a constant activity 
with one or multiple projects in development. 
Furthermore, product innovation was described 
particularly significant in extending the product/service 
range and penetrating new markets and increasing 
market share. The Company attributes 31-40% of 
turnover to products introduced in the last two years. 
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The business also reports process innovations (new to the 
firm) developed 'in-house'. Process innovation is also 
described as a constant activity with one or multiple 
projects in development which are reported to have made 
significant contributions to reducing materials/energy 
costs, reducing labour costs, increased capacity and 
production flexibility. The business also reports 
administrative innovations as an on-going activity. 
While generally discovery push' the Company describes 
innovation as generally occurring organically i. e. the 
product of the work culture, team dynamics and often a 
factor of financial surpluses and 'spare' time. Innovation 
is also prompted when a product or service is determined 
to be no longer performing as it should relative to 
customer requirements and/or competitor 
products/services. 
To support innovation and R&D, the business reported 
expenditure on R&D in house only i. e. no expenditure in 
the last two years on e. g. machinery and equipment, 
design, training and marketing, etc. The Company 
estimates that approximately 20% of turnover is invested 
research and development and a further 20% in training. 
Quality Accreditation: The Business holds ISO 9000 standard accreditation. 
Application of ICT: The Company has established a web-site featuring 
'brochure-ware' an extranet supporting business to 
business transactions, utilises CAD and other advanced 
ICT applications. 
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Intellectual Assets & IPR 
Protection: 
Business Support: 
The Company ascribes a high value to IPR protection 
(patents, trademarks, copyright, confidentiality 
agreements and pay and reward strategies (as a means of 
protecting and retaining `know-how') 
The business reports that it has not benefited from public 
sector business support other than that provided by 
NEBIC. 
Views on Incubator Services: The Company accords a high utility or value to 'Pre- 
incubation Services'; 'Training'; and 'Information'. The 
Company ascribes a lesser value to other incubator 
services such as 'Business planning and forming a 
Company'; Advice and Support in the development of 
New products, services and/or processes'. `Help with 
raising finance'; `Help with accessing R&TD grants and 
grants to support innovation'; 'Access to seed-corn 
funding and venture capital funding'; and `Advice and 
support in recruitment and personnel management. 
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0 
Company Name: Hi Tech Seals and Polymers Ltd 
Date Founded: 2004 
About the Business: Suppliers of hydraulic and pneumatic seals, gaskets, 0 
rings and engineered plastic parts. 
About the Founders: The business was founded by two partners. The 
founder's previous experience included management, 
R&D, sales and marketing, and in higher education. The 
founders also reported previous experience in a large 
firm, family firm and as self-employed, and in new 
venture creation (in the same sector) and business 
development (commercialisation of research/new 
products/processes) 
Founder(s) Education and Qualifications: MSc, 
'A'Level, '0' Level/GCSE and Vocational/Trade 
Qualifications 
Number of Employees: 5 FTEs, a 50% increase on two years ago. 2 members of 
staff were reported as directly concerned with R&D and 
2 as qualified scientists or engineers. 
Turnover: Not disclosed. 
Customer Profile: International customers account for 6-10%, 81-90% UK 
customers of which 81-90% are located in the North 
East. 71-80% of customers are private sector businesses, 
0-5% public sector organisations and the remainder 
private consumers. 
Innovation: The business reports product innovations in the last two 
years with high levels of novelty (new to their industry) 
and developed in collaboration with other businesses. 
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Product innovation is described as a constant activity 
with one or multiple projects in development and 
describes product innovation as particularly significant in 
improving product quality. The Company attributes 41- 
50% of turnover to products introduced in the last two 
years and 21-30% to products significantly 
improved. The business also reports administrative 
innovations as an on-going activity supported by 
business support agency staff. 
The business characterises innovation in the business as 
generally comprising incremental improvements to the 
Company's own products and/or new and original 
innovations that advance the state of their art in their 
industry. While generally 'discovery push' the Company 
describes innovation as generally occurring organically 
i. e. the product of the work culture, team dynamics 
(often the work of an 'energetic' individual) and mainly 
a factor of time in which to do so. Innovation is often 
prompted when a product or service is determined to be 
no longer performing as it should relative to customer 
requirements and/or competitor products/services. 
To support innovation and R&D, the business reported a 
range of expenditure on R&D in the last two years which 
has included investments in the acquisition of external 
R&D, licenses and specialised technology services, 
machinery and equipment, design, training and 
marketing The Company estimates that approximately 
15% of turnover is invested research and development 
and a further 5% in training. 
477 
Quality Accreditation: I The business holds ISO 9000 standard accreditation and 
accreditation with public sector agencies as an approved 
supplier. 
Application of ICT: The Company has established a web-site featuring 
'brochure-ware' and an extranet supporting business to 
business transactions. The Company also utilises CAD, 
CAE, and other advanced ICT applications. 
Intellectual Assets & IPR I The Company ascribes a high value to IPR protection - 
Protection: patents, copyright, confidentiality agreements. The 
registration of trademarks and pay and reward strategies 
(as a means of protecting and retaining 'know-how') are 
reported as not important. 
Business Support: 
Views on Incubator Services: 
The Company reports that it has benefited from a range 
of Management Information programmes in the last two 
years and has received specific support for innovation 
(Idea creation, Idea definition and Idea Protection) and 
other general business support which has included 
business grants, training, consultancy, information and 
marketing. 
Location, image and the availability of professional 
business support services were identified as key to the 
decision to locate at NEBIC. 
The Company accords a high utility or value to 'Pre- 
incubation Services'; 'Advice and Support in the 
development of New products, services and/or 
processes'; 'Help with raising finance'; 'Help with 
accessing R&TD grants and grants to support 
innovation'; 'Access to seed-corn funding and venture 
capital funding'; and `Training'. The Company ascribes 
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a lesser value to other incubator services such as 
'Information'; 'Business planning and forming a 
Company'; and 'Advice and support in recruitment and 
personnel management. 
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Company Name: IS Squared (Tricon Group) 
Date Founded: 2004 
About the Business: Offering statistical services to businesses 
About the Founders: The business was founded by two partners. The 
founder's previous experience comprised management, 
sales and marketing, and consultancy. Previous 
experience also included working in a large firm, family 
firm, as self-employed; and new venture creation and 
business development (commercial isation of 
research/new products/processes). 
Founder(s) Education and Qualifications: MA, `O' 
Level/GCSE and Vocational/Trade Qualifications. 
Number of Employees: 2 FTEs who are both reported as directly concerned with 
R&D. 1 is a qualified scientist/engineer. 
Turnover: Not disclosed. 
Customer Profile: International customers account for 0-5% of sales, the 
remainder are UK based of which 71-80% are located in 
the North East. 71-80% of customers are private sector 
businesses, 0-5% are public sector organisations and the 
remainder private consumers. 
Innovation: The business reports no product or process innovations 
as occurring in the last two years. The business reports 
administrative innovations as an on-going `in-house' 
activity. 
The business otherwise characterises innovation in the 
business as generally comprising incremental 
improvements to the Company's own products/services. 
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While generally 'market-pull' the Company describes 
innovation as generally occurring organically i. e. the 
product of the work culture, team dynamics (often the 
work of an 'energetic' individual) and a factor of time in 
which to do so and/or when a product or service is 
determined to be no longer performing as it should 
relative to customer requirements and/or competitor 
products/services. 
To support innovation and R&D, the business reported a 
range of expenditure in the last two years which has 
included investments in the acquisition of licenses and 
specialised technology services, machinery and 
equipment, and training. The Company estimates that 
approximately 2% of turnover is invested in research and 
development and a further 5% in training. 
Quality Accreditation: The business has secured accreditation with public sector 
agencies and private sector businesses as an 
approved/preferred supplier. 
Application of ICT: The Company has established a web-site featuring 
'brochure-ware' and utilises other advanced ICT 
applications. 
Intellectual Assets & IPR 
Protection: 
Business Support: 
The Company ascribes a high value to confidentiality 
agreements. Patents, the registration of trademarks, 
copyright and pay and reward strategies (as a means of 
protecting and retaining 'know-how') are reported as not 
particularly important. 
The Company reports that it has benefited from a range 
of Management Information programmes in the last two 
years and has received general business support which 
has included training and support for ICT. 
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Views on Incubator Services: On its decision to locate at NEBIC, the Company 
identified location and image; quality, price and flexible 
terms, and the availability of professional business 
support services as significant factors. 
The Company accords a high utility or value to `Pre- 
incubation Services' and 'Information'. 
The Company ascribes a lesser value to other incubator 
services such as 'Training', 'Advice and Support in the 
development of New products, services and/or 
processes'; 'Help with raising finance'; 'Help with 
accessing R&TD grants and grants to support 
innovation'; 'Access to seed-corn funding and venture 
capital funding'; 'Business planning and forming a 
Company'; and 'Advice and support in recruitment and 
personnel management'. 
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Company Name: Sprint Finish 
Date Founded: 2000 
About the Business: Print finishing services to printing industry 
About the Founders: The business was founded by two partners and financed 
with bank loans and an initial investment by the partners. 
The founder's previous experience includes 
management, sales and marketing, consultancy and 
higher education. The founders also report experience 
working in a small firm, and in new venture creation and 
business development (commercialisation of 
research/new products/processes). 
Founder(s) Education and Qualifications: Undergraduate 
degree. 
Number of Employees: 18 FTEs of which 3 are reported as directly concerned 
with R&D. 2 FTEs are reported as qualified 
scientists/engineers. 
Turnover: £350,000 up 10% on figure two years ago. 
Customer Profile: International customers account for 0-5% of sales, the 
remainder are based in the UK of which 41-50% are 
located in the North East. 71-80% of customers are 
private sector businesses, 0-5% public sector 
organisations and the remainder private consumers. 
Innovation: The business reports no product or process innovations 
in the last two years, but reports administrative 
innovations as an on-going activity undertaken `in- 
house' and/or by other businesses or institutions and then 
implemented by the Company and/or in co-operation 
with other businesses and/or in consultation with clients 
or customers. 
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Innovation as generally occurring in the business is said 
to comprise incremental improvements to the Company's 
existing product/service range and, moreover, as 
'market-led/pull' innovations - the outcome of strategies 
and plans. The Company reported that innovation tended 
to be driven by one or more energetic individuals and 
was often prompted when the Company determined that 
a product or service was no longer performing as it 
should relative to customer requirements and 
expectations or competitor products and services. 
To support innovation and R&D, the business reported a 
range of expenditure in the last two years which has 
included investments `in-house', the acquisition of 
external R&D, the acquisition of machinery and 
equipment, licenses and specialised technology services, 
training and marketing. The Company estimates that 
approximately 10% of turnover is invested research and 
development and training. 
Quality Accreditation: The business has secured Investors in People 
accreditation and accreditation with private sector 
businesses as an approved/preferred supplier. 
Application of ICT: The Company has established a web-site featuring 
'brochure-ware' and utilises CAD and other advanced 
ICT applications. 
Intellectual Assets & IPR 
Protection: 
The Company ascribes a high value to copyright, 
confidentiality agreements and pay and reward strategies 
(as a means of protecting and retaining `know-how'). 
Patents, and the registration of trademarks, are reported 
as not particularly important. 
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Business Support: The Company reports that it has benefited from a range 
of general (public) business support which has included 
training, marketing and support for ICT. 
Views on Incubator Services: On its decision to locate at NEBIC, the Company 
identified location and image; quality, price and flexible 
terms as the most significant factors. 
The Company accords a high utility or value to 'Advice 
and Support in the development of New products, 
services and/or processes', 'Pre-incubation Services' and 
'Information'. 
The Company ascribes a lesser value to other incubator 
services such as 'Training'; 'Help with raising finance'; 
'Help with accessing R&TD grants and grants to support 
innovation'; `Access to seed-corn funding and venture 
capital funding'; `Business planning and forming a 
Company'; and 'Advice and support in recruitment and 
personnel management. 
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Company Name: Micro Image Document Systems 
Date Founded: 2000 
About the Business Transferring Documents Images to CD Rom and 
associated retrieval software. 
About the Founders: The business was founded by two partners and financed 
via advanced order and on the basis of an initial 
investment by the partners. At start up the founders had 
other means/income/jobs/business interests which they 
have subsequently maintained. The founder's who had 
worked together previously, albeit for different firms, 
possessed previous experience in 'Management', 'Sales 
& Marketing', 'Consultancy', 'Higher Education' and 
experience in a large firm. 
Founder(s) Education and Qualifications: Undergraduate 
degree. 
Number of Employees: 8 FTEs 
Turnover: £80,000 
Customer Profile: International customers account for 81-90% of sales, the 
remainder in the UK of which 31-40% are located in the 
North East. 71-80% Private Sector Business, 11-20% 
public sector organisations and the remainder private 
consumers (less than 5%). 
Innovation: The business reports no product or process innovations 
in the last two years, but reports administrative 
innovations as a regular activity undertaken 'in-house'. 
Innovation as generally occurring in the business is said 
however to occur as new original breakthroughs 
advancing the state of the art in the industry and 
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moreover, as 'discovery-push' initiatives which are 
nevertheless the outcome of strategies and plans. 
To support innovation and R&D, the business reported a 
range of expenditure in the last two years which has 
included investments in the acquisition of machinery and 
equipment, licenses and specialised technology services, 
training and marketing. 
Quality Accreditation: The business has secured accreditation with private 
sector businesses as an approved/preferred supplier 
Application of ICT: The Company has established a web-site featuring 
'brochure-ware' and supporting transactions with 
customers (file-sharing) and utilises other advanced ICT 
applications. 
Intellectual Assets & IPR The Company ascribes a high value to copyright, 
Protection: confidentiality agreements. Pay and reward strategies (as 
a means of protecting and retaining 'know-how'), 
Patents, and Trademarks are reported as not particularly 
important. 
Business Support: The Company reports that it has not benefited from 
public sector business support other than services 
accessed at NEBIC 
Views on Incubator Services: On its decision to located at NEBIC, the Company 
identified location and image; quality, price and flexible 
terms; and the availability of professional business 
support services on site as most significant. In addition, 
the decision to locate at NEBIC was also supported by a 
personal recommendation. 
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The Company accords a high utility or value to 
'Information', 'Pre-incubation Services', 'Business 
planning and forming a Company' and 'Training. 
'Advice and Support in the development of New 
products, services and/or processes'; and 'Advice and 
support in recruitment and personnel management were 
accorded a low utility while 
'Help with raising finance'; 'Help with accessing R&TD 
grants and grants to support innovation'; 'Access to 
seed-corn funding and venture capital funding' were 
accorded no utility/value. 
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Company Name: Meridian Marketing Ltd 
Date Founded: 1998 
About the Business: Marketing Consultancy 
About the Founders: The founder, who financed the business start with an 
initial investment from personal savings had previous 
management, sales and marketing, consultancy, higher 
education gained in a large firm. In addition, the founder 
had experience of new venture creation, business 
development, commercial isation of research/new 
products/processes, etc. 
Founder(s) Education and Qualifications: Undergraduate 
degree. 
Number of Employees: 16 FTEs (which has risen from a figure of two, two years 
ago) of which two are identified as specifically 
concerned with innovation i. e. research and 
development, product/process development 
Turnover: £230,000 (50% up on the figure of two years ago) 
Customer Profile: International customers account for 0-5% of sales, the 
remainder in the UK of which 41-50% are located in the 
North East. 61-70% of customers are Private Sector 
Business, 31-40% public sector organisations and 6-10% 
private consumers. 
Innovation: The business reports no product or process innovations 
in the last two years, but reports administrative 
innovations as a constant endeavour, undertaken `in- 
house'. 
Innovation as generally occurring in the business is said 
however to occur as new original breakthroughs 
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advancing the state of the art in the industry and 
moreover, as 'discovery-push' initiatives and are 
generally a product of team dynamics rather than 
strategy or plans. Innovation, as reported by the 
Company was more likely to be prompted by a 
determination than products or services were no longer 
performing as they should and is generally driven by one 
or more individuals. 
To support innovation and R&D, the business reported a 
range of expenditure in the last two years which has 
included investments in the acquisition of machinery and 
equipment, training and marketing. The Company 
reports that approximately 25% of turnover is invested in 
research and development. 
Quality Accreditation: 
Application of ICT: 
The business reports that it is moving towards ISO 9000 
accreditation and that it has secured accreditation with 
public agencies (DMA) as an approved supplier. 
The Company has established a web-site featuring 
`brochure-ware' and supporting transactions with 
customers (file-sharing). 
Intellectual Assets & IPR 
Protection: 
The Company ascribes a high value to confidentiality 
agreements and pay and reward strategies (as a means of 
protecting and retaining `know-how'). Patents, 
Trademarks and Copyright are reported as not 
particularly important. 
Business Support: The Company reports that it has benefited from a range 
of public sector business support that has included 
Training, Information, Marketing and ICT support. 
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Views on Incubator Services: On its decision to locate at NEBIC, the Company 
identified location and image; quality, price and flexible 
terms; the availability of professional business support 
services on site as most significant; and the opportunity 
to network with other businesses. 
The Company accords a high utility or value to 'Pre- 
incubation Services', 'Information', 'Advice and Support 
in the development of New products, services and/or 
processes' 'Business planning and forming a Company'; 
'Training'; and 'Advice and support in recruitment and 
personnel management'. 'Help with raising finance was 
accorded a low utility while 'Help with accessing R&TD 
grants and grants to support innovation'; `Access to 
seed-corn funding and venture capital funding' were 
accorded no utility/value. 
491 
Company Name: Maxim Cleaning Services Ltd 
Date Founded: 2004 (yet to complete first years trading) 
About the Business: Specialist Cleaning Contractors 
About the Founders: The founder, who financed the business start with an 
initial investment from personal savings and mortgage on 
own home had previous management experience gained 
in a large firm. 
Founder(s) Education and Qualifications: 0 level/GCSE. 
Number of Employees: 7 FTEs and 20 part time staff 
Turnover: Yet to complete first year of trading. 
Customer Profile: International customers account for 0-5% of sales, the 
remainder in the UK of which 81-90% are located in the 
North East. 91-100% of customers are Private Sector 
Business, 0-5% public sector organisations and 0-5% 
private consumers. 
Innovation: The business reports no product innovations in the last 
two years, but does however report process innovations 
(new to their firm), which feature regularly and are 
generally developed 'in-house'; in consultation with 
suppliers, customers, and with the assistance of Business 
Support Agency staff to which the Company accords 41- 
50% of turnover. The Company credits process 
innovation with significant contributions to reducing 
materials and/or energy costs and increasing capacity. 
Innovation as generally occurring in the business is said 
however to occur as incremental improvements to the 
Company's own products/services and, moreover, as 
'market-led' initiatives and are generally a product of 
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team dynamics rather than an outcome of strategy or 
plans. Innovation, as reported by the Company, was 
more likely to be prompted by a determination than 
products or services were no longer performing as they 
should. To support innovation and R&D, the business 
reported expenditure in the last two years on the 
acquisition of machinery and equipment and training. 
Quality Accreditation: No 
Application of ICT: The Company has established a web-site featuring 
'brochure-ware' and supporting transactions with 
customers (file-sharing). 
Intellectual Assets & IPR The Company ascribes little or no importance to IPR 
Protection: protection. 
Business Support: The Company reports that it has benefited from a range 
of public sector business support that has included 
Information, Marketing and ICT support. 
Views on Incubator Services: On its decision to locate at NEBIC, the Company 
identified location and image; and recommendation for 
businesses already located at NEBIC as the most 
significant factors. 
The Company accords a high utility or value to 'Pre- 
incubation Services', 'Information', 'Advice and Support 
in the development of New products, services and/or 
processes' 'Business planning and forming a Company'; 
'Training'; and 'Advice and support in recruitment and 
personnel management'. 'Help with raising finance was 
accorded a low utility while 'Help with accessing R&TD 
grants and grants to support innovation'; 'Access to 
seed-corn funding and venture capital funding' were 
accorded no utility/value. 
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Company Name: Joe Prince 
Date Founded: 2004 
About the Business: On-line specialist clothing 
About the Founders: The founders financed the business start with an initial 
investment from personal savings. The founders had 
worked together albeit for different organisations and 
possessed previous experience in management, sales and 
marketing, consultancy, higher education, small firms 
and in a family business. 
Founder(s) Education and Qualifications: A level. 
Number of Employees: 12 FTEs of which 1 is reported to be directly concerned 
with R&D, and product/process development. 
Turnover: £98,000 (up 20% on last year) 
Customer Profile: International customers account for 11-20% of sales, the 
remainder are based in the UK of which 11-20% are 
located in the North East. 51-60% of customers are 
private sector businesses, 0-5% are public sector 
organisations and the remainder private consumers. 
Innovation: The business reports no product innovations in the last 
two years, but does however report process innovations 
(new to their firm), which feature regularly and are 
generally developed `in-house' to which the Company 
accords 21-30% of current turnover. The Company 
credits process innovation with significant contributions 
to increased flexibility. The Company also reports 
administrative innovations (new to their firm and 
developed in house). 
Innovation as generally occurring in the business is said 
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however to occur generally as adapted adoptions i. e. 
products, services or practices which the Company has 
observed elsewhere and has adopted with improvements. 
Moreover, innovations as said to be generally `market- 
led' though not generally the outcome of strategy or 
plans. Innovation, as reported by the Company was 
more likely to be prompted by the existence of surpluses 
and a determination than products or services were no 
longer performing as they should. 
To support innovation and R&D, the business reported 
expenditure in the last two years on the acquisition of 
machinery and equipment, external knowledge 
(licenses), training and marketing. 
Quality Accreditation: The Company has secured accreditation with private 
sector businesses as an approved/preferred supplier. 
Application of ICT: The Company has established a web-site featuring 
'brochure-ware', allowing customers to place orders and 
make payment and support transactions with customers 
(file-sharing). The Company operates an intranet and 
utilises CAD and other advanced IT applications. 
Intellectual Assets & IPR 
Protection: 
The Company ascribes a high value to copyright and 
confidentiality agreements, the registration of trademarks 
and pay and rewards strategies (as a means to protecting 
retaining intellectual assets) but accords little importance 
to patent protection. 
Business Support: The Company reports that it has benefited from a range 
of public sector business support to support innovation 
(specifically Idea Protection, Product Design and 
Prototype Development) and has also accessed general 
support vis-ä-vis Training, Marketing and ICT support. 
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Views on Incubator Services: On its decision to locate at NEBIC, the Company 
identified location and image; quality, price and flexible 
terms and the opportunity to network with similar 
businesses via NEBIC as significant factors. 
The Company accords a high utility or value to 'Pre- 
incubation Services', 'Information' and 'Training'. 
'Business planning and forming a Company'; and 
'Advice and Support in the development of New 
products, services and/or processes' are accorded a lower 
utility value while and 'Help with raising finance'; 'Help 
with accessing R&TD grants and grants to support 
innovation'; `Access to seed-corn funding and venture 
capital funding'; and `Advice and support in recruitment 
and personnel management' indicated as `least useful' 
services. 
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Company Name: Marine Response Ltd 
Date Founded: 2000 
About the Business: Insurance Claims handling intermediary representing the 
interests of insured shipowners and their marine liability 
insurers. 
About the Founders: The founders financed the business start with an initial 
investment from personal savings. The founders had 
worked together previously for the same firm and 
possessed previous experience in management, sales and 
marketing, consultancy, higher education, and of 
working in a small firm. 
Founder(s) Education and Qualifications: A level. 
Number of Employees: 11 FTEs (approximately 20% up on the figure reported 
two years ago). 
Turnover: Not disclosed. 
Customer Profile: International customers account for 11-20% of sales, the 
remainder are UK based of which 61-70% are located in 
the North East. 61-70% of customers are Private Sector 
Business, 0-5% public sector organisations and the 
remainder (21-30%) private consumers. 
Innovation: The business reports no product or process innovations 
in the last two years, but does however report 
administrative innovations (new to their firm), which are 
ongoing and are generally developed 'in-house'. 
Innovation as occurring in the business is said generally 
to be extensions of the Company's own products and 
services. Moreover, innovations as said to be generally 
`market-led/pull' and are generally the outcome of 
strategy or plans. 
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To support innovation and R&D, the business reported 
expenditure in the last two years on the acquisition of 
machinery and equipment, external knowledge 
(licenses), and training. 
Quality Accreditation; The Company has secured Investors in People 
accreditation, accreditation against Environmental 
Standards and accreditation with public sector 
organisations as an approved/preferred supplier. 
Application of ICT: The Company has established a web-site featuring 
'brochure-ware' and supporting transactions with 
customers (file-sharing). The Company also utilises 
other advanced IT applications. 
Intellectual Assets & IPR The Company ascribes a high value to confidentiality 
Protection: agreements but little or no value to copyright, patent 
protection, trademarks and pay and rewards strategies (as 
a means to protecting retaining intellectual assets). 
Business Support: The Company reports that it has benefited from a range 
of public sector business support specifically Training, 
Information and ICT support. 
Views on Incubator Services: On its decision to locate at NEBIC, the Company 
identified location and image; and quality, price and 
flexible terms as significant factors. The Company 
accords a high value to 'Information', 'Pre-incubation 
Services'; 'Business planning and forming a Company'; 
'Training'; and 'Advice and Support in the development 
of New products, services and/or processes'. 'Advice 
and support in recruitment and personnel management' 
were accorded a lower value. 'Help with raising finance'; 
'Help with accessing R&TD grants and grants to support 
innovation'; and 'Access to seed-corn funding and 
venture capital funding' were reported as 'least useful'. 
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Company Name: Lomax Associates 
Date Founded: 2001 
About the Business: Business and management training. Specialist 
trainer/assessors to gas industry to recognised national 
standards. 
About the Founders: The founder financed the business start with an initial 
investment from personal savings and had previous 
experience in management, consultancy, higher 
education and of working in a large firm. 
Founder(s) Education and Qualifications: MBA. 
Number of Employees: 26 FTEs (approximately 60% are qualified engineers or 
scientists). Employment is up a reported 100% on the 
figure of two years ago. 
Turnover: £1,200,000 (50% up on the figure of two years ago). 
Customer Profile: International customers account for 0-5% of sales, the 
remainder in the UK of which 81-90% are located in the 
North East. 31-40% of customers are Private Sector 
Business, 61-70% public sector organisations and the 
remainder (0-5%) private consumers. 
Innovation: The business reports process innovations (new to the 
firm) in the last two years, which are reported as a 
regularly occurring and developed in consultation with 
clients or customers and to which the Company attributes 
11-20% of current turnover. The Company credits 
product innovation as making significant contributions to 
extending the Company's range of products/services; 
increasing market share and penetrating new markets; 
and improving product/service quality. 
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The Company also reports Administrative innovations 
(new to the firm), reported as constant and on-going and 
developed `in-house', in co-operation with other 
businesses, in consultation with suppliers, clients or 
customers. 
Innovation as occurring in the business are said generally 
to be extensions of the Company's own products and 
services. Moreover, innovations are said to be generally 
`market-led/pull' and generally the outcome of strategy 
or plans. The availability of surpluses are noted as a 
factor in the Company's ability to innovate, as are the 
efforts of one or more energetic individuals. Uppermost 
however as a driver of innovation in the business are 
determinations that products or services are no longer 
performing as they should relative to customer 
requirements and/or competitor offerings. To support 
innovation and R&D, the business reported expenditure 
in the last two years on the acquisition of machinery and 
equipment, training and marketing. The Company 
reports that approximately 10% of turnover is invested in 
R&D/efforts to develop new products/services and 25% 
in training. 
Quality Accreditation: The Company has secured ISO 9000 and Investors in 
People accreditation, accreditation against 
Environmental Standards, accreditation with both public 
sector organisations and private sector businesses as an 
approved/preferred supplier. 
Application of ICT: The Company has established a web-site featuring 
'brochure-ware' and supporting transactions with 
customers (file-sharing). 
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Intellectual Assets & IPR 
Protection: 
Business Support: 
Views on Incubator Services: 
The Company ascribes a high value to confidentiality 
agreements and copyright but little or no value to patent 
protection, registration of trademarks or pay and rewards 
strategies (as a means to protecting retaining intellectual 
assets). 
The Company reports that it has benefited from a range 
of public sector business support specifically Training, 
Consultancy, Information, Marketing, Quality and ICT 
support. The Company has also availed itself of public 
sector business support to support innovation, 
specifically Idea Creation. 
On its decision to locate at NEBIC, the Company quality, 
price and flexible terms as a significant factor. 
The Company accords a high utility or value to 
'Information', 'Pre-incubation Services'; 'Business 
planning and forming a Company'; 'Information'; 
'Advice and Support in the development of New 
products, services and/or processes'; 'Advice and 
support in recruitment and personnel management'. 
Training was accorded a lower utility value while 'Help 
with raising finance'; 'Help with accessing R&TD grants 
and grants to support innovation'; and 'Access to seed- 
corn funding and venture capital funding' were reported 
as 'least useful'. 
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Company Name: Northern Defence Industries 
Date Founded: 2001 
About the Business: Northern Defence Industries (NDI) is an organisation 
that assists its members to develop and grow their 
businesses in the global defence and aerospace sector. 
The business provides members with networking 
opportunities, promotional support, customer contact, 
technology transfer and supports cluster development. 
About the Founders: N/A 
Number of Employees: 7 FTEs - 50% up on the figure of two years ago - of 
which all are reported to be concerned with research and 
technological development and/or the development of 
new products and services. 
Turnover: £680,000 
Customer Profile: International customers account for 11-20% of sales, the 
remainder in the UK of which 81-90% are located in the 
North East. 91-100% of customers are Private Sector 
Business, 0-5% public sector organisations and the 
remainder (0-5%) private consumers. 
Innovation: The business reports both product and process 
innovations (new to the industry) in the last two years. 
Both Product and Process innovations are reported as a 
constant and ongoing activity (developed 'in house') to 
which 6-10% of current turnover is now attributed. 
Product innovation is reported as making a significant 
contribution to the product/service range and a very 
significant contribution to opening new markets, 
increasing market share and improving the quality of 
products and services. 
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Process innovations are reported to have made 
significant contributions to flexibility and increased 
capacity. 
Innovation as occurring in the business is said generally 
to be extensions of the Company's own products and 
services. Moreover, innovations as said to be generally 
'discovery-style' but are generally said to be the outcome 
of strategy or plans. The efforts of one or more energetic 
individuals are noted as instrumental to innovation 
occurring in the business and determinations that 
products or services are no longer performing as they 
should. 
To support innovation and R&D, the business reported 
expenditure in the last two years on the acquisition of 
machinery and equipment, the acquisition of external 
knowledge, design functions, and marketing. The 
Company reports that approximately 30% of turnover is 
invested in R&D/efforts to develop new 
products/services and 10% in training. 
Quality Accreditation: The Company has secured ISO 9000 accreditation 
Application of ICT: The Company has established a web-site featuring 
`brochure-ware', an intranet and utilises other advanced 
ICT applications. 
Intellectual Assets & IPR 
Protection: 
The Company ascribes a high value to the registration of 
trademarks, confidentiality agreements and copyright 
and pay and rewards strategies (as a means to protecting 
retaining intellectual assets) and little/no value to patent 
protection. 
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Business Support: I The Company reports that it has benefited from public 
sector business support grants in the last two years. 
Views on Incubator Services: I N/A 
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Company Name: Neutronic Technologies Ltd 
Date Founded: 2000 
About the Business: Electronic repair services - PCB repairs, robotics and 
PLC 
About the Founders: N/A 
Number of Employees: 7 FTEs - 20% up on the figure of two years ago - of 
which 3 are reported as concerned with research and 
technological development and/or the development of 
new products and services and are qualified scientists or 
engineers. 
Turnover: £300,000 (reportedly 50% up on the figure of two years 
ago) 
Customer Profile: International customers account for 6-10% of sales, the 
remainder in the UK (North East). 91-100% of 
customers are Private Sector Business, 0-5% public 
sector organisations and the remainder (0-5%) private 
consumers. 
Innovation: The business reports both product and process 
innovations (new to the industry) in the last two years. 
The Company also reports administrative innovations. 
Product innovation is reported as a regular activity 
(developed `in house') to which 21-30% of current 
turnover is now attributed. Product innovation is 
reported as making significant contributions to the 
product/service range, opening new markets, increasing 
market share and improving the quality of products and 
services. 
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Process innovations as a constant endeavour and are 
reported to have made significant contributions to 
flexibility and increased capacity. 
Innovation as occurring in the business is said generally 
to be extensions of the Company's own products and 
services. Moreover, innovations as said to be generally 
'market-led/pull' and the outcome of strategy or plans. 
To support innovation and R&D, the business reported 
expenditure in the last two years on the acquisition of 
external R&D, machinery and equipment, the acquisition 
of external knowledge, training and marketing and other 
long-term investments. 
Quality Accreditation: The Company has secured ISO 9000 accreditation 
Application of ICT: The Company has established a web-site featuring 
`brochure-ware', functions to accept orders and payment, 
an intranet, CAD and utilises other advanced ICT 
applications. 
Intellectual Assets & IPR The Company ascribes a little or no value to patent 
Protection: protection, the registration of trademarks, confidentiality 
agreements and copyright. Pay and rewards strategies 
(as a means to protecting/retaining intellectual assets) is 
noted as key. 
Business Support: The Company reports that it has benefited from public 
sector business support programmes and grants to 
support innovation/R&D in the last two years. 
Views on Incubator Services: N/A 
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Company Name: North East Product Development 
Date Founded: 2003 
About the Business: Designing essential modern day products, equipment hire 
and employment pack for employment market 
About the Founders: N/A 
Number of Employees: 8 FTEs - 90% up on the figure of two years ago - of 
which 8 are reported as concerned with research and 
technological development and/or the development of 
new products and services and are qualified scientists or 
engineers. 
Turnover: £700,000 
Customer Profile: International customers account for 0-5% of sales, the 
remainder are UK based (81-90% North East). 71-80% 
of customers are Private Sector Business, 21-30% public 
sector organisations and the remainder (0-5%) private 
consumers. 
Innovation: The business reports both product and process 
innovations (new to the industry) and administrative 
innovations in the last two years. 
Product innovation is reported as a constant endeavour 
with multiple projects in development (developed 'in 
house') and as making significant contributions to the 
product/service range, opening new markets, increasing 
market share and improving the quality of products and 
services. 
Process innovation is also reported as a constant 
endeavour (developed 'in house'), and making 
significant contributions to increased flexibility and 
capacity and reduced materials/energy and labour costs. 
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Innovation as occurring in the business is said generally 
to be extensions of the Company's own products and 
services. Moreover, innovations are said to be 
`discovery-style' initiatives and organic i. e. the product 
of work culture and team dynamics (particularly the 
endeavour of one or more individuals) as opposed to the 
outcome of strategy or plans. 
To support innovation and R&D, the business reported 
expenditure in the last two years `in-house', the 
acquisition of external R&D, machinery and equipment, 
the acquisition of external knowledge, design functions, 
training and marketing. 
Quality Accreditation: The Company has secured ISO 9000 accreditation 
Application of ICT: The Company has established a web-site featuring 
`brochure-ware', functions to accept customer orders and 
payment, an intranet, and utilises other advanced ICT 
applications. 
Intellectual Assets & IPR While the Company ascribes a little or no value to patent 
Protection: protection, the registration of trademarks, confidentiality 
agreements and copyright, and pay and reward strategies 
(as a means to protecting/retaining intellectual assets) are 
noted as very important. 
Business Support: The Company reports that it has benefited from public 
sector business support programmes, specifically grants 
to support innovation/R&D in the last two years. 
Views on Incubator Services: N/A 
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Company Name: Salamander Pumps 
Date Founded: N/A 
About the Business: Designing essential modern day products, equipment hire 
and employment pack for employment market 
About the Founders: The founders had worked together previously, albeit for 
different firms. Previous experience included 
management, R&D, sales and marketing, consultancy. 
In addition, the founders had experience of working in 
higher education, large and small firms, as self-employed 
and working in a family business. Furthermore, they had 
experience of new venture creation and in the same 
sector. 
Founder(s) Education and Qualifications: Undergraduate 
degree 
Number of Employees: 30 FTEs - 40% up on the figure of two years ago - of 
which 3 are reported as concerned with research and 
technological development and/or the development of 
new products and services and are qualified scientists or 
engineers. 
Turnover: Not disclosed. 
Customer Profile: International customers account for 0-5% of sales, the 
remainder in the UK. 81-90% of customers are private 
sector businesses, 0-5% public sector organisations and 
the remainder (0-5%) private consumers. 
Innovation: The business reports product innovations (new to the 
industry), process innovations (new to the firm) and 
administrative innovations (new to the firm) in the last 
two years. 
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Product innovation is reported as a constant endeavour 
(and developed in co-operation with other institutions - 
universities and research centres). Product innovation 
(in the last two years) is reported as making significant 
contributions to the product/service range, opening new 
markets, increasing market share and improving the 
quality of products and services and accounts for 21-35% 
of current turnover. Process and Administrative 
innovations are also reported as constant endeavours 
(developed with financial assistance from European, 
National and/or Regional Research Grants and Awards). 
The former are credited with making significant 
contributions to increased flexibility and capacity and 
reduced materials/energy and labour costs. 
Innovations as occurring in the business are said 
generally to be extensions of the Company's own 
products and services. Moreover, innovations are said to 
be `discovery-style' initiatives and the outcome of 
strategies and plans. The Company indicates that the 
availability of surpluses and the drive of individuals are 
instrumental in the ability of the Company to innovate. 
The Company also indicates that innovation is prompted 
by determinations that products or services are no longer 
performing as they should. 
To support innovation and R&D, the business reported 
expenditure in the last two years 'in-house', on the 
acquisition of machinery and equipment, design 
functions, and training. 
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Quality Accreditation: The Company has secured ISO 9000 and Investors in 
People accreditation, accreditation against 
Environmental Standards, and accreditation with public 
agencies and private sector businesses as 
approved/preferred suppliers. 
Application of ICT: The Company has established a web-site featuring 
'brochure-ware', an intranet, CAD, and utilises other 
advanced ICT applications. 
Intellectual Assets & IPR While the Company describes patent protection, 
Protection: confidentiality agreements and pay and reward strategies 
(as a means to protecting/retaining intellectual assets) as 
important to the business. The registration of trademarks 
and copyright are reported as unimportant. 
Business Support: The Company has participated in innovation-related 
public programmes (Teaching Company Scheme, 
Knowledge Trasnfer Partnership projects and 
Demonstration projects) and has received public grants 
to support process innovation/development. 
Views on Incubator Services: Location and image were instrumental in the decision to 
locate the Company at NEBIC. 
The Company accords a high utility or value to 
'Training'; 'Information' and 'Help with accessing 
R&TD grants and grants to support innovation'. 'Pre- 
incubation Services'; 'Business planning and forming a 
Company'; `Advice and Support in the development of 
New products, services and/or processes'; `Advice and 
support in recruitment and personnel management'; 
'Help with raising finance'; and `Access to seed-com 
funding and venture capital funding' were reported as 
'least useful'. 
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Company Name: Tree Pax Ltd 
Date Founded: 2000 
About the Business: Training, Consultancy and Workshops for Idea 
Generation and Innovation. 
About the Founders: N/A 
Number of Employees: 3 FTEs all of which are reported as concerned with 
research and technological development and/or the 
development of new products and services. 
Turnover: Not disclosed. 
Customer Profile: International customers account for 11-20% of sales, 
while the remainder are located in the UK (81-90% in 
the NorthEast). 71-8-% of customers are private sector 
businesses, 21-30% are public sector organisations and 
the remainder (0-5%) private consumers. 
Innovation: The business reports product innovations (new to the 
firm), process innovations (new to the industry) and 
administrative innovations (new to the firm) in the last 
two years. 
Product innovation is reported as a regular occurrence 
(developed in house) to which the Company attributes 6- 
10% of current turnover. Product innovation (in the last 
two years) is reported as making very significant 
contributions to the product/service range, opening new 
markets, increasing market share and improving the 
quality of products and services. Process innovation is 
reported as a constant endeavour (developed in house), 
and Administrative innovations a regular occurrence. 
Moreover, innovations are said to be 'discovery-style' 
initiatives and the outcome of strategies and plans. 
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Quality Accreditation: No 
Application of ICT: The Company has established a web-site featuring 
'brochure-ware' and utilises other advanced ICT 
applications. 
Intellectual Assets & IPR The Company accords a high value to patent protection, 
Protection: the registration of trademarks, copyright, confidentiality 
agreements and pay and reward strategies (as a means to 
protecting/retaining intellectual assets). 
Business Support: The Company reports that it has not benefited from 
public sector business support in the last two years. 
Views on Incubator Services: N/A 
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Company Name: Computer House 
Date Founded: 1982 
About the Business: ICT specialists 
About the Founders: The founders reportedly knew each other socially but 
had not worked together with experience in management, 
R&D, consultancy, higher education and in a large firm. 
Founder(s) Education and Qualifications: Undergraduate 
degree. 
Number of Employees: 39 FTEs (up 20% on the figure of two years ago), 20% 
of whom are reported as concerned with research and 
technological development and/or the development of 
new products and services. 
Turnover: Up 40% in last two years, actual figures not disclosed. 
Customer Profile: 100% of customers are located in the UK, 6-10% are 
located in the North East. Private Sector Business 
account for 41-50% of customers and 41-50% public 
sector organisations. 
Innovation: The business reports product innovations (new to the 
industry), process innovations (new to the firm) and 
administrative innovations (new to the firm) in the last 
two years. 
Product innovation is reported as a constant occurrence 
(developed in house, in co-operation with other 
businesses, in consultation with suppliers, clients or 
customers, with the support of Business Support Agency 
staff (i. e. as part of public sector business support 
programmes) and with financial assistance from 
European, national or regional research grants or awards. 
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Product innovation (in the last two years) is reported as 
making significant contributions to the product/service 
range, opening new markets, increasing market share and 
improving the quality of products and services. 
Process innovation is reported as a regular occurrence 
(developed by other businesses or institutions and then 
implemented by the Company, in co-operation with other 
businesses and in consultation with suppliers). Process 
innovations are reported as making a significant 
contribution to reducing materials/energy costs and 
labour costs, improved flexibility and a very significant 
contribution to increased capacity. 
Administrative innovations are reported as an occasional 
occurrence (developed in house, by other businesses or 
institutions and then implemented by the Company, in 
co-operation with other businesses and in consultation 
with suppliers and customers). 
Innovation is generally described as incremental 
improvements to the Company's own products and 
services and mix of `discovery-style' and `market pull' 
initiatives. The Company indicated that innovation was 
more usually organic and the product of individual/team 
endeavour as opposed to the outcome of strategies and 
plans. The Company reported that it had recently (in the 
last two years) invested in R&D in house, the acquisition 
of machinery and equipment, training and marketing and 
that approximately 20% of turnover was invested in the 
development of new products and/or services. 
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Quality Accreditation: The Company indicated that it had secured accreditation 
with public sector organisations and private sector 
businesses as an approved/preferred supplier. 
Application of ICT: The Company has established a web-site featuring 
'brochure-ware', operates and intranet and utilises other 
advanced ICT applications. 
Intellectual Assets & IPR 
Protection: 
The Company accords a high value to the registration of 
trademarks, copyright and confidentiality agreements 
and less so to pay and reward strategies (as a means to 
protecting/retaining intellectual assets). Patent 
protection was reported as unimportant. 
Business Support: The Company reports that it has benefited from public 
sector business support in the last two year, particularly 
grants , training, consultancy and marketing. 
Views on Incubator Services: N/A 
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Company Name: Cadunits 
Date Founded: 2000 
About the Business: Provides training and support for the UNIX and 
CAD/CAM market place. 
About the Founders: N/A 
Number of Employees: 2 FTEs (up 100% on the figure of two years ago), one of 
whom is reported as concerned with research and 
technological development and/or the development of 
new products and services. 
Turnover: £40,000 
Customer Profile: 0-5% of business sales are international, 91-100% 
located in the UK, and 0-5% located in the North East. 
Private sector businesses account for 91-100% of 
customers, 0-5% public sector organisations and 0-5% 
private consumers. 
Innovation: The business reports product innovations (new to the 
industry), process innovations (new to the industry) and 
administrative innovations (new to the firm) occurring in 
the last two years. 
Product innovation is reported as a regular occurrence 
(developed by other business or institutions and then 
rolled out by the Company). Product innovation (in the 
last two years) is reported as making significant 
contributions to the product/service range, opening new 
markets, increasing market share and improving the 
quality of products and services. 
Process innovation is reported as a regular occurrence 
(generally developed in house). Process innovations are 
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reported as making a significant contribution to 
improved flexibility and increased capacity. 
Administrative innovations are also reported as a regular 
occurrence (developed in house). 
Innovation is generally described as incremental 
improvements to the Company's own products and 
services and are said generally to comprise 'discovery- 
style' initiatives. The Company indicated that 
innovation was more usually organic and the product of 
individual/team endeavour as opposed to the outcome of 
strategies and plans. 
The Company reported that it had recently (in the last 
two years) invested in: R&D in house, in the acquisition 
of machinery and equipment, external knowledge 
(e. g. licenses) training and marketing. 
Quality Accreditation: The Company indicated that it had secured accreditation 
with public sector organisations. 
Application of ICT: The Company has established a web-site featuring 
'brochure-ware', operates CAD, CAM, CAE and utilises 
other advanced ICT applications. 
Intellectual Assets & IPR The Company accords a high value to patent protection, 
Protection: the registration of trademarks, copyright and 
confidentiality agreements and, to a lesser extent, pay 
and reward strategies (as a means to protecting/retaining 
intellectual assets). 
Business Support: The Company reports that it has not benefited from 
public sector business support in the last two years. 
Views on incubator Services: N/A 
518 
Company Name: IQ Management Systems 
Date Founded: 1991 
About the Business: Delivers training and consultancy in quality, safety and 
the environment 
About the Founders: N/A 
Number of Employees: 3 FTEs 
Turnover: Not disclosed. 
Customer Profile: 0-5% of business sales are international, 91-100% 
located in the UK, of which 51-60% are located in the 
North East. Private sector businesses account for 71- 
80% of customers, 11-20% are public sector 
organisations and 0-5% private consumers. 
Innovation: The business reports no product innovations in the last 
two years, but does report process innovations (new to 
the firm - developed in house and as a constant 
endeavour) and administrative innovations (new to the 
firm - developed in house and again, as a constant 
endeavour). 
Innovation is generally described as incremental 
improvements to the Company's own products and 
services and are said generally to comprise 'discovery- 
style' initiatives. The Company indicated that 
innovation was more usually the outcome of strategies 
and plans and generally 'market led/pull' by nature. 
The Company reported that it had recently (in the last 
two years) invested in: the acquisition of machinery and 
equipment, and design functions. 
Quality Accreditation: The Company indicated that it had secured ISO 9000 
accreditation. 
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Application of ICT: I The Company has established a web-site featuring 
'brochure-ware'. 
Intellectual Assets & IPR The Company accords a high value to copyright and 
Protection: confidentiality agreements but regards patent protection, 
the registration of trademarks and pay and reward 
strategies (as a means to protecting/retaining intellectual 
assets) as unimportant. 
Business Support: The Company reports that it has received public sector 
financial support 
Views on Incubator Services: I N/A 
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Company Name: Pure Value Systems 
Date Founded: 2003 
About the Business: IT asset management services. Managed network 
services, Second user computer equipment. 
About the Founders: N/A 
Number of Employees: 3 FTEs 
Turnover: £150,000 
Customer Profile: 0-5% of business sales are international, 91-100% 
located in the UK (the North East). Private sector 
businesses account for 41-50% of customers, 11-20% 
public sector organisations and 21-30% private 
consumers. 
Innovation: The business reports product, process and administrative 
innovations (new to the firm) as constant and ongoing. 
Product innovations were reported as developed by other 
businesses or institutions and then implemented by the 
Company and credited with making 'very significant' 
contributions to extending the Company's range of goods 
and services, opening new markets and increasing market 
share, and improving the quality of products and 
services. 
Innovation is generally described as incremental 
improvements to the Company's own products and 
services and are said generally to comprise `market 
led/pull' and more usually the outcome of strategies and 
plans. Further, the Company indicated that innovation 
was often prompted by determinations that products or 
services were not operating as they should and/or the 
endeavour of one or more 'energetic' individuals. 
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The Company reported that it had recently (in the last 
two years) invested in: the acquisition of machinery and 
equipment, external knowledge, training and marketing. 
Quality Accreditation: No. 
Application of ICT: The Company has established a web-site featuring 
'brochure-ware' and functions enabling customers to 
place orders and make payment, and support business to 
business transactions (e. g. file-sharing). The Company 
also operates an intranet and utilises other advanced ICT 
applications. 
Intellectual Assets & IPR The Company accords a relatively high value to patent 
Protection: protection, copyright and the registration of trademarks 
but more so confidentiality agreements and pay and 
reward strategies (as a means to protecting/retaining 
intellectual assets). 
Business Support: The Company reports that it has not received public 
sector business support in the last two years (other than 
NEBIC services). 
Views on Incubator Services: N/A 
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